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

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Pamphlets on subjects
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Vol. 9

TO

THE CONQUEROR OF SCINDE,

THE LATE GOVERNOR OF THAT PROVINCE,

AND

THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF IN INDIA,

HIS EXCELLENCY LIEUTENANT-GENERAL

SIR CHARLES JAMES NAPIER, G. C. B.,

THIS COMPILATION OF GENERAL ORDERS, &c.

ISSUED TO THE ARMY SERVING UNDER HIS COMMAND IN SCINDE

BETWEEN THE YEARS 1842 AND 1847,

IS DEDICATED, WITH PERMISSION,

BY HIS GRATEFUL AND OBLIGED SERVANT,

THE COMPILER

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PREFACE.

OFFICERS OF THE ARMY SERVING IN INDIA.

EMEN,—In sending forth to the Army serving this Compilation, it is hardly necessary for me to add anything in the way of Preface; for the orders contained in it having been written by the renowned Soldier to whom it is dedicated, (with his most kind permission,) I feel convinced that they will be earnestly read and studied by officers who have the interest of their profession at heart.

They are the productions of one who has deeply studied human nature—of one whom habit and education have made a Soldier, and who, being in early life habituated to command, was then taught the art of War under the immortal Moore, and the Great Duke of Wellington. They were written by one of the kindest-hearted of men,—by a stern Soldier, who understood not disobedience of orders, and who, knowing what a Soldier could do, required of him no more.—Acquainted with the minutiæ of duty, nothing escaped his eagle-eye; and while punishing, with a strong hand, insubordination and disobedience, he has ever the kind heart to overlook indiscretions when not accompanied by vice.

These are, however, matters of history, and I hesitate to add more on a subject which is so well-known to those of greater experience than myself; but I do not hesitate to say, that these orders should not be lost

to Officers who desire to study how t
Soldiers.

To those who know, and have had the ho
ing under, Sir Charles Napier, this Prefa
unnecessary; but to others who have no
advantage, I can only recommand an attentiv
of the following pages.

I have sought to prevent anything in thes
from giving offence, by excluding names and pla
and trust that I have succeeded: they will naturally be known to those who served in Scinde during the time they were issued, as all orders were printed and circulated throughout the Province.

Having been Sir Charles Napier's Assistant Adjutant-General from April 1843 till he left the Province, I can vouch for their correctness; and I publish these orders with the hope that they may be of assistance to all in command, and advantage to the Army at large, knowing, as I well do, that this was the sole aim of their author, the Soldier's true friend,—Sir Charles James Napier.

EDWARD GREEN, *Lieut.-Colonel,*
Assistant Adjutant-General, Scinde Division.

CAMP KURRACHEE,
1st January, 1850.

INDEX.

INDEX TO COMPILATION OF GENERAL ORDERS, &c., BY MAJOR-GENERAL SIR C. J. NAPIER, G. C. B.

SECTION I.

CIVIL ORDERS.

Page.

All Civil functionaries in Scinde amenable to Military Law—No man receiving above thirty Rupees per month from any Civil Establishment, to be discharged except by the orders of the Governor-General... 1

No person to be re employed unless he can produce a certificate from last employer..... *ib.*

Conditions under which the people of Scinde will be allowed to carry arms in public... *ib.*

In a purely Military Government in the field, every Officer takes his rank, whether employed in the Civil or Military Department.... 2

Regrets being forced to send Captain Brown to Shikarpoor to put the Police right..... *ib.*

Jurisdiction of the Civil and Military Police defined..... 3

None but men in Government employment are to wear belts..... ... ... *ib.*

All persons halting at Wuttajee, to show respect to the Musjid there, and not deface it... 4

Remarks on the proceedings of a Military Commission on the complaint made against the Kardar of the Kurrachee Collectorate..... ... ... *ib.*

Rescinds former order—the Government of Scinde having become a Civil one..... 5

SECTION II.

COMMISSARIAT.

Orders one man per Regiment to be placed at the disposal of the Commissariat Department for the care of the Camels attached to the Regiment... 5

Directs arrangements to be made by the Commissariat for supplying the European Troops with bread, the bakers having refused to do so..... ... ... *ib.*

Orders a Court of Enquiry to investigate the circumstance of the Steel-yards of the Commissariat Department being reported false... 6

Regrets being obliged to publish the opinion of a Court of Enquiry on the Commissariat Scales and Steel-yards which were reported to be false, with observations thereon..... 7

Orders that eight men per Company be nominated in every European Regiment in Scinde, as "Weighers," that the Soldiers may know they receive the right quantity of bread and meat..... 9

Observations on the proceedings of a Court of Enquiry on the complaint made against the Bakers, who appear not to have been supported,—and lays down certain rules for future guidance..... 10

SECTION III.

COURTS-MARTIAL, COURTS OF ENQUIRY, &c.

Page.

On the importance of acquiring a thorough knowledge of Military Law..... ... 11

An Adjutant never to be questioned as to the character of a prisoner, when any other Officer is acquainted with the man and can be called upon..... 12

Remits half the punishment awarded. Desertion being rare among the Sepoys of the Company's Army..... ... ... *ib.*

Remits punishment of a Gunner for good conduct in the Action of the 17th Feb., 1843... 13

Remits hard labour in hopes of the culprit turning out a good Soldier..... ... *ib.*

On the evil tendency of allowing a Sentry to leave his post to go in search of the Corporal of the guard to relieve him..... ... ... *ib.*

All acts of plunder injurious to discipline : the first case of aggravated plundering will be punished with death,..... 14

Committing a theft while *on guard*, constitutes a case of robbery, combined with breach of Military duty..... ... ... *ib.*

The Superintending Officer should insert in the proceedings, that *nothing* had been brought forward on the defence, when such happens to be the case..... ... 16

Recommends a less severe punishment where discharge is involved for behaving ill in a fit of ill-temper..... ... ... *ib.*

Previous convictions are not brought forward to aggravate but to mitigate punishment... *ib.*

Warns those employed with the Indus Flotilla, that Military Law reigns in Scinde, and that they will be punished if they seriously offend..... 17

Notices omission of the Court to enquire into character and former conviction—the character of the prisoner is important to the confirming authority..... ... ... *ib.*

Considers the punishment insufficient,—the Commanders of the Indus Flotilla stand in greater need of protection of the laws than any other Commanding Officer.... ... 18

Sentence of imprisonment must count from the date of President's signature..... *ib.*

Mutinous and disrespectful conduct cannot be passed over unpunished : the way to command men, however, is to avoid giving provocation to those under them..... ... 19

No intermediate approval necessary when the proceedings of a Court-Martial require the confirmation of superior authority..... ... ... *ib.*

Death is the proper punishment for deserters in presence of the enemy..... ... 20

Regrets the necessity of publishing the opinion of a Court of Enquiry on the conduct of an Officer..... ... ... *ib.*

It is the duty of every Officer or Non-Commissioned Officer making a prisoner, to see that prisoner placed in charge of a guard... 21

Explains that any sentence, however severe, would have been executed against a guard who allows a prisoner to escape..... ... ... *ib.*

Disapproves of Lieutenant ————'s conduct towards certain mess servants, as disrespectful to the Officers of that mess... 22

Page.

Notices the remissness of a Court in its examination of Witnesses... 22

When two prisoners are tried for the same crime, their punishment should be equal—or reason given why it should be otherwise..... ... ... *ib.*

Disrespectful language to a Commanding Officer will not be forgiven in any Soldier, whether of the Queen's or Company's service.... 23

Pardons a crime which arose from ignorance rather than bad disposition, in a very young Native Soldier..... ... ... *ib.*

Disapproves of sentence of three years' imprisonment for an unprovoked murder... ... 24

Points out certain important omissions in the proceedings of a Military Commission..... *ib.*

Differs in opinion with a Military Commission, but allows the sentence to be carried into effect.... ... ... *ib.*

Disagrees with Court as to prisoner's guilt of desertion, and remits the whole sentence... 25

Remarks on the careless conduct of four Troopers who were attacked while on escort duty, and requires all escorts to carry their fire-arms loaded..... ... ... *ib.*

Animadverts on the conduct of the Commanding Officer of a Cavalry Corps towards the Serjeant-Major of the Regiment, which led to an attempt at Suicide... 26

Where dishonesty is proved, good characters do not avail a man... 29

Expresses surprise at the irregular sentence of a Regimental Court-Martial on a Color-Serjeant, and orders his release.. ... ... *ib.*

To let prisoners escape, discreditable to a Soldier; and to set Sentries to guard prisoners with unloaded arms, incorrect.... 30

Relating to the escape unhurt of prisoners in charge of a guard,—the whole affair discreditable to Military discipline..... ... ... *ib.*

Animadverts on the conduct of the Court in letting a sentry go unpunished, who had allowed the escape of a state-prisoner under sentence of death..... 31

Nothing so injurious to discipline as to give a Soldier more to do than it is possible for him to do..... 34

To provoke Duelling is derogatory to the character of Gentlemen, and against the Articles of War..... ... ... *ib.*

Courts-Martial to consider the facts of a case as proved, which are sworn to by prosecutor and witnesses, and not disproved by the prisoner... 35

On the gallant conduct of Serjeant Power and his Detachment..... 36

Pardons two men convicted of robbery, because the third party concerned in it was acquitted by a separate Court-Martial..... ... ... *ib.*

Mitigates a sentence because the prisoner is well-spoken of by his Officers... ... *ib.*

Dismisses a complaint against an Officer which has not been proved before a Court of Enquiry, with a caution to complainant not to make any memorial in a language which he does not understand... 37

Sentries not to allow themselves to be approached without challenging... ... ... *ib.*

Orders a revision, because to have a drunken person in the Medical Department is to endanger the lives of the Soldiers.... 38

Page.

The public not to lose, because deficiencies occur from an Officer's neglecting his duty... 39

No man has a right to tempt his fellow-men to commit crime..... ... ... *ib.*

Expresses satisfaction of a Sentry slaying his prisoner who attempted to escape... ... *ib.*

Approves and confirms a sentence, though not a *just* one, because it is well in Military men to be ready to spare an enemy... 40

No excuse for disobedience of orders except the impossibility of obeying them... ... *ib.*

Never pardons a man who cannot go through a guard without misconduct..... ... 41

Orders the assembly of a Court to enquire into the cause why six men deserted from a Native Regiment .... *ib.*

Orders a revision, because the punishment is considered too severe for a momentary loss of temper and folly in a very young man.... 42

Soldiers well know there is a proper channel through which to obtain redress... ... *ib.*

Remits the remainder of punishment of a Soldier, on account of the excellent behaviour of his Regiment, and at the request of the Commanding Officer... ... . *ib.*

Remarks on the neglect of a Department in omitting to copy the station orders, unless they especially referred to that Department... 43

Pardons a culprit for certain reasons... 45

One year's imprisonment too indequate a punishment to a culprit who has been running-a-muck and wounding several people... ... ... *ib.*

Modifying part of the order relative to copying the station orders 46

Prosecuting Officer never to be called upon to speak to prisoner's character... ... *ib.*

Orders the Superintending Officer of a Native Court-Martial to write out certain Articles of War for his instruction... ... ... *ib.*

The General has a right to protest against a sentence which he believes erroneous..... 47

Mitigates sentence of corporal punishment to fifty lashes, in hopes of its proving a sufficient lesson.. ... ... *ib.*

Remits 100 lashes of the corporal punishment awarded, in hopes that the infliction of the remainder will be a sufficient warning... ... ... *ib.*

Orders an Enquiry to be made into all matters of complaint which the Native Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers of a Local Corps have preferred through their Commanding Officer..... 48

Remarks on Proceedings of a Court of Enquiry on a complaint made by a Lieutenant of the Indian Navy..... ... ... *ib.*

Pardons a Serjeant for slandering an Officer, but directs the Officer to prosecute the Serjeant for defamation... 49

Remarks on the proceedings of a Court of Enquiry, relative to a quarrel between the Police and a Local Corps... ... ... *ib.*

Pardons a Private, and requests his Commanding Officer to admonish him against intoxication 50

Page.

Mitigates punishment, in consideration of other Courts having awarded less for a similar crime... 50

Returns a prisoner to his duty, the proceedings having become illegal by the absence of one of its members during passing of sentence... 51

SECTION IV.

MARCHES AND ROUTES.

Officers not to encumber themselves with more Baggage than is absolutely necessary ... *ib.*

Shews by example that no Officer's comfort is unnecessarily curtailed... ... ... *ib.*

Publishes scale allowed for public and private baggage.!.' 52

Especial care requested to be taken of the Camels, which cannot be replaced if lost..... *ib.*

Relative duties of the Commanding Engineer, and Assistant Quarter-Master-General, on the line of march... 53

Grain and Forage if not promptly supplied, a report to be made to the parties indicated. 54

The Baggage Master held responsible that no Camels with the Force are over-loaded... *ib.*

No noise to be allowed in Camp,—the Field Officer of the day responsible for its tranquillity. 55

Notices a report that several Camels of certain Regiments were over-loaded... ... *ib.*

Notices the plundering which is going forward, and declares determination to hang some of the offenders... 56

List of necessaries each Sepoy is allowed to carry. ... . *ib.*

Method of supplying conveyance whenever troops or stores are to be sent from one station to another by the River. ... ... *ib.*

Making arrangements previous to the Troops taking the Field in 1845. 57

Order of movement of the Troops. 58

Regulating the arrival of supplies in Camp... 61

The Provost-Marshal to flog any man he finds half-a-mile beyond the Camp except on duty... ... ... *ib.*

Regulates the manner of despatch of stores for or from the Camp... 62

General Regulations for the guidance of Commanding Officers and Departments with the Field Force... ... ... *ib.*

Orders reduction in scale of Baggage... 63

No Baggage animals beyond the stated number to be allowed to accompany the Force... 64

Observations on the correspondence relative to the mortality among the Soldiers going down the river in boats not properly covered in..... ... ... *ib.*

Observations on a report that the Camels sent to carry the baggage of a Cavalry Regiment were over-loaded to an enormous extent, and lays down certain further rules on the subject... 67

Page.

The Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers, and men, of the Camel Baggage Corps to have the sole and entire command of the Baggage on the line of march, and no Officer in command of Troops is on any pretence to interfere with them... 70

Directs the return to Kurrachee of an Officer for disobeying orders relative to the loading of the Camels... 72

SECTION V.

MISCELLANEOUS ORDERS.

The supremacy of the British over the Native of India, must be maintained by justice... ... ... *ib.*

Furious riding not to be allowed in Camp or Bazaar... 73

Order relative to amount of passage-money chargeable to Officers' families. ... ... *ib.*

Expresses satisfaction at the promptness with which the Bengal Brigade got under arms... 74

Notices a report of certain riots made in the Bazaar at night by Officers.... ... ... *ib.*

Farewell Order on the Bengal column leaving Scinde ... ... *ib.*

Recommends Officers to go armed whenever they move out any distance from Camp ... *ib.*

Notices a report made by Major Outram, of the steady conduct of a Company of H. M.'s 22nd Regiment... 75

Directs the City of Hydrabad to be taken possession of, and the Standard of the Queen to be unfurled on the great Tower... ... ... *ib.*

Complimentary Order after the battle of Meanee... ... ... *ib.*

Rules relative to the disposal of the people coming to the Major-General, and points out the Departments to which the several cases are to be referred 76

Any person found a mile from Camp without a pass, to be treated as a plunderer, and punished accordingly... 77

Address to the Sepoys before the battle of Dubba. ... ... *ib.*

Complimentary Order after the battle of Dubba. 78

Orders the execution of the murderer of Captain Ennis, 21st Regt. N. I. ... ... *ib.*

An accomplice of the murderer sent to work on the roads... 79

No Camp-follower to bear arms from 1st May... ... ... *ib.*

When Officers send people to make purchases, they must send money also for payment..... ... ... *ib.*

Duties of the Native Officer escorting boats down the river to Tatta... ... ... *ib.*

Substitutes Horses and Mules for Camels in the draft of Field Artillery Batteries in Scinde... 80

Complimentary to certain Officers who captured a large band of robbers... 81

Congratulates the troops on the medals awarded them for the battles of Meanee and Hydrabad... ... ... *ib.*

Page.

Expresses approbation of the zeal shewn by the Medical Officers at Hydrabad and Sukkur under very severe trials... 82

Farewell Order on the 1st Grenadier Regiment leaving Scinde..... ... ... *ib.*

Farewell Order on Lieutenant-Colonel Leslie's Troop of Horse Artillery, and Major Whitlie's Battery, leaving Scinde... ... ... *ib.*

Complimentary to Lieut.-Colonel Lloyd, on occasion of Lieut.-Colonel Schuler taking command of the Artillery in Scinde... 83

Farewell Order on the 21st Regt. N. I leaving Scinde... ... ... *ib.*

Do. do. on the 2nd European Regiment leaving Scinde..... ... ... *ib.*

Do. do. on the 3rd Cavalry leaving Scinde... 84

Do. do. on the 9th Bengal Cavalry leaving Scinde... ... ... *ib.*

Do. do. on the 20th Regt. N. I. leaving Scinde... ... ... *ib.*

Requests that all proceedings of Courts-Martial will be written in English, as the Major-General unfortunately understands none of the Eastern dialects... 85

Forbids the shooting of Peacocks in Scinde, they being all private property, and sacred birds... ... ... *ib.*

Farewell Order on the 15th Regt. N. I. leaving Scinde... ... ... *ib.*

Grants furloughs to ten men per Company of the 6th, 8th, 12th, and 25th Regts. N. I., for their excellent conduct..... 86

Officers permitted to quit Cantonments on short excursions with permission of Officers commanding Stations..... ... ... *ib.*

Farewell Order on the Madras Sappers and Miners leaving Scinde..... ... ... *ib.*

Expresses approbation of the conduct of a Detachment though repulsed in the attack on a fortified place... 87

Makes arrangements on the assembly of the Belooch Chiefs in March 1844. ... *ib.*

Prohibits the practice of seizing the Natives as guides and ill-treating them... ... 88

Cautions Officer not to make exaggerated reports of death by "coup-de-soleil"... ... 89

Encounters with the enemy to be reported in an official form, and not by private notes... *ib.*

Observations on an affair between a Detachment of Irregular Cavalry guarding grass cutters, and some hill-robbers... ... ... *ib.*

Observations on the report made of the above affair..... 91

Remarks on the report of the Court of Enquiry relative to the failure in the attack on ———— ... ... *ib.*

Observations and Orders on the report of the repentance and return to their duty of a refractory Regt. of ———— N. I.... 95

Forbids Officers commanding out-posts and detachments on the frontier to cross the boundary without permission... 96

Forbids Officers on medical certificate at Kurrachee to appear at parades, messes, &c... *ib.*

Expresses satisfaction at the brilliant exploit of Captain McKenzie near Mobarukpore... *ib.*

Authorises discharge of 71 men of a Native Regiment for misconduct... 97

Page.

Farewell Order on the 6th Regt. N. I. leaving Scinde... 97

Farewell Order on the departure of Lieut.-Colonel Waddington, C. B., from Scinde.. ... *ib.*

Observations on a report that a Corps of Irregular Cavalry behaved with barbarity, and prescribes precautionary measures for future guidance of Native Kardars of frontier towns... 98

Expresses approbation of Lieut. FitzGerald's zeal in building the fort and barracks for his Camel Corps at Larkhana... 99

Complimentary to Captains Salter, Jacob, and Mowatt, for expeditious movement of their troops and guns... 100

Records two circumstances worthy of admiration, which occurred in the opening of the campaign against the robber tribes,—the conduct of the Scinde Horse under Captain Jacob, and that of the Police under Lieut. Smallpage... ... ... *ib.*

Applauds the conduct and skill of Captain McMurdo and twelve men of the Scinde Horse in effecting a retreat..... 101

Calls for a Lieutenant, an Ensign, and 100 men, as volunteers for an especial duty... ... *ib.*

Admires the courage of 25 brave robbers, and the gallantry of 20 of the Scinde Horse who fought with them... .... *ib.*

Farewell Order on Meer Ali Moorad retiring with his troops from Truckee..... ... 102

Farewell Order on the breaking up of the Feld Force against the hill-robbers..... ... *ib.*

Complimentary to certain ranks of the Camel Corps and the Europeans who mounted the precipice at Truckee... 103

Publishes extract from a despatch from the Government of India, relating to the late campaign against the robber tribes... 104

Publishes the General Order by the Government of India regarding the late campaign in the hills... ... ... *ib.*

Explains the proper course for Soldiers to pursue in preferring complaints... 105

Records the unexpected death of Major William Brown, of the 69th Regt. N. I. ... 107

Thanks a Subedar and two Privates of the Police for capturing certain deserters from a Native Regiment... 108

Examines the circumstances relating to the above desertions... ... ... *ib.*

Remedies the want complained of in a Native Regiment, of Standing Orders..... ... 111

Farewell Order on the 25th Regiment N. I. leaving Scinde..... ... ... *ib.*

Do. do. on the 8th Regt. N. I. leaving Scinde... ... ... *ib.*

The Soldier's post of honor is that where the State requires his services... 113

Warns the Dooleewallahs and Camel-men that if they desert and are caught they shall be hanged... ... ... *ib.*

Records the gallantry of several small Detachments... ... ... *ib.*

Any Camel-men who may desert the public service will be tried by General Court-Martial, and the sentence immediately executed... 114

Page.

Takes leave of the Force on occasion of being ordered to join the Army on the Sutledge... 114

Farewell Order on Major-General Simpson leaving Scinde .... *ib.*

Forbids Weekly Guards and Permanent Orderlies under any pretence whatever.. ... 115

Rules relative to Cholera Hospitals... ... ... *ib.*

Officers proceeding on leave to Bombay, are not to go beyond it without the permission of the Commander-in-Chief... 116

Publishes a letter from the Officer commanding in Cutch, in compliment to Captain Gaisford of the Artillery... ... ... *ib.*

Complimentary to Lieut.-Colonel Douglas, to whom is attributable the improved condition of the large cantonment of Kurrachee... 117

Commanding Officers to be held responsible that the reports and returns of their Regiments are sent in at the proper periods... 119

Censures an Officer for moving his Detachment beyond the frontier—zeal being no excuse for disobedience of orders... ... ... *ib.*

No complaints to be made by Officer, Non-Commissioned Officer, or Private Soldier, except through his immediate superior... 119

Farewell Order on the 12th Regt. N. I. leaving Scinde... ... ... *ib.*

Observations on the report of a serious affray which took place in a Bazaar... 120

Enumerates the advantages gained by the conquest of Scinde, on occasion of breaking up the Army in Scinde... 121

Applauds the gallant conduct of a Duffadar and eighteen Sowars of the Scinde Horse in charging a party of 200 robbers and dispersing them... 125

Farewell Order on Major-General Hunter leaving Scinde... ... ... *ib.*

Complimentary to the Mounted Police who recovered fifty Camels from the party which robbed them... ... ... *ib.*

Farewell Order on Major Jameson's proceeding to Bombay on sick leave... 126

Forbids the practice of allowing a Sentry to walk about with his bayonet only in his hand, and his musket placed against a wall... ... ... *ib.*

Expresses sorrow for the death of Major Jameson at Bombay... ... ... *ib.*

All persons having no ostensible means of living in Scinde, to be sent out of the province or to be put to work on the roads... 127

Regrets the departure from Scinde of Dr. Gibbon... ... ... *ib.*

Attention of Officers commanding Regiments called to the necessity of keeping their Camp-equipage in a serviceable state... ... ... *ib.*

Orders a Standing Camp to be pitched at Ghizree to accommodate a wing of one of the European Regiments at Kurrachee... 128

Complimentary to the Scinde Horse for retaking certain stolen Camels... 129

Farewell Order on Captain Malet, Resident at Khyrpoor, leaving Scinde .... *ib.*

Page.

Details a very gallant action of Lieut. Younghusband against a party of plundering Mundranee Boogties..... 129

Notices an unjustifiable attack made upon the conduct of two Officers by an anonymous writer in the Newspaper, relative to the death of two natives killed by a tiger..... ... 131

Prohibits the native ranks of the Corps engaged in a late affray with the Police entering the town till the men who drew swords and carried clubs on the occasion are discovered..... 132

Orders it to be explained that any Sepoy may complain to his European Officer direct, without the leave of any Native Commissioned or Non-Commissioned Officer... ..... *ib.*

Complimentary to Major Jacob and Lieutenant Merewether of the Scinde Horse, and to the Kyheerees who boldly defended their village against an attack made by 210 Boogties... 133

Farewell Address to the Troops on retiring from command of the Scinde Force... 134

General Order by the Government of India on occasion of Sir Charles Napier's retirement from Scinde... ... ... *ib.*

SECTION VI.

PARADES.

Observations on a General Parade of the Troops, and notices the several points in which they erred... 135

Observations on a General Parade, with remarks on "touching" and "dressing" and on the way of "passing an order."... 136

Directs Officers commanding Native Corps to exercise their Regiments daily, especially the Officers... 137

Directs Officers commanding Regiments to teach their Recruits to fire with ball cartridge... ... ... *ib.*

Observations on General Parades. No time should be lost in dressing Companies. Commanders of Battalions must be quick in forming line, and give their whole attention to dressing their *colours* and not their men... 138

No Field-day or Parade to be ordered on each Thursday in the week, which the Major-General requests may be considered as a Holiday 139

All Officers who have been absent from their Regiments for two months, are to undergo a course of drill for one month ... ... *ib.*

Allows three days to a Native Regiment to be perfected in the use of their percussion caps... ... ... *ib.*

Regulations for marching past in column at quarter distance..... 140

Relative to the precedence of Her Majesty's and the Company's Troops, and publishes the orders on the subject..... ... ... *ib.*

SECTION I.

CIVIL ORDERS.

HEAD QUARTERS, CAMP HYDRABAD, 13*th May*, 1843.

No man is to be discharged from any of the Civil Establishments without a report being made to the Commissioner for civil administration of the circumstances which produced the infliction of such punishment, against which an appeal may always be made to the Governor.

No arbitrary dismissal from employment is to take place, with regard to individuals receiving above rupees (30) thirty per month, except by the orders of the Governor-General,—but the Governor of Scinde has a right to suspend any functionary, in case of misconduct—referring the same to the Governor-General.

All Civil Functionaries, employed under the Government of Scinde, are amenable to, and under the protection of, the Military Law.

HEAD QUARTERS, KURRACHEE, 1*st February*, 1844.

His Excellency the Governor directs that no Officer in Scinde, having charge of a public office, shall entertain any writer or party who may have quitted other offices, unless they can produce certificates that they have done so with the consent of the officer under whom they may have been formerly employed.

HEAD QUARTERS, KURRACHEE, 16*th February*, 1844.

1. All officers in command, and officers of the revenue, must exercise their discretion as to people found bearing arms. If these cannot give a good account of themselves, their arms must be taken from them; but if they are travellers, who evidently carry arms for their protection, they are not to be deprived of them. No man is to bear arms in the towns, except in passing through.

2. All Chiefs who have made their salaam, are entitled to carry arms personally.

3. All Merchants who live in Scinde, are to apply to the Lieutenant of Police when they send out people with merchandise, and the Lieutenant of Police should give to the said merchant a permit to carry arms. This permit is to be given free of all expence, and will state the number of people, and the number and description of arms, which the merchant requires; and for the good conduct of these, his people, the merchant is to be responsible.

HEAD QUARTERS, KURRACHEE, *4th August*, 1844.

In a purely Military Government, in the field, as is that of Scinde, every officer takes his rank, whether employed in the Civil or the Military Department. For example,—should a Collector become the senior officer at any station, he would take the command and be responsible for the duties thereunto attaching. In like manner, he must obey any orders he may receive from a superior commanding the station,—should that superior take upon him to interfere with the civil duties, which it is not to be supposed he would do, except in cases of emergency, and on his own responsibility to the Government. The great principle, in every Military Government, is the obedience of the junior to the senior officer. But this principle does not permit the senior to forget that discretion which should dictate to him a non-interference with the duties of those employed in the Civil branches of the Government, except in peculiar circumstances.

Captain Goldney is to command at Larkhana.

HEAD QUARTERS, OPPOSITE TRUCKEE, *3rd March*, 1845.

The road between Sukkur and Shikarpoor has become impassable for thieves, and the police seems to be disorganized. It is therefore with great regret that the Governor has been forced to order Captain Brown to proceed to Shikarpoor to put these matters right. The loss of this active and excellent officer's services in camp is inconvenient to the Governor at the present moment, but it is unavoidable.

HEAD QUARTERS, CAMP KURRACHEE, *25th April*, 1846.

1. The Police have no jurisdiction within cantonments, but are, if they see anything going wrong, to arrest the ill-doer even there.

2. In that case, they bring him, not before their own officer, but before the Bazaar Master.

3. Every one present, whether Civil or Military, is bound to assist the Police on such occasions.

4. If offence is committed outside the bounds of the Cantonment, by Soldiers or Camp Followers, the Police are to take the offender before the Lieutenant of Police, who is to take cognizance of the offence according to his instructions. His jurisdiction extends to all offenders, and his sending such to the Military Authority is unnecessary, unless the Officer of Police should deem it advisable so to do,—and this, in ordinary cases, may be the best way of dealing with offenders, and is recommended.

5. The Officer of Police should always report, through the Brigade Major, to the Commandant of the Station, when any person belonging to the Cantonments has been arrested, but it is not necessary to do more, unless by a special order by the Commandant in any particular case.

6. In the case reported, the Policemen are accused of beating their Prisoner. This must be enquired into,—and, if true, they are to be warned that, if it happen again, serious notice will be taken, unless the conduct of the Prisoner warranted such a proceeding, by refusing to surrender himself a Prisoner, and defending himself against lawful arrest.

7. The above order is based upon the principle, that the Police force is held responsible for the security of Society: to preserve tranquillity, it must promptly seize and punish offenders.

HEAD QUARTERS, CAMP KURRACHEE, *20th April*, 1847.

There are men who go about with belts across their shoulders, and brass badges: they pass themselves upon the poor people as Government Peons, and do much mischief, robbing the people,—all which is laid upon the Government;—it is therefore ordered that

none but men in Government employment are to wear these belts: —those of the Military Department are to be *red*,—those of the Civil Department to be *blue*.

Any man found with a belt over his shoulder, who is not in Government employ, is to be taken up by the Police, and a report made to the Governor, who is determined to prevent the tyranny which has, in numerous cases, been inflicted upon the people of Scinde, especially by the peons of the Contractors.

HEAD QUARTERS, CAMP KURRACHEE, 12*th May*, 1847.

His Excellency the Lieutenant-General directs that all persons passing through, or halting at, Wuttajee, are to shew respect to the Mussid there.

The walls of the building are not to be defaced, and no animals are, on any account, to be picketed inside.

HEAD QUARTERS, CAMP KURRACHE, 21*st August*, 1847.

Remarks on a Military Commission assembled at Kurrachee, to enquire into a complaint made by ——— against the Kardar of Kurrachee.

Memo.—On reading the above proceedings, my first determination was to bring Mr ——— to a public trial before a Military Commission, for grossly deceiving Captain ———, and robbing the public,—as, on the face of these proceedings, he clearly appears to have done; but Mr ——— has formerly, at various times, done good service to the British, and it would grieve me to see him tried before a British Tribunal. I, therefore, order that Mr ——— should retire from the service of the British, and be incapacitated from serving our Government in future—unless he wishes to be tried by a Military Commission,—in which case it shall be granted to him. With regard to the Moonshees ———, ———, and ———, they ought to be brought to trial and punished,—but, as I have excused the Kardar——— from this shame, so I shall let them off, but they are dismissed from the public service, and are not again to be employed.

HEAD QUARTERS, CAMP KURRACHEE, 30*th September*, 1847.

The order of the 4th August 1844, which enables officers in Civil employments to take any command which falls to them, is hereby rescinded.

The Government is now a Civil, not a Military Government,—and all officers holding Civil employment are to report direct to the Secretary to the Government, for the information of the Commissioner.

SECTION II.

COMMISSARIAT.

HEAD QUARTERS, CAMP HYDRABAD, 13*th May*, 1843.

One man per regiment is to be placed at the disposal of the Assistant Commissary-General for the purpose of taking charge of the camels of the regiment. The animals are not to be changed, but are to be considered as regimental camels, and the man who has charge of them is to be held responsible for their efficiency. He is to receive rupees ten per month, and be excused other duties. Commanding Officers are requested to select the best men for this duty, as the efficiency of the troops so much depends on the camels being in good order.

HEAD QUARTERS, CAMP KURRACHEE, 1*st July*, 1846.

The Baker———— having declined to furnish the troops any longer with bread, Colonel ———— will be so good as to make such arrangements with Major ————, Assistant Commissary-General, as may appear to be most proper for the future supply of the troops, and report the same to the Governor.

A Committee, composed of Lieutenant-Colonel ————, of the —— regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel ————, of the—regiment, and Captain ————, Assistant Quarter-Master General, attended also by Major ————, is to assemble at the Bazaar Flagstaff

to-morrow morning, at half-past five o'clock, and proceed to examine the stores of flour in possession of the Contractor ———. The Governor's Moonshee is to attend as Interpreter. If any bad grain is found, the Committee is to put a seal upon the same, and report all proceedings to the Governor, through the Officer commanding the station.

HEAD QUARTERS, CAMP KURRACHEE, *9th August*, 1846.

It having been reported to the Major-General, that the Steel-yards of the Commissariat Department are false, it becomes necessary that immediate enquiry should be made into a circumstance of so important a nature, by which the soldiers have been defrauded to a great extent, and in a manner calculated to diminish their strength and injure their health.

The Major-General will pronounce no opinion upon this extraordinary circumstance until a searching enquiry has been made into the same by a Court of Enquiry, whose examinations are to be taken with closed doors.

The officers composing this Court need scarcely be told how deeply important the enquiry is, in all its bearings, and the Major-General places implicit confidence in the rigid minuteness with which they will carry on their investigation.

The chief points to be ascertained are:—

1st.—How false Steel-yards came to be in the possession of the Commissariat Department.

2nd.—In whose charge they have been.

3rd.—What articles they have generally been used to weigh.

4th.—By whom they have generally been used, or rather under whose immediate inspection the weighing has taken place.

5th.—How long they have been in use in the Commissariat department.

These are the chief points, but the Court is to carry its researches into every part of the transaction, and to record its opinion thereon.

HEAD QUARTERS, CAMP KURRACHEE, *25th August*, 1846.

It is with very great regret that I have read, and am obliged to publish, the opinion of a Court of Enquiry, assembled by my orders, to enquire into a complaint made to me, that the Scales and Steel-yards used by the Commissariat Department are false, and that the soldiers have been defrauded thereby to a large amount, and consequently, that the Government has been more defrauded even than the soldiers, for it must be recollected—

1st.—That the Government pays Commissariat Officers to see that the soldiers be not defrauded, and that justice is done to the public and the soldiers.

2nd.—That Government pays Commanding Officers of Regiments to teach the Company Officers that it is their especial duty to see that no fraud is committed on their men.

3rd.—That Government pays Quarter-Masters to look to the quantity, and quality, of all the Rations which are issued by the Commissariat, and to see that these issues are correct.

4th.—That the Government orders Officers on duty to look to these things.

5th.—Now in the face of all these salaries paid to the Officers for the express purpose of preventing the public and the soldiers from being cheated, I find that not only both have been cheated, but would have continued to be so cheated had it not been for the intelligence of a native cook, who discovered the fraud carried on against the troops. How long this fraud would have continued, the guilty only know.

6th.—After reading the proceedings of the Court, which have been conducted with a zeal and judgment which does great credit to the Officers that composed it, I must exhort Officers who are on daily "regimental duty" to recollect, that it is not by stepping carelessly into a barrack-room at breakfast and dinner-time, and asking if there are *any* complaints, that they execute their duties, but by a close examination of the Rations, in all respects, before they are cooked as well as after. In short, the business of an officer, on what is termed "regimental duty," is to see that

nothing goes wrong in the ordinary daily duties of his Regiment, and, if he sees anything wrong, he is either to put it right himself or immediately to report it to his Commanding Officer.

7th.—It is also the business of the Officers of Companies, when not on duty, frequently to look to their Messes, and especially those Officers *who command Companies.* No Officer who allows of any injustice to his soldiers is fit for command, whatever may be his rank, because he can never enforce rigid discipline.

8th.—But, while I exhort young officers to the full and zealous discharge of these (which I may term) "temporary duties," what can I say to Quarter-Masters of Regiments, who have been (as appears in the proceedings of the Court of Enquiry) neglectful of duties for which they are expressly and highly paid,—duties which they have, by their own confession, grossly neglected; and neglected, too, in a way which exposes those officers to severe remarks. This must always be the case, when a neglect of bounden duties, on the part of Quarter-Masters, produces the very frauds which they are paid to prevent.

9th.—It is with the greatest pain that I have to express my regret that ———, whom I know to be a most zealous and hard-working officer, should have allowed such disorder to exist in this branch of his department. For this officer I have ever entertained a very high opinion, and great personal regard: nor is that high opinion and regard for ———— changed; but that he has left important duties in the hands of untrustworthy men, and neglected the necessary superintendance of those men, is very clear, and he has thereby drawn upon himself the first censure of the Court of Enquiry.

10th.—That ———— had long since represented to the Commissary-General that Steel-yards were not safe, and that he endeavoured to get them abolished, is quite true; but ———— must admit, that this should have made him more careful to look after those to whose charge he committed them.

11th.—With regard to Conductor ————, I will bring him to a General Court-Martial, as there seems strong reason to believe that, by his neglect or dishonesty, he has caused the troops to

be defrauded to a large amount, and it is just that he should either clear himself before a competent Court, or receive the punishment due to a crime of such magnitude that, if proved, it will call for the greatest severity of punishment.

12th.—The question is a very simple one. The soldier has been cheated to an enormous amount. The whole of the Commissariat Scales and Steel-yards in charge of Conductor ——— are false. Those Steel-yards and Scales have long been in the charge of, and daily used by, Conductor ———, and he must prove his innocence of the charge given in against him, or be condemned.

13th.—The amount of fraud cannot be ascertained, but it has been, in meat *alone*, at the rate of a thousand pounds sterling a year.

14th.—To the justice of a Court-Martial is now entrusted the protection of the British soldiers in this Cantonment, and the public interest.

HEAD QUARTERS, CAMP KURRACHEE, 29*th August*, 1846.

1st.—As it is right that the soldiers who eat the meat issued by the Commissariat should know that they receive the right quantity, it is ordered that, in every European corps in Scinde, each company shall name eight privates, who are to be called "weighers," and *one* of these, accompanied by the cook of each mess, are to attend when the meat is issued for the company: only the weighers need attend the issue of bread.

2nd.—This order does not exempt the Quarter-Masters of Regiments from the full execution of their duties, in seeing that all issued to their Regiments are of the exact quantity, and of the first quality, according to the condition of the contracts; for, in reading the proceedings of a late Court of Enquiry, the Governor observed that one Qr.-Master talked of seeing that the rations were *of a wholesome quality*.

Now, the Governor would ask that gentleman, what a Quarter-Master has to do with wholesomeness? His business is not that of a Doctor. It is to see *that the Rations are of the proper quality and quantity stated in the Government Contract*. The Quarter-Master

who made this speech, may take the Governor's word for it that nothing is so unwholesome for a British soldier as being cheated.

The Major-General, therefore, hopes to hear no more opinions from the Quarter-Master as to whether food is "*wholesome*" or not "*wholesome,*" but that that officer will abandon the study of "*Apothecaries' Weight,*" and attend to that of "*Avoirdupois,*" and not allow his men to be defrauded by the use of false scales as they have.

HEAD QUARTERS, CAMP KURRACHEE, 17*th September*, 1846.

The Court of Enquiry on the complaint made against the Bakers, shews that these men have not been supported. I set them to work with the object of getting good bread for the soldiers, and to give these Bakers the full support of the Government, which they have not received, but the very reverse. This is the opinion of the Court of Enquiry, and I entirely concur in that opinion. Major—— made a contract with these men, which they could not fulfill with justice to themselves. They are to be paid immediately the money due to them, and this payment is to be made in cash. I am quite at a loss to conceive how Major —— could think that I would sanction his forcing the Bakers to give a higher price for Government wheat than the price paid in the market. This would at once have defeated my exertions, and the measure is unjust in itself. I therefore order—

1st.—That the Bakers are to be paid in ready cash weekly.

2nd.—That they may take Government wheat, or not take it, as they please.

3rd.—That the Assistant Commissary-General be responsible that the Government wheat sold to the Bakers be perfectly clean, and at such prices below the lowest market price as shall be arranged by me, with the advice of the Collector of Kurrachee.

4th.—That if any Baker goes to the Commissariat Officer for wheat, and is put off by any of the people of the Commissariat, instead of being immediately served, as the Bakers complain that they have been, such Baker is to come immediately to me, having

marked well the man who so put him off, and who shall learn the danger of opposing my exertions to protect the British soldiers from being robbed and ill-treated by Contractors and Bakers.

5th.—If the Bakers, so assisted by the public, make bad bread, the Commander of the Station will be pleased to report the same to me immediately, and I will try them, as camp-followers, by a Court-Martial, and execute the sentence, whatever it may be.

6th.—The present Contract with the Bakers is to be torn up, and a new one made out, under the direction of the Court of Enquiry and the Assistant Commissary-General, which contract is then to be submitted to me for final sanction.

SECTION III.

COURTS-MARTIAL, COURTS OF ENQUIRY, &c.

HEAD QUARTERS, SUKKUR, 11*th November*, 1842.

Major-General Sir Charles J. Napier, K. C. B., calls the attention of officers to the importance of making themselves thoroughly acquainted with Military law. Irregularities have occurred, since he has had the honor to command in Scinde and Beloochistan, such as he seldom before witnessed,—and he must beg that Officers will read the Articles of War, and H. M.'s Regulations. There is not much, but there is some, excuse for Officers of the Hon'ble E. I. Co.'s Service being unacquainted with the rules which govern the Royal Service,—but there is none whatever for the Officers of the latter being ignorant of the rules and ordinances of their own Branch.—The Major-General well knows that an appeal to the right feelings of British Officers will correct any evil, however great; and he has only to tell those under his orders, that, in all things which require Military Discipline, any inattention to the rules of Military Law produces hardship on the good soldier, and impunity to the bad one, and exposes the Courts-Martial themselves to serious consequences.

Remarks on an European General Court-Martial, assembled at Kurrachee on the 17*th of February* 1843, *for the trial of a Private of*

H. M.—Regiment, charged with going to an Officer's Tent with a loaded Firelock, and habitual drunkenness, and sentenced to suffer a corporal punishment of 200 *lashes, and to be put under stoppages.*

MEMO.—1st.—I do not approve of the finding, because I cannot imagine what should have brought the prisoner to the tent of Lieutenant ——— with a loaded musket in his (the prisoner's) hand, unless it was with the intention of shooting that officer.

2nd.—It was irregular to swear the prosecutor as a witness, unless he be sworn as to facts of his own knowledge. In this case, he never swears to have seen the prisoner, and only narrates what his servants told him. Such hearsay evidence amounts to nothing more than the mere preliminary statements of the prosecutor.

3rd.—It was highly irregular, and objectionable, to examine an interested prosecutor, with regard to the character of the prisoner. To do so was derogatory to the dignity of the Court, indelicate towards the prosecutor, and unjust towards the prisoner.

4th.—It is at all times irregular to examine an Adjutant as to the character of a prisoner—he being acting only, and belongs to the same Company; but in that case, he is examined, not as Adjutant, but as the officer of the Company. An Adjutant should never be questioned as to the character of a prisoner when any other officer is acquainted with the man, and can be called upon.

As the prisoner has been so long in confinement, owing to the Officiating Judge-Advocate having erroneously sent the proceedings to Bombay, and their having been delayed in their return by the enemy, which prevented my receiving them to this day,—as this, I say, is the case, I will remit *half* the number of lashes sentenced, and one hundred only are to be inflicted.

Remarks on a Native General Court-Martial held at Shikarpoor, on the 12*th of November* 1842, *for the trial of a Private of the—Regiment N. I., charged with deserting his Regiment while stationed at Poona, and sentenced to imprisonment with hard labour for two years.*

MEMO.—There appears to be a severity in the sentence, though

not unjustly,—and I will therefore remit half the punishment, as I am well aware that the disgraceful crime of desertion is rare among the sepoys of the India Company's Army.

HEAD QUARTERS, CAMP HYDRABAD, 26*th February*, 1843.

Captain Whitlie, Commanding Camel Battery, having brought to the notice of the Major-General the steady and soldierlike conduct of Gunner Thomas Pine, on the day of the action of the 17th,—the Major-General has been pleased to remit the punishment awarded to the abovementioned Gunner by a District Court-Martial.

Remarks on a Native General Court-Martial holden at Sukkur, on the 13*th March* 1843, *for the trial of a Private of the—Regiment N. I., charged with sleeping on his Post whilst on duty as sentry, and acquitted of the crime.*

MEMO.—I revise the proceedings, because I see nothing to shake the direct testimony of Lieut. ———, which proves the guilt of the prisoner.

Memo. on revised Sentence.—I will remit the hard labour, in hopes that the culprit may turn out a good soldier: he is to be confined in the Fort of Bukkur.

Remarks on a Native General Court-Martial assembled at Sukkur, on the 18*th of March* 1843, *on a Private of the—Regiment N. I., charged with leaving his post without being regularly relieved, and sentenced to six months' imprisonment with hard labour.*

MEMO.—I remit the sentence of the prisoner, who is to return to his duty. It is impossible for me to inflict punishment upon a private of a regiment in which the orders of the guard are for sentries to leave their posts and go on a wild-goose chase to find the corporals of the guard to relieve them.

Lieutenant-Colonel ———— will be pleased to make the necessary enquiry into this extraordinary circumstance, and report to me who could issue an order so admirably calculated to lay all

military discipline prostrate, and endanger the safety of the troops in Scinde. Of the fact I cannot doubt,—because the corporal of the guard has sworn to it: nothing short of this could make me believe the fact to be so.*

Remarks on a Native District Court-Martial assembled at Hydrabad, on the 28th of April 1843, on a Private of the Golundauze Battalion charged with oppressive conduct towards certain villagers, and sentenced to undergo two months' ordinary imprisonment.

My complying with the wishes of the Court is impossible. I consider its sentence as utterly inadequate to the offence of which the culprit has been convicted. I am charged with the protection of the people of Scinde; I am charged with the honor of the Company's Service,—I am charged with the safety of this Army,—and am charged with the success of our arms. Now, I consider all acts of plunder calculated to injure these matters in the very highest degree; and if I am not supported by Military tribunals, I must resort to the higher powers vested in me by Act of Parliament,—which I exceedingly dislike to do. The prisoner has been convicted of direct marauding, in face of all Military discipline—in face of my orders, and in face of the orders received from his own Captain. His trumpery defence is just what every criminal adduces—so many mere assertions, carrying their contradiction along with them. Had I been on the Court, I should have sentenced him to, at least, one year's imprisonment with hard labor. However, the sentence passed upon him, trifling as it is, he must undergo, in the Fortress of Hydrabad; and I take this opportunity to republish what I have already put in public orders, that the first case of aggravated plundering which is brought to my notice, and clearly established, I will punish to the utmost extent allowed me by Act of Parliament,—namely, *Death*.—The people must be protected.

Remarks on a Native General Court-Martial held on the 2nd of May,

* *Note.*—His Excellency is pleased to publish the following Memorandum, having reference to the trial of the Corporal of the guard above adverted to:—

Memo.—The Corporal of the Guard has since been brought to trial for perjury, and found guilty: this was right, and proves that such extraordinary orders were never issued in the —Regiment N. I., and the Commanding Officer is therefore entirely exculpated.

and re-assembled on the 3rd of May 1843, at Camp near Hydrabad, for the trial of a Private of the—Regiment N. I., charged with stealing Prize Property, and sentenced to one month's ordinary imprisonment.

Revised.—Because I never read a sentence more directly in the face of the evidence adduced before the Court. It appears on the proceedings that this thief, ————————, had the stolen articles found upon him, viz., the *Mat*, the *Sword*, the *Knife*. He avows having stolen the first,—he pretends that he did not know the other things were in it. Now, I took the trouble (and if the Court did not do the same it did not do its duty) to send for these articles, and I assert, that it was *impossible* that these things should be in it, and the person carrying the mat not be aware of it; it is perfectly possible he might not have known what was in it. He might have hoped that he had committed a more valuable robbery, —and that, instead of silver, he had stolen gold; but he knew he had stolen other property, as well as that he had stolen the mat. All this is *proved*:—it is also proved that he refused to give up what he had stolen, when a constituted authority demanded that he should surrender his plunder.—Finally, it is proved that the thief was *on guard* when he committed the robbery; and a grosser case of robbery, combined with breach of Military duty, I never met with, nor one more completely brought home, in all its details, to the culprit. For these reasons, I order the proceedings and sentence to undergo revision, reserving to myself to make any remarks hereafter upon the extraordinary finding of the Court.

Remarks on Revised Finding and Sentence.

Memorandum.—The Court having come to a proper sense of its own duties, the prisoner's punishment shall be mitigated, though well merited. I therefore remit the sentence to imprisonment for two months with hard labor,—and he is to be sent to the entrenchments, to work under Captain ————————.

Remarks on a Native Line Court Martial, holden at Sukkur on the 12th May 1843, for the trial of a Privite of the—Regiment N. I.,

charged with disobedience of orders, and sentenced to imprisonment with hard labour for six months.

Memo.—I think the sentence too severe for the crime, but I leave it to Lieutenant-Colonel ——— to inflict the whole or remit any portion which he may deem proper.

The Superintending officer, in framing the finding and sentence, should have observed that *nothing* had been brought forward on the defence.

Remarks on a Native Line Court Martial assembled at Hydrabad, on the 14th of April 1843, for the trial of a Private of the—Regiment N. I., charged with insubordinate conduct, and sentenced to undergo imprisonment with hard labour for nine months.

Revised.—Because I think, if the Court will consider the matter, it will see that, though the crime is a serious one, it is not of such a nature as to deserve so severe a punishment as nine months' imprisonment with hard labour, which dismisses the man from the service. It appears to me that, in a fit of ill temper, he behaved ill; and that two or three months' imprisonment, with hard labour, would be sufficient punishment.

Remarks on a District Court-Martial assembled in Camp near Hydrabad, on the 24th May 1843, for the trial af an Engineer of the Indian Navy, charged with drunkenness and disobedience of orders, and sentenced to be dismissed the service.

Memo.—Nothing is permitted to be adduced before a Court as "previous conviction," except conviction before sworn Courts. The admission of the admonition given by Captain ——— was irregular, but in no way affects the legality of the sentence, as previous convictions are not brought forward for the purpose of aggravating punishment, but to enable a Court to judge how far it can mitigate punishment with justice to the service.

Remarks on a District Court-Martial assembled in Camp near Hydrabad, on the 1st of June 1843, for the trial of an Engineer of the

Indus Flotilla, charged with disobedience of orders, and sentenced to be dismissed the service.

Memo.—I shall remit the sentence passed upon the prisoner. I do so only because the court has recommended it, but I will not again pass over such conduct. The class of men which the prisoner belongs to I have always considered to be a most respectable one, but I have had so many reports against, and so much trouble with, those of the Indus Flotilla, that I look upon it as due to those who are sober, respectable, men among them, to punish with the utmost severity those who disgrace their whole class by their beastly drunken blackguard conduct. I therefore forewarn the prisoner, that he shall suffer due punishment if he again offends, and I will tell him what possibly he does not know—*that Military Law reigns in Scinde* while the war lasts, and until regular courts are established by Act of Parliament,—and that I have the power to treat drunkards, mutineers, and marauders, as I think most convenient for the maintenance of order in this force, without any trial at all. This is according to Act of Parliament, and if any of the Flotilla continue to disgrace and impede the service, I will exercise my power, which extends to corporal punishment, and to life, according to circumstances. Let the prisoner therefore beware!

Remarks on an European District Court-Martial assembled at Hydrabad, on the 26th of June 1843, *on a Gunner of the—Troop of Horse Artillery, charged with being drunk, using abusive and threatening language to his commanding officer, and destroying his helmet, and sentenced to undergo a corporal punishment of* 150 *lashes, and be put under stoppages.*

Memo.—While I approve and confirm the sentence, which is to plenary execution, it is necessary to remark, in these proceedings, the omission of the Court to enquire into character, and whether former conviction existed against the prisoner. In this case, the omission does not signify, as nothing would induce me to pardon the prisoner; but in many cases, the character of the prisoner is important to the confirming authority.

Remarks on a District Court-Martial assembled in Camp near Hy-

drabad, on the 26th of June 1843, for the trial of an Engineer of the Indian Navy, charged with mutinous and insolent conduct to his Commanding Officer, and sentenced to be suspended from rank and pay for two months.

Revised.—Because, with every respect for the Court, I cannot think the punishment awarded is sufficient for the culprit, who, when his vessel was engaged in most important duty, and in presence of the enemy, used the most mutinous language to his Commanding Officer, thereby endangering the success of the expedition against the enemy.

This mutinous conduct against his Commander has been distinctly proved before the court, and no attempt made to disprove it. Had the example been followed by others, (and if such trifling punishment attends such flagrant cases of mutiny it will be followed), and officers knocked down, Lieut. ———— would have had no alternative but to give up the operations which I ordered, and to have brought all the steamers back to Kotree. I cannot agree to such a sentence, which appears to me dangerous to the discipline of the Flotilla, and in thus revising the proceedings, I request the President and Members to reflect on what their own feelings would be if one of the soldiers under their personal command answered, *you are a* —— ———, *you are a d—d liar*, and I dont care *a d—n for you;* yet, assuredly, if one man in command has greater claim to the protection afforded by the laws of discipline than another, that man is he who commands in a small vessel, and has no other protection but his own personal strength, if Naval laws fail.

I hope the Court will maturely reflect upon these matters, and pass a sentence to which I can put my approval.

Remarks on a Native Line Court-Martial assembled in Camp near Hydrabad, on the 8th of July 1843, for the trial of a Private of the—Regiment N. I., charged with disrespectful and insubordinate conduct, and sentenced to five months' imprisonment with hard labour.

Memo.—The sentence is irregularly worded: the imprisonment *must count from the date of the signature of the President of the*

Court,—the *place* alone can be left to the confirming authority. I remit two months of the imprisonment, on account of the prisoner being a young soldier. The age of the prisoner has not been stated, as it ought to have been, in the extract from the Register Roll.

Remarks on a District Court-Martial held at Hydrabad, on the 28th July 1843, for the trial of an Engineer of the Indus Flotilla, charged with mutinous and disgraceful conduct to his Commanding officer, and sentenced to three months' imprisonment, one of which solitary.

Memo.—In compliance with the recommendation of the Court, I pardon the prisoner that part of the sentence which condemns him to solitary confinement, and one month of the other. But I consider this mutinous and disrespectful conduct to the Commander of the Indus Flotilla cannot be pased over: he must, therefore, take one month's imprisonment.

I cannot conclude these remarks without expressing a hope that Mr. ——— will in future shew that the way to command men, is to avoid giving provocation to those under them; they will not commit themselves by acts of indiscipline, or easily do so.

HEAD QUARTERS, HYDRABAD, 11*th August*, 1843.

The Governor wishes it may be understood that when a Minor Court passes a sentence of hard labor, the said sentence must be confirmed by the General officer commanding the Division, and by him *alone:* no intermediate approval can be admitted, and for this evident reason, that such intermediate approval is of no use,—the sentence can only be confirmed by the higher authority, and such approval and confirmation may, possibly, be diametrically opposed to the intermediate approval, and confirmation, by which the officer who makes it is necessarily animadverted upon by his superior officer. Now this must be injurious to discipline, and wounding to the feelings of honorable individuals; and is there any *reason* for such a collision? None whatever!—The intermediate approval is, therefore, not only useless, but very harmful, and not only harmful, by exposing commanding officers of regiments to have their

opinions overruled, but also injurious to the chain of military subordination; for, suppose a case to arise, in which the regimental commanding officer revises the Court, he deprives the General of Division of the right to revise a sentence which he, and he alone, can confirm. In every point of view, therefore, it is irregular for the commanding officer to make an intermediate approval, and it must not be done.

Remarks on a Native General Court-Martial assembled at Sukkur, on the 19th of June 1843, for the trial of a Private of the—Regt., late Shah Soojah's Force, charged with desertion before the enemy, and theft, and sentenced to imprisonment with hard labour for two years.

Memo.—It is with great reluctance that I confirm this sentence. I think Courts-Martial ought to *shoot* such villains as the prisoner. *Death* is the proper punishment for deserters in presence of the enemy. This villain has had a milder sentence than he deserves.

This memorandum to be translated and read at the head of every Regiment in Sinde.

Remarks on a Court of Enquiry, held on the 14th of August 1843, for the purpose of investigating into the cause of complaint made by Assistant Surgeon ————, of the —— Regt. N. I., against Captain————, Commanding that Regiment.

Memo.—It is with regret that Major-General Napier feels it necessary to publish the opinion of the Court of Enquiry, held by his orders, and at the request of Captain ————. The Governor hopes that Captain ———— will, in future, feel the necessity of holding his temper more under control than he appears to have done.

Remarks on an European General Court-Martial, held at Hydrabad, on the 26th of August 1843, for the trial of a Gunner of the— Troop H. A., charged with being drunk, striking a sentry, and

using insulting and mutinous language to Major ——————, and sentenced to three months' ordinary imprisonment.

Memo.—1. The Governor pardons, though with considerable difficulty, the gross misconduct of Gunner ——————, in consideration of the recommendation of the Court.

2.—It becomes necessary that the Major-General should observe to the Court that he cannot, in the evidence before him, trace the slightest cause for the animadversion which it has allowed itself to pass on the conduct of Major ——————, and which conduct appears to the Major-General to have been forbearing, and correct in every particular but one—it was that of allowing the prisoner to be unbound. This was to give the rioter power to do further mischief. Major —————— ought to have accompanied the prisoner the whole way till he saw him delivered bound into the possession of the non-commissioned officer of the nearest guard, who might unbind him or not at his pleasure, as he, the commander of the guard, then became responsible.

3.—It is the duty of every officer and non-commissioned officer, when they find it necessary to make a man a prisoner, to see that prisoner placed in charge of a guard, and never to quit him till he is so placed. Had Major —————— laid hands upon the prisoner, personally, he would have done wrong,—but he did no such thing.

Remarks on a Native General Court-Martial assembled at Hydrabad, on the 2nd of October 1843, *for the trial of a Subedar of the— Regiment N. I., charged with gross neglect of duty, in not properly securing a prisoner, and sentenced to suspension from rank and pay for four months.*

Memo.—I beg that it may be explained to every Regiment, that whatever sentence had been awarded, however severe it might have been, I would have executed it; because, if a guard cannot be trusted with a prisoner, discipline is at an end.

The President has omitted to date his signature, which omission is contrary to regulation: the date must be filled up, and the suspension of the prisoner to take place from that date.

HEAD QUARTERS, KURRACHEE, 2*nd January*, 1844.

The Court of Enquiry into the complaints preferred by the Messman of H. M. ——— Regiment, against Lieutenant ———————, has closed its proceedings, which are approved of by the Major-General.

The Major-General feels it necessary to express his disapprobation of conduct so disrespectful to the officers of the ——— Mess, as that which Lieutenant ———————— avows to have adopted towards their servants.

With respect to the Messman, personally, the Major-General considers that the case is properly cognizable by the Bazaar Master, to which magistrate he therefore refers it for judgment.

Remarks on a Native General Court-Martial held at Hydrabad, on the 27th December 1843, *for the trial of a Private of the—Regiment N. I., charged with poisoning certain women of the Town of Hydrabad, and acquitted thereof.*

Memo.—Confirmed, but not approved,—because the Court has certainly been remiss in its examination of witnesses. It appears unaccountable how the Court could omit to examine Gahee the Banian, who appears to have sold the poison to the prisoner.

That the latter did not intend to commit the murder, I am inclined to believe,—but that he did commit it, is plain. Gahee should have been rigidly cross-questioned by the Court; and its not having done so is censurable.

Remarks on a Native General Court-Martial holden in Camp near Hydrabad, on the 7th of February 1844, *for the trial of a Private of the—Regiment N. I., charged with desertion when the Regiment was under orders for Field service, and sentenced to two years' imprisonment.*

Memo.—I revise the proceedings, because I do not understand why a Court which tries two prisoners for the same crime, should sentence one more than double the punishment that it sentences the other to receive,—for, assuredly, two years' imprisonment,

though double the time, is nearly *four* times the punishment in point of severity. Now between the crimes of these two men I can perceive no difference. I therefore must beg of the Court, either to give me its reasons for being so severe on the Prisoner *Rowjee Furtarray*, or else reduce its award to a level with that passed upon *Narrain Jaddoo*.

Remarks on a Native General Court-Martial re-assembled at Kurrachee, on the 14th of March 1844, for the trial of a Private of the—Regiment N. I., charged with disobedience of orders, and disrespectful language to his Commanding Officer, and sentenced to hard labour for one year.

Memo.—I am sorry that I cannot comply with the recommendation of the Court: my wish is to give every indulgence to all sepoys, and especially to those of the —Regiment, because the sepoys are brave and obedient soldiers, that I feel proud to command,—but the Prisoner used language that I will not forgive in any soldier, whether he belong to the Queen's or Company's service, and this man must receive his punishment.

The Major-General requests that Lieut.-Colonel ——— will record the names of the two men who applied for leave at the same time as the Prisoner, and did so in a respectful and soldier-like manner. These men shall have leave on the first occasion when leave can again be granted without injustice to others.

Remarks on a Native General Court-Martial re-assembled at Kurrachee, on the 15th of April 1844, for the trial of a Private of the Sappers and Miners, charged with disobedience of orders, and insubordinate conduct, and sentenced to imprisonment with hard labor for six months.

Memo.—As the prisoner is a very young soldier, I will, for this time, pardon him the punishment awarded, as it is hoped that his crime arose more from ignorance than from a bad disposition. Captain ——— will be so good as to send for him, and explain to him the consequences which will follow such misconduct in future. This admonition, I trust, will have a proper effect.

Remarks on a Military Commission assembled at Sukkur, on the 25th April 1844, for the trial of a Scindee, charged with having murdered his wife, and sentenced to three years' imprisonment with hard labour.

Memo.—I confirm, but I certainly cannot approve of a sentence which condemns a man, who has committed an unprovoked murder, to three years' imprisonment. I think it one of the grossest cases of murder that I have known since coming to Scinde.

Remarks on a Military Commission assembled in the Fort of Hydrabad, on the 29th May 1844, on a Scindee woman, accused of aiding and abetting another women to take poison, and sentenced to three years' imprisonment.

Memo.—In approving and confirming the proceedings and sentence, I cannot help remarking that the Court appears to have omitted three important things.

1st.—Not enquiring into the circumstances why the woman had quitted her husband, so as to form some idea why she should have committed suicide, or been aided or advised to do so by the prisoner.

2nd.—In not taking the evidence of *Mahomed Hoossain*, the Doctor. I have no proof that he was called : the whole story may be true or false—there is no proof brought forward.

3rd.—The man *Abdool Hamel* ought also to have been produced. The impression on my mind is against the prisoner,—but I must say it has not been thoroughly sifted in my opinion.

Remarks on a Military Commission assembled in the Fort of Hydrabad, on the 30th May 1844, on a Scindee accused of murdering his daughter, and sentenced to two years' imprisonment with hard labour.

Memo.—I confirm, but cannot approve of, these proceedings and sentence. In my opinion, a more gross case of murder could scarcely be met with. I have not a doubt but the villain strangled his daughter, and that all the rest is a trumped up story. There has

not been sufficient evidence brought forward. However, let the sentence be put in force, and the prisoner is fortunate to escape being hanged.

Remarks on a Native General Court-Martial, holden at Bhooj on the 26th of June 1844, *for the trial of a Private of the—Regiment N. I., charged with desertion, and sentenced to six months' ordinary imprisonment.*

Memo.—I do not agree with the Court, that the prisoner is guilty of desertion; but he is guilty of being absent without leave. It is hard upon a man to have such a record against him, of a crime that he evidently had no intention to commit. I fully and honorably acquit the prisoner, in my opinion, of this great crime, and I remit the whole sentence. He is to return to his duty.

HEAD QUARTERS, CAMP KURRACHEE, *7th August*, 1844.

The proceedings of the Court of Enquiry, relative to the four troopers of the —— Light Cavalry who were on escort duty, and were cut down on the 3rd of June by a few robbers, near Larkhana, have been this day laid before the Governor.

The case seems very plain. This escort was well armed, but the men straggled at a distance from each other, and were very careless. Not a carbine was loaded. Their swords were slung over their backs. They fought like brave men when set upon by the robbers; and, as their severe wounds have caused them to suffer much for their careless conduct, the Governor can only express his satisfaction at hearing that these four brave soldiers have been restored to health.

The punishment which these men have received from the villains who attacked them, will, it is to be hoped, prove a salutary lesson to soldiers on duty, that they should always be prepared to fight. All escorts must carry their fire-arms loaded.

Observations on a Court of Enquiry held at ————, on the 10th August 1844, for the purpose of giving an opinion relative to an attempt at Suicide made by Serjeant-Major ————, of —— Cavalry.

I have read, with great pain, the proceedings of a Court of Enquiry, held by order of Lieutenant-Colonel ————, Commanding at ————, for the purpose of giving an opinion relative to an attempt at Suicide made by Serjeant Major ————, of the ——Cavalry.

I cannot concur in the opinion of the Court, which, in my opinion, is defective.

I observe that Major ———— has deviated from what is the proper line for a Commanding Officer to pursue when a new exercise was to be taught to the officers. These things are matters of duty, and not to be left to the pleasure of a corps of officers. Major ———— ought, himself, or by his Adjutant, or (if just cause of impediment existed to either) by his Serjeant-Major, to have given the necessary instruction to his officers, at a fixed hour in the cool time of morning,—and the said officers should be taught in a squad, and not individually in their respective bungalows; and his not having done so, is unmilitary.

In the second place, it is with grief I see that Major ———— should have so far forgotten himself as to have ordered the Serjeant-Major, who had already suffered from the sun in a very severe manner, to do a duty which would, probably, to use the man's own words, "kill him," and "that he could not do it." He made no other resistance to this inconsiderate and ill-judged order (to say the least of it), in issuing which Major ———— went in the face of every authority in India, which all concur in ordering that every care is to be taken not to expose men to the baneful effects of the sun: yet Major ———— orders his Serjeant-Major to pass from one officer to another, in such a way that, I am obliged to say, the Serjeant-Major "*could not do it,*"—and this was ordered in the hottest time of the year, in the hottest part of Scinde. Major ———— is perfectly right in saying that "Mi-

litary duty must be attended to,"—and he has not attended to his military duty, which is, to take care of his men, and not to risk the life of his Serjeant-Major without the slightest perceptible object or excuse. I consider that Major ——— ———'s conduct has been such as is by no means calculated to serve the public: on the contrary, I consider it such as deserves the severest animadversion,—and, if any thing of this kind again occurs, I will report Major ——— ———'s conduct to the Commander-in-Chief.

In the third place, it appears, by the statement of the Serjeant-Major to the Court of Enquiry, that he had to go to drill at nine o'clock, after the march, when on the route from ———————. It is strange that the Court should have taken no notice of these matters, and should not have gone properly into an enquiry so important, so as to have laid the whole case before me. I therefore cannot form an opinion how far this assertion made by the Serjeant-Major is true or not; but if it be true, and I see no reason to disbelieve the assertion, it shows that a bad system of command exists in the ——— Cavalry,—calculated to disgust soldiers with a noble service, and to destroy discipline.

In the fourth place, I must remark on the letter of Major ——— ———, dated 1st April. That officer calls the Serjeant-Major's conduct "insubordinate." I find no marks of insubordination in the Serjeant-Major's conduct. I find a respectful remonstrance against an order much more suited to produce insubordination than to improve discipline. He said "he was not able to execute the order," and every man of common sense would say so too, and would have changed the order, an obedience to which would have probably killed the man. There was not the slightest appearance of disrespect in the conduct of the Serjeant-Major,—on the contrary, the man seems to have been driven to despair at not being able to comply with the order.

In the Major's letter dated 31st July, he makes Captain ——— ——— say, when he heard the Serjeant-Major's respectful remonstrance against being walked about all day in the sun,—"he is mad or drunk." It is hard to believe that Captain ——————— made

so extraordinary a speech ; or to satisfy one's mind to whom he could have addressed it : certainly there was neither madness nor drunkenness in what the Serjeant-Major said to Major ————.

The man was respectfully remonstrating, in order to save his life, which was about to be sacrificed without the slightest pretext, and contrary to the rules of the service. Again, I find in Major———— ——'s letter that the Serjeant-Major, after having cut his throat, " ran about the barracks, demanding spirits." No notice whatever is taken of this by the Court of Enquiry: I do not pretend to know on what Major———— grounds this *positive assertion* made by him, but the evidence before the Court goes to contradict it. How could a man, who had cut his throat in a desperate manner, and then had an epileptic fit, run about the barracks ?—It appears that he was well guarded, and cared for,—that he was sober ; that Quarter-Master-Serjeant ———— was ordered to attend him. I desire that Major ———— give his reasons in writing for making this assertion, and that Quarter-Master-Serjeant ———— should state also why he allowed the Serjeant-Major to run about the barracks, calling for drink, (if such be the case), after his throat was cut ; the Quarter-Master-Serjeant having received orders to take care of the patient, and see that he " *remained quiet and did no harm to himself.*" That this assertion, made by Major ———— , must be made clear, is necessary. It is not to be forgotten, that this letter is written on a most serious occasion, when every word must be weighed. The Court ought to have sifted every thing, and this letter with the rest. It has sifted little or nothing.

Having expressed my disapprobation of the conduct of Major ————, it is necessary that I should express to Serjeant-Major ———— my sorrow to see a man, who has hitherto borne a good character, guilty of an attempt at suicide,—a crime of the most contemptible and of the most irreligious nature. The man who has not courage to bear the ordinary evils of life, with resignation to the will of the Creator, is despicable in the eyes of man, and guilty in the eyes of his Maker. He who has no fortitude, is unfit to be a soldier : instead, therefore, of the disgraceful threat of repeating his base action, the Serjeant-Major had better humble himself in the

dust, repent of his crime, and endeavour to gain the respect of his profession, for he may rest assured that he has lost that of all whose respect is worth possessing.

Remarks on an European General Court-Martial, assembled at Kurrachee on the 21st of August 1844, *for the trial of Brigade Serjeant* ——, *of the* —— *Battalion of Artillery, charged with fraudulently sharing in the contents of a wooden box containing gold ornaments, and sentenced to be reduced to the rank and pay of a gunner.*

Memo.—The prisoner, in his defence, alludes to some enemy having made a report against him. No one ever reported anything against him. His conduct came out in the examination, I made personally, of the men of his company, relative to Corporal ————. The soldiers who hear this, should take warning against such weak defences. When an honest man is accused, he at once disproves facts, and cares very little who it is that accused him. I am sorry for the prisoner, but good characters do not avail a man in cases where dishonesty is proved.

Head Quarters, Camp Kurrachee, 15*th October*, 1844.

His Excellency the Major-General has seen with surprise, an extract from an order issued to the —— Regiment N. I., dated ——————, 29th September, publishing to that Regiment the finding and sentence of a Regimental Court-Martial held for the trial of a Color Havildar for highly insubordinate conduct.

The Havildar is found guilty of the whole and every part of the charge, and the sentence of the Court is that he be confined for the space of one month.

His Excellency cannot understand how any Court-Martial could award such an irregular sentence,—how the superintending officer could have recorded it, or the Commanding Officer confirm it, which has been done. The Color Serjeant must be immediately released from imprisonment, and return to his duty.

Remarks on a European General Court-Martial, holden at Kurrachee on the 24th of October 1844, *for the trial of Sergeants* ——— *and* ———, *of the* ——— *Regiment, charged with neglect of duty, in having permitted the escape of Prisoners, and found not guilty.*

Memo.—I am not, however, satisfied that Sergeant ——— might not have more closely watched the prisoners when he saw the confusion that existed so close to where they were, and he does not appear to have closely examined their room. He has had a very narrow escape, and I have no doubt but he will in future be more careful when prisoners are entrusted to his care.

2d.—I cannot at all understand why the arms of the sentries were not loaded. There were but four sentries to guard thirty-two prisoners badly ironed, and all these sentries with unloaded arms. This was not correct: the careful guarding of prisoners is one of the most important duties of a soldier, and to let them escape is very discreditable.

Remarks on a European General Court-Martial, holden at Kurrachee, on the 25th of October 1844, *for the trial of certain Privates of the* —— *Regiment, charged with permitting certain Prisoners to escape from confinement, and acquitted thereof.*

Memo.—I cannot concur in the finding of the Court, because, 1st,—When soldiers have prisoners in charge, to let them escape, and to see the sentries who had charge of them escape unpunished, is disgraceful to the service, unless the sentries have been overpowered, which has not, in this instance, been the case. 2nd,—The prisoners ———, ———, ———, and ———, had orders to bayonet the native prisoners, who were given to their charge, rather than let them escape: they did not bayonet one of them, nor attempt to do so. Will the Court pretend that four sentries cannot prevent nine men, lying down at their feet and in irons, from jumping up and running away, without a single man being marked or stabbed with a bayonet, by any one of the four sentries,—not one of the said sentries having been knocked down, or in any way overpowered? I assert, that the finding of the Court is against the

evidence, and against common sense, for it is impossible for the nine men to have escaped all unhurt had the sentries done their duty, and I am wholly at a loss to imagine on what this extraordinary finding of the Court is based. But I will not revise the proceedings, because of the improper manner in which these escaped prisoners seem to have been looked after by the Commanding Officer of the Head-Quarter Division ———, for when so careless an example is set, no wonder the soldiers follow it. In the first place, he did not order his guards to load their arms. In the second place, it does not appear that he gave orders for the irons to be put on both legs at night; if he did, the officer on duty neglected this. Thirdly, there does not appear to have been an order to examine the irons at every relief of the sentries, though this attaches more to the officer of the day, who had charge of the guard, than to the Commanding Officer. Fourthly, the cooking utensils were left in the reach of the prisoners. This also is more blameable in the officer of the day than in the Commanding Officer; as also was it the fault of the Officer of the day and the Serjeant of the guard, that such a mass of camels and idle people should be assembled so close to a place where a guard was posted over so many prisoners condemned to suffer heavy penalties, and of course prepared to make the most desperate efforts to escape. I must say, that the whole of this affair, including the finding of the Court, does very little credit to our Military discipline.

HEAD QUARTERS, CAMP SUPPORA, 12*th November*, 1844.

The proceedings of the Court-Martial which tried private ———, of Captain ——'s Company ——Regiment, have been forwarded to me by Major General ——, as deserving serious notice.— He calls it "*a very extraordinary Court*," and I am of the same opinion. The Major-General revised the proceedings, with a very strong and just expression of his disapprobation. The Court returned the same finding of acquittal, and the General has forwarded the proceedings to me, after ordering the prisoner to return to his duty. My remarks on these proceedings are those which would strike every Military man, viz. :—

1st. That discredit has twice fallen upon discipline. In two instances, prisoners heavily sentenced have been allowed to escape by British soldiers. Secondly, in both cases, but more especially in that in which the —— Regiment is concerned, the greatest neglect appears to have been evinced by the various officers charged with guarding them. The Brigade-Major at ——— does not appear to have given over his prisoners to the —— Regiment. He does not appear to have take any pains to see that a mutineer, sentenced to die, was in secure custody. The officer on duty and in charge of the guards, and whose duty it was to have examine l the prisoners, and to have seen that every necessary order has been given to, and understood by, his sentries, seems to have done nothing. The Commanding Officer of the——Regiment, knowing his rear guard had charge of the state prisoner under sentence of *death*, does not appear to have taken the proper, or indeed any, precaution that a Commanding Officer is bound in duty to take when prisoners are confided to his charge. In short, from first to last there seems to have been gross neglect of duty, and an abandonment of Military discipline, which reflects upon every soldier, whether officer or private, to whose custody the prisoner was committed. So much I have to say as regards those charged with the custody of the convict. Now for the Court-Martial which tried the sentry —— ——, premising that I am convinced the acquittal of private ———— could not have been unanimous. Had the prisoner pleaded the difficulty of guarding his prisoner, in consequence of the neglect of his superiors, I do think he would have had a fair claim to acquittal; and I confess I feel greatly disposed to bring those superiors before a General Court-Martial, for I feel that my command, and myself, are disgraced by the escape of so many state prisoners from Her Majesty's Regiments. But the prisoner ———— did no such thing. He avows that he saw the prisoner escape: he gave no alarm till the convict was gone. The Serjeant-Major deposed that the orders to the sentry were, to let the culprit quit the room when "received by the native guard," not otherwise. The native guard *did not* receive the prisoner, and he escaped! The Serjeant of the rear guard deposed that the sentry was "*not to let out the prisoner, except when taken by the native guard.*" The native guard had *not taken* him, and he escaped! Every answer to the questions of the Court, directly

proves that the sentry ——— —— allowed the prisoner to escape without taking the least trouble to prevent it. But among all the remarkable proceedings of this "extraordinary Court," perhaps the greatest is, that it does not appear to have asked what order the Corporal of the guard gave to the sentry when planted over the prisoner: yet, on this depends the question of the man's guilt or innocence! If the Corporal ordered the sentry to let the prisoner jump in and out of the windows at his pleasure, then the sentry is guiltless, and the finding of the Court was correct. But the Serjeant-Major, and the Serjeant of the guard, both declare that the sentry had no such orders: yet the Court do not examine either Brigade-Major, Commanding Officer, Officer on duty for the day, Serjeant or Corporal, or even the sentry himself, to ascertain what the sentry's orders were! The Court has acquitted the prisoner in the face of all evidence, and of every fact, and he has returned to his duty; but if Courts-Martial act as this Court has acted, to talk of discipline in this army will be a farce: all guards and sentries had better be taken off at once, and the whole force trust its safety to fate. I consider that the acquittal of the sentries, by the two Courts-Martial referred to, is much more injurious to discipline, and more discreditable to the army which I have the honor to command, than the escape of the prisoners,—and this will *be* the opinion of every thorough-bred soldier.—As to private ———'s character, it has nothing to do with the matter; neither has his eighteen years' service. I do not want good-natured well-behaved old women to stand sentries over condemned felons; I want hardy, alert soldiers, who know how to use their arms; and Courts-Martial that will deal out justice to those who fail in their duty, and not acquit men under pretences that are mere quibbles. I call upon the old Officers of the Scinde Army to instruct those under their command, that when men are charged with prisoners, no quibbles raised by weak minds are to excuse the crimes of letting those prisoners escape. A sentry, or a guard, may be overpowered; he or they may strike with the bayonet, and the blow be parried; they may discharge their muskets, and fail in their shots: these are not legitimate excuses in letting prisoners escape, but under peculiar circumstances, they may entitle the sentry or guard to mercy.

This small army is replete with noble soldiers, experienced, and

inexperienced, and for their character I am responsible, not only to my superiors, but to the army itself; therefore, discipline shall be rigidly maintained.

Remarks on a Native General Court-Martial, holden at Hydrabad, on the 15th of November 1844, *for the trial of Privates of the —— Regiment N. I., charged with neglect of duty, in permitting a Prisoner to escape, and acquitted thereof.*

Memo.—I have confirmed the acquittal, because whoever placed the sentries, gave them more to guard than they could guard, and this the Court has decided by the finding and sentence. The proper authorities will be so good as to take care that one or more sentries be immediately placed at the spot, as nothing is so deeply injurious to discipline as to give a soldier more to do than it is possible for him to do: a sentry who sees he cannot rigidly do his duty, despairs and neglects it altogether, and defends his conduct by the pretence that it was impossible. This pretence cannot be refuted, and discipline is injured.

HEAD QUARTERS, CAMP BELOW DERAH PASS, *4th February*, 1845.

Sir Charles Napier has read the proceedings of the Court of Enquiry on Ensigns ——— and ———, and it becomes his duty to Her Majesty's Service in general, to the honor of the ——— Mess in particular, and to these officers themselves, that their conduct should be made clear. If that conduct has been as appears by the proceedings of the Court of Enquiry, they have endeavoured to provoke duelling by gross misconduct towards a brother officer; thereby flying in the face of the Articles of War, and Her Majesty's express commands. Sir Charles Napier cannot coincide with the opinion expressed by the Court of Enquiry, that there is any room for lenient consideration of conduct so derogatory to the character of gentlemen, and it is necessary that these officers should have the opportunity of clearing themselves from such an imputation. They shall therefore both be tried by a General Court-Martial.

The Governor coincides with the opinion of the Court of Enquiry,

that Ensign ——— has "adopted the correct and prescribed mode of proceeding," and he approves of that officer's conduct, who patiently endured the unprovoked insults he appears to have received, till complaint became necessary.

Remarks on an European General Court-Martial holden at Hydrabad, on the 1st of February, 1845, for the trial of Sub-Conductor ———, of the Commissariat Department, charged with having feloniously sold certain stores, the property of Government, and acquitted thereof.

Memo.—Revised. 1st. Because I find no disproof of the dubbas of ghee being sent from the stores by order of the prisoner, as sworn to by the prosecutor and witnesses, and therefore the Court is bound to consider the facts as proved.

2nd. Because I find no account made out by the prisoner of what became of these dubbas of ghee. The prisoner, if innocent, could have proved this,—but he has not.

3rd. The attempt to show that, though they were Government dubbas, they were sold by auction, is inadmissible, unless the prisoner proved by the books of the Commissariat, and those of the purchaser, that these identical dubbas had been so sold. The "onus probandi" lies with the prisoner.

4th. The prisoner has not disproved, and therefore the testimony against him is conclusive, that he not only ordered the dubbas of ghee to be taken to the boat, but that he was himself present, and saw them in the boat. I therefore must think that the facts are proved against the prisoner, and I trust that the Court will alter its finding in re-considering the testimony, and most improper style of the defence,—a defence which, I should observe, the Court had a right to reject if it thought fit, or to admit and remark upon as to the Court seemed proper. But the paper signed by the prisoner ought not to have been altered by the Court, because it deprives Lieutenant ——— of the power to bring Mr ——— to trial for insolence to his superior officer, whose character has thus been openly attacked in a written paper signed by the prisoner, and which paper has been read in public.

HEAD QUARTERS, CAMP SUKKUR, 28*th March*, 1845.

The Governor has read with attention the proceedings of the Court of Enquiry, of which Lieutenant-Colonel ——— —— was President. He wholly approves of the gallant conduct of Serjeant Power, and his detachment. It does not appear that the Serjeant had orders to attack the enemy, but it is clear that he so considered the signals made by his officers, and like a good soldier he attacked. He and his party did all that brave and strong soldiers could do. Honour be to them, for they have won it like men! The Governor has sent to the Commanding Officer of the 39th Regiment a copy of the letter which he, the Governor, has written to the Commander-in-Chief of India, enclosing a list of this little band of heroes.

HEAD QUARTERS, CAMP KURRACHEE, 14*th April*, 1845.

As the Court-Martial which tried Mr Conductor ——— has thought it right to acquit this soldier of the heinous crime of robbery with which he stood accused, and as I wholly disapprove of the opinion of the Court, I think it but just that ———, and ———, condemned by another Court, as participators in the crime, should be pardoned, as I cannot reconcile it to my conscience to see two men punished, and a third escape whom I believe to be more guilty than either of them. The Captain of Police will be pleased to order the release of ——, and ——.

Remarks on a Native General Court-Martial, holden at Kurrachee, on the 29th of April 1845, for the trial of a Private of the—Regiment N. I., charged with assaulting certain sepoys of the—Regiment N. I., and sentenced to twelve months' imprisonment with hard labor.

Memo.—I am sure that the soldiers of the—Regiment are too steady and good soldiers to allow of such disgraceful riots again taking place, and I therefore order the prisoner to be simply imprisoned for two months, and remit the remainder of his sentence. I treat him with this leniency, because he is well spoken of by his officers, and I am in hopes this will be a caution to him in future.

Remarks on a Court of Enquiry assembled at Kurrachee, on the 23rd May, 1845.

1. The conduct of ——————— has been grossly culpable towards Major ——————— and Lieutenant ———————. He made various accusations against them for conduct the most disgraceful. They have been honorably cleared from the aspersions ——————— cast upon them, every one of which aspersions have turned out, upon the clearest proof, to be an unqualified falsehood :——————— has not in a single instance substantiated a charge against them.

2. ——————— is a man well thought of among his own class of people, therefore his conduct casts a reflection on all his countrymen in Scinde, and he ought to be punished.

3. But as the Court is of opinion that he was misled by the person who wrote the petition, to cast reflections upon the officers of the ——— Department, and who have interceded for him, I will not bring him to trial, but dismiss him with a caution in future not to make any memorial in a language which he does not understand, and on condition that he gives up the name of the person who wrote the memorial.

Remarks on a Native General Court-Martial, holden at Bhooj, on the 9th of June 1845, *for the trial of a Private of the—Regiment N. I., charged with sleeping on his post while on sentry, and acquitted thereof.*

Revised.—The crime is proved, *first*, by the Corporal who commanded the rounds (viz.——) ; *secondly*, by the 2nd evidence ——, who swears that the rounds were not challenged, and that the Corporal called *their attention* to give evidence to what was wrong. Would the Corporal have done this had not something gone wrong ? And was it not *clear* what was wrong ? Does not ———, 2d evidence, prove by the first part of his testimony, saying they were not challenged, that he *did* know what was wrong, and *told the Court* so too ! Is it come to *this*, that a sentry is to be approached on a windy night, and not challenge ! Two Corporals and three privates have proved the guilt of the prisoner, and there is nothing to disprove a word which they have said. The reasons given by the Court are quite absurd : if there had been anything to cast a doubt on their testimony, some excuse would exist for the observations of the Court,—but I can see none whatever. The prisoner

appears to me to be guilty, and I think the Court ought to reverse its Finding, as being at present in the face of Evidence.

Remarks on a General Court-Martial, holden at Kurrachee, on the 17th of June 1845, for the trial of Assistant Apothecary and Steward ——— ———, charged with being drunk in his quarters, and sentenced to be suspended from rank and pay for six months.

Memo.—Revised.—I am sorry to "revise" the proceedings, but I hope that the Court will take into consideration the feelings of the troops when they see a man so slightly punished for drunkenness,—a man who is entrusted with the compounding of medicines among which are deadly poisons; a man entrusted also with administering these medicines to the soldiers. The latter are not on the footing of officers, who are able to refuse the prescription or the medicine offered by a drunken man, but the private soldiers are obliged, by the necessary rules of the service, to receive what is ordered, and dare not refuse what is given even by one who has voluntarily deprived himself of reason. Will the Court force back into the hospital such a culprit, and place the lives of brave men in his hands? Will the Court thus oblige the soldier to take the medicine, or the poison, offered, or rather I should say forced upon, him by this drunken culprit? I ask the members of the Court to place themselves in the position of the families of the soldiers (as well as that of the men,) and ask themselves what would be *their* feelings if they saw those nearest and dearest to them lying on the bed of sickness, and a drunken person, like the prisoner, enter their bed-room to prescribe, to compound, or to administer, medicine? I cannot believe that any member of the Court would, in such a case, consider six months' suspension an adequate punishment. Let the members of the Court be apprised, that the soldier sees all these things clearly, and reasons soundly upon what he sees. If what I have said be true, will not the Court agree with me that to leave such a culprit in the service is to endanger the lives of the soldiers, and to shake their confidence in the protection of their officers,—the only protection they can have against such criminals?

Memo. on revised sentence.—I have to express my approbation of the conduct of Serjeant-Major ———, and Gunner ———.

The Serjeant-Major acted like a good soldier in putting the infamous culprit under arrest. I have also observed the evidence given by ————, who has sworn to a falsehood. I would bring ———— to a Court-Martial for *perjury*, but I conclude he was as drunk as his companion,—the infamous ————.

HEAD QUARTERS, CAMP KURRACHEE, 21*st June*, 1845.

The following remarks by His Excellency the Major-General, on the proceedings of the Medical Committee assembled at the Hospital of the ————, for the purpose of examining and reporting upon the amount of deficiency, and the circumstances connected with the loss of public property, in that hospital, are published for general information.

Remarks.—Assistant-Surgeon ———— is to make good all the deficiencies at his private cost. The public is not to lose because an officer has neglected his duty, which the Governor regrets he is obliged to say has been the case on the present occasion.

Remarks on a Native General Court-Martial, holden at Kurrachee, on the 23rd of June 1845, *for the trial of a Private of the—Regiment N. I., charged with desertion, and theft, while on duty as sentry, and sentenced to five years' imprisonment with hard labor.*

Memo.—In approving and confirming this sentence on the unfortunate soldier, I am bound to express my entire disapprobation of Major ———— having left the keys of a treasure-box in possession of the Naik or Corporal of the guard. To throw such temptation in the way of another man is, in every point of view, unpardonable. No man has a right to tempt his fellow men to commit crime. I therefore remit three years of the sentence.

HEAD QUARTERS, CAMP KURRACHEE, 30*th July*, 1845.

It is with much satisfaction that the Major-General Governor has read the proceedings of the Court of Inquest held on the body

of a prisoner named ————, to enquire into the cause of his death. It appears (as far as can be understood from proceedings so imperfectly drawn up) that he was a powerful man and attempted to escape, when the sentry, Barsea Sing, true to his duty, to the honor of his corps, and undismayed by the superior force of the prisoner, slew him. The Major-General Governor has the pleasure thus publicly to express his approbation of the soldier-like conduct of Barsea Sing, and to desire that, when the sepoy is out of hospital, (into which he has been obliged to go by the hurts he received in his contest with the deceased,) he may be sent to the Governor's quarters, that the latter may in words express his approbation to the soldier.

Remarks on the proceedings of a Military Commission held at Shapoor, on the 26th of August 1845, for the trial of a Boogtie Beloochee, charged with attempting to commit murder, and sentenced to imprisonment for life.

Memo.—I approve and confirm the sentence, because I like to see Military men ready to spare an enemy; but it is not altogether a *just sentence.* In every case of robbery which has occurred in Scinde by armed robbers who have drawn blood, I have hanged the offender: now this is not only a case of this kind, but the culprit is also an *invader* as regards us, and *a rebel* as regards our ally the Khan of Khelat. However, I spare his life in compliment to the activity of the officer and others composing the post at Shapoor.

Remarks on a European General Court-Martial, holden at Sukkur, on the 18th of August 1845, for the trial of a Private of the—European Regiment, charged with murder, and acquitted thereof.

Memo.—The Court has done wrong in calling for previous convictions. *Soldiers are to obey their orders.* This was a wilful and direct disobedience of General Orders, for which there was no excuse whatever: *there never can be any excuse for disobedience*

of orders, except the impossibility of obeying them. But this is not all, – it is also a direct breach of the Mutiny Act, Clause 21st, and of the 84th Article of War, both of which positively prohibit what the Court has taken upon itself most unaccountably to do; and, moreover, all three authorities state, that such a proceeding is "*only for the purpose of affixing punishment.*" Yet the Court has deliberately acted in the face of all authorities, the "*General Orders,*" the "*Articles of War,*" and the "*Act of Parliament.*" It is my duty to express my strongest disapprobation of this.

Remarks on a Native General Court-Martial, held at Kurrachee, on the 1st September 1845, for the trial of a Private of the —Regt. N. I., charged with being asleep on his post while on sentry, and sentenced to one year's imprisonment with hard labor.

Memo.—I am surprised that the Court should recommend the prisoner to mercy, because there is not the slightest reason to believe that the story he tells has the least foundation. The tent of the guard is 30 *paces* from the sentry's post; the verandah has a high step to get up, and no man being giddy would attempt to get up this, but would sit down on it. Besides, he was fast asleep. I never pardon a man who cannot go through a guard without misconduct.

HEAD QUARTERS, KURRACHEE, 13*th September*, 1845.

1. A Court of Enquiry of which Captain ———, of the —— Regt. N. I., is to be President, and Captain ———, and Captain ———, members, will assemble at —— as soon as possible, at such place as Brigadier ——— may appoint, to enquire into the cause why six men deserted from the —— Regt. N. I.

2. The Brigadier will be pleased to call upon Lieutenant-Colonel ——— for the explanation why no report was made of this disgraceful occurrence when it was discovered the men deserted early on the morning of the 10th, or during the night of the 9th, instant, and the report was not made to the Brigadier till four o'clock in the afternoon of the 10th, and not to the Police at all till reported by the Brigadier. This is quite inexplicable to the

Major-General. It gave the deserters full time to reach the hills; and to this circumstance will the Major-General attribute the escape of these deserters if they do escape.

Remarks on a Native General Court-Martial, holden at Kurrachee, on the 17th of September 1845, for the trial of a Private of the Sappers and Miners, charged with insubordinate conduct, and disobedience of orders, and sentenced to one year's imprisonment with hard labor.

Revised.—I think that the Court has very properly found the culprit guilty, but I think the punishment is too severe. It is true that the character of the man is bad, but sentence must be in proportion to the crime. I have just signed a Court's sentence of one year for desertion. Now, this crime is the result of temper, and ought not, in my opinion, to be so severely treated. However, it is for the Court to consider this matter: a year is a long time for hard labour, and to fall upon a man for a momentary loss of temper and folly, and a very young man too.

Remarks on a Native General Court-Martial, holden at Kurrachee, on the 30th of September 1845, for the trial of certain Privates of the—Regt. N. I., charged with desertion, and sentenced to hard labor for two years.

Memo.—It gives me very great pain to punish the abovenamed soldiers, because there has been much to complain of in the —— N. I., but soldiers all perfectly well know that there is a proper channel through which redress may be had. I myself asked the whole regiment on parade if any man had a complaint to make, and no man made a complaint!

The defence set up by the prisoners, that they could get no redress, is, therefore, a palpable falsehood, to my personal knowledge, and they have no excuse for their crime—a crime of the deepest die.

HEAD QUARTERS, KURRACHEE, *4th November*, 1845.

In consequence of the excellent behaviour of the 86th Regiment, and at the request of Brigadier Douglas, Lieutenant-Colonel

Derinzy, and the Captain of the Company to which Private ——— belongs, the Major-General Commanding remits the remainder of that soldier's punishment, who is to return to his duty. This act of mercy the Major-General considers to be a great compliment to the 86th Regiment, as he very much dislikes to pardon any man for a crime resulting from intoxication.

HEAD QUARTERS, KURRACHEE, 12*th December*, 1845.

Major-General Sir Charles Napier was sorry to see in the proceedings of a District Court-Martial, that in the department of the ——————— there was a neglect of a serious kind, namely, that of omitting to copy the station orders unless they especially referred to that department. This is a very unmilitary practice, and must be put a stop to at once. *Every* order, even to the details of guards, issued by authority, refers to *every* corps, *every* department, and *every* man, serving under that authority. It is the duty of *every* man in an army, not only to obey the orders of his commander, but, also, to report any disobedience of orders which he happens to see. Thus discipline is ensured. This he cannot do unless the various orders issued are known to him. The unsoldier-like practice of not copying every order issued, into all the orderly books, is sufficient to cause the loss of a campaign. This irregularity Sir Charles Napier hopes does not exist among the troops which he has the honor to command: it is a great and dangerous laxity of discipline, and if it again comes to the notice of the Major-General, he will feel it to be his duty to take very serious notice of it.

The system for the circulation of orders is as follows, and must not be departed from—it is as old as the hills:—

The Commander of an Army gives his orders to the Adjutant-General, who delivers them to the Divisional officers of his department.

These officers deliver them to the Majors of Brigades.

These last issue the General, Division, and Brigade, Orders to the Adjutants of Regiments, who attend at the Brigade-Major's quarters or orderly room at an appointed hour,—or, if the Adjutant of a Regiment should not be able to attend in person, the Regimen-

tal Subaltern of the day attends for him; for no Brigade-Major who knows, and does, his duty, will issue orders to any but a Commissioned Officer: to issue orders to a Non-Commissioned Officer is to break the chain of responsibility, to injure discipline, and to compromise himself. The Brigade-Major has no right whatever to pass over *one rank* and transact business with the *next*. Adjutants, and the Regimental Subalterns on duty, are alone authorized to receive orders from a Brigade-Major, except in special cases where a corps or a department may not have a Commissioned Officer. But this is an exception to the rule, which can very rarely occur.

When it does, it should be sanctioned by a distinct order of the Officer Commanding the Brigade or Station, and as it is a dangerous practice, such a permission should be given with great caution.

The Ajutant in turn, issues his order to the Orderly Serjeants of Companies, who bring them immediately to their Officers, and the Officer Commanding the Company reads and explains them to his men. In Native Regiments, this is better done by the Interpreter if the Officers of a Company are not able to speak to their men, which of course can never be the case after a year's residence in the country, and Officers of less standing are necessarily excused.

From the above, it is easily seen that the special duty of circulating orders attaches in the highest degree to Adjutants, and is among their *most important duties*. They are the links by which Staff and Regimental duties are joined, and if broken, the whole machine of an army is endangered. Such important duties emphatically belong to Commissioned Officers.

Sir Charles Napier hopes that Officers Commanding Stations will take means for preventing such a breach of discipline, should it exist, which he hopes is not the case; and it is the duty of the Major-General himself to look to this matter, for it must be evident to every man of sound sense, how much the efficiency and honor of an army depends upon this matter: though at first sight it appears to be a trivial affair, it is not so, and every thorough-bred soldier knows that it is not.

It is the desire of the Major-General to give as little duty to Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers, and Private Soldiers, as he can, but that duty must be well done,—and it is but just to the troops under his

command to say that, as far as he can judge, this has been the case. They obey orders well, and it is proper that they should be accurately circulated,—for it is vexatious to see a respectable Non-Commissioned Officer commit a breach of orders, and defending himself before a Court-Martial by proving that the orders had not been communicated either to him or any of his department.

Remarks on a Native General Court-Martial, holden at Kurrachee, on the 23rd of December 1845, for the trial of a Havildar of the Beloochee Battalion, charged with insubordinate and abusive conduct to a Native Officer, and sentenced to be reduced to the ranks, and two years' imprisonment.

Memo.—I pardon this man for reasons which I stated on parade, and others which I did not state, and have not time to state here,—nor indeed can I well do so: they are strong however.

Remarks on a Native General Court-Martial, holden at Sukkur, on the 26th of December 1845, for the trial of a Camp-follower, accused of wounding certain persons with a sword, and sentenced to imprisonment without hard labor, for twelve calendar months.

Revised.—The sentence of one year's imprisonment to a culprit who has desperately wounded several people, is a perfect mockery of justice. Unless the Court choose to alter the sentence, there is no security for the discipline of the station, and it will be my duty to report the proceedings of the Court to His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.

Memo. on revised sentence.—The Major-General has read with astonishment the sentence of one year's imprisonment passed upon ———— by a General Court-Martial held at Sukkur, for running amuck, and wounding four people, of which Court Subedar ———— was President, and Captain ———— was officiating Judge-Advocate-General. The revised sentence has been disapproved of by the Major-General Commanding, but *confirmed*. The prisoner is to be sent to Kurrachee, to undergo his punishment, such as it is, and the proceedings have been forwarded to His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.

HEAD QUARTERS, KURRACHEE, *27th December*, 1845.

With reference to General Orders of the 12th inst., His Excellency the Major-General directs, in modification thereof, that in the Ordnance, Engineer, and Commissariat, Departments, in which there is only one Officer, a Warrant Officer may attend to copy the daily orders.

The Fort Adjutant at Hydrabad will personally attend for orders.

The orderly book will be sent to the Staff-Surgeon as usually done, taking his receipt for the daily orders.

Remarks on a General Court-Martial, held at Kurrachee on the 2nd January 1846, *for the trial of a Bombardier of the —— Battalion of Artillery, charged with making use of highly disrespectful and abusive language to his Commanding Officer, and sentenced to be reduced to the rank and pay of a Gunner, and further to suffer corporal punishment to the extent of* 200 *lashes.*

Memo.—When a prisoner is prosecuted by an officer, *that* officer should never be called upon to speak to his character.

HEAD QUARTERS, KURRACHEE, *3rd January*, 1846.

The Major-General has read with much astonishment the proceedings of a Native District Court-Martial of which Captain ——, of the ——— Regiment, is Superintending Officer. His Excellency thinks it most strange, and by no means creditable to this Superintending Officer, that he should allow a Native Court-Martial to pass an illegal sentence, and so break the 75th Article of War, which is especially ordered to be attended to. When His Excellency considers the rank of the Superintending Officer, he is the more surprised at this. Captain ——— is to write out the Articles of War with his own hand, from Article 75 to Article 79 inclusive. If an officer will not take the trouble to ascertain what his duties are, when clearly pointed out, and where no misconception can possibly exist, it is the Major-General's duty to instruct him better in the Military code. When Captain ——— —— has written out these Articles of War, the Commanding Officer of the —— Regiment is to forward them for the inspection of the Major-General.

Remarks on a European General Court-Martial, holden at Kurrachee, on the 22nd of May 1846, *for the trial of two Privates of the Bombay Artillery, charged with robbery in a dwelling house,—one being acquitted, and the other sentenced to one year's imprisonment.*

Memo.—The sentence passed upon the Prisoner ——— I approve of and confirm. The acquittal of the Prisoner ——— I can neither approve of or confirm. I am sorry to differ in opinion with the Court; but I am unable to trace, in the proceedings, the evidence upon which such an acquittal is grounded. I am therefore obliged to revise the Proceedings as regards the prisoner ———, not so much with the expectation that the Court will change its opinion, for I am persuaded that such an acquittal could not have taken place without strong discussion—I therefore could add nothing to what has probably been already said to the clear evidence (as I conceive) against ———, and to the lucid address of the Deputy Judge-Advocate-General, but revise the Finding against ———, because I have a right to make this protest against a sentence that I believe to be so erroneous, and by which, I think, a very cunning thief escapes the sentence passed upon his more stupid companion in iniquity.

Remarks on a Native General Court-Martial, holden at Kurrachee, on the 8th June 1846, *for the trial of a Private of the Beloochee Battalion, charged with desertion, and sentenced to receive* 100 *lashes.*

Memo.—As I do not believe that the prisoner had any intention to desert, I will remit fifty lashes, in hopes that the remainder will prove a sufficient lesson to him, that in future he must obey his orders.

Remarks on a Native General Court-Martial, holden at Kurrachee, on the 8th June 1846, *for the trial of a Private of the Beloochee Battalion, charged with disobedience of orders, and insubordinate conduct and language to a Native Officer, and sentenced to receive* 150 *lashes.*

Memo.—As the Belooch Regiment is a young corps, I will remit one hundred lashes of the prisoner's sentence, in hopes that the fifty which are to be inflicted, will be a warning to this soldier to conduct himself with propriety in future.

HEAD QUARTERS, CAMP KURRACHEE, 13*th August*, 1846.

It having been reported to His Excellency the Major-General Commanding, that much dissatisfaction prevails among the Native Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers of the ——— corps, who were transferred from the line for promotion in that corps, arising from some misunderstanding as to the nature of the duties which they are now called upon to perform,—His Excellency is therefore pleased to direct, that a Court of Enquiry shall be assembled as soon as possible at Hydrabad, and at Jurruck, for the purpose of fully investigating into all matters of complaint which the Native Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers have preferred through their Commanding Officer Major———.

Lieutenant-Colonel ———, commanding at Hydrabad, will be President of this Court of Enquiry, and Lieutenant-Colonel ———, commanding the —— Regiment N. I., and Major ———, Assistant Adjutant-General, Members of the same.

Major ——— will be pleased to direct that all parties belonging to the 1st and 3rd Divisions of the corps not actually detached on duty, be with their respective Divisions at Hooseeree and Soondah by the 19th instant.

HEAD QUARTERS, CAMP KURRACHEE, 31*st August*, 1846.

The Major-General Commanding has read the proceedings of the Court of Enquiry held on the conplaint which was very properly made by Lieutenant ——— of the Indian Navy. The Court could not detect the officer who acted so improperly : but the Major-General can, if he chooses—and easily too! However, instead of ordering people never to appear out of full uniform well and comfortably buttoned up to the chin, sword, sashes, and all other useful and ornamental matters, the Governor prefers appealing to the good sense of the unknown gentlemen, and he is sure that no more offensive practical jokes will be played upon Lascars or any other natives : and so ends the matter this time.

Remarks on a European General Court-Martial, holden at Kurrachee, on the 9th November 1846, *for the trial of a Sergeant of the —Regiment, charged with making a false and malicious statement against Captain———, and sentenced to be reduced.*

Memo.—In compliance with the recommendation of the Court, I pardon Serjeant ———. It was with regret that I brought the prisoner to trial, but it was the only way in which to prove that the honorable character of Captain ——— was vilely slandered, either by Serjeant ———, or the slander propagated by him. The high honor of Captain ——— I well know; but it was a duty to that officer to give him an opportunity of publicly disproving the false accusation of the Serjeant. This has been done, and I now direct Captain ——— to prosecute ——— before a General Court-Martial on a charge of defamation.

HEAD QUARTERS, CAMP KURRACHEE, 28*th November*, 1846.

The Major-General has received the proceedings of the Court of Enquiry, regarding the quarrel between the Police and the ——— Battalion. The opinion of the Court he entirely concurs in.

It appears—1st, That the soldiers of the —— Battalion disobeyed the 35th Article of War, and were consequently the cause of the riot which has taken place, and are wholly to blame, for it cannot be reasonably expected, that men in the situation of the Police of Kurrachee, when attacked and insulted while in the execution of their duty, should be held accountable for that loss of temper which is common to men when provoked to anger.

That the Police should have pursued the ——— Battalion rioters beyond the Town, and so far towards the Cantonments, was wrong. They should have desisted when they had, in obedience to their orders, cleared the Town; but, as the Major-General has already said, calm and correct conduct cannot be expected from bodies of men who have been wantonly irritated.

The Major-General feels assured that the ——— corps will in future recollect, that orders are not to be broken through without such misconduct being followed by severe punishment; and he trusts to the respectable soldiers of that corps for the preservation of discipline in future.

The Sowar ———has presumed to give false evidence against Lieutenant ———, saying that that officer had struck him, which that officer did not do. This Sowar is therefore to be put in confinement, and shall be punished.

It is the duty of every man, whether of regular Troops, Irregular Troops, Cavalry or Infantry, Police, either mounted or dismounted,—in short, of every man,—present at a riot, immediately to place himself by the side, and obey the orders, of the first British officer he sees.

The three men who first entered the town with bludgeons, are to be brought to a District Court-Martial.

The Major-General will not move the ——— Battalion to prevent future quarrelling with the Police. It is his duty to make those under his command obedient to orders, and the first man, of either the Police or ——— Battalion, that breaks the peace, shall be punished with the utmost severity that is in the power of the Major-General to inflict.

This order is to be translated and carefully explained to every Native Regiment on Parade.

Remarks on a Native General Court-Martial, assembled at Shikarpoor, on the 25th March 1847, *for the trial of a Private of the— Regt. N. I., charged with desertion, and sentenced to imprisonment with hard labour for eighteen months.*

Memo.—As the prisoner is so young a soldier, and as I believe his story, because his general character is good, I will pardon him, and desire his Commanding Officer will be so good as to admonish him against intoxication.

Remarks on a Native General Court-Martial, holden at Hydrabad, on the 16th of April 1847, *for the trial of a Private of the Beloochee Battalion, charged with desertion and re-enlistment, and sentenced to two years' imprisonment with hard labor.*

Memo.—I think the punishment well merited, but as other Courts have sentenced about a year's imprisonment with hard labor for a similar crime, I will remit one year of this man's punishment.

Remarks on a European General Court-Martial, assembled at Bhooj, on the 18th of June 1847, *for the trial of a Gunner of the— Battalion Artillery, charged with being drunk and riotous, and*

striking a Bombardier, his superior officer, while in the execution of his duty, and sentenced to receive 200 *lashes.*

Memo.—It is with regret, and great surprise, that I find a Court-Martial so unacquainted with its proper constitution as to pass a sentence, when it had been, by the sickness of a member, reduced below the legal number sanctioned by the Articles of War.

The result is, that the proceedings have become illegal, and the prisoner must be sent to his duty.

SECTION IV.

MARCHES AND ROUTES.

HEAD QUARTERS, SUKKUR, 26*th November*, 1842.

The Major-General requests that officers will not encumber themselves with more Baggage than is absolutely necessary. A Subaltern's tent between four officers must be sufficient, as no service that the troops may be called upon to perform can be of long duration. The whole Baggage of the Bengal Troops to cross with the Brigade.

HEAD QUARTERS, SUKKUR, 17*th December*, 1842.

If the Troops march from Roree, the Major-General's whole Baggage, with that of his servants, and including his tent and theirs, shall be carried by four Camels; and he is sure that this will convince those under his command that he has no desire to curtail their comforts unnecessarily, nor any intention of personally flinching from the inconvenience which the good of the service obliges him to inflict upon them. A fifth Camel may possibly accompany the Major-General's baggage; but if so, this Camel will carry stationery and public papers alone, which, though the quantity is not great, it will not be in the Major-General's power to place in his own restricted baggage.

HEAD QUARTERS, SUKKUR, 18*th December*, 1842.

The following is the scale allowed for Public and Private Carriage, in the event of the Troops marching from Roree, and Indents are to be framed accordingly :—

Rowties—2 Camels to 3 Rowties.

7 Camels to 100 Natives.

Ammunition, 4 boxes to.....	1 Camel.
Native Officers' Rowties.....	3 Camels.
Hospital and Guards.....	4 Camels.
Intrenching Tools.....	1 Camel.
Flints.....	1 Camel.
Puckauls.....	14 prs. Camels.
Kujawahs.....	14 prs. Camels.
Hospital Stores.....	2 Camels.
Field Officers.....	4 Camels.
Captains	3 Camels.
Subalterns.....	2 Camels.
Messes.....	7 Camels.
Adjutant's and Quarter Master's Offices.....	1 Camel.

European Regiment.

10 Camels to 100 Europeans.

HEAD QUARTERS, CAMP NEAR NUSSEER KHAN'S KOTE,
29th December, 1842.

Commanding Officers of Regiments are requested to take especial care of their Camels,—for if these animals be stolen at night, the Commissariat Department cannot replace them, so that the Regiment which loses its Camels must suffer. The Major-General most earnestly calls the attention of Commanding Officers to this point, which is of vital importance. It is not possible to get more Camels.

Major ————, Commanding Engineer, will be so good as to so arrange it, that an Officer of the Sappers and Miners shall always precede the column, marching with the advance guard, and is to be entrusted exclusively with the care of clearing the road in front

of the column. On coming to any difficulty, he is to leave an Officer, non-commissioned officer, or private, of the Sappers, in charge of the fatigue party, unless the impediment be so serious as to require his own presence: of this matter, he must judge for himself.

The Pioneers of Her Majesty's 22nd Regiment, with ten men from each Regiment of Native Infantry, are to march with the Sappers and Miners, under command of the Officer of Sappers and Miners charged with opening the road.

Two Camels with entrenching tools are also to accompany the party, and all working parties for clearing roads, whether of peasants or soldiers, are to be under the orders of the officer entrusted with this duty during the march; and to that officer the Major-General will look for the removal of all impediments. He is to apply to the Assistant Adjutant-General for such fatigue parties as may be necessary to assist the Sappers and Miners, who are to be considered as a corps of overseers rather than of labourers, though they must frequently work as such when the service demands this exertion, for there must not be any duty so exclusively belonging to any man in the Army, that he may not be called upon to perform another duty when there is necessity.

The Commanding Engineer is requested to take charge of the duty of examining and exploring the country, reporting every information that he can acquire, as to distance, state of communication, water, forage, &c., applying to Lieut.-Colonel ——————— for such escorts of the 9th Light Cavalry as he may require, and the detachment so escorting the Engineer should carry carbines.

The Assistant Quarter-Master-General is to mark out the encamping grounds, and ascertain whether the supply of water be abundant or not; and the Commanding Engineer will be so good as to afford to the Quarter-Master-General's Department every information in his power. There are many points on which the Commanding Engineer, and Assistant Quarter-Master-General, have nearly the same duties; but they are not such as will at all clash: on the contrary, they are most important, and these officers can assist each other. The Assistant Quarter-Master-General will also

endeavour to provide guides, and to assist the Assistant Commissary-General in procuring supplies, &c. Such are a few of the duties of the above officers, which the Major-General thinks it advisable to point out for their guidance in a general way.

With the view of ensuring to the public Camels attached to Regiments, Departments, and individuals, the regulated supply of forage and grain, the Camel Serjeants and Havildars of Regiments, and servants of individuals, will take daily to the Commissariat Office, the requisitions for the same; and if the grain and forage is not promptly supplied, they will report immediately, personally, to Captain Blenkins, Sub-Assistant Commissary-General. The distribution of the grain and forage to the Camels should be personally superintended by the above individuals, and duly reported to the officers under whose orders they act.

Unless the above directions are strictly attended to, it will be impossible for the Commissariat Officer to know whether the Camels are fed or not.

Head Quarters, Camp near Dejee ka Kote, *5th January*, 1843.

Captain ——— has very properly reported to the Major-General that the Camels are overloaded, especially those carrying the private baggage of Soldiers and Sepoys. The Officer commanding the rear guard has made the same report. Two Camel-loads were weighed yesterday: one found 600 lbs., the other above 700 lbs.—a Camel load is, by regulation, 280 lbs., that is 2½ cwt. As the Major-General has always made it a rule not to repeat orders, Officers Commanding Regiments ought to see that those already issued are obeyed; he therefore publicly declares to the troops, that he has ordered weighers to accompany the Baggage Guard, and whenever the Baggage Master sees a Camel that he thinks overloaded, whether it belongs to the Major-General or any Officer or Sepoy in the Force, he, the Baggage Master, is to weigh it, and carefully place all that is above 280 lbs. on the road side. The Major-General will hold the Baggage Master responsible that this order is complied with, or he will direct the Assistant Commissary-General to charge the value of the Camel to the

Baggage Master's private account. The Major-General gives the Baggage Master unqualified supported against all complaints, and also a guard, and the Major-General has a right to hold him responsible for the due protection of the Camels; and the Major-General is determined that he will not allow the service he is ordered to execute, to fail, because these vital regulations are not obeyed.

HEAD QUARTERS, PEER ABOO BUKKER, 28*th January*, 1843.

The noise made by the Camp-followers at night is insufferable, against Military Rules, and precludes security in case of being in an enemy's country: the quarter and rear guards are to keep order in front and rear of their respective corps. In future, therefore, these guards are to send patrols out, every hour from tatoo-beating till 12 o'clock, and these patrols will confine in the Bazaar guard such noisy people as they find. The Superintendent of Bazaars and Police will deal with them according to their deserts. The Field Officer of the Day will be pleased to recollect that he is responsible for the tranquillity of the camp.

HEAD QUARTERS, CAMP BALLEANEE, 28*th January*, 1843.

It is very painful to the Major-General to observe that, in the face of the orders issued relative to Camels, and the impossibility of his moving with the troops if those orders are not obeyed, it has this day been reported to him that several Camels of the ——— and—Regiments were shamefully overloaded—disobedience, cruelty to the animals, and a decided and immediate injury to the service, are involved in this disregard of so important an order. There is no excuse for Camels being destroyed by overloading, if officers of Companies will attend rigidly to their duty. He therefore distinctly states that Regiments, in which the Camels are overloaded and die, cannot have them replaced, and must carry their baggage as they best can, and must be charged the value of the Camels lost. This would be very painful to the Major-General; but the loss of Camels is so injurious to the public service, and as it is im-

possible to replace them, the most effectual measures are absolutely necessary; but the Major-General most sincerely hopes, that the zeal of the officers, and the knowledge which they all must have, that he cannot replace the Camels lost, will prevent the continuance of this evil, and disregard of orders.

HYDRABAD, 20*th February*, 1843.

The plundering which is going forward, is disgraceful, and is most dangerous to the troops. The Major-General, therefore, desires Commanding Officers, and Head of Departments, to warn all under their orders, and especially the Camp-followers, who are the chief offenders, that he is resolved to stop the robbery now carrying on in all the country round,—and he gives this public notice, that however painful it may be to him to take the life of any man, yet he is resolved to hang some of these robbers in front of the camp. After this public warning, their blood be on their own heads.

HYDRABAD, 21*st March*, 1844.

The following is the list of necessaries each sepoy is allowed to carry on the march: the whole weight not to exceed 16 lbs:—

2 Lotas...	Cooking Utensils.
1 Talee...	
1 Kuttoree.	
1 Towah...	
1 Dunnee.	Bedding.
1 Gullief...	
1 Chuddur.	
1 Small Bag of Pipeclay.	
1 Small Bag of Flour....	
1 Pair of Shoes.	

HEAD QUARTERS, KURRACHEE, 10*th August*, 1844.

Whenever troops or stores are to be sent from one station to another by the River, a return of such troops or stores is to be sent at the earliest possible date to the Commander of the Flotilla at the Station, who will himself send a steamer, or hire boats, as

he finds best for the public service, and for the most speedy execution of orders for the conveyance of the said troops or stores. To facilitate the service, commanders of stations will be so good as to communicate to the Naval Officer the time for, and other particulars relative to, moving the said stores or troops. These matters will generally be communicated *direct* to the Commander of the Flotilla from Head Quarters, but urgent cases may arise in which Commanders of stations must act at once, and on their own responsibility, —especially at Sukkur, to which station orders from the Supreme Government and Commander-in-Chief are, on emergent occasions, sent direct.

It is hoped that the above order will remove any difficulty or impediment to that union of exertion between the two services which is essential for the public good, and which both are so desirous to accomplish,—but without well understood arrangement, nothing goes right.

HEAD QUARTERS, SUKKUR, 12*th January*, 1845.

1.—The troops will take the Field on the 13th instant. The following arrangements are made.

ARTILLERY.

2.—Lieut.-Col. Geddes is immediately to form a Mountain Train, under the command of Captain Graham, Commissary of Ordnance at Sukkur, with the officers and men of his own battery. The train is to consist of four 4⅔ inch Mortars, two 3-pounder Guns, and two 4⅔ Howitzers, with ammunition and stores complete. The train artificers to be made as efficient as possible, and those attached to Nos. 1 and 5 Light Field Batteries will be added to the Magazine Establishment.

It is to assemble with all possible expedition at Khanghur. To Lieut.-Col. Geddes the Governor trusts all the details of the Artillery, and that officer is to proceed to Khanghur with all convenient despatch. The ordnance artificers are attached to the artillery.

Mr Conductor Smith is placed in charge of the Arsenal at Sukkur while the troops are in the field.

ENGINEERS.

3.—Lieutenant Maxwell, of the Bengal Engineers, is to proceed immediately on the route to Poolajee with the entrenching tools. On passing through Shikarpoor, he will receive the Bombay public followers from Captain Jameson, and form his Corps of Pioneers on his march to Khanghur.

The Bombay Sappers and Miners are to proceed along with Lieutenant Maxwell, and are placed under his command. This officer will endeavour to reach Poolajee as soon as possible.

COMMISSARIAT.

4.—Assistant Commissary-General Gerrard is to form the Military Field Chest immediately, and proceed as soon as convenient to Shikarpoor, making his arrangements for conveying provisions for a fortnight for 2440 Infantry and 1600 Cavalry.

He is to establish a Bazaar at Poolajee, and there form a Magazine for supplying the troops, that they may enter the mountains with a fortnight's provisions in the Camp.

The Commissary is to provide 100 pairs of Puckalls in case of need, and he will be so good as to endeavour to push forward a supply of water to Captain Jacob with all possible alacrity.

Major-General Hunter will be pleased to name an officer to assume charge of the Commissariat Department at Sukkur during the absence of Captain Gerrard on field duty.

BAGGAGE.

5.—Captain Jameson is appointed Baggage-Master to the Force in Cutchee.

The allowance of carriage to Officers provided by the Commissariat, is as follows, and must not on any account be exceeded :—

For Field Officers, 5—for Captains, 4—for Subalterns, 3—for Messes, 14.

MOVEMENTS OF TROOPS.

6.—Major-General Simpson is to continue his march with the Legion to Khanghur, where further orders await him.

Major-General Hunter, C.B., is to proceed with the 2nd Europeans to Khanghur. On passing through Shikarpoor, he will take with

him all the disposable Infantry there, and he may march such Infantry from Sukkur as he deems advisable. The arrangements for the garrisoning of these two stations are left entirely to the Major-General's discretion.

LARKHANA.

7.—The Scinde Horse and Camel Corps, with the Volunteers of H. M. 39th Regiment mounted on the Camels of the latter Regiment, together with the two mountain Guns, are to march from Larkhana on the morning of the 13th, under the orders of Captain Jacob.

The Commissariat, under Captain Jameson, to march the same day, under escort of a detachment of the 9th Irregular Cavalry, to Rojhan, and from thence with all practicable rapidity to Poolajee.

SHIKARPOOR.

8.—Captain Mowatt's Troop of Horse Artillery is to march from Shikarpoor on the morning of the 14th, to Jaghun, and on the 15th to Khanghur, and await orders.

When at Khanghur, Major-General Hunter, C. B., is to establish temporarily his Head Quarters, and push forward each Corps to Poolajee as rapidly as he can command carriage, and which can only be done when it is known that the advance-guard under Capt. Jacob has found sufficient water. If he has not, the whole of the carriage must be applied to furnish water to the advance-guard—and in order that such accident may be provided for, the Pioneers under Lieut. Maxwell are to be pushed on to Poolajee before any other troops, in order to open wells.

KHANGHUR.

Captain Salter will be so good as to assemble the 6th Irregular Cavalry at Khanghur on the 15th instant, to march on Poolajee under the immediate command of the Governor on the 16th, as the troops will by that day be everywhere in movement. Captain Salter need not consider it necessary to leave strong guards, but merely a few men to protect the quarters, and thus the 6th Irregular Cavalry will muster as strong as possible for the advance to support Captain Jacob.

HEAD QUARTERS, KHANGHUR, 15*th January*, 1845.

Captain Salter is to march at half-past twelve P. M. with 400 Irregular Horse, one Howitzer, and one 3-pounder gun. He will endeavour to reach Ooche with all practicable celerity, and attack the enemy on arriving at that place.

He is to endeavour as soon as possible, after arriving at Ooche, to communicate with Captain Jacob at Shahpoor.

He is also to endeavour to communicate with Captain William Brown, who is ordered to march from Meerpoor to Sooree Khooshta, and who will entirely depend upon Captain Salter for support.

At Ooche, Captain Salter is to halt till he receives further orders.

Captain William Brown is to march from Meerpoor as soon as possible upon Sooree Khooshta.

If during his march he hears that the enemy is in force at that place, Captain Brown will march upon Ooche and join Capt. Salter.

If Captain Brown, when at Ooche, hears that the column of His Highness Ali Moorad is advancing upon Sooree Khooshta or Muth, he is to endeavour to join Captain Malet.

As the movements of Captain Brown must entirely depend upon his means of supplying provisions, and other circumstances over which the Governor has no control, he leaves everything regarding Captain Brown's movements to his own discretion.

His Highness the Meer has promised to move on the 18th instant.

Lieutenant Maxwell is to proceed to Minootee this evening, accompanied by all the Infantry of the 69th Detachment at Khanghur, and taking all the Commissariat Puckalls filled with water.

As soon as he has given his carriage sufficient rest, he is to proceed to Shahpoor.

HEAD QUARTERS, CAMP BELOW THE DERAH PASS, 31*st Jan.*, 1845.

The posts of communication between Head Quarters and Shikarpoor are to be regulated by Major-General Hunter, C. B., who may place Native Infantry, if he deems it requisite, at the posts between Head Quarters and Shahpoor.

The arrival of all supplies in Camp is to be immediately reported by the Assistant Commissary-General in writing, and also personally to the Governor,—the number of days' supply being stated, and the description of carriage by which it has been brought, according to a Form which will be given to Captain Gerrard by the Assistant Adjutant-General.

The Commander of the Escort having given over his charge to the Assistant Commissary-General, is to receive a receipt for the same from the Commissariat, and then to report his arrival to the Assistant Adjutant-General, to whom he is to deliver his receipt, and state if anything particular has occurred on the march. The Assistant Adjutant-General is to file these receipts regularly.

When carriage is to go to the rear, the Assistant Commissary-General is to apply to the Assistant Adjutant-General for an escort, stating the number of men he considers necessary, and the precise hour that his carriage will be ready to march.

The Assistant Commissary-General is requested to give the earliest notice to the Assistant Adjutant-General, when he wishes to send an escort, in order that the officers of the force may have time to write letters.

HEAD QUARTERS, CAMP BELOW THE DERAH PASS, 1*st Feb.*, 1845.

The Major-General Governor is sorry to see such an exhibition of indiscipline as he now witnesses,—soldiers straggling beyond the limit of the Camp; why, he knows not—he has had no report of anything extraordinary either from Major-General ——— or from the Captain of the day. All this is perfectly irregular, and calculated to produce the greatest disaster. No Soldier is, under any pretence whatever, to quit the Camp unarmed, and none with arms without the direct orders of the Governor. In case of any alarm, every Officer is to fall in his own Corps, and there abide orders. The Provost-Marshall is to flog any man he finds half-a-mile beyond the Camp except on duty. The slightest alarm is to be instantly reported by the Captain of the Day to the Governor direct.

HEAD QUARTERS, CAMP BELOW DERAH PASS, *2nd February*, 1845.

When stores of any kind are dispatched either for, or from, the Camp, the Officer dispatching such stores is to give an inventory of them to the Commander of the Guard, and take the Commander's receipt for the same. On reaching his destination, the Commander is to deliver his charge over, and if it is not correct, the Commissary, or other person to whom the stores were consigned, is to report the Commander of the Guard immediately, to the Commanding Officer, who is to put the Commander in close arrest, and report him to the Governor, that he may be tried by a General Court-Martial on the spot.

HEAD QUARTERS, CAMP BELOW DERAH PASS, *3rd February*, 1845.

1. Regulations for the Field Force under command of Major-General Sir C. J. Napier.

2. The Departments of the Assistant Adjutant-General, the Quarter-Master General, the Commissary-General, the Provost Marshal, and the Artillery, are to report direct to the Major-General Governor.

3. Lieutenant ————, and the Sappers and Miners, with a Native Officer's party of thirty Sepoys, are attached to the Quarter-Master General's Department, and are exclusively under the orders of that Officer.

4. The whole of the Cavalry and Infantry, in the absence of Major-Genl. ————, are to report to Major-Genl. ———— except the Scinde Horse under Captain Jacob, who are employed on exclusive duty.

5. The Adjutant-General is to send all General Orders direct to Major-General ————, and Major-General ————, to be by those Officers issued to the Troops under their immediate command.

6. The Governor's escort is to receive orders from nobody but the Governor himself.

7. There is to be a Field Officer of the Day in the Governor's Camp, when there are more than two Field Officers present. This

Officer is responsible for the alertness of all on duty, as well as for the general cleanliness of the Camp, and to make his daily report to Major-General ————, unless in case of alarm, when he is immediately either to come himself or send an Officer to report to the Major-General Governor, whether the alarm should occur by day or by night.

8. There is also to be a Captain of the Day.

9. A Quarter-Master of the Day is to mount regularly, and is especially responsible for the cleanliness of the Camp.

10. The Brigade-Major is to point out a spot where animals are to be slaughtered, and the Quarter-Master on duty is held responsible that no animals are killed in any other place.

11. The Provost-Marshal is to have a daily guard of a Serjeant and 12 Rank and File, and a Corporal and three of Irregular Horse are to be attached to the Provost-Martial. He is to punish on the spot any Soldier or Camp-follower who may be found half-a-mile from the Camp except by special permission of Major-General ————.

12. Every Commanding Officer of a Corps is to appoint his private parade where, in case of alarm, his men are instantly to fall in with their arms.

13. The above orders will not exonerate the Commanders of Corps, and the Commandant at Head Quarters, from their responsibility that their respective lines are kept clean, and they are all submitted to any further rules that may be established by Major-General ———— for the internal Police of the Camp.

14. When the Field Force marches, the Quarter-Masters of Regiments, attended by the Camp color-men, are to place themselves under the orders of the Assistant Quarter-Master-General, who will point out to them their respective encamping grounds, and which are not to be altered, in the slightest particular, without the Governor's personal orders.

HEAD QUARTERS, CAMP BELOW DERAH PAPS, *5th February*, 1845.

The Head Quarters' Baggage is to be reduced to the undermentioned scale.

His Excellency the Governor... ... 4 Camels.
Secretary to Government... ... ...
Assistant Adjutant-General.....
Assistant Quarter-Master-General. } 2 Camels for private Baggage and 1 for Public.
All other Officers of the General Staff...2 Camels each.

All Public Offices to be sent back to Shahpoor to-morrow morning.

His Excellency the Governor calls upon all Officers with this Force to reduce their Baggage as much as possible, sending back to Shahpoor all that is not actually necessary, in order that the Baggage-animals may be made available for Commissariat purposes.

HEAD QUARTERS, CAMP BELOW DERAH PASS, *7th February*, 1845.

The Major-General and Governor is sorry to put any Officer to inconvenience—but no Baggage-animals are to be allowed to accompany the Force beyond the stated number allotted to each rank.

This applies equally to Public and Private animals. Officers are referred to the General Order No. 5 of the 12th January 1845.

HEAD QUARTERS, CAMP DERAH, *26th February*, 1845.

A report having been made to the Governor, that the Soldiers of the 1st Division of the ——— Regt. suffered greatly in going down the River in boats not properly covered in, the Governor made immediate enquiry into the circumstance, and having read the correspondence between Major-General ———, Col. ———, Major ———, and Captain ———, on the subject, has come to the following decision.

In the first place, Lieutenant-Colonel ——— was ordered by the Governor in person, to take command of the 1st Division as far as Hydrabad, and there to see it properly quartered, and to order whatever was necessary for the comfort of the sick.

That Lieutenant-Colonel ——— himself understood that he was in command of the Wing, is evident, for General ——— asserts that the Lieutenant-Colonel applied to him to be put in orders, that he might draw boat-allowance as commanding the 1st Division. This point being decided by the above circumstances, and by the

fact that Lieutenant-Colonel ——— was, according to his own request, put in Station Orders to command the 1st Division, the Governor has now to consider the question generally, and enquire who was in fault in this affair, as the Major-General ———, and Lieutenant-Colonel ———, have mutually accused each other of being to blame—if blame there was,—for it appears yet doubtful whether the boats were improperly covered in or not.

Captain ——— asserts that the aggravated mortality was caused by the neglect of the authorities at ———, who covered the boats badly. It also appears that Captain ——— first reported the imperfect state of the boats to Lieut.-Col. ——— when at ———, and frankly stated, that were he on a committee on those boats, he would condemn them all. On the voyage down, Captain ——— appears to have exerted himself to remedy this deficiency in the preparation of the boats, and to have done all that a zealous Officer could do for his men. The Governor considers that Captain ——— is further justified in making his report of the 1st of January, and he also considers that Officer's conduct to have been in every way becoming, and proper, as far as he is able to judge from the papers before him, and he therefore further considers, that no enquiry into the conduct of that Officer is called for after thus publicly expressing his approbation of it. If that Officer feels himself aggrieved by the observations of General ———, Captain ——— must recollect that he had neglected to give any explanation of the means he had taken to remedy the evil he had complained of, or that he had represented the case to his Lieutenant-Colonel. Major-General ——— therefore stood under an implied accusation by Captain ——— of neglect of duty, of which his conscience justly acquitted him. Had Captain ——— stated in his first letter what he afterwards stated to Lieutenant-Colonel ——— in those of the 17th and 18th January, Major-General ———would not have written as he did relative to Captain ———. The Governor now considers this matter at an end as far as regards Major-General ——— and Captain ———.

With regard to Major-General ———, and Lieutenant-Colonel ———, the case is very different. Captain ——— has stated, on the authority of Assistant-Surgeon ———, which

authority was sufficient to authorize the statement, that the aggravation of disease was caused by "the very imperfect manner" in which the boats were prepared. Now on an occasion in which a vast and unprecedented mortality has taken place, and that disease was "*greatly aggravated*" by its results, the number of deaths must also have been aggravated by that neglect, and therefore the enquiry becomes imperious to ascertain who was in fault. That Major-General ——— was not in fault, is perfectly clear from his own statement, uncontradicted by anybody. It appears that Major General ———, who was on the spot, and his attention unremitting, considered that the boats were properly covered, and as no complaint to the contrary was made to him, the Governor holds the Major-General to be free from blame.

The question then resolves itself into a small compass. Assistant-Surgeon ——— had done his duty in reporting his opinion of the imperfect preparation of the boats to Captain ———. Captain ——— did his duty in reporting the same to Lieutenant-Colonel ———, and it is very painful to the Governor, holding the very high opinion that he does of Lieutenant-Colonel ——— as an Officer, to say that Lieut.-Colonel ———, if he considered that the boats were not properly covered, did not do his duty in withholding the report of Captain ——— from Major-General ———. It was Colonel ———'s duty to have superintended the preparation of the boats, and to have ascertained, by personal inspection, the correctness of Capt. ———'s and Dr. ———'s reports; and whether he concurred with those Officers or not, it was his duty, on an occasion of such vast importance, to have called the immediate attention of Major-General ——— to the circumstance.

The Governor now comes to the important questions:—1st, were the boats properly prepared, or were they not? 2nd, were the sick Soldiers of the ——— honorably dealt with, or have they been sacrificed by neglect? To ascertain the first, (for various opinions seem to exist upon the subject,) the Governor will order a Court of Enquiry to be held in the ——— Regiment, consisting of the Commanding Officer of the Regiment, and all Officers commanding Companies; and Maj.-Genl. ———

will order another Court of Enquiry to be held at ——, consisting of Lieutenant-Colonel ——, of the Artillery, Captain ——, of the Indian Navy, and Major ——, of the Engineers. These Courts are to give their opinion, whether the boats were properly covered in or not; and if not, whether the circumstances of the case, which were very imperious, admitted of their being better covered in, for it appears very evident to the Governor, that although he has found fault with Lieutenant-Colonel —— for not reporting the opinion of Dr.—— to Major-General ——, the Lieutenant-Colonel's opinion was correct, that delay would be more injurious to the men than dropping down the river with the boats in the imperfect state in which they are represented by Captain —— —— to have been.

The above is all that the Governor can do in this matter till he has the opinion of the Courts of Enquiry.

HEAD QUARTERS, KURRACHEE, 24*th November*, 1845.

The Commandant of the Baggage Camel Corps has reported to Head Quarters, that the animals sent to carry the baggage of the —— Light Cavalry were overloaded to an enormous extent. Upon this, the Major-General Commanding has to make the following observations, to which he begs that Officers Commanding Regiments in Scinde will pay the strictest attention, for the Major-General is resolved to enforce them rigidly.

1st.—Every Officer commanding a Brigade, Regiment, or Detachment, is responsible for obedience to General Orders. These are explicit with regard to the loads which are to be put on Camels: they were issued at Abu Buker, in 1843, and no excuse can ever be received that an Officer did not know these orders. The Major-General is not obliged to read his orders to the Officers Commanding the Regiments forming the Army in Scinde, nor will he repeat them; but he will take care that they are obeyed.

2nd.—The first and highest duty of the Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers, and Privates, composing the Camel Baggage Corps,

is to prevent Camels from being overloaded, and to report to the Senior Officer of the Camel Baggage Corps present, and Commanding the Baggage of any Division, Brigade, Regiment, or Detachment, when he sees any animal overloaded;—upon which such Officer is immediately (and without any reference whatever to the Officer Commanding the Division, Brigade, Regiment, or Detachment) to unload the Camel—re-load it with *half* the ordered burden, and throw the overplus baggage clear of the line of march. Nor is the Officer Commanding a rear guard to permit any Sepoy or public servant to remain in charge of such castaway baggage, under pain of being brought to trial before a General Court-Martial for disobedience of orders.

3rd.—The Officers Commanding Regiments are responsible that no public stores are put on Camels beyond the weight allowed by the General Orders of January 1843, and any neglect of this must be at their private peril, for the stores shall be destroyed, and will probably be charged to such Commanding Officers' private accounts by order of the Supreme Government, to which the Major-General will make a report with strong recommendation to that effect.

4th.—All Camels which may be injured by being overloaded, are to be given up to the Commanding Officer of the Corps, who is to be charged the value paid for the animal by the public in the first instance; a Court of Enquiry having first made a report on the subject, to decide between the Honorable Company and the Commanding Officer, who may settle with his Regiment as he pleases. The public hold the Commanding Officer answerable, as having signed the Indent, and having full power to enforce an obedience to General Orders.

5th.—Every Camel is to have a brass plate hung round his neck, with the number of pounds weight he is to carry written on it: that is to say, the animals of the Corps are to be divided into two classes—the *strong* and the *weak*, and the plate to be so marked in large letters; the load for the strong being 280 lbs., that for the weak being 200 lbs.; the Company letter and No. be-

ing placed under, and also the divisional colour. This plate to be four inches by three.



6th.—Thus will every body know the proper load, and it is the duty of every one to report to the nearest Officer belonging to the Camel Baggage Corps if a camel is overloaded,

7th.—With regard to private or hired camels, their owners must settle their own loads. But if they once enter the line of march, they must be submitted to the orders of the Commandant of the Camel Baggage Corps, in every particular, for under his immediate command is placed the whole baggage of the troops serving in this province, when in the field or on a march; and he is responsible to no one but the Officer Commanding the Troops on the spot, provided that Officer be his senior in rank,—and no Officer is to alter the standing orders issued for the Camel Baggage Corps.

8th.—No Officer Commanding a Regiment, or Detachment, is to mount Baggage-guards,—every soldier is to march with his Corps. Any breach of this order is to be immediately reported to Head Quarters, by the Commandant of the Baggage Corps.

9th.—In the field, all baggage above the proper weight is to be burned on the spot. But where animals fail from any other cause than disobedience of orders, the baggage will be immediately taken care of, and spare Camels furnished. The honor of the Corps would be compromised by loss of baggage, even the smallest.

10th.—Officers' servants are strictly to comply with all orders issued by the Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers of the Baggage Corps.

11th.—The Provost-Martial's Deputy is to attend the Commandant of the Baggage Corps in the field.

12th.—There may be some points in the forgoing orders which appear at first sight to be harsh; but to controul baggage, is as difficult as it is indispensible, and it is only by severity that such order can be established and preserved, as will ensure the general safety of the baggage, and its prompt arrival at the encamping ground when on the march: the necessity as well as the comfort of this, especially to Europeans, require no comment.

13th.—As regards the complaint made by Captain ——— against both his own Officers and the Officer Commanding the —— Division of the —— Regiment of Light Cavalry, the Major-General has to regret that these Officers should have allowed General Orders to be broken by their men, but as the Regiment is now leaving his command, he shall say no more about it, except to set Capt. ——— right in an erroneous idea which that Officer seems to have formed, as I understand his letter, that it rests with the Officer of the Baggage Corps alone to see that the Camels are not overloaded. This is a great and important error. One of the first duties of the Commissioned Officers of every body of men is to look to their comfort and health, and both depend on their having their baggage properly arranged. The Officer in command indents for animals to carry a certain weight of baggage, and it is his duty to see, and to make those under him see, that not a pound more baggage is put on the Camels than that for which he has signed the indent. The duty of the Officer of the Baggage Corps is to detect any breach of orders in this respect, not to weigh and pack the baggage of the troops. It might as well be expected, when a Regiment is ordered to march, that the Officers should lift all their troopers into their saddles. The Major-General corrects this erroneous view as regards baggage, because, though this fine regiment and its excellent Commandant, Major ——— ———, are going to leave Sciude, I still hope to have the honor of again commanding them, baggage and all.

HEAD QUARTERS, KURRACHEE, *9th January*, 1846.

It is to be clearly understood, that no Officer in command of troops, is on any pretence whatever to interfere with, or give any orders to, the Baggage Corps Quarter-Masters or their Assist-

ants; under whom the whole baggage is placed. No Officer is to send any Camel away on the line of march, nor to give any order whatever relative to baggage. All orders are to come from the Officer or Non-Commissioned Officer in command of baggage with every Brigade, Regiment, or Detachment.

If any Officer or Non-Commissioned Officer in command of baggage misconduct himself, the Officer in command of the Brigade, Regiment or Detachment, is to take the proper steps in regard to him as usual for the due maintenance of military discipline. But this Corps, or any detachments therefrom, having the Commander of the troops orders at what time the troops are to march, is to be left to his own discretion in all points relating to the march of the baggage, and no baggage is to march in front of the troops, but always on the reserve flanks of the column or in rear of the column. This rule is imperious, and no Commander of a Brigade, Regiment, or Detachment, is to break through it, without being forced by unforeseen circumstances to make so dangerous an innovation on the order of march.

The Officers of this Army will, on due reflection, see that the comfort, and even the safety, of the force depends on the good regulation of the march of the baggage; and that unless *one system* is rigidly enforced, there cannot be any *good regulation:* and one system cannot be established if any interference is permitted with those who are entrusted with the march of the baggage, and who have their orders from the Baggage Master, Captain ——— ———,—orders that have for their object the preservation of the Camels. The Quarter-Masters and Non-Commisioned Officers of the Baggage Corps, have great exertions to make, and if they are crossed in those exertions by Officers they cannot do their duty—it is impossible.

The Major-General, therefore, being determined to give full effect to the experiment which the general Government has permitted him to make, calls with much confidence upon all Officers under his command to render every assistance in their power to the Baggage-Master and the Quarter-Masters, whose labour in all circumstances will be trying both to their strength and to their temper, especially at first. He cannot doubt that this appeal to the zeal and kindly feelings of Officers will be responded to generally.

It is positively prohibited to the guards or to servants, or to any with the baggage, to beat or hurry on Camels, or to disobey the Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers, and men, of the Baggage Corps, who are to have the sole and entire command of the Baggage on the line of March.

The Major-General therefore repeats, that it is only by enforcing the above regulations that the baggage can be well up on arriving at the encamping ground, and the comfort of the troops secured. The whole object in forming this expensive Corps is, while diminishing, as far as possible, the quantity of baggage, to secure comfort to the Army, that it shall be able to accompany the troops in the most trying marches. The good treatment of these poor animals is essential to their exertion, and on these must depend the efforts of the troops, especially Europeans, who without their baggage are incapable of making war in this climate.

HEAD QUARTERS, CAMP MUSSEED LANDEE, 21*st Jan.*, 1846.

Major ———— having disobeyed the orders issued relative to the loading of Camels, that Officer must return to Kurrachee and place himself under the orders of Brigadier ————, who will be pleased to assist Major ———— in getting the Camels necessary for making his tour of inspection at a later period, when carriage can be more easily procured.

SECTION V.

MISCELLANEOUS ORDERS.

HEAD QUARTERS, SUKKUR, 16*th November*, 1842.

Captain ————'s conduct to Captain ————, of the Indian Navy, was ill-calculated to preserve that harmony and kindness of feeling which ought to be cultivated by British Officers, and Major-General Napier cannot express his approbation thereof: but that was not the cause of the Major-General's ordering Captain ———— to be placed under an arrest; he was put under an arrest for striking, and throwing into the Indus, an inoffensive Peon, who gave him no provocation, but who was obeying the or-

ders he had received from Captain ———. The Major-General has heard it said, that the supremacy of the British over the Native must be maintained in India, and he entirely concurs in that opinion, but it must be maintained by justice.

However, as Captain ——— has had the good sense to acknowledge the impropriety of his conduct, the Major-General directs the Assistant Adjutant-General to return to that officer his sword.

HEAD QUARTERS, SUKKUR, 21*st November*, 1842.

Gentlemen as well as beggars, may, if they like, ride to the devil when they get on horseback, but neither gentlemen, nor beggars, have a right to send other people there, which will be the case if furious riding be allowed in camp or bazaar. The Major-General calls the attention of all in camp, to the orders of Lieutenant-Colonel Wallace (dated the 18th ultimo,) and begs to add that he has placed a Detachment of Horse at Captain Pope's orders, who will arrest any offender; and Captain Pope will inflict such a fine or other punishment, as the Bazaar regulations permit.

This order to be published through the cantonments by beat of drum for three successive days. Captain Pope is not empowered to let any one off punishment, because, when orders have been repeated and not obeyed, it is time to enforce them: without obedience, an army becomes a mob, and a cantonment a bear-garden.

The enforcement of obedience is like physic,—not agreeable, but at times very necessary.

HEAD QUARTERS, SUKKUR, 12*th December*, 1842.

Four rupees for an officer's wife, and two rupees per diem for each child, appears to be the rate of passage-money ordered to be charged to an officer when his family is permitted to accompany him on foreign service, and no other charge is authorized by the G. G. O. No. 434, dated the 19th August 1839.

"*In the spirit of the above regulations*" (using the precise words of the order alluded to,) "the families of officers proceeding to join their husbands on foreign service" are to receive their passage on

the above conditions, viz., paying four rupees for the wife, and two rupees for each child, and no other charge to be made. Captain ——, Commanding the Flotilla, will be so good as to consider this order as his authority, till further orders from the Honorable the Governor-in-Council. But the liberal intentions expressed in the above order by the Government, appear to the Major-General so evident, as to convince him that the enormous sum ordered to be charged to officers must have arisen from some mistake.

HEAD QUARTERS, SUKKUR, 13*th December*, 1842.

The Major-General had his reasons for turning out the Bengal Brigade last evening without much preparation, and it is due to Lieutenant-Colonel Wallace, and the troops under his orders, that the Major-General should express his satisfaction at the promptness with which they were under arms.

HEAD QUARTERS, SUKKUR, 17*th December*, 1842.

It having been reported to the Major-General that discreditable riots have been made at night in the bazaar by officers, the field officer of the day will be held responsible that no such irregularity shall take place in future. If this order be not sufficient, a Captain's guard shall mount in the bazaar.

HEAD QUARTERS, ROREE, 23*rd December*, 1842.

The Bengal column will march on the morning of the 25th instant, at such hour as may be appointed by Brigadier Wallace, who will be pleased to express to the troops under his orders, the Major-General's approbation of their orderly conduct while they have been attached to the Field Force serving in Scinde.

HEAD QUARTERS, CAMP SUKKURUND, 12*th February*, 1843.

The Major-General recommends officers not to proceed any distance from camp; and whenever they do move out, to go armed.

CAMP MUTTAREE, 16*th February*, 1843.

Major Outram has reported to the Major-General his satisfaction at the steady conduct of the Light company of H. M. 22d Regiment; they had but forty rounds *in each man's pouch*, and did not fire a shot but when they were sure of their aim,—not a round was thrown away. Every account says they killed and wounded a number of the enemy nearly equal to their own strength.

HEAD QUARTERS, HYDRABAD, 21*st February*, 1843.

At 11 o'clock, the 12th Regiment, and 2nd Company or Captain Hutt's battery, is to march and take possession of the City of Hydrabad, and to unfurl the Standard of the Queen on the great tower.

Lieutenant-Colonel Pattle is to command this force in person.

The greatest care is to be taken not to give offence to the peaceable inhabitants, nor is any one to enter that part where the families of the Ameers reside.

The Prize Agents are to accompany this force, and take possession of all public treasure till the decision of the Governor-General be received.

The necessary guards are to be placed by Lieutenant-Colonel Pattle, who is appointed Commandant of the Town till further orders.

Major Lloyd is to take charge of the Ordnance stores found in the fortress.

The line to be formed at such hour as Lieutenant-Colonel Pattle may send word from the city that he is ready to hoist the British Colour, on which a royal salute is to be fired.

HEAD QUARTERS, CAMP HYDRABAD, 22*nd February*, 1843.

Officers who commanded Regiments and Corps in the Battle of the 17th, are requested to express to those under their orders the admiration that the Major-General feels for the intrepidity with which, on that day, they so gloriously maintained the honor of the Queen's and Company's arms, and it has been his earnest desire to

represent their brilliant conduct to the Governor-General, and to the Commander-in-Chief, in such terms as the limited nature of a despatch would admit. At the same time, he feels how inadequately he has described the daring devotion of the Queen's and Company's officers—a devotion to the service too conspicuous not to be for ever impressed upon his mind.

As many deeds were done, both by officers, non-commissioned officers, and private soldiers, of which deeds he has no better means of becoming acquainted, he requests of Commanding Officers to send him a list and a record of those who especially distinguished themselves in the battle, that he may lay the same before the Governor-General.

HEAD QUARTERS, HYDRABAD, 24*th February*, 1843.

All people coming to the Major-General are to be taken by the orderlies to the tent of the Aide-de-Camp, who is to send them to whatever department their affairs regard; the officer at the head of such department dispatching the business, unless reference is necessary to the General himself.

All cossids with letters or intelligence, to be sent to Captain Brown; also all messengers from the Ameers.

All complaints of plundering, to be referred to the Adjutant-General; and by him to the Provost-Marshal.

All matters relative to discipline and guards, to be referred to the A. A. Adjutant-General.

All information of people assembling near the Camp, or as refers to the movement of troops, to be referred to the Acting Assistant Quarter-Master General.

All ordinary prisoners to be made over to the Provost-Marshal.

The Provost-Marshal to be furnished, if possible, with a large yellow flag to place before his tent. The Quarter-Master General can probably procure this or some very marked flag.

Everything relative to the City, to be referred to Colonel Pattle.

Everything relative to Prizes, to the Prize Agents.

Everything relative to Military stores and provisions, to the Commandant of Artillery, or Commissary, according to the nature of the case.

Every minor matter as to guards and details of the troops, to be referred to the staff officer.

The field officer on duty is answerable for the general security of the camp, the quarters of the sick, and those of the General Staff.

Commanding officers of Regiments are responsible for the perfectly free communication between their respective corps and to the rear; also that necessaries are immediately built for their Regiments.

The Quarter-Master of the day is answerable to the Field officer on duty for the cleanliness of the Camp, and he must apply to commanders of corps and regiments to clear away all nuisances for 200 yards at least in front and rear of the camp; unless this is strictly attended to, assuredly some epidemic fever will arise. The Major-General therefore earnestly requests the attention of all officers to this important subject.

HEAD QUARTERS, CAMP HYDRABAD, *9th March*, 1843.

Any soldier, sowar, or camp-follower, found a mile from the camp without a pass signed by his Commanding officer, shall be treated as a plunderer, and punished accordingly. The plundering which is going forward is most disgraceful, and will inevitably not only prevent the Beloochees from becoming our friends, but turn the Scindians against us. The Major-General calls upon officers commanding regiments to exert themselves to put a stop to these dangerous proceedings. The grass-cutters of the Bengal Light Cavalry are to be under command of one or more European officers.

HEAD QUARTERS, CAMP HYDRABAD, *20th March*, 1843.

The Major-General not being able to make himself understood

by the Sepoys, requests their officers to translate to them the following order.

SEPOYS!—On the 17th February you fought well, and defeated the enemy. *We* had but 2,700 men in the field, *he* had 22,000. *We* had but ten pieces of cannon engaged, *he* had fifteen. On the 24th we shall march to Alliar ka Tanda: *we* shall have twenty pieces of cannon, *he* has very few, and they are bad; we shall be 6,000 fighting men, and he will not have 15,000, and all of them men you have beaten. Do your duty, and victory must be our own. But you must understand what I mean by saying "do your duty." I do not mean to tell you to be brave, for that I well know you to be; but I mean that no man is to fire without orders. Let all sepoys keep their ranks, shoulder to shoulder, close and firm, and level at your enemies' knees; if you do this, no enemy can stand before your bayonets, or bear your fire.

This is all I have to say: do this, and another glorious battle will be won.

HEAD QUARTERS, CAMP NEAR DUBBA, *25th March*, 1843.

To the officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers, both European and Native, who fought the battle which took place yesterday, the Major-General cannot help expressing his unqualified approbation, and the pride he feels in having the honor of being their commander. He especially congratulates the 3rd Cavalry on the opportunity which offered, and of which they took such prompt advantage, to charge the enemy. He congratulates the Horse Artillery on the admirable and effectual advance made on the enemy's right flank. The conduct of these two renowned bands shewed the Major-General that their fame in Affghanistan had been fairly won. All did right well, but to Her Majesty's 22nd Regiment, upon whom the brunt of the battle fell, he must express his heartfelt praise, —and sure he is that all the troops will join him in this feeling.

HEAD QUARTERS, CAMP HYDRABAD, *20th April*, 1843.

The murderer of Captain Ennis, of the 21st Regiment N. I., is to

die to-morrow. Major ———— is to so arrange the execution that the prisoner be well guarded by both Cavalry and Infantry. The culprit, Panday Sindee, is to have a placard affixed to his breast, on which, in large letters, is to be written the crime for which he is executed, viz :—

"For the murder of Captain Ennis, a prisoner of war, who had given up his arms and asked for mercy."

HEAD QUARTERS, CAMP HYDRABAD, 21*st April*, 1843.

The prisoner named Balloo, convicted of being an accomplice to the murder of Captain Ennis, and at present confined in the quarter-guard of the 21st Regiment N. I., is sentenced to imprisonment with hard labour for a period of two years, and will be handed over to the Engineer officer's guard, for employment on the public works.

HEAD QUARTERS, HYDRABAD, 22*nd April*, 1843.

No Camp-follower is to bear arms in future, unless the army again assembles to take the field, in which case a special order shall be issued. The Provost-Marshal is to seize any arms found on the person of a Camp-follower, and punish the wearer of the same. This order is to take effect from the 1st of May.

HEAD QUARTERS, CAMP HYDRABAD, 22*nd April*, 1843.

When officers send their people to make purchases, they must also send money to make the necessary payments. It is not just that the purchaser should put his own price upon any article, and force the vender to take it ; such a principle cannot be admitted.

HEAD QUARTERS, CAMP HYDRABAD, 19*th June*, 1843.

A detachment of a Native Officer and 50 rank and file, from the —— Regiment N. I., with a due proportion of Non-Commissioned Officers, will embark on board and escort ten boats going down the river to Tatta. The native officer must be a smart and intelligent man, and Major ———— will be pleased to instruct him that his duties are to collect all mess stores, and supplies of every des-

cription, whether belonging to Government, Messes, or individuals, and to escort them safely to Hydrabad. He must make inquiries at the different villages on his way down the river, and ascertain if any stores which may have been plundered, can be collected.

Every exertion must be made by him to recover any stores that may have been left between Tatta and Garra, and on the Native Officer reaching Tatta, he will report himself to Major ———, sending a native letter by a Cossid. The party will remain at Tatta, and, on the arrival at that place of the Commissariat stores from Kurrachee, the native officer will receive charge of them, and also of a prisoner of H. M.'s ——— Foot, under escort to Hydrabad. The native officer will report himself to Lieutenant ———, of H. M.'s ——— Foot.

The Commissariat will be pleased to ration the above party for fifteen days.

HEAD QUARTERS, HYDRABAD, 30*th June*, 1843.

The following artillery arrangements will take place, pending the sanction of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, or until further orders.

His Excellency the Governor having had the experimental Camel Battery under his own observation, in all the operations in which this army has been engaged since leaving Sukkur in December last, to which must be added the result of the last two years' experience, he is convinced that Camel draft is not suitable for Field artillery in Scinde. The use of these animals for that purpose will, therefore, be discontinued immediately, and the establishment of Camels now with Captain ———'s battery made over to the Commissariat, after selecting sixteen for the spare ammunition of the nine-pounder, and twelve for that of the six-pounder, battery. Captain ———'s battery will be henceforward drawn by horses and mules, which will be selected by that officer from the animals now attached to the six-pounder battery, to the extent of fifty-six horses and fifty-seven mules. These animals will be selected alternately by Captains ——— and ———, but as Captain ——— has the heavier battery, he will make the selection of the first horse or mule, Captain ——— of the second, and so on throughout.

The camel-drivers of the nine-pounder battery will be the syce-drivers of the same on its new organization, continuing to receive their present rate of pay. The establishment is to be fixed at one syce for each horse or mule.

Such of the present mule-keepers who by this arrangement may become supernumerary, to receive their discharge, or be employed as sirwans to the camels now leaving the battery.

The camel harness to be returned immediately into the Ordnance Store Department, and indents forwarded by Captain ———, on that department, for the requisite quantity of mule harness.

This arrangement will be carried into execution, under the orders of Major ———, Commanding the Artillery, and is to have effect from the 1st proximo.

HEAD QUARTERS, HYDRABAD, 16*th July*, 1843.

The Governor has received a letter from Captain Blood, Commanding Wanga Bazar, stating that, under his orders, Lieutenant Forbes, of the 3rd Regiment N. I., Lieutenant Raitt and Ensign Davidson, of the 16th Regiment N. I., have captured a large band of robbers. The whole transaction does great credit to the above officers, and the Governor has much pleasure in thus publicly expressing his approbation of their conduct.

HEAD QUARTERS, KURRACHEE, 17*th October*, 1843.

The honors which the Queen and the Honorable the Court of Directors have bestowed upon their faithful troops, must animate us all with gratitude and with pride.

To do our duty in battle, is a negative virtue: cowards and traitors alone desert their colours. Her Majesty has a right to our best exertions, without other reward than the glory which beams from victory. But the Sovereign has been graciously pleased to mark her approbation of the courage displayed by her united troops in attacking enemies at once so numerous and so hardy!

Let me, then, congratulate you all upon these glorious Medals!

—the fruits of discipline, and of those well wielded weapons, the matchless musket and bayonet, which pour a double death upon an enemy,—death by fire, and death by steel.

It is when we receive honors and rewards that we should recur to the *means* by which they have been won. Thus do our minds gather confidence from reflection, and if again we have the good fortune to meet an enemy, again we shall conquer.

HEAD QUARTERS, KURRACHEE, *29th October*, 1843.

Major-General Simpson has made a report to the Governor, of the great zeal shown by the Medical officers at Hydrabad, under very severe trials, which unfortunately still continue; nor has personal illness prevented these officers from doing their duty, except when too violent to be longer resisted. Nor, judging from Brigadier Paul's letter, are the Medical officers at Sukkur less zealous, and they are equally, if not more severely, tried.

It is the duty of Medical officers to exert themselves on all occasions, but that does not detract from the praise which is due to men who execute their duty so honorably; and the Governor hopes that this mark of his approbation may be acceptable to the Medical officers of the Army under his command.

HEAD QUARTERS, KURRACHEE, *1st November*, 1843.

The 1st Grenadier Regt. N. I. is ordered to Bombay. The Governor will not allow this fine corps to quit his command without expressing his respect for the Regiment, and his good wishes for its future prosperity.

HEAD QUARTERS, KURRACHEE, *11th December*, 1843.

Lieutenant-Colonel Leslie's Troop of Horse Artillery, and Major Whitlie's Battery, are on the eve of leaving Scinde. Under my command, they have signally distinguished themselves, therefore it is not surprising that I should experience, and I do experience,

great regret at losing the services of these brave men, and their intrepid commanders—Lieutenant-Colonel Leslie and Major Whitlie, two soldiers for whom I must ever feel the highest respect as Artillery officers, and the warmest regard as comrades. My best wishes attend them all, and may they soon recover that health which they have lost in performing honorable service in Scinde.

HEAD QUARTERS, KURRACHEE, 16*th December*, 1843.

Lieutenant-Colonel Schuler having joined the army in Scinde, is to take command of the whole of the artillery from the date of his arrival.

In putting the Lieutenant-Colonel in orders, I cannot omit referring to the good service rendered by Lieutenant-Colonel Lloyd in command of the artillery in Scinde, during the whole of the campaign in which a portion of the troops were lately engaged, and in which this excellent officer distinguished himself by his zeal, his courage, and his arrangements. In losing his services, I must express the respect and regard which I personally feel for him.

HEAD QUARTERS, KURRACHEE, 13*th January*, 1844.

The 21st Regiment, under Lieutenant-Colonel Wyllie, C. B., embarks this day to quit Scinde, where both the Regiment and its Commander leave distinguished names. *It is, therefore, with deep regret, that the Major-General sees them obliged by sickness to depart.*

This corps, and its commander, have been proved in action with the enemy, under the General's immediate orders, and his best wishes will always attend Colonel Wyllie, C. B., and the 21st Regiment N. I.

HEAD QUARTERS, KURRACHEE, 20*th January*, 1844.

The Governor regrets that the sickness of the 2nd European Regiment obliges its recall from Scinde, where the conduct of the Regiment, under Lieutenant-Colonel Stalker and Major Spencer,

has been such as to claim his approbation, and makes him regret to lose its services.

HEAD QUARTERS, KURRACHEE, *5th February*, 1844.

Soldiers of the 3rd Cavalry!—you are about to quit my command and return to your Presidency after a long absence.—The record of the Scindian War borne on your standards, speaks for your glory, and you take with you my regards, and the regards of all who beheld you reap the laurels of victory, as the intrepid Delamain led you charging over the deep nullahs on the plain of Dubba.

The 9th Bengal Light Cavalry is to march towards Ferozepoor on the 17th February: a year has passed since on that day it won great honor. The soldiers of Meanee and of Hydrabad are becoming few in Scinde. The 9th Bengal Cavalry had scarcely arrived under my command, when it took the field, and its conduct has been exemplary. It returns to its presidency full of fame, and with standards that bear the records of its glory. I behold its departure with regret, and I request of Lieutenant-Colonel Worrall to assure Lieutenant-Colonel Story and his brave regiment of my sincere good wishes and regard.

HEAD QUARTERS, KURRACHEE, 11*th February*, 1844.

The 20th Regiment N. I. leave my command to-morrow, under the command of Captain Keily. They gained laurels at "Peer Arree," an enterprise which was executed by Lieutenant-Colonel Roberts, and all engaged, with a degree of energy more suited to a cold European climate than to the heat of Scinde, and in the hottest part of the country.

The long march from Sukkur, and the overthrow of Shah Mahomed, did honor to all engaged; and though neither at the battle of Meanee nor of Hydrabad, the soldiers of the 20th Regiment are among the conquerors of Scinde.—My best wishes attend them. I request Major Bulkley will be so good as to have these orders explained to his sepoys on their arrival at Bombay.

HEAD QUARTERS, KURRACHEE, 12*th February*, 1844.

The Governor unfortunately does not understand Hindoostanee, nor Persian, nor Mahratta, nor any other Eastern dialect. He therefore will feel particularly obliged to Collectors, Sub-Collectors, and Officers writing the proceedings of Courts-Martial, and all staff officers, to indite their various papers in English, larded with as small a portion of the to him unknown tongues as they conveniently can, instead of those he generally receives,—namely, papers written in Hindoostanee, larded with occasional words in English.

Any indent made for English dictionaries shall be duly attended to, if such be in the stores at Kurrachee: if not, gentlemen who have forgotten the vulgar tongue, are requested to procure the requisite assistance from England.

HEAD QUARTERS, KURRACHEE, 25*th February*, 1844.

Officers must not shoot Peacocks: if they do, the Beloochies will shoot officers,—at least so they have threatened, and Major-General Napier has not the slightest doubt but that they will keep their word. There are no wild peacocks in Scinde,—they are all private property and sacred birds, and no man has any right whatever to shoot them. The Major-General is satisfied that, after this warning, no officer will again give such offence to the people, whose tranquil behaviour and extreme civility has been the subject of general remark and admiration; but this tranquillity has been produced by the good conduct of the officers of this army in the first instance, and by the strict discipline which has been preserved: therefore, a deep responsibility will be upon any man who wantonly destroys the harmony now existing. If there be one evil which the Major-General has more strenuously endeavoured to avoid than another, it is that of a Guerilla war. If such a misfortune should arise, there is no saying where the sacrifice of life and treasure would end: every man who has common sense must see this.

HEAD QUARTERS, KURRACHEE, 7*th March*, 1844.

The Major-General regrets parting with Lieutenant-Colonel Saunders and the 15th Regiment N. I., which has served well in

Scinde, and has his best wishes for its speedy recovery and prosperity.

HEAD QUARTERS, KURRACHEE, *8th March*, 1844.

The excellent conduct of the 6th, 8th, 12th, and 25th Regiments, that have so distinguished themselves in Scinde, induces Major-General Napier to grant furloughs to ten men (including officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates) per company. The sepoys of these regiments well know that the General has long wished to grant them furloughs, but there has been till now a prospect of war, therefore he was unable to let any soldiers leave Scinde. He has now a strong force, and seizes with pleasure the opportunity of granting this indulgence to brave and good men, well knowing, that if war breaks out, those on furlough will quickly return to their colours.

HEAD QUARTERS, KURRACHEE, *11th March*, 1844.

As the hot season approaches, and as everything appears now to be perfectly quiet in Scinde, the Major-General will permit officers to quit their Cantonments on short excursions of a fortnight or three weeks, with the permission of the officers commanding stations.

HEAD QUARTERS, KURRACHEE, *25th March*, 1844.

Captain Henderson, and officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates, of the Madras Sappers and Miners!—you have earned laurels in Scinde. No troops have more honorably conducted themselves. Associated in all the glories of the Bombay Army, you leave this country regretted by your companions. You have served under my immediate command for a year and a half; your labours during our march into the desert, were greater than those of any other soldiers, and were undergone with spirit: you did your duty bravely in the battles of Meanee and Hydrabad. In the former of these two actions, you were conspicuously placed, and nobly

acquitted yourselves. I regret to lose you, but justice to you after your hard service has made me send you to your own homes, where an honorable reception awaits you. Go where you will, you will be attended with my sincere regards, and my heartfelt respect. To my friend Captain Henderson I have given a letter for the Commander-in-Chief of the Madras Army, that his Lordship may be aware of his worth.

HEAD QUARTERS, KURRACHEE, 28*th April*, 1844.

Major-General Sir Charles Napier has received from Captain ——— a very meagre report of the repulse which his party received on the morning of the 17th instant at ———. While the Major-General regrets that it is necessary to order an enquiry why a fortified place was attacked by a handful of infantry wholly inadequate to such an assault, the infantry being alike destitute of scaling-ladders or artillery,—while it is necessary to enquire into the cause of such proceedings, the Major-General is bound to give the strongest expression of his approbation to the troops, especially the sepoys of the Camel Corps, whose conduct is stated by Captain ——— to have been most gallant.

The Major-General desires that this order may be explained to those who have behaved with such a noble spirit.

HEAD QUARTERS, KURRACHEE, 3*rd May*, 1844.

Lieutenant-Colonel Derinzy is to make the following arrangements on the 23rd May, or sooner, if the assembling of the Belooch Chiefs begin earlier :—

1. The 13th N. I. are to be so divided between Meerpoor and Aliar ka Tanda, as may be necessary to defend these posts.

2. The detachment 8th Regiment at Fort Kotree is to remain there, and be on the alert.

3. The steamers to be so anchored as to assist this detachment if necessary.

4. The Captain of Police to send men to Kotree and the Fulailee, to prevent armed men crossing, unless they are Chiefs, and these are only to be allowed one follower each, that follower being unarmed. If any suspicious circumstances arise, immediate notice is to be sent to the Captain of Police. The police, if they see any armed bodies crossing either river, are civilly to warn them back, and at the same time to send to the Captain of Police.

5. The 6th Regiment to be withdrawn from Mahomed Khan's Tanda, and encamped at the entrenched camp, and a few Police to take charge of the Tanda.

6. The company of Artillery to be also withdrawn from the same post, marched to the entrenched camp, and the guns placed in battery.

7. The 17th, 12th, and 8th, Native Infantry, remain where they are, but in the event of any disturbance, the 8th and 17th are to close upon the 12th, under the guns of the fortress.

8. The Scinde Horse to remain in their lines, and in case of alarm retire upon the entrenched camp, and join the 2nd Light Cavalry, which, with the Troop of Horse Artillery, is to advance as far towards Hydrabad as possible, without compromising their retreat to the entrenched camp.

9. The hospitals of the 6th, the Scinde Horse, and the battery at Mahomed Khan's Tanda, are to be removed into the Fort.

10. No Englishwoman is, under any pretence whatever, to be out of the fortress or the entrenched camp, while the Beloochees are assembled.

11. Provisions to be in Hydrabad, the entrenched camp, Aliar ka Tanda, and Meerpoor, for a month's consumption.—Lieutenant-Colonel Derinzy will be so good as to pay particular attention to these last two paragraphs.

HEAD QUARTERS, KURRACHEE, *8th May*, 1844.

It having been brought to the notice of His Excellency the Major-General by officers commanding detachments, that the

inhabitants of certain villages had deserted them, in consequence of guides having been seized, and not only ill-treated, but not paid for their labour. His Excellency directs that Officers Commanding Stations and Detachments in Scinde will use their utmost endeavours to put a stop to such a practice.

The greatest inconvenience must arise to the public service if such injustice is permitted to be used towards the peaceable inhabitants; and should it be persisted in, Regiments and Detachments will shortly find themselves in the greatest difficulties from the desertion of these useful people.

HEAD QUARTERS, HYDRABAD, 27*th May*, 1844.

The Major-General requests that Officers will be careful in speaking and writing of the number of deaths which have occurred by "Coup de Soleil." Exaggerated reports have been spread of these deaths, and this exaggeration does much mischief, for they alarm those whose nerves are delicate,—especially invalids, and may produce great danger to such persons. The Major-General hopes that no more exaggerated accounts will be given by any gentlemen to their friends, and no more reports spread of this nature in the camp.

HEAD QUARTERS, KURRACHEE, 22*nd June*, 1844.

On all occasions of an encounter with an enemy, Officers engaged are to make the most detailed report in their power, in an official manner, and not to send private letters to each other. When the full details cannot be given, the report must be followed up by a second when all the circumstances are known.

HEAD QUARTERS, KURRACHEE, 23*rd June*, 1844.

Captain ———— has not thought proper to make an official report of the scandalous affair which has taken place between a Detachment of the Troops under his command, and some hill-robbers, in which the latter appear to have been completely victorious in the open field without any loss to themselves, while they destroyed our troops,—thus evincing their great superiority in Military skill and valour. The Collector of ———— has made an official report,

from which, and from a most unsatisfactory private note which Captain ———— was pleased to write to Colonel ———— (instead of making his official report as an Officer ought to have done, and as the Major-General orders him to do on all future occasions,) the Major-General learns that this encounter has been no less disastrous that it has been disgraceful to the —— Regiment of Irregular Cavalry. There must have been either great cowardice in the Detachment which has been cut up, and which the Major-General cannot believe, or there is a gross want of discipline and instruction in that Corps; for it is not possible to believe, that in a well-instructed Regiment such thorough ignorance of duty could have taken place as has been displayed by the Detachment which has been destroyed by those skilful and gallant robbers.

The Major-General cannot understand (Captain ———— having thought proper to leave him without a report) why a Detachment was sent to such a distance, and in face of such an enemy, without Captain ———— being himself either at its head or within reach accompanied by a squadron of his Regiment. The Major-General desires that the European Officers of the —— Irregular Cavalry shall never quit their saddles, night or day, when a Detachment is out of their cantonment. The European Officer who commands at an out-post must be eternally on his horse, with his sword in his hand; he should eat, drink, and sleep, in his saddle. An out-post Officer has no right to comfort or to rest, except when all is safe; and that can never be when in presence of such an active enemy as these mountain-robber tribes are in every country where they exist. It is ignorant work for Officers to gallop their troops over-country after mischief has been done. This is to harrass their men and horses, and is a mark of inexperience in out-post duty. It is to play the game of the enemy. Had Captain ———— been near his grass-cutters with one-third of the men which he afterwards uselessly galloped over the desert, it would have prevented the disgrace which has fallen upon us,—the second which has tarnished the honor of our arms within three months. The first was the result of great imprudence, but had at least the merit of daring and of enterprize. This second disgrace appears to have arisen completely from misconduct on the part of the Detachment, and from ig-

norance of their duty. If there be any circumstances to qualify this censure, it is the fault of Captain ——— that the Major-General remains in ignorance of them.

HEAD QUARTERS, KURRACHEE, 4*th July*, 1844.

The Governor has at last received a report from Captain ——— of the destruction of his grass-cutters and their guard on the 16th June.

That guard was certainly sufficiently strong to have defeated the enemy, but it does not appear to have been even prepared to fight, and, to use the words of Captain ———, "the enemy, seeing its irresolution, advanced nearer, and caused a panic: some of the Sowars turned and fled, and the rest, seeing themselves deserted by their comrades, followed." That is to say, the detachment behaved with cowardice and indiscipline! These inevitably go together!

The only redeeming circumstance in this disgraceful affair was, that a few of the "Sowars" carried off the body of their commander. It now only remains for the ——— Irregular Horse, by their alertness and discipline, to retrieve the disgrace which this affair has cast upon the Regiment.

Captain ——— will be so good as to bring to trial the second in command.

HEAD QUARTERS, KURRACHEE, 11*th July*, 1844.

The Governor has attentively read the report of the Court of Enquiry relative to the failure at ———.

The matter divides itself into three parts.

First.—Whether this expedition ought to have been undertaken or not.

Secondly.—Whether the arrangements to secure success were well made.

Thirdly.—The fight itself!

With respect to the first part, the expedition ought not to have been undertaken without the sanction of the Governor, which would never have been given to an enterprize so ill-timed, and so absurd in every point of view; because the object was not very important; the success very uncertain, and great loss of life more than probable.

Captain ———— had the command of the Detachment, and with him must rest the chief responsibility which attaches to this enterprize. But this does not absolve Lieutenant ————, who was perfectly acquainted with the place, and assured Captain ———— of the ease with which "————" might be taken by the ———— alone; whereas, when launched against the place, and exhibiting the greatest intrepidity in his own person, backed up by the unflinching gallantry of his sepoys, he was unable to succeed, though supported by the imposing presence of about three hundred cavalry. The blame which exclusively rests with Capt.————, was having been persuaded to undertake this absurd enterprize.

Captain ———— had been authorized to surprise and carry off an individual named ————. Both Captain ———— and Lieutenant ———— wrote to the Governor saying that this was an exploit of easy performance,—but neither of them mentioned that ———— lived in a small fort, within a larger fort, and, that, instead of surprising a Chief sleeping in an open village, it was necessary to storm two forts. The first was not only a feasible operation, but one which Lieutenant ———— had actually performed a few weeks before. To attempt the last was an absurdity, and of this Captain ———— was aware, having written to the Governor that he deemed it impracticable, and that (as the delay of some days was of no importance) he should wait the Governor's orders.

The Governor's orders were, that he, Captain ————, was not to undertake the expedition. But, contrary to his own opinion, that the expedition was unadvisable,—contrary to his own statement, that he would not march without the Governor's orders, and having justly asserted that there was no hurry for the undertaking,—in face of all these things, Captain ———— allows himself to be over-ruled by Lieutenant ————, whose knowledge of the locality did not bear in any way upon the above question!

Moreover, that the expedition was in contemplation, was well known to the whole country,—so that the possibility of surprising "————" was out of the question; and the hopes of doing this could alone excuse Captain ———— not waiting for the orders of the Governor.

The first question is therefore decided—the expedition should not have been attempted.

Secondly.—Whether the arrangements to secure success were well made?

They were not.

As a surprise was out of the question, an application ought to have been made for two guns and some scaling-laders. The attacking force ought to have been assembled at ————, and the next day the attack should have been made with refreshed troops, and before day-light enabled the matchlock-men to take aim. Part of the Cavalry might have been dismounted, and their horses left at —— with the camels in charge of the armed "Surwans," or camel Drivers; or the Force might have halted at————, which is nearer to ————, if at that place there was water. In any case it might have been secured. The Governor also perceives, on reading the Court of Enquiry, that ———— and the ——— Irregular Horse broke their ranks, and commenced plundering some baggage and fugitives of the enemy while on the march towards ————. The Governor can nowhere perceive that Captain ———— punished those concerned in this disgraceful proceeding, or that any of these disorderly Troopers were shot or cut down on the spot by their Officers. This circumstance appears to the Governor to be the worst feature of the whole expedition. The other misfortune arose merely from error in judgment, which every Officer that ever had command has occasionally made. This was disgraceful to the two corps in question. If troops are to break their ranks in search of plunder, especially when marching against an enemy, there is an end of discipline, and defeat is certain. The Governor would much rather command the robbers of the hills than such men.

Thirdly.—*The fight itself!*

Ignorant of the locality, the Governor cannot pretend to pass a decided opinion upon the facts of the case; but he observes that no attack was made,—the force having marched fifty miles for the purpose of making an attack! This was evidently an error. But would an attack have succeeded, had it been tried? Was Capt.———— warranted in ordering a retreat?

The first question is so doubtful, that no reasonable man, especially one who was not present, would presume to give an opinion on it.

In justice to Captain ————, the Governor must say, that he acted as the majority of Commanders would have done in similar circumstances.

The second question may be answered more decidedly. The men and horses were all exhausted; no measures had been taken to secure the wells and forts in the rear at ———— and ————, consequently there was not a moment to be lost; and even as it was, the Detachment was saved by its good fortune in finding the above forts unoccupied by the enemy, and one of them by mere accident in possession of a few of the Detachment that were unable to keep up with the rest. These men had fortunately taken shelter in ————. The order to retreat was therefore justified by the circumstances existing at the moment, but those circumstances should not have existed.

The story of one of the gates having been burnt down, ought to have been thoroughly enquired into by the Court,—an enquiry which, in the Governor's opinion, would have wholly and effectually destroyed a part of the evidence, which the Governor discards as a piece of exaggeration,—because a man who had burnt down the gate of a fortress, would have taken care to make his success known, which ———— did not do. That he lighted a fire against the gate, the Governor is willing to believe. Taking all the above matters into due consideration, it appears that there was a want of judgment, but no want of enterprize or of gallantry, in this unlucky affair; on the contrary, the conduct of the Sepoys of the ———— deserves the highest praise from the Governor. They attacked with unflinching valour: no man retired till he received orders; and even then, almost sinking with thirst and fatigue, they asked

their Commander to be again led to the attack, with a courage worthy of his own gallantry.

The Governor has analysed this affair with two objects. The first is to show, that, although there was error in judgment, there was nothing injurious to their characters in the conduct of either Captain ——— or Lieutenant ———.

The second is to trace a failure to its cause; which it is good for military men to do. It is thus men learn their profession.

HEAD QUARTERS, KURRACHEE, 22*nd July*, 1844.

The Governor is happy to find that the ——— Regiment Bengal Native Infantry has shown repentance for their late misconduct. His Excellency attributes this proper feeling to the admirable conduct of Major-General ———, whose temper, patience, and firmness, have restored the Sepoys of the —— Regiment to a sense of their duty. The Governor takes the earliest opportunity of stating thus publicly his satisfaction at the conduct of Major-General ———, and at the report made by that General Officer of the support which he has received throughout the most trying circumstances from various Officers, and especially Captains ——— and ———. The exertions of these Officers have saved a Regiment to the Company's service, for, had the misconduct of the Sepoys gone one step further, His Excellency the General was determined to disband the —— Regiment,—a power to do so having been vested in him by the Supreme Government. Major-General ——— is hereby authorized to extract from the ranks of the ——— Regiment, all those men, whether Native Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers, or Private Soldiers, whose conduct has been of a nature to deserve a minor punishment to that which the Governor trusts will fall upon the ringleaders now in confinement. The men so extracted from the ranks are to be immediately discharged the service, and ordered to quit the cantonment of the Regiment which they have disgraced. The Colours of the —— Regiment are to be taken from the Corps, and lodged in the arsenal of Sukkur till the orders of the Supreme Government and the Commander-in-Chief be received.

HEAD QUARTERS, KURRACHEE, 30*th July*, 1844.

His Excellency the Governor directs that on no account will officers Commanding Out-posts and Detachments on the Frontier cross the boundary without the permission of His Excellency, or in pursuit of a defeated enemy.

HEAD QUARTERS, KURRACHEE, 16*th August*, 1844.

It having been brought to the notice of His Excellency the Major-General Commanding, that some Officers, while on medical certificate at Kurrachee from the different stations in Scinde, are in the habit of attending at Parades, Messes, and other places of public resort,—and this practice being perfectly at variance with the established orders of the Service,—His Excellency deems it necessary at once to put a stop to so unusual a proceeding. In case of such again occurring, the medical certificate granted will be cancelled, and the Officer ordered to rejoin forthwith.

HEAD QUARTERS, KURRACHEE, 31*st August*, 1844.

It is with the greatest satisfaction that Sir Charles Napier has read the report of Captain McKenzie's fight near Mobarukpoor.

This Officer has signally distinguished himself; he has taught the hill-robbers that the dwelling of a Cavalry Officer on out-post duty is in his saddle. The mountain tribes have learned that they have to deal with men who can fight them in their own fashion. This exploit has been very brilliant and very honourable to Captain McKenzie and his Regiment, and Sir Charles Napier assures them that from this time he shall feel perfect confidence in the security of the line of frontier committed to Captain McKenzie's care.

The Governor has therefore to express his thanks to Captain McKenzie, Lieutenant Radcliffe, and Russeldar Meerza Asim Beg, as well as to their companions in arms, including the Detachment of Police, for their gallant conduct in this combat.

In admiring the spirit which led Doctor Comberbach so boldly to join in the charge, and in which charge he was wounded, Sir Charles Napier must express his hopes that in future Doctor Com-

berbach will confine himself in battle to his proper post. A medical man is bound in honour, and by the rules of the service, to be in the safest place to be found nearest to the scene of action; a rule from which no Commander can excuse the departure, without casting a reflection upon the courage of every Surgeon who does his duty.

HEAD QUARTERS, KURRACHEE, 17*th September*, 1844.

Bad men must be cleared away from the good men of the — Regiment. Major-General ———— is therefore to discharge the seventy-one men of that Regiment whose names and misconduct he has reported to His Excellency the Governor, and this order shall be to the Major-General a full authority. His Excellency fully expects that the —— Regiment will now become what it ought to be—a well-conducted Corps; and as Lieutenant-Colonel ———— is too ill to do duty, His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief will soon select another officer for the command. In the mean time Captain ———— is to assume the command of the —— Regiment, till the pleasure of His Excellency Sir Hugh Gough shall be known.

HEAD QUARTERS, KURRACHEE, 16*th October*, 1844.

The 6th Regiment N. I. leaves Scinde after a long course of honorable service on the Indus, and the Governor bids it farewell with regret, as one of those Regiments longest under his command, and engaged in the operations of the war. He wishes the 6th Regiment every success if called into the field. If they and the 20th won laurels easily at Peer Arree, the well-conducted and well-sustained marches which that success led to, in the terrible heat of April, May, and June, were proofs that these Regiments are composed of good soldiers,—men who will always uphold the honor of the Bombay Army.

HEAD QUARTERS, KURRACHEE, 29*th October*, 1844.

The departure of Lieutenant-Colonel Waddington, C. B., has deprived Major-General Sir Charles Napier, G. C. B., of one of his bra-

vest comrades in the conquest of Scinde ; and as such, the Major-General takes leave of him, wishing Lieut.-Colonel Waddington every success and happiness in his future career.

HEAD QUARTERS, KURRACHEE, 6*th November*, 1844.

When there is any doubt of the conduct of the troops—whether their courage be impeached, or their honorable treatment of an enemy impugned, and said to be degrading to the character of a soldier,—it is the duty of their Commander to cause a strict enquiry to be made, without respect either to individuals or regiments ; thus the truth becomes known.

A report had gone forth that the —— Irregular Cavalry had behaved with barbarity on the ————. The Governor ordered an enquiry to be made, chiefly through officers employed in Civil situations, and Natives. This enquiry has led him to the following conclusion :—That while the Detachment led by Captain ———— in person was engaged with the enemy far in front, another Detachment in the rear, under command of a Native Officer, made one of those mistakes, of attacking friends, which unfortunately often occur in battles, even when friends and enemies are distinguished by a difference of uniform and language. In the present case, the Governor has great doubts whether those who suffered were friendly or not ; but supposing them to have been so, it was very difficult to distinguish between men of the same country, dressed and armed alike, and only differing from each other in their motives of action. That these people threw down their arms and asked to be spared, is probable : that they were spared, and afterwards butchered in cold blood, is not probable, and the Governor rejects this story as groundless. There was no motive for such brutality on the part of the troops. There was no difference of religion to cause animosity. There was no previous quarrel between the —— Irregular Horse and the people to provoke such brutality, and it is solemnly and indignantly denied by all who were present and engaged in the affair, except those who escaped the slaughter.

There seems to be but one mode of preventing mistakes in future engagements. It is to forbid the villagers to move from their villages with arms in their hands, except under the command of their

immediate Kardar, who, if he meets with our troops, must halt his men and instantly ride alone up to the Officer and put himself under his orders. The Kardars of all the frontier villages are frequently to wait upon the Officers Commanding the nearest out-posts, so as to be personally known to the officers and soldiers, and on the occasions of these visits they are to be accompanied by two or three of the leading men of each village. All Officers commanding out-posts are to bring these men several times on their parades, so that the private soldiers may become acquainted with them. But the Officers are requested not to detain these Kardars longer than is necessary to introduce them to their men, otherwise these visits would be inconvenient, and the Kardars would avoid making them.

Every Kardar is to have a red flag, on which the name of the village is to be written in English and Persian. The Collector of Sukkur will be pleased to furnish each frontier village with one of these flags according to the pattern which will be sent. It is to be hoisted at the Kardar's door whenever troops approach the village, and under its protection the villagers are to march when ordered to attack or pursue the mountain robbers. No exertion must be spared by Officers to prevent unhappy accidents from taking place, and the Governor does not see any more effectual mode than that herein ordered, in addition to the precautions which have already been adopted by the Major-General.

HEAD QUARTERS, CAMP MUDDONJEE, 16*th December*, 1844.

The Governor cannot leave Larkhana without expressing the great satisfaction he felt at seeing the fort and barracks which have been constructed by Lieut. FitzGerald, and which do that Officer very great credit. Lieutenant FitzGerald has in a few months formed the Camel Corps, and built the fort and barracks for his men, having been suffering under ill-health during nearly the whole time. The Governor has therefore great pleasure in thus recording his approbation of Lieutenant FitzGerald's ability, and zeal for the public service.

HEAD QUARTERS, CAMP SHAHPOOR, 18*th January*, 1845.

The Governor cannot deny himself the pleasure of thanking Captains Salter and Jacob, and the troops under their immediate command, for their prompt and decided conduct in action with the enemy on the 16th instant,—Captain Salter after marching forty miles, and Captain Jacob thirty-seven miles.

Had either of these Officers delayed their attack, the enemy would inevitably have escaped.

The marches have been long, and well executed by the Troops. Captain Mowatt in twenty-four hours marched fifty-six miles through the desert with two guns—a march rarely exceeded in the history of Military movements, and it does great credit to the effective state of his Battery.

HEAD QUARTERS, CAMP SHAHPOOR, 19*th January*, 1845.

There are two circumstances which occurred in the opening of this campaign against the robber tribes, which excites the admiration of the Major-General Governor, and which he thinks it right to make the subject of a separate order. The first is, that in the prompt and dangerous attack, for Cavalry, of a village like Shahpoor, in the highest degree defensible and built for defence, and which was defended, that Captain Jacob and his men carried it with the rapidity of lightning; and, while losing men, did not injure one of the defenders, but captured them all. This is a very rare and a very glorious instance of the perfect discipline, as well as courage, of the Scinde Horse,—and, though to men less acquainted with war, it may appear trifling, yet in the mind of the Major-General Governor, it stamps both the Scinde Horse and its Commander as first-rate Soldiers,—prompt, resolute, obedient and humane, even in the momentary excitement of action against the most ferocious of enemies.

The Major-General Governor feels the greatest satisfaction in thus publicly mentioning Captain Jacob and his Corps for thus setting an example so honourable to themselves and to the Army.

This order to be translated, and to be read to every Regiment, European and Native, serving in Scinde.

The other instance of the spirit which animates this force, and of which Major-General Napier feels very proud, was the march made by Lieut. Smallpage at the head of 172 of the Police. To the Cavalry of this body, such a march was an ordinary occurrence, but 130 were Infantry of the Police, and these men marched through the desert forty miles in sixteen successive hours. Such exertions make the Major-General feel very proud of the force he has the honor to command. The glory of Soldiers is as often gained by their legs as by their arms.

HEAD QUARTERS, CAMP SIBBEE, *9th February*, 1845.

The skilful and courageous conduct this-day exhibited by Captain McMurdo and twelve men of the Scinde Irregular Horse, in effecting their retreat from very superior numbers of the enemy, does all that were engaged in this affair the greatest credit, proving them to be good and stalwart Soldiers, yielding no ground to the enemy, and though out-numbered, forcing a dangerous pass and carrying off their booty victoriously. The conduct of Sowars Radoo Khan, Nujjoo Khan, and Seedee Ismail, was particularly gallant, and worthy the glorious Regiment they belong to.

HEAD QUARTERS, OPPOSITE TRUCKEE, *2nd March*, 1845.

Sir Charles Napier wants one Lieutenant, one Ensign, and 100 Privates, all volunteers. They must be men of great activity and great resolution. Their duty will be to ascend the highest part of the enemy's position in the night time, and courageously to maintain their ground when they reach it until men can get up to their support.

The glory of accomplishing such an achievement will be equal to the daring of this bold attempt, and secure to those who perform it the greatest renown. Sir Charles Napier will take care that their names shall be made known to the world.

HEAD QUARTERS, TRUCKEE, *11th March*, 1845.

Twenty-five brave robbers, on foot, well armed with swords, shields and matchlocks, met twenty of the Scinde Horse patrolling

28023

in the desert. The parties closed for battle. The robbers gave a volley and charged. The Scinde Horse met them—a combat with sabres ensued. The Scinde Horse had one man killed and two wounded, four horses killed and two wounded: of the enemy, every man fell sword in hand. Quarter was repeatedly offered to those stern gladiators, but they refused, and every robber bit the dust. Honour be to their courage! more honour to their conquerors,—another laurel leaf has been added to the rich wreaths of Jacob's Horse. The conduct of the Jemedar Guffoor Mahommed and his companions demands the Governor's highest approbation,—and he will report their gallantry to the Governor-General of India, and to the Commander-in-Chief of the Bombay Army, as soon as Captain Jacob sends in the names of these brave men.

Lieutenant-Colonel Geddes, Commanding the Artillery, will be pleased to order a royal salute to be fired on the departure this evening of His Highness Meer Ali Morad.

The Governor of Scinde cannot permit His Highness the Ameer to retire with his Army from Truckee without requesting that Prince to accept for himself, and express to his troops, the Governor's approbation of their conduct in this campaign, and his thanks for their assistance against the enemy.

His Highness has proved himself to be the faithful Ally of the Honorable the East India Company.

Soldiers! There are different kinds of glory. The glory of Battle, and the glory of endurance.

Of the first, the little to be gleaned was carried away by Salter, Jacob, and their companions.

To us there remained only the glory of exertion and endurance, and it has been won by you in such a guise as to do you the greatest credit. Never have I served with men more thoroughly imbued with the true military spirit, and it becomes me, as I have witnessed it, to give you the credit you so well deserve.

I have heard it said that some of the Officers of the —— Regt. took umbrage with me without clearly knowing why! I smiled at

the pouting of younger soldiers with an old one. This generally happens in the beginning of a campaign, after which a good fight, like a good storm, clears the atmosphere of bilious vapours. As there is no fight, a little reflection must do the work, and tell these gentlemen that as my great admiration of their excellent and beautiful Regiment is well-known, so must I, and so do I, greatly appreciate the Corps of Officers. No good Regiment ever had bad Officers. The two things are incompatible. Of no body of Officers have I a higher opinion than of those belonging to the —— Regiment.

The men of the ——— Regiment have, in this short campaign, gained under Major ————'s command, the character which they lost under the late Lieutenant-Colonel ————. Good Officers always make good Soldiers! When Major-General ——— returns to ——, he is to restore to this now good Regiment their Colours,—a duty which, I am sure, will be particularly gratifying to that Officer, to whom the —— Regiment and the Indian Army are deeply indebted.

We shall now return to our respective Cantonments, and wait with patience for further service,—having all added something to our previous knowledge of war.

To those who are about to leave my command, I wish every success.

HEAD QUARTERS, CAMP SUKKUR, 26*th March*, 1845.

Commandant FitzGerald is requested to express to the Sirwans of the Camel Corps, Jemedar Dowlut Sing, Duffadar Nowla, Sirwans Chinto Sing, Jehangeer Khan, and Ram Buccus, the approbation of His Excellency the Governor. Their good conduct in re-capturing several Camels from Beloochee horsemen at Goojroo, deserves his thanks, and he has pleasure in thus publicly expressing his satisfaction. The Commandant of the Camel Corps is also to inform Ramzan Aiheer that his name has been sent to the Commander-in-Chief along with the names of those brave Europeans who so gloriously mounted the precipice at Truckee on the 8th of March.

The European Soldiers spoke highly to the Governor of the courage exhibited by Ramzan Aiheer.

ON BOARD THE STEAMER "NAPIER," ON THE INDUS,
1st April, 1845.

The Governor has much pleasure in publishing the following Extract from a Despatch received from the Government of India, having reference to the late campaign against the robber tribes :—

"The energy, the endurance, and the decisive courage, shewn by the Troops of all arms, are deserving of the warmest approbation of the Governor-General in Council, and he begs the same may be communicated by His Excellency to the Officers and men composing the expeditionary force."

HEAD QUARTERS, KURRACHEE, *25th April*, 1845.

Major-General Sir Charles Napier has great pleasure in communicating to Majors-General Simpson and Hunter, and the Troops which served under their respective orders in the hills, the flattering General Order issued by the Right Honorable the Governor-General of India in Council, with regard to the late campaign; and when it is considered that this order comes from one so experienced and distinguished in war as the Governor-General of India, the value of such an order, high at all times, becomes greatly enhanced.

General Order by the Right Hon'ble the Governor-General of India in Council.

CALCUTTA, *29th March*, 1845.

The Governor-General in Council has the greatest satisfaction in announcing to the Army the complete success of the operations of Major-General Sir Charles Napier, G. C. B., against the Mountain Desert Tribes, on the right bank of the Indus, to the North of Shikarpoor. Extracts of His Excellency's despatches are published for general information.

An operation of this nature demanded, on the part of the General, the utmost prudence, skill, and foresight, and on the part of the troops, the greatest fortitude in enduring the fatigues and privations to which they were exposed.

These qualities, which prove the merit of a Commander, and the discipline of the troops, having been displayed by both with

characteristic energy every officer and man in this short but arduous campaign, has shewn that there are no difficulties which discipline cannot surmount under able guidance.

In some instances, the marches performed by Infantry and Artillery have been so remarkable, that the Governor-General-in-Council has called upon the Major-General to transmit the details of his arrangements, in order that the record may be preserved for the information of the service.

The chastisement which these robber tribes have received will convince them that they can no longer depend upon their mountain fastnesses for security, nor plunder with impunity villages under British protection.

The Governor-General-in-Council cordially congratulates Major-General Sir Charles Napier on the successful termination of this campaign. He begs that His Excellency will inform the General officers, officers, non-commissioned officers, and private soldiers, that the Governor-General-in-Council admires and acknowledges their patient perseverance and indefatigable exertions throughout these operations.

The Governor-General will convey to His Highness Ali Moorad, the sense he entertains of the zeal, courage, and fidelity, displayed by His Highness on this occasion.

By order, &c. (Signed) F. CURRIE,
Secretary to the Government of India.

This order is to be carefully translated and read at the head of every regiment and detachment serving in Scinde, at a special parade ordered for the purpose.

HEAD QUARTERS, KURRACHEE, *26th May*, 1845.

Sir Charles Napier well knows that the sepoys are orderly good soldiers; there are no better in the world, and when they understand what is proper, they do it. Now he has heard from Major-General ———, and he found it so himself, that at the inspection of regiments, men come forward with complaints, or with the wish for discharge, or some such matter, which ought to come through

their Captains, to the Commanding Officer, and through him to the General who makes the inspection. It is therefore right to explain to all soldiers the proper course to pursue. It is this :

When a man has a complaint to make, no matter what it may be, he is to go to his Captain direct, who is to give his opinion to the soldier. If the latter be satisfied, all is well ; if not, the Captain is to state the same to the Commanding Officer direct, bringing the complainant along with him. The Commanding Officer is to give his opinion to the soldier : if the soldier is not satisfied, he is to wait till the regiment be inspected by a superior officer, and he is then to recover his arms, walk out of the ranks, and make his complaint, to which the Inspecting-General Officer is bound to attend, and if he does not, the soldier has a right to address the Commander-in-Chief by letter, who decides the question. But the soldier should understand that General Officers are obliged to state the complaints made to them, and their decision thereon, to the Commander-in-Chief, so that the soldier is sure of redress.

But if soldiers make frivolous, unjust, and unfounded complaints, such as appear to have been made by men of the Band of the—— Cavalry, then do such men disgrace their regiments, and injure discipline. Sir Charles Napier feels conscious that he acts honestly towards every soldier under his command, and he knows that Major-General ———————— does the same, and neither of them would fail in what is their duty to their brother soldier who has just cause of complaint ; but while they have a duty towards every private soldier, they have also a duty towards every Commanding Officer of a regiment, and towards every Commander of a company, and it would be very unjust to the latter to allow them to be accused of neglect of duty, in not attending to complaints when no complaint has been made to them, and when they did not even know that a complaint was intended to be made. Neither are men to prefer written complaints to a General officer : let every man go up to his Officer and speak boldly what he has to say : if he is ordered to put it in writing he must do so.

The sepoys, when this is properly explained, will in future, if any cause for grievance arise, go to work in a proper manner, and they may be assured that the Inspecting General will do justice

to them. In the present instance, Sir Charles Napier finds it necessary to punish some of the young men of the Band of the ——— Cavalry, for making very improper complaints to Major-General ———. Both these Generals do their best to act with justice, and see all soldiers and sailors under their orders get their rights, whether officers, non-commissioned officers, or privates; but they will not allow of the slightest breach of discipline, or that the just rule of listening to, and redressing, complaints, should be turned into abuse. Sir Charles Napier, therefore, will try by a Court-Martial any officer, non-commissioned officer, or private soldier, whether European or Native, that makes a complaint at an inspection, unless he has first complained to his Commanding Officer, and has been refused redress. Thus shall the rights of all men be supported, and real justice upheld.

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HEAD QUARTERS, KURRACHEE, 17*th September*, 1845.

There are men to whom Providence has given the talents necessary for war, but denied to them the opportunity of exhibiting their abilities. Admired by their comrades, they pass their lives usefully and honorably, but within the narrow limit of subordinate rank, and they die little known beyond it.

The duty of a Commander is to search out such Soldiers while living, and to record their merit when they fall.

Such a man was Major William Brown, of the 69th Regiment N. I., who unexpectedly died on the 12th September, after a long and creditable service of 32 years.

Sir Charles Napier's acquaintance with this excellent officer was very short, but it was made during the operations of war, and war is a strong "coppel," that rigorously tests the metal of which men are made.

The Major-General hoped to give this accomplished gentleman a wider field for the display of his military virtues than fate had hitherto permitted. But her decree had gone forth, and suddenly the Indian Army has to regret one of its best officers.

HEAD QUARTERS, KURRACHEE, *19th September*, 1845.

The conduct of *Subedar* Gool Mahomed, *sepoys* Ebrahim Jokeyah, and Oomer Sindee, all of the Police, in capturing the deserters from the —— Regiment N. I., has done the police great credit: they did their work with skill, coolness, and courage, and the Governor therefore thus thanks them in public orders, and has ordered them a reward.

HEAD QUARTERS, KURRACHEE, *24th September*, 1845.

1.—The deserters from the ——— N. I. are to be tried by a General Court-Martial.

2.—In examining the circumstances relating to this matter, the Major-General Commanding finds great room for animadversion. He finds that the orders issued by Brigadier ———————, when this officer inspected the regimental books by order of the Major-General, who was dissatisfied with those books, have been neglected by Lieutenant-Colonel ———————, a neglect of which the Major-General must express his disapprobation.

3.—The Major-General finds that an interference with the discipline of the regiment has been permitted to native officers and non-commissioned officers, in a far greater degree than becomes their position, or the welfare of the Company's service; this is wrong, and must not be continued.

4.—He finds that the European Company Officers are interfered with by the Adjutant, and such interference supported by the Commanding Officer instead of being prohibited. If the soldier is not taught to look to the *officer in command of his company*, whether in a Queen's or Company's regiment, the chain of discipline becomes broken, and the discipline, as well as the moral feelings, of a corps are destroyed; nor can any individual exertion of subordinate officers save such a corps from discredit. An "Adjutant Regiment" is unfit for service in the field.

5.—The Commanding Officer's chief duty is to preserve the chain of responsible and combined exertion of all ranks uninjured in his regiment. This has not been done in the ——— N. I. The desire of the European officers to do their duty was, and is, apparent; but

their zeal has been repressed, and even paralysed by, a false system. It is not to Adjutants, whether European or Native, nor to Subedars, that the punishment of men is to be entrusted. If it is, and the system of discipline placed in their hands, the Major-General has no idea what can be the use of European Officers. One in each regiment would be ample. The Major-General is known to hold the opinion that the number of officers in the Company's service might be advantageously encreased. What, then, must he think, when he sees the exertions of those already posted to a regiment, rendered nugatory by a wrong system? He can only imagine that the Commanding Officer is unaware of their vast importance. The Major-General would ask, what business an Adjutant, European or Native, has with the punishment of men who came ill-dressed for guard? His duty is, when parading a guard, to see that the men are correct in number, properly dressed, sober, and their arms and ammunition ready for use. If any man comes drunk, or improperly dressed, or with his arms and ammunition in bad order, the Adjutant has what is called a "*ready man*" to supply his place, and the culprit is sent back to the *officer of his company* with a charge against him. It is for that officer, and the Commanding Officer, not for the Adjutant, to deal with the offender. Yet this plain and simple system has been broken in the ——————— N. I.,—apparently allowing the Subedar-Major to command the regiment, and thus the European officer has been rendered useless, instead of being what he ought to be—looked up to by the men of his company, as their instructor and their protector, and the great support of discipline.

6.—The system in the —— Regiment appears to have been, that no sepoy can go at once to his European officer, and make his complaint, unless he has an orderly with him. This appears to be a most pernicious system, and the Major-General positively forbids the practice in any regiment under his command. Her Majesty in her service, and the Court of Directors in their service, permit the private soldier to go up to a General Officer and make his complaint, and if he may so address a General Officer, surely he may address a Regimental officer. It seems to be a strange and anomalous proceeding for an officer commanding a regiment to take upon himself the responsibility of putting it in the power of Na-

tive officers thus to cut off the free access to his European officer of any sepoy who feels aggrieved; the Major-General considers such an order at variance with the spirit of General Orders, and highly dangerous. An officer who knows his duty, prides himself upon there being *no cause* for complaints in his Regiment: a bad officer tries to stifle them, by rendering it difficult for a soldier to obtain a hearing.

7.—In conclusion, the Major-General attributes the late desertions of the men in a great degree to the breach of this system of preventing the sepoy from freely complaining to the European officer of his company; and he directs that, not only is the Commanding Officer of the ——— Regiment to give his officers of companies the real command of their companies, but he is to assemble them on some stated day in each week, instruct the younger officers in the mode of commanding their companies, and ask the whole such questions as may satisfy him that they thoroughly know everything relative to the companies under their command.

It is by the European Officers of the company, and not by the Adjutant, that transgressors are to be punished when their offences are not of a nature to bring them before the Commanding Officer of the regiment.

Under arms, and in the field, an Adjutant has still less right to interfere: his work is not to teach the men, but chiefly to give points and assist his Commanding Officer, and others, by passing words of command, and watching that the supernumerary rank does its duty. It is the duty of the supernumerary rank to note men who talk, or are unsteady, and report them to their Company Officer, by whom the discipline and the interior economy of a regiment ought to be executed, as ordered by the Commanding Officer of that regiment and the General Orders of the army. An officer commanding a company ought not to permit an Adjutant to interfere with the interior economy of his company. An *Adjutant* is not a Company Officer, and his duties are distinct; nor will any Commanding Officer, who knows and does his duty, allow of their interference with each other.

HEAD QUARTERS, KURRACHEE, *27th September*, 1845.

Lieutenant-Colonel ———— has complained to the Major-General Commanding, that the reason of matters going wrong, is, that there is no book of Regimental "Standing Orders" in the ——— Regiment: yet this regiment is one of the most distinguished in the Bombay Army! It has never been the opinion of the Major-General that the discipline of a regiment depends upon standing orders,—but upon the zeal, activity, and adherence to Military discipline, of its Commanding Officer. It is his duty to be himself the standing orders of his regiment, by constantly instructing his officers in their duties, and seeing that they do those duties when so instructed.

The Major-General hopes that Lieutenant-Colonel ———— will endeavour to remedy the deficiency he complains of; and to assist him in that operation, the Major-General directs Lieutenant-Colonel ———— to keep a "diary" of his parades like that ordered for the Commanding Officers of Her Majesty's Regiments, page 295, "*Queen's Regulations and Orders*," which will enable the Major-General to ascertain whether Lieutenant-Colonel ————'s system of instruction is such as to make the younger officers thoroughly acquainted with their duties, and so preserve the very high character which the ——— Regiment has always maintained.

2nd.—The Lieutenant-Colonel is immediately to send to the Major-General a copy of the various questions that he means to put to his company officers weekly.

3rd.—As a beginning of the Regimental "*Standing Orders*," the first to be inserted is, that all company officers are to inspect their companies on their private parades, see that the men are properly dressed and all present,—and their arms and ammunition fit for service. It is on these private parades that officers get acquainted with their men, and familiarize themselves with their habits and their wishes. On the private parade it is that the British Officer, if he knows and does his duty, should teach the sepoy that he is both his leader and his protector. From the private parades, the officer marches his company to the Regimental parade, whence the Commanding Officer, having first ascertained that his arms and ammuni-

tion are fit for service, and every man accounted for, is to march his regiment to the General parade in a Military manner, with its European officers at their posts—posts of which the Major-General well knows the officers of the ——— N. I. are proud, and have reason to be so. But officers of companies must have their companies to themselves, or they can neither know, nor care for, nor be responsible for, them.

HEAD QUARTERS, KURRACHEE, *9th October*, 1845.

The 25th Regiment are to embark for India.

This regiment leaves Scinde after five years of brilliant service.

On the field of combat, fortune has attended its colours; and the courage displayed by those who fought under them showed that these hardy soldiers were worthy of her favours.

Their old General bids them adieu. He can hardly expect ever again to have them under his command, but while regretting this, he feels proud to reflect that his name will be associated with that of the 25th Regiment N. I., when those that survived the conquest of Scinde shall be gathered to their comrades who fell in battle.

HEAD QUARTERS, KURRACHEE, *20th November*, 1845.

The 8th Regiment N. I. are ordered to the Presidency.

Few now remain in this country of those courageous Regiments which conquered Scinde, and Sir Charles Napier cannot see the 8th depart without regret.

For the troops which fought so bravely at Meanee and Hydrabad, the Major-General must ever feel a peculiar regard: they gained for him a celebrity which it is his boast that he owes to their gallantry; but the word "Scinde" inscribed on their colours, and the Medals on their breasts, are the best records of their glory.

In thus taking leave of the 8th Regiment N. I., Sir Charles Napier wishes to the Regiment, collectively and individually, all success. They have served with honor in Scinde.

HEAD QUARTERS, KURRACHEE, *26th December*, 1845.

The Governor knows right well the desire of every officer to march against the Enemy,—so it is with every private soldier. He wishes that he could take every man in Scinde, but Scinde must be guarded, and every man must make his mind up to do his duty where the State requires his services. That is the post of honor. Having premised this, the Governor hopes that all in this army will be satisfied with the assurance that he is not influenced by any feeling but the good of the service, as far as his judgment enables him to act, and that he may be spared the pain of refusing particular applications to march with the Field Force.

HEAD QUARTERS, KURRACHEE, *27th December*, 1845.

The Governor desires that it may be made known to the Dooleewallas and Camel-men, that no increase of wages shall be given to them. They are very highly paid. If any man deserts, the Governor will have him pursued by the Police, and if caught, he shall be hanged.

HEAD QUARTERS, KURRACHEE, *13th January*, 1846.

In war, whoever does his duty bravely in battle deserves the notice of his immediate Commander, and of his comrades. The smallest fight has its glory, and is generally as full of personal danger to those engaged as in great actions.

A Subedar, four Havildars, one Naik, and twenty Privates, escorting invalids to Ferozepoor, were attacked near Mittenkote : assisted by the invalids, they gallantly repulsed a body of Seikhs that attacked them, but with the loss of the brave Subedar Nudjoo Khan of the 4th Bengal N. I., and two privates killed; 1 Havildar, 2 Naiks, and 9 Privates, wounded ; 1 Hayildar, 3 Privates, 1 Native Doctor, and 1 Lascar, prisoners.—Total 21 men. This action does the Detachment credit, and Sir Charles Napier takes this opportunity of recalling to the minds of the soldiers under his command, the intrepid conduct of Jemadar Mookunjee Naik, of the 15th Regiment Bombay N. I., on the 19th, 20th, and 21st February 1843, who fought so bravely at Vikhur and defeated a large body of Be-

loochies.—The same gallantry was exhibited by Lieutenant Scott and his Detachment of the 17th Regiment N. I., the same year. These deeds by small detachments, mark the high spirit of the troops, and are made known that those who perform them should receive the best reward of courage,—the applause of their comrades.

HEAD QUARTERS, KURRACHEE, 14*th January*, 1846.

If any Camel-men who have been engaged for the public service, desert the same, and are apprehended, they shall be tried for the offence by a General Court-Martial, and the sentence shall be immediately executed.

The officers of the Commissariat and Baggage Corps are to explain this to the men concerned, and the Magistrates are to do so likewise, when engaging these men.

HEAD QUARTERS, CAMP ROREE, 8*th February*, 1846.

I am ordered to join the army on the Sutledge, and leave that on the Indus, together with the temporary Government of the Province, under Major-General Simpson, to whom all (in both branches of the services) are, from this day, to address their reports.

It is painful for me to leave, even for a short time, those troops in which I put such confidence, and to which I am so attached. Some have been constantly at my side since I marched against the Ameers from this very camp in 1842, and others served with me in the hills against the robber tribes. Nor can I omit to acknowledge what I owe to those soldiers employed in the Civil branches of the administration and police,—men to whose courage, abilities, and just conduct, I attribute the tranquillity of this country: the labours of these officers will not now relax, for while war rages so near the frontier no effort will be spared to create disturbance in Scinde.

And thus wishing success to all, I take my leave.

HEAD QUARTERS, CAMP KURRACHEE, 11*th April*, 1846.

Major-General Simpson has permisssion to proceed to Bombay, in anticipation of leave to proceed to England. Sir Charles Na-

pier cannot allow the Major-General to quit this command without expressing his regret at losing an officer whose value an intimate friendship of thirty years has enabled him justly to appreciate, and one who for the last three years has rendered him so much assistance in this command.

Major-General Simpson may rest assured that no officer in the Scinde Force could leave it more regretted, and justly regretted, by all ranks.

HEAD QUARTERS, KURRACHEE, 21*st April*, 1846.

No weekly guards are to be allowed to mount in Scinde, under any pretence whatever,—nor are any permanent orderlies permitted.

Officers Commanding Stations and Regiments are held responsible to the Major-General Governor that this order is strictly obeyed.

HEAD QUARTERS, CAMP KURRACHEE, 18*th June*, 1846.

Rules relative to Cholera Hospitals.

1. Lieutenant-Colonel ——— is to send 100 men to be encamped close to the ——Hospital in the Cantonments : a Captain and two Subalterns are to accompany this Detachment, with 9 Serjeants.

2. Lieutenant-Colonel ——— is to order one of the above three Officers to be constantly on duty in the wards, and not to leave the wards.

3. The 100 men to be divided into three reliefs of thirty-two men each,—these reliefs to mount and come off duty with the Officer.

4. Each Officer and his relief to remain on duty six hours, day and night.

5. The Officer on duty is to give his Serjeants (three being with each relief) such orders relative to liquor as the Surgeon may direct, and Officers or Serjeants are to *see it given to the patients ;* in short, the Officer is to take all duties for the Surgeons, except those of attending to the sick and administering medicine.

6. The same rules to apply to —— and —— Regiments.

7. The Superintending-Surgeon will make any modification of these orders he may think proper, but first report to the Major-General and the Commandant of the station.

8. The Major-General is aware that the above is rather severe duty, but the occasion demands that exertion which Officers are always ready to make.

9. Lieutenant-Colonel ——— will be pleased to visit the Hospital three times a day, to see that all is right, and make a report in writing to the Major-General, of the number of cases admitted up to five o'clock P. M., and the number that have died between that time and five o'clock the preceding day.

HEAD QUARTERS, CAMP KURRACHEE, 11*th July*, 1846.

All Officers having leave of absence from the Major-General Commanding in Scinde, to proceed on leave to Bombay, have leave to Bombay *alone ;* and, on arriving, are to comply with the usual and invariable custom of the service, viz., they are to report their arrival and leave their address in Bombay at the office of the respective Adjutants-General of the Queen's and Company's service, as the case may be, and these gentlemen are on no pretence to leave Bombay without the permission of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief of the Army. Sir Charles Napier has no authority from His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief to grant leave of absence beyond Bombay. If this order be not attended to, Officers who, on arriving at Bombay, proceed beyond that station without the leave of the Commander-in-Chief, will find themselves exposed to His Excellency's displeasure.

Every Officer leaving Scinde on leave of absence, is to take a copy of the order which grants him leave, with him, and present the same to the proper Military authority at Bombay.

HEAD QUARTERS, CAMP KURRACHEE, 24*th July*, 1846.

His Excellency the Governor thinks it just to Captain Gaisford, to publish the following letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Roberts. The Lieutenant-Colonel's known abilities and character are a pledge to the Governor that such praise has been fairly earned by Captain

Gaisford, and it therefore does that Officer great credit. It is by such exertions made by Officers in time of peace, that Troops are made fit for war: without these exertions, an Army dwindles into an armed rabble.

From Lieut.-Col. ROBERTS, *Commanding in Cutch,*

To Major GREEN, C. B., *Assist. Adjt. General S. and B., Kurrachee.*

DATED CAMP BHOOJ, *18th July*, 1846.

SIR,—It is with much satisfaction that I have the honor to report, for the notice of His Excellency Major-General Sir Charles Napier, G. C. B., Governor of Scinde, that I reviewed Captain Gaisford's Battery of Artillery this morning, and found it in a perfect state of efficiency.

His Excellency is aware that this Battery only arrived at Mandavie from Bombay in March, with Drivers untaught even to ride, and new horses just purchased from the stables. At the end of April, Capt. Gaisford, by his exertions, had sufficiently put these materials together to enable him to bring the Battery to the Head Quarters of the District, and in the short period since, he has made them perfectly efficient; and I consider it my duty to this excellent Officer to make the same known to His Excellency the Governor.

(Signed) H. J. ROBERTS, Lieut.-Col., Commanding in Cutch.

HEAD QUARTERS, CAMP KURRACHEE, *5th August*, 1846.

Lieutenant-Colonel Douglas quitted this command when Sir Charles Napier was at Lahore. The Maj.-Genl. was in hopes of seeing the Lieutenant-Colonel again serving under his orders in the Province, but by letters now received, these expectations are at an end,—and it is therefore due to Lieutenant-Colonel Douglas to say that the Major-General attributes the formation and remarkably improved arrangement of this large cantonment, chiefly to the abilities of this excellent Officer, the loss of whose services is a source of much regret to Sir Charles Napier.

Lieutenant-Colonel Douglas assumed the command of Kurrachee at a moment when the state of Scinde was a matter of considerable anxiety to the Governor, and from the time of Lieutenant-Colonel

Douglas's arrival at the station, which he so long commanded, it ceased to be a source of uneasiness to the Major-General

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HEAD QUARTERS, CAMP KURRACHEE, 14*th August*, 1846.

Unless Reports and Returns are supplied by Regiments to the Departments requiring them, at fixed periods, the Officers at the head of those Departments cannot make their reports to the Commander-in-Chief at Bombay, and the Major-General is thereby very properly exposed to the reprimand which he richly deserves to receive if he allows of such slackness: he will not allow of it, and therefore calls upon the Commanders of Stations to hold Commanding Officers of Regiments responsible that the monthly distributions are sent in at the proper periods.

If this order be not obeyed, the Major-General will send off the "General Returns" incomplete, with a letter reporting the Commanding Officer of every Regiment whose return is deficient.

HEAD QUARTERS, CAMP KURRACHEE, 18*th August*, 1846.

The Major-General Governor placed Lieutenant———— under an arrest, because that Officer took upon himself to divide his detachment, and to send part of it to ———— for the purpose of assisting the subjects of the Khan of Kelat against His Highness's enemies. He also made a long and dangerous march towards the hills, and might have lost half his men and horses by coup-de-soleil. These proceedings were contrary to orders. Lieutenant———— appears to have forgotten that no Officer in Scinde except the Governor of this province has a right to move detachments, and occupy fresh posts, even within the province; yet Lieutenant———— took upon himself to do this far beyond the frontier, and without permission,—a responsibility which the Governor himself would not presume to take without leave from the Governor-General. No Officer, who knows his duty as a military man, ever presumes to move the Troops under his command without orders. A ready assumption of responsibility is the surest sign that an Officer does not know his business.

The Governor will for once pass over this disobedience of orders, and Lieutenant ———— is to return to his duty. • But should such again occur, it will oblige the Governor to uphold discipline, and bring the offender to a Court-Martial. Zeal excuses much, but is no excuse for disobedience of orders,—because such conduct dissolves a military force, and turns an army into a rabble.

The Khan of Kelat must protect his own subjects—the Kaheeries. If the latter choose to behave like cowards, they must take the result.

HEAD QUARTERS, CAMP KURRACHEE, *25th September*, 1846.

No Officer, Non-Commissioned Officer, or Private Soldier, is permitted to complain of his superior Officer except through the regular channel; and if any Officer, Non-Commissioned Officer, or Private Soldier, presumes to make a direct complaint to any authority out of Scinde, except through his immediate superior to the Major-General Commanding the Troops in Scinde,—and unless the Major-General refuses to forward such complaint so forwarded in an orthodox channel to him,—such Officer, Non-Commissioned Officer, or Private Soldier, shall be punished for such unsoldier-like conduct. Her Majesty and the East India Company have issued orders on this head, and they shall be rigidly obeyed, or this Army would become a mob.

The Major-General Commanding the Forces in Scinde holds all Officers in command of Regiments, and Detachments of Regiments, responsible for the discipline of their Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers, and Privates,—that they take the measures prescribed by the rules of the service for punishing the guilty, and that they make Officers in command of Detachments do their duty.

HEAD QUARTERS, CAMP KURRACHEE, *8th January*, 1847.

Lieutenant-Colonel Reid, and the 12th Regiment Native Infantry, are ordered to leave Scinde.

For above four years this brave Regiment has been under my command, and goes away the last of those Infantry Regiments which conquered this country. The justly celebrated 3rd Cavalry is about to follow. One by one these Regiments have left my com-

mand, and the Scinde Horse alone remains of that small band whose courage overthrew the more numerous army of the Ameers.

Soldiers of the 12*th Regiment Native Infantry !* It is not agreeable to part with those who have stood by us in many dangers, and in no ordinary battles. The chain of affection which bound together the Soldiers of Meanee and Hydrabad may be lengthened by separation, but can never be broken.

To Lieutenant-Colonel Reid, and the Regiment which he has so long and so well commanded, I bid adieu : wishing them all health and happiness, long to enjoy the glory which they won in Scinde.

HEAD QUARTERS, CAMP KURRACHEE, 18*th January*, 1847.

1. An affray took place in the Bazaar at ———, on the night of the 28th ultimo, between the ——— and the Police. A Sowar of the ——— was killed—the Kutwal of the Bazaar wounded; yet so serious an affair was not reported to Lieutenant-Colonel ——— by the Officer in command of the ———. This was irregular : every serious affray (and all are such which occur between two armed bodies) ought to be immediately reported to the Officer commanding the Station, by the first Officer who becomes acquainted with the circumstance.

2. The next thing which the Lieutenant-General Commanding observes in this matter, is more serious. The affray entirely arose in consequence of a direct breach of orders issued by Government,—a breach of the Articles of War, and a breach of the orders recently issued by the Lieutenant-General himself on the 24th November 1846, calling the attention of Officers to the Articles of War, and reiterating the substance of the Article of War, that no Soldier is to enter a Bazaar armed.

The Lieutenant-General will not allow of disobedience to orders by those under his command. In this instance, a Soldier's life has been lost in consequence of this disobedience, and the first instance of it that again occurs, the most serious notice shall be taken of it.

Officers Commanding Stations, and Regiments, are hereby ordered to see that the Articles of War and General Orders are rigidly enforced.

3. With regard to the affray itself, the Court of Inquiry, of which Lieutenant-Colonel ———— was President, find it impossible to come to any satisfactory opinion: the whole evidence seems to be such a mass of falsehoods as to defy elucidation.

The Lieutenant-General entirely concurs in the opinion expressed by the Court on this most unfortunate affair.

The Kutwal seems to have done his duty resolutely and to the best of his judgment. He was placed in a position of difficulty and great danger in consequence of the Sowars having disobeyed orders, which the Lieutenant-General Commanding trusts will not again occur.

The affair is now to drop, as a further enquiry would lead to no useful result, for it seems in vain to endeavour to discover the truth.

HEAD QUARTERS, CAMP KURRACHEE, *27th January*, 1847.

The Army of Scinde is ordered to be broken up, and the number of troops reduced so as in future to form the ordinary garrison of a frontier province. This as regards the interior tranquillity of Scinde, might have been done two years ago; but the character of the Lahore Government, and of its troops, made it necessary for the Government of India to keep an army in Scinde.

The danger apprehended from the Punjaub subsided after the victories gained on the Sutledge.

The concentration of a large force on the Indus ceased to be necessary.

To the Army of Scinde is due the tranquillity of this noble province.

To the discipline and orderly conduct of all, and the support which the Officers of this Army have given to me by their just and conciliating conduct towards the people, England is indebted for the tranquil possession of a country which the valour of the troops had conquered.

To the abilities of those Officers who have from the first conducted the civil branches of this Government, and to their unremitting

exertions in the administration of justice, is more especially to be attributed the successful administration of the province, that attachment to the British rule, and that confidence which has been so strongly evinced by the inhabitants of Scinde on two signal occasions, —the campaign in the Boogtee hills, and the march of the Scinde Force to Bhawulpoor.

But to the glory of freeing an enslaved country by a necessary conquest, and the consequent tranquillity of an apparently satisfied people, this army has added an increase of revenue to the Company. The last financial year showed that the united ordinary and extraordinary expenses of the Civil Government of Scinde, including the expense of a Police force of two thousand four hundred Horse and Foot, amounted to only fifteen lacks, one thousand, seven hundred and fifty-four rupees; that the revenue for that year was forty-one lacks, forty-two thousand, nine hundred and twelve rupees; and consequently, that twenty-five lacks were paid last year towards defraying the Military expense incurred, *not by the Conquest of Scinde in* 1843, but by *the previous occupation of Scinde,* and by the *disturbed state of the Punjaub.*

Previous to the conquest, the Army of Scinde was an unmitigated expense to the East India Company. *Since* the conquest, that expense has been reduced by the aggregate sum of forty-two lacks, thirty-seven thousand, four hundred and thirty-five rupees, which has been collected in *excess* of the expenses of *Civil Government* and *Police Force,* calculating both from the battle of Hydrabad to the present day.

Thus, whatever the previous occupation may have produced, the *Conquest* of Scinde has not cost the East India Company a single rupee, for had the Ameers continued to rule the land, not a Soldier could have been withdrawn from the force which occupied Scinde in 1842. On the contrary, strong reinforcements must have been added to it, divided as it would have been between Kurrachee and Sukkur, with the aggregated forces of the Courts of Hydrabad and Khyrpoor assembled in a central position between the weak wings of the army of occupation,—wings separated by four hundred miles of difficult country, and incapable of assisting each other, or of receiving any reinforcements during five months of every year.

Such a position must have been untenable, or tenable only in consequence of egregious folly on the part of an enemy who commanded one hundred thousand men in a central position.

An army divided as I have stated, would probably have been cut to pieces, for apparently there could not have been any retreat.

The prompt Military operations ordered by Lord Ellenborough in 1843, not only saved the Army of Scinde from the fate which befel that of Cabul, but secured the North-west frontier of the Indian empire, speaking of it in a Military point of view; while in a Commercial one, as commanding the navigation of the Indus, it is the key to the Punjaub. Not a man has been added to the army of occupation *in consequence of the conquest*—Scinde was conquered by the army which *previously occupied Sukkur.*

This is a fact which cannot be too often repeated.

But this is not all: the advanced frontier has a right to the troops which occupied the former retired frontier from Bhooj to Balmeer. The latter no longer require garrisons, and consequently the conquest of Scinde has not entailed the necessity for having additional troops, or throwing greater duties on the Bombay Army, whereas but for the conquest, not a Soldier could now be withdrawn, or (even though the Punjaub be opened) the Indus would have been closed to commerce.

No troops beyond the Police are now required to preserve the *interior* tranquillity of Scinde. The increasing revenues are thrown into the Indian treasury.

An immense increase of revenue has taken place in Bombay in consequence of the conquest of Scinde, which prevents the smuggling trade in opium formerly carried on: what may be the amount of this increase, I have no means of knowing, but it is said to be very great.

Commerce is already actively commencing between Kurrachee and Sukkur, ready to branch forth into the Punjaub when the results following the victories on the Sutledge shall open the *five rivers* to the enterprizing spirit of British merchants.

Already Sukkur, ordered by Lord Ellenborough to be called "*Victoria on the Indus,*" has become the depôt for goods passing

into Central Asia. Such, Soldiers of the Scinde Army, have been the services of those Regiments which conquered, and those which have occupied, Scinde since the conquest!

During this period of four years there has not been a single political crime, conspiracy, or act of hostility of any kind, public or private, committed by the people of Scinde against the Government, nor against the troops, nor against any individuals; nor am I aware that any body of Officers, any Officer, or any private Soldier, has given cause of complaint to the inhabitants. There has been perfect harmony between the conquerors and the conquered, if the term "*conquered*" can be applied to a people who have been freed from a degrading and ruinous tyranny, which sixty years ago was established by traitors over the country of their murdered sovereign.

This adds more glory to our arms, and to the British name, than even the victories which you won on the fields of *Meanee* and of *Hydrabad*. Courage may win a battle, but it is something more than courageous when a victorious army turns a conquered people into friends and peaceable subjects! Such, soldiers, have been the results of your labours and your dangers, and those Regiments which return to their Presidency return with the becoming pride of men who have well performed their duty, and gained the approbation of their Sovereign and their Government—the greatest reward which well-disciplined soldiers can receive!

For myself, I return to my proper post as Governor of Scinde, and the Commander of that Division of the Bombay Army stationed on the new line of frontier. But it becomes your General, who best knows what you have done and what you have suffered, to make known, on the breaking up of this Army, the things which it has achieved for India,—his admiration of its merits, and his gratitude for its assistance.

The high Military spirit which animated the force that marched last year to Bhawulpoor, was probably never surpassed: no Army was ever more worthy of India, nor more fully possessed the confidence of its Commander.

HEAD QUARTERS, CAMP KURRACHEE, *2nd February*, 1847.

The Governor has great pleasure in publishing to the troops in Scinde, that a party said to consist of 200 robbers, were met, on the frontier, by a Duffedar and eighteen Sowars of the Scinde Horse. This resolute officer, like a brave soldier instantly charged and dispersed this band of robbers: they fled, casting their arms away: some of them were cut down by the Sowars, but night falling, the pursuit became difficult, and the robbers escaped that severe punishment which they would have otherwise received. The Lieutenant-General thus publicly expresses his approbation of the detachment and its commander. They have maintained the honor of the Scinde Horse, and Captain Jacob is to inform the Duffedar that the Governor has made an especial report of his gallant conduct to Lord Gough.

HEAD QUARTERS, CAMP HYDRABAD, *17th February*, 1847.

Major-General Hunter is about to leave Scinde, where for three years he has distinguished himself, publicly by his zeal for the service of the Honorable Company, and privately by his hospitality.

The suppression without bloodshed of the mutiny which took place in the ——— Native Infantry at ———, in 1844, was, in the opinion of the Lieutenant-General, wholly and entirely owing to the resolute conduct and sound judgment evinced by Major-General Hunter in the most perilous circumstances. The Governor cannot therefore allow the Major-General to leave this command without the present public testimony of Sir Charles Napier's conviction that to no one of its public servants is the Honorable Company more deeply indebted than to Major-General Hunter for his conduct on the above trying occasion.

HEAD QUARTERS, CAMP HYDRABAD, *18th February*, 1847.

The party of mounted police, quartered at Kusmore, commanded by Jemedar Bhaie Khan, pursued a party of fifty Boogtee robbers, overtook and attacked them. The police had one Naik and two Sowars wounded, one horse killed, and three died of fatigue. The robbers had seven men killed: how many were wounded is not

known. The police re-captured fifty camels. This affair is very creditable to the police, which on every occasion proves its gallantry and zeal in the service of the public. Whatever horses may have been taken from the robbers, are to be sold for the advantage of the captors. All arms are to be sent to the arsenal. The re-captured camels are to be returned to their owners.

HEAD QUARTERS, CAMP KURRACHEE, 16*th March*, 1847.

The severe illness of that excellent officer Major Jameson, has obliged him to resign the command of the Baggage Corps.

The Lieutenant-General very deeply regrets the departure of that zealous and able officer, whose incessant labour in the performance of his arduous duties has much added to, if not produced, his illness.

HEAD QUARTERS, CAMP KURRACHEE, 17*th March*, 1847.

The Lieutenant-General finds that a most unmilitary practice has crept into the Regiments in Scinde, of allowing soldiers when on sentry to place their muskets against the wall, and walk about with their bayonets only in their hand. This is contrary to all rules of the service, and the Lieutenant-General calls upon all officers, when on duty, to take care that no such neglect of discipline occurs.

The only occasion on which the practice of allowing sentries to place their muskets against the wall is allowable, is when sentries are planted in a room the roof of which is so low that they cannot shoulder their arms.

HEAD QUARTERS, CAMP KURRACHEE, 4*th April*, 1847.

Intelligence having been received of the death at Bombay, of that excellent man and Officer, Major Jameson, Commanding the Baggage Corps, on the 24th ultimo, Colonel the Honorable H. Dundas, C. B., Commanding at Kurrachee, will be pleased to order a Committee of Adjustment to assemble as soon as possible, for the purpose of securing and taking an inventory of the effects at Kurrachee of the deceased officer.

The Lieutenant-General cannot close this order without expressing his sorrow for the loss of one whose exertions in the Hill Campaign, and conscientious discharge of his duties in every post which for some years he has filled under the command of the Lieutenant-General, were exemplary.

HEAD QUARTERS, CAMP KURRACHEE, 19*th April*, 1847.

The Cantonment of Kurrachee is infested by vagabonds who came with the troops from Bombay. The Police and Bazaar Master are to arrest all such men as have no ostensible means of earning their bread, and send them back to the place from which they came to Scinde. Those who do not belong to Bombay, are to be put to work on the roads for a month, and then liberated for three days, at the end of which time if they do not find work, they are to be again sent to the road gang. There are good wages and plenty of work going on in Scinde, and the Lieutenant-General Governor will not allow vagabonds to be loose on the public to rob industrious people.

This order to apply to all the other stations in Scinde.

HEAD QUARTERS, CAMP KURRACHEE, 23*rd April*, 1847.

The Governor cannot help expressing his regret at the departure of his excellent friend Doctor Gibbon, who, first under the political agency, and afterwards under the Scinde Government, has performed a period of eight years' uninterrupted and zealous service in this country, which has entitled him to this public expression of the Governor's approbation and thanks.

HEAD QUARTERS, CAMP KURRACHEE, 29*th April*, 1847.

His Excellency having observed a recent instance, where camp-equipage in charge of a Regiment had been pitched for a period of ten months without having been exchanged or repaired, owing to which the tents have now become unserviceable, begs to call the attention of the Officers Commanding Corps having tents in their charge, to the necessity of keeping them in a serviceable state, as the wear and tear of camp-equipage in this climate is very great.

Whenever a tent is observed to show symptoms of decay, it is immediately to be struck and returned into stores, and another tent drawn in lieu.

Officers commanding corps are to certify at the foot of their Monthly Returns of Camp-equipage, that the tents are serviceable and in good order.

HEAD QUARTERS, CAMP KURRACHEE, 11*th May*, 1847.

Colonel the Honorable H. Dundas, C. B., commanding at Kurrachee, will be pleased to order a standing Camp to be pitched at Ghizree for 400 men, allowing eight men to each tent, for the accommodation of a wing of one of the European Regiments at Kurrachee, to be relieved twice a month.

A favorable situation is to be selected for the Camp, open to the breeze, and in view of the ocean.

The greatest care is to be taken of the tents by the regiment in charge, which are to be kept in continual repair, as directed in General Orders No. 8 of the 1st May 1846, and No. 1 of the 6th of June 1846, and the attention of officers Commanding is directed to the orders relative to the cleanliness of the Camp.

The Assistant Commissary-General will be pleased to make arrangements for the regular and early supply of the daily rations and water to the camp.

After orders.

The Lieutenant-General wishing to give such of the soldiers as like it, the pleasure of bathing, and change of air, at Clifton, begs of the Medical officers in the Cantonment to assemble at Head-Quarters to-morrow, at eleven o'clock precisely, to discuss the safety of this measure, as regards the health of the men, who must necessarily be under canvas.

The above suspends the previous order on this subject, issued with the concurrence of the Superintending-Surgeon, as the Lieutenant-General understands that some of the Medical officers differ as to the propriety of the measure.

HEAD QUARTERS, CAMP KURRACHEE, 19*th May*, 1847.

The promptness with which Captain Jacob put his Detachment in motion, was the cause of retaking the Camels stolen by the thieves on the 4th instant, near the neighbourhood of Khyree Gurrie.

The Jemedar Sowaie Khan, of the Scinde Horse, well executed the orders of his commander: he persued the thieves for seventy miles, and caught all the stolen camels.

HEAD QUARTERS, CAMP KURRACHEE, 21*st May*, 1847.

Captain Malet, the Resident at the Court of Khyrpoor, leaves Scinde after a service of five years in this Province.

The zeal which this officer has exhibited in the various important civil services on which he has been employed, and also his gallantry in the field, makes it a source of regret that ill-health should deprive Scinde of the meritorious services of this gallant officer; while at the same time, it gives the Lieutenant-General an opportunity of thus publicly expressing his personal regard for Captain Malet.

HEAD QUARTERS, CAMP KURRACHEE, 14*th July*, 1847.

A party of plundering Mundranee Boogties had pitched their camp about twenty miles from Kusmore, to plunder our frontier, under the command of a well known Marauder, Dota Mundranee. Lieutenant Younghusband, of the police, resolved to attack him on the morning of the 7th of July, with about an equal number of the mounted police.

Both parties had spies, and both spies left their enemies' camp about the hour Lieutenant Younghusband marched. Dota Mundranee's spy, being on foot, was out-marched by Younghusband's detachment of Horse, and arrived at the Boogtie camp too late. Lieutenant Younghusband had surprised it, and, after a short combat, was victorious. But let Lieutenant Younghusband give his own account.

"About a mile from their camp I formed line, placing the Jak-
"ranee horse on my flanks, and advanced at a trot. When within
"fifty yards of the enemy, I drew swords and charged. The Mun-

" dranees advanced gallantly to receive us, and nearly all the " fighting men were cut down in the charge, and the rest fled with " precipitation. I had ordered to make prisoners, if possible: twen- " ty-eight of the enemy were left dead in the field, and I have " brought in twenty-seven prisoners. The only drawback to the " complete success of the affair was the failure in capturing Dota " Boogtie.

" As none but women and children were left in the camp, I " could not allow it to be plundered, therefore drew my men off, " and I am happy to say so much for the discipline of the mounted " police, that not a single article, except arms, was carried off by " them.

" I am also happy to report that I had not a single man killed, " and only four wounded, viz. Adjutant Alif Khan, Jemedar Bhaie " Khan, and a Duffadar, also Beerah Khan, Jemedar of Jekranees. " But my loss in horses is, I regret to say, very severe, five being " killed, eleven wounded, many of them mortally, and three dead " from fatigue.

" I beg to bring to your favorable notice, Alif Khan, Adjutant of " Police. He has been of the greatest possible assistance to me. " His bravery in the field is too well known to require any com- " ment from me. I beg also to report the gallantry, steadiness, " and good conduct, of the Native Officers, Non-Commissioned Offi- " cers, and Sowars, of the mounted police : the line they kept in the " charge, was worthy of any regular Regiment.

" I must not omit to mention the Jakranee Sowars of the police, " who have for the first time had an opportunity of shewing in ac- " tion how they appreciated our service. It was with the greatest " difficulty that I kept them from getting in front of the line, " they wishing to lead into action, '*to shew*,' as they said, '*whether* " *they were friends of the British Government.*' Dooru, the real " chief of the Mundranees, is among the wounded prisoners ; Do- " ta's name being generally mentioned, because he leads all the " forays. I intend dispatching the prisoners in a boat to Shikar- " pore, as soon as one can be got ready, in order that such of

"them as are wounded, may receive medical assistance as soon "as possible.

"I have the honor to be, &c.

"(Signed) J. W. YOUNGHUSBAND, *Lieutenant of Police.*"

The above very gallant action is just what I expected from the excellent Scinde Police. The conduct of Lieutenant Younghusband has, in this enterprize, been marked, in a prominent manner, by the skill with which he surprised the enemy, by the decisive boldness of the charge, by the capturing so many prisoners, and by the protection afforded to the women and children of the robbers. All are glorious to himself and his brave companions, and the two last the most so, because it prominently marks the perfect discipline of the Police, the respect due to humanity, and to the honor of our arms.

It may here be useful to observe, that, in a private letter, Lieutenant Younghusband says that his men were saved by preserving a good line, knee to knee, when charging the enemy, who wounded and slew the *horses* of the Police, but they could not get at the *men*. This is another instance added to the multitude of examples which history presents to us, that not only victory, but personal safety, attends upon *discipline*. Had the charge made by the Police been broke, loose, disorderly, many men would have been killed.

Soldiers of all ranks should ponder well on these matters.

HEAD QUARTERS, CAMP KURRACHEE, *29th July*, 1847.

An unjustifiable attack was made by an anonymous writer in the Newspapers, upon the conduct of two officers of the —— Regiment N. I., who, a short time ago, went out shooting tigers near Sukkur.

Lieutenant-Colonel ———, Commanding in Upper Scinde, very properly ordered a Court of Inquiry to examine into the deaths of two Natives who were killed by the tiger on the occasion.

The result of which enquiry shows, that the Natives *were armed*, were not more exposed than the officers themselves, and that the conduct of the two gentlemen in question was in every way correct and gallant. The party, eight or ten, all armed alike, drew up in line to receive the charge of the wild beast;—the Europeans

fully as much exposed as the Natives, and even more so, for the latter ran away when the tiger charged, whereas Lieutenants ——— and ——— stood till their arms were discharged. At this moment, the tiger, fortunately for them, let go the Native he had seized, and taking the poor man's gun in its mouth, went back into the wood. The Natives were all interested in the sport, and joined voluntarily. There was another man killed. Two of them (away from the party, and on the bank of the river) seeing the beast issue from the wood and lie down, thought he was dead, and went to him: he seized them, and wounded one mortally. It was altogether a noble hunt, and honorably conducted by Lieutenants ——— and ———. I consider that this order is due to the character of these gentlemen.

HEAD QUARTERS, CAMP KURRACHEE, 31*st August*, 1847.

It having been reported to the Lieutenant-General Commanding, that several men of the ——— Regiment N. I. and Police have been cut down by men of the ——— Horse in a riot between individuals of these Regiments, and that a Court of Enquiry has in vain sought to discover the details of this riot.

The Lieutenant-General orders that no Native Officer, Non-Commissioned Officer, or Private Soldier, of the ——— Horse, nor of the ——— Regiment Native Infantry, be allowed to enter the town of ——— till the men are discovered who drew swords and carried clubs on the occasion in question; nor will the Lieutenant-General permit the Sowars of the ——— Regiment of ——— Horse at any time to enter the town of ——— with swords on.

The Lieutenant-General imagines that this irregular conduct of the ——— Horse must have been caused by some of the men who have lately joined the Corps;—he cannot believe that any of the old Soldiers would so conduct themselves as to cut down men of the Police or of another Regiment. The offenders in both Regiments must be discovered.

HEAD QUARTERS, CAMP KURRACHEE, 7*th September*, 1847.

The Lieutenant-General regrets to find in a recent case, that the 6th paragraph of the order which he issued regarding the ——— Regi-

ment Native Infantry, on the 24th September 1845, has not been obeyed.

He, therefore, refers Commanding Officers of Native Regiments to that order, and requests that they will take care to have it clearly explained to the Sepoys under their command, that any Sepoy may complain direct to his European Officer without the leave of any Native Commissioned or Non-Commissioned Officer. Unless direct complaints from the Sepoy to his European Officer are permitted in Regiments, no Sepoy can be secured from oppression, and the most dangerous consequences will be the result.

HEAD QUARTERS, CAMP KURRACHEE, *15th September*, 1847.

Lieutenant-Colonel Shaw has forwarded a report made by Major Jacob, of an attack made by 210 Boogties upon a Kyheree village beyond the Scinde frontier. The villagers repulsed the Boogties, and the hill-robbers went off. Major Jacob states that Lieutenant Merewether's conduct has been so watchful and active, that he attributes the spirit shewn by the Kyheerees to have been instilled by that Officer. The Lieutenant-General, therefore, takes the opportunity of expressing his satisfaction with the conduct of Lieutenant Merewether,—and also of saying that he extends the praise to Major Jacob himself, whose services on the frontier have been what the Lieutenant-General expected from an officer of Major Jacob's zeal and abilities.

The Lieutenant-General has directed a Loongee to be presented to Wullee Mahomed Kaheerea, for his bold conduct in defending his village.

The Lieutenant-General directs that every assistance may be given to the Boogties who come in and make their obedience to the English.

Lieutenant-Colonel Shaw is, in communication with the Collector, to see that this order is carried into effect promptly. The Boogtie tribes have been ruined by their own folly ;—but all who surrender, shall be treated with the same kindness that has been shewn to those who saved themselves by making an early submission.

HEAD QUARTERS, CAMP KURRACHEE, 1*st October*, 1847.

I this-day take leave of the Scinde Division of the Bombay Army which I have had the honor to command,—and it is but just to that Division to say that the conduct of the Troops has been so excellent as to add greatly to the regret with which I leave my comrades of the Queen's and Company's Services in Scinde. The separation is to me painful;—but it is a source of great pleasure to make over the command, as I hereby do, to the Honorable Colonel Dundas, an Officer whose character and abilities inspire those under his orders with the highest degree of confidence and affection.

May success attend you all, is the parting and sincere wish of your old Commander.

(Signed) C. J. NAPIER, Lieutenant-General.

CAMP KURRACHEE, 1*st October*, 1847.

Division Order by Colonel the Hon'ble H. Dundas, C. B., Commanding the Troops in Scinde.

The following General Order by the Right Hon'ble the Governor-General in India, having been transmitted for publication by the Secretary to the Government in Scinde,—the Colonel Commanding the Division has the greatest pleasure in making known the opinion entertained by the highest authority in India, of the distinguished services of Sir Charles Napier, who has this day retired from the Government of Scinde, and from the command of the Troops stationed in the Province.

"SIMLA, ———, 1847.

"His Excellency Lieutenant-General Sir Charles Napier, G. C. B., "having tendered to the Right Hon'ble the Governor-General of "India his resignation of the office of Governor of the Province of "Scinde, His Lordship desires to express the regret he feels in "losing the services of so distinguished and valuable an Officer.

"The Governor-General most cordially acknowledges the sense "he entertains of the just, firm, and able, manner in which His Ex-"cellency has conducted the Civil Administration of the Province "entrusted to his charge. This important and difficult duty has "been performed with an ability which justifies the unlimited confi-

" dence which His Lordship has reposed in Sir Charles Napier,—a " name gloriously pre-eminent as the leader of the Forces which " achieved the victories of Meanee and Hydrabad.

" The Lieutenant-General will, after a long, brilliant, and honor- " able career in the public service, retire from the Government of " Scinde, having in the course of his service in Scinde received the " approbation of the Government he has served, the thanks of the " British Parliament, and been honored by a distinguished mark of " his Sovereign's favour.

" By order of the Right Hon'ble the Governor-General,

" (Signed) H. M. ELLIOT,

" *Secretary to the Government of India,*

" *with the Governor-General.*"

SECTION VI.

PARADES.

HEAD QUARTERS, SUKKUR, 21*st November*, 1842.

1. The Major-General was pleased with the Troops this morning: altogether they did well—making allowance for want of practice in large bodies. There are a few points on which after a while we shall improve.

2. For example,—when we advanced up the hill, every Commander of Battalion should have been in rear, watching that he did not swerve from the 19th Bengal Regiment, which, as it led the echellon previous to forming line, and the line was formed on it, was the regulating Battalion.

3. The great error in this advance, though it was by no means a bad one, lay with the Major-General for not riding along the line and cautioning the Commanders that the 19th was the regulatiug Battalion.

4. In like manner, on retiring in open column, the Major-General ought never to have quitted the pivot flank of the 19th Regiment. By doing so, he set a bad example,—as every Commander of a Bat-

talion ought in such marches to be at the head of his column on the pivot flank, watching his distance and alignment: it was for the Staff to ride about to those columns which lost sight of the regulating column by the inequalities of ground, and to assist those Regiments;—the mounted Officers, except the Commanding Officer of each Regiment, keeping the Companies square to the line of march, ranks well-locked, and the Soldiers silent.

5. This talking is one great mischief, and the Soldiers must be taught that it cannot be allowed.

6. The Officers Commanding Regiments will be so good as to practice their men to line the ridge of a hill: it is not a thing that can be learned in a moment.

7. Regiments are also to be drilled to fire in *close order while advancing:* it is very difficult at first, but is nevertheless to be acquired with a little perseverance,—in action, the files are soon loosened by killed and wounded men falling out, but on parades the men loosen out gradually. If one centre Company falls to the rear and reserves its fire as a guard to the colours, there will be room to loosen out without extension of front.

8. The Major-General observed that the firing was very high. It is necessary to level low: a low-ball strikes the ground and rises again, and then strikes a man,—but the ball fired too high is lost altogether.

9. In firing, Officers Commanding Regiments must be particular not to fire till they see their front perfectly clear: to-day we fired on our own picquets.

HEAD QUARTERS, SUKKUR, 29*th November*, 1842.

1. The Major-General was well satisfied with the Troops this morning: generally speaking, they did well—there was less noise, and more correctness of movement, than there was last field-day.

2. The chief fault that he perceived was, that the men are not taught to halt when the word is given, but keep touching in to the dressing point for half an hour. Now,

In the first place, they should never lose the touch; in the second, when ordered to dress let them dress, but not attempt to recover

the lost touch ; if they have lost their touch, it must be remedied by the Commanding Officer, or second in command, giving the word "right (or left) close." The eternal touching in to the pivot one man after another, when large bodies of troops are in motion, is destructive of all manœuvre,—it never ceases.

3. After the word halt, no man must move either to *touch* or to *dress*, except by word of command from his Commanding Officer. Much depends on supernumeraries in a line : they can see what an Officer in the ranks cannot see ; they can make the men preserve their touch, and if there be a crush, they can direct files to fall to the rear, which the Officer Commanding the Company cannot do. No mischief can ever arise in action from this ; as there will quickly be vacancies, and the files again come up into line,—whereas, when men jostle each other, the whole line is put into disorder.

4. Commanders of Battalions, Majors, and Adjutants, cannot be too attentive to the exact dressing of heads of columns and distances, upon which the correctness of all formations mainly depends. If those nearest the directing Battalion go wrong, they throw out the whole line.

5. Another important point is the repetition of the words of command ; every mounted Officer should repeat them, and even those who are in the ranks, if they perceive the least check in the transmission of an order : in the noise and smoke of an action, there is no other way of passing orders.

HEAD QUARTERS, CAMP HYDRABAD, 14*th March*, 1843.

The Officers Commanding Native Corps are requested daily to exercise their Regiments, especially the Officers. The chief points to be attended to are marching in column and line : these are essential, and the Major-General hopes everything from the zeal and activity of all ranks. Glorious results can only be obtained by incessant labour.

HEAD QUARTERS, HYDRABAD, 17*th March*, 1843.

Officers Commanding Regiments are immediately to teach their Recruits to fire with ball cartridge, omitting all the regulated mo-

tions of the firelock. The only thing at present required is, that the Recruit should know how to charge a firelock, and take aim from behind an intrenchment. The Recruit is to practice at a target at once.

Major ——— is requested to furnish some of the captured gun-powder and ball for this purpose.

HEAD QUARTERS, HYDRABAD, *4th August*, 1843.

The movements of large bodies are necessarily slow, and there must be no time lost by Commanders of Regiments in dressing Companies, and other details which they attend to on their Battalion parades, where no one is kept waiting for them, and where this instruction in such details is the business of the day. It is quite different in Divisional movements: on these occasions, Commanders of Battalions must be quick in forming lines; they must give their whole attention to the dressing of their *colours*, not of their men; if all their colours are in line, the Companies will soon get right, but if the colours are wrong, the whole of the Battalions beyond are thrown out, and the effect of the general movement lost. A whole Wing might be thrown under the fire of the enemy's cannon, or the occupation of a piece of commanding ground lost.

2nd. In deployments into line, the second in command of each Battalion rides forward, and marks the flanks which first enters the new line, and which is termed the inner flank: from the 2nd in command, the Adjutant takes the Battalion distance, and places himself on the new line, the 2nd in command placing him, which he does correctly, being himself in the new line, and having the distant point to dress the Adjutant upon. The Commanding Officer is to be on the inner flank, watching that his leading Company dress correctly, and that none over-step the line. The moment his colours get into line, he corrects their dressing on those of the Regiments first formed.

3rd. Officers are not to allow their men, when they halt, to *touch* in after having opened out: when the word halt is given, no man is to move; be he in his proper place or out of it, there he is to remain, but if he moves, he throws whole Battalions wrong; and what at first is a mere trifling opening of a few inches, may, ere this touching in

finishes, throw a whole Army into confusion. If a Company Officer thinks he has time to close without setting those beyond him wrong, let him give the command "close—march."

These are the chief points: our marching in line last Monday was good.

HEAD QUARTERS, HYDRABAD, 17*th August*, 1843.

His Excellency requests that Officers commanding Regiments and Detachments with the force under his command, will be pleased to allow the Officers and men to consider each Thursday in the week as a holiday, and that on these days no field-day or parade will be ordered.

Officers Commanding Regiments will use their own discretion in granting leave on days of Native festivals.

HEAD QUARTERS, KURRACHEE, 9*th January*, 1844.

All Officers joining from Bombay, or who have been absent from their Regiments above two months, are, if under the rank of Field Officers, to undergo a course of drill on their arrival at the Head Quarters of their Regiments: those of the rank of Field Officers are to be directed to exercise the Regiment daily for one month, under the direction of the actual Commanding Officer.

HEAD QUARTERS, KURRACHEE, 13*th January*, 1846.

Captain ——— and his Subaltern Officers of the ——— Regiment Native Infantry, are immediately to drill their men, both on and off guard, to use their percussion caps. The Major-General gives him three days to make the whole perfect, and the fourth day the Major-General will inspect the whole at seven o'clock in the morning, whether on or offguard. Those on guard the Major-General will visit at their respective posts. There are three Officers of the ——— Regiment Native Infantry at Kurrachee, and Captain ——— is to divide his men into three divisions, giving one to each Officer for the above instruction. These three Officers are to be taken off garrison duty for the above purpose.

HEAD QURATERS, KURRACHEE, 12*th June*, 1846.

As there seems to be some misunderstanding with regard to marching past in column at quarter distance, it is right to state that the Regulations on that subject are as follows :—

1st. Marching past in column at quarter distance is an evolution performed when a large body of Troops has been assembled, because the usual mode of marching past in open column in ordinary time would be too tedious : the troops therefore march past but once, and that once in quick time, and consequently a salute is given to the Reviewing Officer.

2nd. But this salute can only be given by mounted officers,—as the close or quarter distance column will neither of them admit of Companies taking open order.

3rd. But should the Troops first march past in ordinary time in open column, giving the usual salute, and are afterwards marched past in column at quarter distance and in quick time, then the mounted officers do not salute, because that compliment has been already paid.

HEAD QUARTERS, CAMP KURRACHEE, 25*th August*, 1846.

A reference having been made to the Major-General by Colonel ————, with respect to the precedence of Her Majesty's and Company's Troops, His Excellency forwarded the same to His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in Bombay, by whom it was referred to the Right Hon'ble the Commander-in-Chief in India. The following copy of a letter from the Adjutant-General of the Bengal Army, and decision by the Most Noble the Marquis of Hastings, are published for general information. The instructions contained therein are to be most strictly adhered to.

No. 1477.

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, HEAD QUARTERS,
SIMLA, 18*th July*, 1846.

SIR,—With reference to your despatch No. 1462, of the 25th ult., transmitting correspondence on the subject of the relative precedence of the Troops of Her Majesty's and the Hon'ble Company's Services on parade on honorary occasions,—I have the honor, by direction of His Excellency the Right Hon'ble the Commander-in-Chief in India,

to acquaint you, for the information of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief of the Bombay Army, that the General Order by the Most Noble the Marquis of Hastings, under date the 18th of March 1814, of which a Copy is annexed, has governed the question of the precedence of the Troops of the two services, when assembled on parade on honorary occasions, ever since it was promulgated to the Army,—and that the practice which you state has existed on the point at the Bombay Presidency, has also been invariably observed in the Bengal Army.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) P. GRANT, *Lieut.-Colonel, Adjutant-General of the Army.*

To the Adjutant-General of the Bombay Army.

(True Copy.)

(Signed) C. HAGART, *Lieut.-Colonel, Adjutant-General of the Army.*

CARROLL'S CODE.

CHAPTER 58.—PROMOTION, RANK, AND PRECEDENCE.

G. O. C. C. 18th March, 1814. } 161. It being understood that doubts have been entertained whether the Hon'ble Company's Horse Artillery should take the right of His Majesty's Dragoons, His Excellency is pleased to announce to the Army in public order, that, in conformity with the spirit of the King's Regulations, the uniform and perspective usage of the Indian service, and repeated decisions of His Excellency's predecessors, the Hon'ble Company's Artillery take the right of His Majesty's Infantry; and consequently the Horse Artillery, whether mounted or dismounted, are entitled to precedence of His Majesty's Dragoons on all occasions of parade.

162.—The foregoing rule does not affect the precedence due to His Majesty's Forces, the Corps composing which take the right of the same description of Corps in the Hon'ble the East India Company's Service.

(True Extract.) (Signed) P. GRANT, *Lieut.-Colonel, Adjutant-General of the Army.*

(True Copy.) (Signed) C. HAGART, *Lieut.-Colonel, Adjutant-General of the Army.*

GENERAL ALPHABETICAL INDEX

TO COMPILATION OF GENERAL ORDERS, &c., BY MAJOR-GENERAL SIR C. J. NAPIER, G. C. B.

Page.

Address to the Sepoys before the battle of Dubba. 77

Admires the courage of 25 brave robbers, and the gallantry of 20 of the Scinde Horse who fought with them... 101

All Civil functionaries in Scinde amenable to Military Law—No man receiving above thirty Rupees per month from any Civil Establishment, to be discharged except by the orders of the Governor-General... 1

All persons halting at Wuttajee, to shew respect to the Musjid there, and not deface it... 4

All acts of plunder injurious to discipline: the first case of aggravated plundering will be punished with death,..... 14

All persons having no ostensible means of living in Scinde to be sent out of the province or to be put to work on the roads... 127

All Officers who have been absent from their Regiments for two months, are to undergo a course of drill for one month 139

Allows three days to a Native Regiment to be perfected in the use of their percussion caps... 139

An Adjutant never to be questioned as to the character of a prisoner, when any other Officer is acquainted with the man and can be called upon..... 12

An accomplice of the murderer of Capt. Ennis, 21st N. I., sent to work on the roads..... 79

Animadverts on the conduct of the Commanding Officer of a Cavalry Corps towards the Serjeant-Major of the Regiment, which led to an attempt at Suicide... 26

Animadverts on the conduct of the Court in letting a sentry go unpunished, who had allowed the escape of a state-prisoner under sentence of death..... 31

Any Camel-men who may desert the public service will be tried by General Court-Martial, and the sentence immediately executed... 114

Any person found a mile from Camp without a pass, to be treated as a plunderer, and punished accordingly... 77

Applauds the gallant conduct of a Duffadar and eighteen Sowars of the Scinde Horse in charging a party of 200 robbers and dispersing them... 125

Applauds the conduct and skill of Captain McMurdo and twelve men of the Scinde Horse in effecting a retreat..... 101

Approves and confirms a sentence, though not a *just* one, because it is well in Military men to be ready to spare an enemy... 40

Attention of Officers commanding Regiments called to the necessity of keeping their Camp-equipage in a serviceable state... 127

Page.

Authorises discharge of 71 men of a Native Regiment for misconduct... 97

Calls for a Lieutenant, an Ensign, and 100 men, as volunteers for an especial duty... ... 101

Cautions Officer not to make exaggerated reports of death by "coup-de-soleil"... ... 89

Censures an Officer for moving his Detachment beyond the frontier—zeal being no excuse for disobedience of orders... 118

Commanding Officers to be held responsible that the reports and returns of their Regiments are sent in at the proper periods... 119

Committing a theft while *on guard*, constitutes a case of robbery, combined with breach of Military duty..... 14

Complimentary Order after the battle of Meanee... 75

Complimentary Order after the battle of Dubba. 78

Complimentary to certain Officers who captured a large band of robbers... 81

Complimentary to Lieut.-Colonel Lloyd, on occasion of Lieut.-Colonel Schuler taking command of the Artillery in Scinde... 83

Complimentary to certain ranks of the Camel Corps and the Europeans who mounted the precipice at Truckee... 103

Complimentary to Lieut.-Colonel Douglas, to whom is attributable the improved condition of the large cantonment of Kurrachee... 117

Complimentary to the Mounted Police who recovered fifty Camels from the party which robbed them... 125

Complimentary to the Scinde Horse for retaking certain stolen Camels... 129

Complimentary to Major Jacob and Lieutenant Merewether of the Scinde Horse, and to the Kyhcerees who boldly defended their village against an attack made by 210 Boogties... 133

Complimentary to Captains Salter, Jacob, and Mowatt, for expeditious movement of their troops and guns... 100

Conditions under which the people of Scinde will be allowed to carry arms in public... 1

Congratulates the troops on the medals awarded them for the battles of Meanee and Hydrabad... 81

Considers the punishment insufficient,—the Commanders of the Indus Flotilla stand in greater need of protection of the laws than any other Commanding Officer.... ... 18

Courts-Martial to consider the facts of a case as proved, which are sworn to by prosecutor and witnesses, and not disproved by the prisoner... 35

Death is the proper punishment for deserters in presence of the enemy..... ... 20

Details a very gallant action of Lieut. Younghusband against a party of plundering Mundranee Boogties..... 129

Differs in opinion with a Military Commission, but allows the sentence to be carried into effect.... 24

Directs arrangements to be made by the Commissariat for supplying the European Troops with bread, the bakers having refused to do so..... 5

Directs the return to Kurrachee of an Officer for disobeying orders relative to the loading of the Camels... 72

Page.

Directs the City of Hydrabad to be taken possession of, and the Standard of the Queen to be unfurled on the great Tower... 75

Directs Officers commanding Native Corps to exercise their Regiments daily, especially the Officers... 137

Directs Officers commanding Regiments to teach their Recruits to fire with ball cartridge... 137

Disagrees with Court as to prisoner's guilt of desertion, and remits the whole sentence... 25

Disapproves of Lieutenant ————'s conduct towards certain mess servants, as disrespectful to the Officers of that mess... 22

Disapproves of sentence of three years' imprisonment for an unprovoked murder... ... 21

Dismisses a complaint against an Officer which has not been proved before a Court of Enquiry, with a caution to complainant not to make any memorial in a language which he does not understand..... 37

Disrespectful language to a Commanding Officer will not be forgiven in any Soldier, whether of the Queen's or Company's service.... 23

Duties of the Native Officer escorting boats down the river to Tatta... 79

Encounters with the enemy to be reported in an official form, and not by private notes... 89

Enumerates the advantages gained by the conquest of Scinde, on occasion of breaking up the Army in Scinde... 121

Especial care requested to be taken of the Camels, which cannot be replaced if lost..... 52

Examines the circumstances relating to the desertions of certain Sepoys..... 108

Explains that any sentence, however severe, would have been executed against a guard who allows a prisoner to escape..... 21

Explains the proper course for Soldiers to pursue in preferring complaints... 105

Expresses surprise at the irregular sentence of a Regimental Court-Martial on a Color-Serjeant, and orders his release.. 29

Expresses satisfaction of a Sentry slaying his prisoner who attempted to escape... ... 39

Expresses satisfaction at the promptness with which the Bengal Brigade got under arms... 74

Expresses approbation of the zeal shewn by the Medical Officers at Hydrabad and Sukkur under very severe trials... 82

Expresses approbation of the conduct of a Detachment though repulsed in the attack on a fortified place... 87

Expresses satisfaction at the brilliant exploit of Captain McKenzie near Mobarukpore... 96

Expresses approbation of Lieut. FitzGerald's zeal in building the fort and barracks for his Camel Corps at Larkhana... 99

Expresses sorrow for the death of Major Jameson at Bombay... 126

Farewell Address to the Troops on retiring from command of the Scinde Force... 134

Farewell Order on the Bengal column leaving Scinde 74

Farewell Order on the 1st Grenadier Regiment leaving Scinde..... 82

Page.

Farewell Order on Lieutenant-Colonel Leslie's Troop of Horse Artillery, and Major Whitlie's Battery, leaving Scinde... 82

Farewell Order on the 21st Regt. N. I. leaving Scinde... 83

Farewell Order on the 2nd European Regiment leaving Scinde.... 83

Farewell Order on the 3rd Cavalry leaving Scinde... 84

Farewell Order on the 9th Bengal Cavalry leaving Scinde... 84

Farewell Order on the 20th Regt. N. I. leaving Scinde... 84

Farewell Order on the 15th Regt. N. I. leaving Scinde... 85

Farewell Order on the Madras Sappers and Miners leaving Scinde..... 86

Farewell Order on the 6th Regt. N. I. leaving Scinde... 97

Farewell Order on the departure of Lieut.-Colonel Waddington, C. B., from Scinde.. ... 97

Farewell Order on Meer Ali Moorad retiring with his troops from Truckee..... ... 102

Farewell Order on the breaking up of the Field Force against the hill-robbers..... ... 102

Farewell Order on the 25th Regiment N. I. leaving Scinde..... 111

Farewell Order on the 8th Regt. N. I. leaving Scinde... 111

Farewell Order on Major-General Simpson leaving Scinde 114

Farewell Order on the 12th Regt. N. I. leaving Scinde... 119

Farewell Order on Major-General Hunter leaving Scinde... 125

Farewell Order on Major Jameson's proceeding to Bombay on sick leave... 126

Farewell Order on Captain Malet, Resident at Khyrpoor, leaving Scinde. 129

Forbids the shooting of Peacocks in Scinde, they being all private property, and sacred birds... 85

Forbids Officers commanding out-posts and detachments on the frontier to cross the boundary without permission... 96

Forbids Officers on medical certificate at Kurrachee to appear at parades, messes, &c... 96

Forbids Weekly Guards and Permanent Orderlies under any pretence whatever.. ... 115

Forbids the practice of allowing a Sentry to walk about with his bayonet only in his hand, and his musket placed against a wall... 126

Furious riding not to be allowed in Camp or Bazaar... 73

General Regulations for the guidance of Commanding Officers and Departments with the Field Force... 62

General Order by the Government of India on occasion of Sir Charles Napier's retirement from Scinde... 134

Grain and Forage if not promptly supplied, a report to be made to the parties indicated. 54

Grants furloughs to ten men per Company of the 6th, 8th, 12th, and 25th Regts. N. I., for their excellent conduct..... 86

In a purely Military Government in the field, every Officer takes his rank, whether employed in the Civil or Military Department... 2

Page.

It is the duty of every Officer or Non-Commissioned Officer making a prisoner, to see that prisoner placed in charge of a guard... 21

Jurisdiction of the Civil and Military Police defined 3

List of necessaries each Sepoy is allowed to carry. 56

Making arrangements previous to the Troops taking the Field in 1845. 57

Makes arrangements on the assembly of the Beloooch Chiefs in March 1841. ... 87

Method of supplying convoyance whenever troops or stores are to be sent from one station to another by the River. 56

Mitigates a sentence because the prisoner is well-spoken of by his Officers... ... 36

Mitigates sentence of corporal punishment to fifty lashes, in hopes of its proving a sufficient lesson..... 47

Mitigates punishment, in consideration of other Courts having awarded less for a similar crime... 50

Modifying part of the order relative to copying the station orders 46

Mutinous and disrespectful conduct cannot be passed over unpunished : the way to command men, however, is to avoid giving provocation to those under them..... ... 19

Never pardons a man who cannot go through a guard without misconduct..... ... 41

No intermediate approval necessary when the proceedings of a Court-Martial require the confirmation of superior authority..... 19

No man has a right to tempt his fellow-men to commit crime..... 39

No excuse for disobedience of orders except the impossibility of obeying them... ... 40

No person to be re-employed unless he can produce a certificate from last employer..... 1

No noise to be allowed in Camp,—the Field Officer of the day responsible for its tranquillity. 55

No Baggage animals beyond the stated number to be allowed to accompany the Force... 64

No Camp-follower to bear arms from 1st May... 79

No complaints to be made by Officer, Non-Commissioned Officer, or Private Soldier, except through his immediate superior..... 119

No Field-day or Parade to be ordered on each Thursday in the week, which the Major-General requests may be considered as a Holiday 139

None but men in Government employment are to wear belts..... 3

Nothing so injurious to discipline as to give a Soldier more to do than it is possible for him to do..... 34

Notices omission of the Court to enquire into character and former conviction—the character of the prisoner is important to the confirming authority... 17

Notices the remissness of a Court in its examination of Witnesses... 22

Notices a report that several Camels of certain Regiments were over-loaded... ... 55

Notices the plundering which is going forward, and declares determination to hang some of the offenders... 56

Page.

Notices a report of certain riots made in the Bazaar at night by Officers... 74
Notices a report made by Major Outram, of the steady conduct of a Company of H. M.'s 22nd Regiment... 75
Notices an unjustifiable attack made upon the conduct of two Officers by an anonymous writer in the Newspaper, relative to the death of two natives killed by a tiger..... ... 131
Observations on the proceedings of a Court of Enquiry on the complaint made against the Bakers, who appear not to have been supported,—and lays down certain rules for future guidance..... 10
Observations on the correspondence relative to the mortality among the Soldiers going down the river in boats not properly covered in..... 64
Observations on a report that the Camels sent to carry the baggage of a Cavalry Regiment were over-loaded to an enormous extent, and lays down certain further rules on the subject... 67
Observations on an affair between a Detachment of Irregular Cavalry guarding grass cutters, and some hill-robbers... 89
Observations on the report made of the above affair..... 91
Observations and Orders on the report of the repentance and return to their duty of a refractory Regt. of ——— N. I.... 95
Observations on a report that a Corps of Irregular Cavalry behaved with barbarity, and prescribes precautionary measures for future guidance of Native Kardars of frontier towns... 98
Observations on the report of a serious affray which took place in a Bazaar... 120
Observations on a General Parade of the Troops, and notices the several points in which they erred... 135
Observations on a General Parade, with remarks on "touching" and "dressing" and on the way of "passing an order."... 136
Observations on General Parades. No time should be lost in dressing Companies. Commanders of Battalions must be quick in forming line, and give their whole attention to dressing their *colours* and not their men... 138
Officers not to encumber themselves with more Baggage than is absolutely necessary ... 51
Officers permitted to quit Cantonments on short excursions with permission of Officers commanding Stations..... 86
Officers proceeding on leave to Bombay, are not to go beyond it without the permission of the Commander-in-Chief... 116
One year's imprisonment too inadequate a punishment to a culprit who has been running-a-muck and wounding several people... 45
On the evil tendency of allowing a Sentry to leave his post to go in search of the Corporal of the guard to relieve him..... 13
On the gallant conduct of Serjeant Power and his Detachment..... 36
On the importance of acquiring a thorough knowledge of Military Law..... ... 11
Orders one man per Regiment to be placed at the disposal of the Commissariat Department for the care of the Camels attached to the Regiment... 5
Orders a Court of Enquiry to investigate the circumstance of the Steel-yards of the Commissariat Department being reported false... 6
Orders that eight men per Company be nominated in every European Regiment in Scinde, as "Weighers," that the Soldiers may know they receive the right quantity of bread and meat..... 9
Orders a revision, because to have a drunken person in the Medical Department is to endanger the lives of the Soldiers..... 38
Orders the assembly of a Court to enquire into the cause why six men deserted from a Native Regiment 41
Orders a revision, because the punishment is considered too severe for a momentary loss of temper and folly in a very young man.... 42
Orders the Superintending Officer of a Native Court-Martial to write out certain Articles of War for his instruction... 46
Orders an Enquiry to be made into all matters of complaint which the Native Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers of a Local Corps have preferred through their Commanding Officer..... 48
Order of movement of the Troops. 58
Orders reduction in scale of Baggage... 63
Order relative to amount of passage-money chargeable to Officers' families. 73
Orders the execution of the murderer of Captain Ennis, 21st Regt. N. I. 78

Page.

Orders a Standing Camp to be pitched at Ghizree to accommodate a wing of one of the European Regiments at Kurrachee... 128
Orders it to be explained that any Sepoy may complain to his European Officer direct, without the leave of any Native Commissioned or Non-Commissioned Officer... 132
Pardons a crime which arose from ignorance rather than bad disposition, in a very young Native Soldier..... 23
Pardons two men convicted of robbery, because the third party concerned in it was acquitted by a separate Court-Martial..... 36
Pardons a culprit for certain reasons... 45
Pardons a Serjeant for slandering an Officer, but directs the Officer to prosecute the Serjeant for defamation... 49
Pardons a Private, and requests his Commanding Officer to admonish him against intoxication... 50
Points out certain important omissions in the proceedings of a Military Commission..... 24
Previous convictions are not brought forward to aggravate but to mitigate punishment... 16
Prohibits the native ranks of the Corps engaged in a late affray with the Police entering the town till the men who drew swords and carried clubs on the occasion are discovered..... 132
Prohibits the practice of seizing the Natives as guides and ill-treating them... ... 88
Prosecuting Officer never to be called upon to speak to prisoner's character... ... 46
Publishes scale allowed for public and private baggage... 52
Publishes extract from a despatch from the Government of India, relating to the late campaign against the robber tribes... 104
Publishes the General Order by the Government of India regarding the late campaign in the hills... 104
Publishes a letter from the Officer commanding in Cutch, in compliment to Captain Gaisford of the Artillery... 116
Recommends a less severe punishment where discharge is involved for behaving ill in a fit of ill-temper..... 16
Recommends Officers to go armed whenever they move out any distance from Camp ... 74
Records two circumstances worthy of admiration, which occurred in the opening of the campaign against the robber tribes,—the conduct of the Scinde Horse under Captain Jacob, and that of the Police under Lieut. Smallpage... 100
Records the unexpected death of Major William Brown, of the 69th Regt. N. I. ... 107
Records the gallantry of several small Detachments... 113
Regrets being forced to send Captain Brown to Shikarpoor to put the Police right..... 2
Regrets being obliged to publish the opinion of a Court of Enquiry on the Commissariat Scales and Steel-yards which were reported to be false, with observations thereon..... 7
Regrets the necessity of publishing the opinion of a Court of Enquiry on the conduct of an Officer..... 20
Regrets the departure from Scinde of Dr. Gibbon... 127
Regulating the arrival of supplies in Camp... 61
Regulates the manner of despatch of stores for or from the Camp... 62
Regulations for marching past in column at quarter distance..... 140
Relative to the precedence of Her Majesty's and the Company's Troops, and publishes the orders on the subject..... 140
Relative duties of the Commanding Engineer, and Assistant Quarter-Master-General, on the line of march... 53
Relating to the escape unhurt of prisoners in charge of a guard,—the whole affair discreditable to Military discipline..... 30
Remarks on the proceedings of a Military Commission on the complaint made against the Kardar of the Kurrachee Collectorate..... 4
Remarks on the careless conduct of four Troopers who were attacked while on escort duty, and requires all escorts to carry their fire-arms loaded..... 25
Remarks on the neglect of a Department in omitting to copy the station orders, unless they especially referred to that Department... 43
Remarks on Proceedings of a Court of Enquiry on a complaint made by a Lieutenant of the Indian Navy..... 48
Remarks on the proceedings of a Court of Enquiry, relative to a quarrel between the Police and a Local Corps... 49
Remarks on the report of the Court of Enquiry relative to the failure in the attack on———— 91
Remedies the want complained of in a Native Regiment, of Standing Orders..... ... 111

Page.

Remits half the punishment awarded. Desertion being rare among the Sepoys of the Company's Army..... 12
Remits punishment of a Gunner for good conduct in the Action of the 17th Feb., 1843... 13
Remits hard labour in hopes of the culprit turning out a good Soldier..... ... 13
Remits the remainder of punishment of a Soldier, on account of the excellent behaviour of his Regiment, and at the request of the Commanding Officer... 42
Remits 100 lashes of the corporal punishment awarded, in hopes that the infliction of the remainder will be a sufficient warning... 47
Requests that all proceedings of Courts-Martial will be written in English, as the Major-General unfortunately understands none of the Eastern dialects... 85
Rescinds former order—the Government of Scinde having become a Civil one..... 5
Returns a prisoner to his duty, the proceedings having become illegal by the absence of one of its members during passing of sentence... 51
Rules relative to Cholera Hospitals... 115
Rules relative to the disposal of the people coming to the Major-General, and points out the Departments to which the several cases are to be referred 76
Sentence of imprisonment must count from the date of President's signature..... 18
Sentries not to allow themselves to be approached without challenging... 37
Shows by example that no Officer's comfort is unnecessarily curtailed... 51
Soldiers well know there is a proper channel through which to obtain redress... ... 42
Substitutes Horses and Mules for Camels in the draft of Field Artillery Batteries in Scinde... 80
Takes leave of the Force on occasion of being ordered to join the Army on the Sutledge... 104
Thanks a Subedar and two Privates of the Police for capturing certain deserters from a Native Regiment... 108
The Superintending Officer should insert in the proceedings, that *nothing* had been brought forward on the defence, when such happens to be the case..... ... 16
The public not to lose, because deficiencies occur from an Officer's neglecting his duty... 39
The General has a right to protest against a sentence which he believes erroneous..... 47
The Baggage Master held responsible that no Camels with the Force are over-loaded... 54
The Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers, and men, of the Camel Baggage Corps to have the sole and entire command of the Baggage on the line of march, and no Officer in command of Troops is on any pretence to interfere with them... 70
The Provost-Marshal to flog any man he finds half-a-mile beyond the Camp except on duty... 61
The Soldier's post of honor is that where the State requires his services... 113
The supremacy of the British over the Native of India, must be maintained by justice... 72
To let prisoners escape, discreditable to a Soldier; and to set Sentries to guard prisoners with unloaded arms, incorrect.... 30
To provoke Duelling is derogatory to the character of Gentlemen, and against the Articles of War..... 34
Warns those employed with the Indus Flotilla, that Military Law reigns in Scinde, and that they will be punished if they seriously offend..... 17
Warns the Doolcewallahs and Camel-men that if they desert and are caught they shall be hanged... 113
When two prisoners are tried for the same crime, their punishment should be equal—or reason given why it should be otherwise..... 22
Where dishonesty is proved, good characters do not avail a man... 29
When Officers send people to make purchases, they must send money also for payment..... 79

PLAN OF THE

BATTLE OF MEANEE

By

Major C. Washington

Aid de Camp to the Commander in Chief of the British Forces

and the

Rebel Army of the Assumed Name

ACCOUNT OF THE BATTLE OF MEEANEE,

BY

MAJOR C. WADDINGTON,

COMMANDING ENGINEER WITH THE BRITISH FORCE.

Written in 1843, and published in 1847 in Vol. IX. of the Royal Engineer Professional Papers.

WITH SOME

STRICTURES ON THAT ACCOUNT,

BY

MAJOR GENERAL SIR W. NAPIER, K.C.B.,

Dated September 10th 1847, and published in 1849 in Vol. X. of the Royal Engineer Professional Papers, under the title of "Explanation of the Battle of Meeance."

TO WHICH IS ADDED,

A REPLY TO THE OBSERVATIONS OF MAJOR GENERAL SIR W. NAPIER,

BY

LIEUT.-COL. WADDINGTON,

Dated 28th September 1849, and published in 1851 in Vol. I. of the Royal Engineer Professional Papers, New Series.

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1852.

failing, they had been compelled to retreat to the river. Here they were received on board the two steamers, *Planet* and *Satellite*, which conveyed them to Muttāra, as above stated.

Major Outram brought with him the intelligence that the Beloochees had assembled in great force, and posted themselves in the shikargahs* which intervene between Muttāra and Hydrabad. It was thought that by setting fire to these woods, the enemy would be driven to the plain, and a party of 200 Sipahees was embarked the same evening with Major Outram and other officers, on the two steamers, to co-operate with the sailors in carrying this scheme into effect. The design, however, failed; for though the woods were partially fired, the scene of action on the 17th was too far distant to be affected by this stratagem. The Beloochees, it was said, had shifted their ground during the night, but it is more probable that we were mistaken as to the position of the shikargahs which they occupied.

At four o'clock on the following morning, 17th February, the troops again marched, the Scinde Horse, under Captain Jacob, leading. They were followed by the Sappers, under Captain Henderson, with a working party of 100 Sipahees to prepare a passage for the guns. The numerous canals which intersect this country had made the arrangements for crossing them a nightly work of great labour, and much impeded the progress of our artillery. We usually cut down the banks of the canals, throwing the earth into the centre; but as camels cannot pull up hill, it was necessary to make the ascents very gentle. On this morning, a delay of more than an hour occurred in forming the road over two large canals not far from Muttāra. Beyond these, however, it was found that the Ameers had anticipated our

* The shikargahs are forests enclosed for the preservation of game.

labours, the roads being already prepared for the passage of their own artillery.

A march of seven miles brought the advanced guard to the Foolailee, which is a small branch of the Indus, filled during the inundations of that river, but at this time of the year dry. Along its eastern bank the road continued for a couple of miles, passing, in quick succession, several small villages interspersed with groves of trees. Near the second of these, the silence of the march was first broken by the sound of a distant cannon. Sir Charles instantly formed up the infantry of his advanced guard behind a small canal, disposing the Scinde Horse in the bed of the Foolailee, and unlimbering the two 9-pounders which accompanied him. Shortly afterwards a squadron of the Scinde Horse was dispatched across the Foolailee to skirt round a shikargah on the opposite bank, while the remainder was sent to the front to reconnoitre. It was soon ascertained that the enemy was certainly in the latter direction, and the General again moved on, till he arrived at a village where the road to Hydrabad leaves the bank of the river.*

Close on the General's right at this time was the dry bed of the Foolailee, having its course nearly south; and, as far as the sight could reach in that direction, its further bank was enclosed by a mud wall, which bounded a dense shikargah. Directly to his front rose the last of the string of small villages before mentioned (Zāhir Bāhirchy kā Gote). Half a mile again beyond that, another vast enclosed shikargah extended at a right angle from the near bank of the Foolailee about a mile, and overlapped his left flank, though somewhat receding from it.

Two squadrons of the Scinde Horse, under Captain Jacob

* These roads are merely beaten tracks, and the bed of the river is as much used as any other.

and Lieutenant Russell, meanwhile continued their advance, turning off obliquely to the left till they found themselves within half a mile or less of the enemy's guns. Here they drew up in line, and were afterwards joined by the squadron which had been detached to examine the shikargah on the other bank of the Foolailee. In this position the whole of this gallant corps remained, observing the enemy's movements and exposed to his fire, till the final advance of the British line.

The General again moved forward for a thousand yards or so, along a beaten track which appeared to lead round the left skirt of the shikargah in his front. Here, finding himself in sight of the enemy, and within long range of his artillery, he decided on waiting for the main column of his force. This column was far behind, as the guns had been much impeded in their progress by accidents arising from the badness of the road.* The delay thus caused was considerable, and gave time to examine attentively the enemy's position.

Immediately in our front, the top of the shikargah wall was thickly studded with matchlock-men, more particularly at its eastern or receding end. Extending from this to the enemy's right, was seen a dense mass of his infantry, surrounding two conspicuous flags, and supported by large bodies of horse in its rear, while in front of it were posted numerous pieces of cannon. Some of these, more advanced than the rest, had been firing on the Scinde Horse, and now directed their shots,† though from a great distance, on the General and his advanced guard. The right of the

* The store carts of both batteries had had their pintle-eyes broken this morning, and a waggon of the camel battery had been upset.

† These balls were of beaten iron and weighed 5 or 6 lbs. each. The Ameers' artillery was under the direction of an Englishman.

enemy's infantry rested on groves of trees, which concealed a village, and the whole of this chosen ground was occupied in great strength.

Such was the formidable position taken up by our yet untried adversary, and which the slow approach of the British column allowed ample time to observe and discuss. It was generally thought that about 8000 infantry and 3000 cavalry were at this time visible from the General's station, as yet distant nearly a mile from the eventual scene of action. But the full strength of the Beloochee was not manifest from this place of observation; for it could neither be seen from thence that he held on his right a village strongly protected by trees and canals and walled enclosures, nor that along and behind the whole of his line ran the bed of the Foolailee river, at right angles to its former course.

At length the arrival of the main column enabled the General to advance. The same order of march was preserved, and, following the direction of the beaten road, which edged off to the left, the column was not halted till within 300 yards of the shikargah wall. This wall, as before mentioned, had been studded with Beloochees, but was deserted on our approach after some distant discharges of matchlocks; and as it was eight feet high, without loopholes or banquette, it afforded in fact no advantage of offence to the enemy, though it screened him from our fire.

The head of the column, which arrived left in front, was directed on the first distant tree standing to that flank, nearly at right angles with the road, and, as soon as it had taken up sufficient ground, the column was again halted, and wheeled to the right into line. The whole of the guns under Major Lloyd, four 9 and two 6-pounders, two 24 and two 12-pounder howitzers, with the Sappers, were placed

on the right of the infantry towards the shikargah. Behind the right, the 9th Bengal Cavalry, 350 strong, was in reserve. The Scinde Horse, about 500 sabres, were in the position which they had occupied for the last hour, 300 yards in advance of the left of the infantry line. They now formed column near the shallow green bed of a dry water-course, bordered by scattered trees, and leading directly forward to the village of Syud Sooltan Shak Ki Wustee, or Kātree* which flanked the enemy's right. From right to left the order of the infantry regiments was as follows:—first, H. M. 22nd regiment; next, the 25th and 12th regiments Native Infantry; and last, the 1st Grenadiers Native Infantry; mustering altogether, when joined by their details from the advanced guard, 1350 bayonets. The Poona Horse, under Captain Tait, with 200 of the Grenadiers, and two 6-pounders, had been left as a rear-guard, and did not come into action.

Before the British line there now lay a narrow plain, dotted with low sandy hillocks and camel bushes, and extending in front to the Foolailee, a distance of 1100 yards. Bounded on the east by the shallow green nullah, the trees and the village before described, and beyond these by an impassable canal,† it was shut in on the west by a continuation of the shikargah wall, which, taking an abrupt turn from its north-east corner, ran thence for a distance of 600 yards to the Foolailee, in a south by east direction. The front of this contracted space measured, in a straight line, only 700 yards from the shikargah wall to the village, and this was to be the field of battle. The enemy had selected it with judgment, for while the abrupt banks of

* Kātree is more properly the name of the district.

† This canal was dry, but the sides had been recently scarped, probably in the process of cleaning it.

the Foolailee afforded him a strong retrenchment, the British artillery and cavalry were greatly embarrassed by want of room, as will appear in the sequel of this account.

As soon as our line had been carefully dressed, and skirmishers thrown out, the guns were moved forward 200 yards, and our first fire (of round shot) opened on the enemy's batteries a little before eleven o'clock. H. M. 22nd formed up on the left of the artillery, and the remaining regiments were placed in échellon to the rear at 20 paces distance. Our guns, being found too distant to silence the enemy's batteries, were again advanced about 250 yards; and the enemy's fire, which, though briskly kept up, had not been very destructive, now evidently slackened under the rapid and well-directed discharges of the British artillery. At this time an opening was seen in the shikargah wall close to our right flank, and the grenadier company of the 22nd regiment, under Captain Tew, was detached to clear the wall. This was done by entering the shikargah, the jungle for some distance from the wall being thin and open. Captain Tew was almost immediately shot dead, and the company otherwise suffered, but the skirt of the shikargah was cleared for the time by these brave men.

A third halt was made at 300 yards from the Foolailee; and while some of the British cannon swept the outside of the shikargah wall with grape shot, and others kept down the enemy's fire, and at last silenced it, the infantry line, still formed in close échellon of regiments, was dressed in preparation for its final advance.

The word to advance was given, H. M. 22nd, our only European regiment, led the échellon, and as the bugles sounded, moved on in the most perfect order. A galling fire from numerous matchlocks was received with firmness, and in due time returned, though at first without much effect.

Sheltered by the steep bank of the Foolailee, the Beloochees rested their matchlocks and took deliberate aim. In its turn the 25th regiment N. I. became engaged, and then the 12th and Grenadiers. On this flank the enemy was even more strongly posted than on our right, for the watercuts and walls of the village protected him. His guns meanwhile had been abandoned when the British troops advanced, and were most of them already in our possession. But as the distance lessened, the more daring of the Beloochees, fresh and impatient for the fight, put aside their matchlocks. With sword and shield in hand, they rose from their hiding-places, and in more than one impetuous onset, shook and forced back the British line. Twice or three times were the 12th N. I.* beaten back, and as often were they nobly rallied by their officers. Brevet Major Jackson of that regiment, dismounting from his horse, thus sacrificed his life. Advancing to the front, followed by only two havildars, this lamented officer, after a short combat, fell beneath the sabres of the enemy. The 1st Grenadier regiment,† driven back with the 12th, fell into some confusion, and appears to have taken but little share in the action. Major Teasdale, commanding the 25th, was killed while animating his Sipahees, who gave ground in an alarming manner before their fierce opponents.‡ Lieutenant-Colonel Pennefather, commanding H. M. 22nd, was shot through the body, and Major Poole succeeded to that command. Even his stout Europeans could not keep their ranks unmoved under the furious attacks of the Beloochees. Defending themselves more skilfully with their bayonets

* Commanded by Major Reid.

† The 1st Grenadier regiment mustered less than 200 bayonets with its colours.

‡ Captain Jackson, brother of Major Jackson, of the 12th, took command of the 25th on Major Teasdale's death.

than the Sipahees, they yet swerved back from the sharp sabres of their desperate foes, many of whom were excited with bhang* or opium. Lieutenant MacMurdo, Assistant Quarter-Master General, his horse having been shot under him, killed a Belooch chief hand to hand, and made prize of his gold-handled sword. Still our brave officers and soldiers continued to fall,† and now Sir Charles Napier, seeing the obstinacy of the fight, and doubtful of its issue, pushed his horse through the ranks of H. M. 22nd, and, waving his cap, cheered on that gallant regiment. In the same manner, regardless himself of danger, he encouraged the 25th N. I. to advance. At this time it was no doubt the General's wish to drive the enemy from the bed of the river by a vigorous charge, but this intention was not carried into effect. The bayonet was but little used except in defence, and it shortly became evident that the fire of the matchlock, and the glancing of the keen sabre, were less and less frequent, while the continued and destructive roll of musketry, delivered from the edge nearly of the river bank, levelled every living being before it.‡ For upwards of an hour did this mortal

* Bhang is a decoction of hemp-seed.

† *Killed.*

Captain Mead, 12th Native Infantry. Lieutenant Wood, do.

Wounded.

Major Wyllie, Assistant Adjutant-General.
Captain Conway, H. M. 22nd.
Lieutenant Harding, do.
Ensign Pennefather, do.
Ensign Bowden, do.
Ensign Holbrow, 12th Native Infantry.
Lieutenant Phayre, 25th N. I., Quarter-Master.
Lieutenant Bourdillon, do.

‡ The bed of the Foolailee is an excavation produced by the current of the river in an alluvial soil, the bank here spoken of being simply the edge of this excavation. The elevated bank alluded to in the official dispatch

struggle endure; and when at last the British line descended into the river, it was but over crowded heaps of dead and dying. The pouches and cotton clothes of nearly all these men had taken fire, probably from their lighted matches, and their scorched and writhing bodies presented a shocking spectacle. Many Belooch corpses too lay on the bank above, mingled with those of their enemies, mute evidences of desperate valour. Quarter was not asked or given. The wounded were shot or bayoneted by our exasperated soldiers, disdaining to yield, and striking at our men to the last.

Meanwhile neither artillery nor cavalry were idle, nor was their aid unimportant in deciding the fate of the day. So contracted was the last position of the guns, that only four of them could be brought into action.* One of Captain Hutt's guns, with the assistance of the Sappers, who also broke down part of the wall, was brought round to bear on the shikargah, and did great execution there, while the remaining three swept the Foolailee to the right and front with a continued deadly discharge of grape shot and spherical case.

During the heat of the fight, orders were sent to the cavalry to force the enemy's right. The 9th Bengal Cavalry had been previously crossed in support of the left of our line, and formed immediately in rear of the 1st Grenadiers. By some misconception of an order, the men of the latter regiment faced to the right about and retreated some distance before their officers could rally them. The Beloochees showed themselves at the same time in numbers from the village enclosures and ravines. Lieutenant-Colonel Pattle, of the 9th Cavalry, second in

was confined to a small portion of our front. Below the edge of the bank was a double step or ledge, which was heaped with the bodies of the slain.

* Captains Whittlie and Hutt commanded the camel and horse batteries.

command, had not yet received the General's order to advance, but seeing the necessity of checking the enemy's movement, and partly, as I am informed, on the urgent representation of Captain Tucker, he, after some hesitation, permitted the cavalry to act. The moment certainly appears to have been critical, when the 3rd squadron of the 9th Cavalry, led by that gallant officer, advanced at a trot, passing between our infantry and the village, and driving the enemy into and along the bed of the Foolailee. A body of Beloochees, drawn up in rear of the village, made a stout resistance, from which this brave squadron suffered severely. Captain Tucker received six shots and fell,* but Captain Bazett succeeding him, completed the dispersion of the enemy in this direction. The 3rd squadron was followed by the 2nd under Captain Garrett, which supported Lieutenant Colonel Pattle in an attack on the village, while the 1st, under Captain Wemyss, filing between the Grenadiers and 12th Native Infantry, crossed the Foolailee, dispersing the enemy on the opposite bank. Brevet Captain Cookson, the Adjutant, was at this time killed, and three other officers were wounded.† Lieutenant Colonel Pattle, with a few men of the 3rd squadron, had gallantly attacked the enclosures of the village, and being afterwards supported by the 2nd squadron, succeeded in partially clearing them. It was the fire from these and the neighbouring canals and gardens which caused the heavy loss of the 9th Cavalry. The Scinde Horse, after an ineffectual attempt to get round the outside of the village, in

* It is gratifying to record that this gallant officer recovered from his wounds.

† *Wounded.*

Brevet Capt. Smith, 9th B. Cavalry.
Lieutenant Plowden, do.
Ensign Frith, Quarter-Master, do.

which they were stopped by a deep canal occupied by the enemy, also descended into the river between our infantry and the village, and rode direct to the enemy's camp. The Ameers had already abandoned it and fled to Hydrabad, but many brave men were still found there who defended themselves obstinately, and were not cut down without loss to their pursuers. Captain Jacob had his horse killed under him, and deputed Lieutenant Fitzgerald to continue the pursuit, which he did for some distance, till coming on a large body of horse who had not been engaged, that officer was obliged to retire. The Scinde Horse were about the same time recalled to defend our baggage, and a detachment of the Bengal Cavalry held possession of the camp, which was afterwards burnt and evacuated by order of the General.*

When the British troops crossed the river, about half-past one P. M., the battle may be said to have ended, but firing did not altogether cease, and multitudes of the enemy still hovered about; nor was it till our guns had been crossed and opened both up the Foolailee, and on the village and neighbouring enclosures, that the insurgents gradually dispersed. The General formed his camp on the field of battle, with the baggage in the centre of a hollow square, and the troops slept on their arms.

Thus closed this eventful day. Seldom perhaps has the determined valour of the Beloochees on that occasion been surpassed. The Europeans behaved steadily and bravely, and were no doubt much inspired by Sir Charles's brilliant example. The Sipahees were sustained and rallied by their officers, whose conduct was marked by a noble self-devotion. Without them, they would hardly have recovered them-

* Thirty or forty thousand rupees were found in the camp. The Ameers were said to have brought some lacs of rupees with them.

selves as they did, after being more than once driven back. The artillery and cavalry did their duty well, but their actions were in a great degree paralyzed by the confined field to which they were chiefly restricted. It must be admitted, however, that the advance of our cavalry on the enemy's right had probably an important effect in deciding the battle.

Our loss in this engagement was severe, considering the small number of our troops engaged: 62 killed and 194 wounded, of whom 19 were officers (6 killed and 13 wounded.)* The enemy left upwards of 400 dead in the bed of the Foolailee, and there were probably as many more in different parts of the field and the shikargah, killed by the artillery and cavalry. As quarter,† with a few exceptions, was not given, it may be doubted whether the number of wounded who escaped much exceeded the number of the killed. The statements of the Beloochees make their loss much greater, but are probably exaggerated. At the lowest computation, however, the loss of the Beloochees must have been six times that of the British,—a surprising disproportion when we consider their advantage of position, and a plain proof of the superiority gained by discipline, and especially by one of its results, a rapid and well-sustained fire.

The whole of the enemy's guns, 15 in number, the standards, ammunition, baggage, tents, and some treasure, fell into our hands, and the immediate results of the battle were most important. On the two following mornings six of

* The number of horses killed on both sides was considerable. The enemy's cavalry was not much engaged, but many of the Beloochees dismounted to fight, picketing their horses in the bed of the river.

† It must be noted that the Beloochees, not expecting quarter, defended themselves to the last, making it nearly impossible to spare them.

the Ameers surrendered themselves prisoners, and shortly afterwards Hydrabad* was taken possession of, and Lower Scinde declared a province of the British empire.

* Hydrabad was not taken possession of till the 21st, after Major Outram's departure. It was said that there were two millions sterling of public treasure in the fort. If so, a great part of it must have been removed during this delay. The prize-money found was about one-quarter of that sum.

Explanation of the Battle of Meeānee. By Major General Sir William Napier, K. C. B.

To the Editor of the Professional Papers.

Guernsey, September 10th 1847.

Sir,

Major Waddington's account of the Battle of Meeānee, in the ninth volume of the Engineers' Professional Papers, is, on some points, so much at variance with my account of the same action, that I must earnestly request the favor of having the following observations placed in the next volume of the Professional Papers of which you are Editor: and as I have the greatest respect for Major Waddington's services, you will, I hope, find nothing in my observations unmeet for the general tone and sober propriety of your publication; and some portions of them may perhaps be considered interesting to military men.

Major Waddington states the British forces to be about 3000 strong. They were so perhaps on paper, ten days before the action, and including sick; but I am assured by Sir C. Napier, that for the reasons mentioned in my work, not more than 1700, including Officers, were engaged in the battle; and this enumeration is the result of a very careful examination by the Staff of the General, made after the action, to correct the dispatch, which, written in the confusion of the moment, was certainly inaccurate. This result has also been recently confirmed by the assurance of two Officers of the 22nd Regiment, and one of the Company's Service, who were present in the fight.

Major Waddington states that the top of the Shikargah wall was at first thickly studded with matchlock-men, but

on the advance of the line was abandoned. Sir C. Napier writes as follows:

"The Beloochees were not crowded on the wall, which was only a foot thick; one man sat astride on it, firing at us, I believe at me, and that he was a marksman, put there as knowing me. He had only time for three shots, or so; for seeing how he fired at me and my Staff, I told some of the 22nd to shoot him, and he fell like a lump of lead on our side. We had seen matchlocks handed up to him; I swept the whole wall well with my telescope before we advanced, and while under the cannonade, and there was not a man but him on it. I saw through the opening A B obliquely, my light passing A



to a good way behind B; and I ascertained there was no scaffolding to enable them to fire over, no loopholes to fire through. It was this made me think the wall was purposely broken to let them sally out on our rear. When I was satisfied there were neither loopholes nor banquette, I ordered the advance. I was so particular, that, though my horse, Red Rover, stands steady, I could not satisfy myself while on the beast's back; and I dismounted, and again steadily swept the wall and examined the breach.

"I did not think of sending on Tew till we were advancing, and I was thinking of how to deal with them, if they rushed out from the wall: many things came like flashes across my mind. I was unsatisfied at this moment; the fire from the matchlocks in front was heavy, and no time to lose. Suddenly the idea came into my head to *attack them through the wall, as the best check*, and I ordered one company, about 60 or 70 men; I could not spare more. I told Tew, he must defend the entrance to *the last;* or rather, I sent him that order, for the 22nd had got to firing: there was confusion, and matters had put on a very dangerous aspect. Tew beat them back, and he found plenty there, and fell about 60 yards within the gap; but his men *held on*. He could not have gone further; thousands filled the wood,

upon whom, soon afterwards, we opened a nine-pounder through the wall: it told tremendously, and relieved Tew's men, who would otherwise have been sorely pressed; yet I could have aided them with guns, had they been driven back.

Major Waddington would seem to imply, for I am not quite sure of his meaning, that the close fighting did not last more than one hour.

Upon this point I have consulted the three Officers alluded to before, having first requested them to read the Major's account: they were unanimous that he was mistaken, and gave several strong facts within their own peculiar knowledge in support of their view; and from Sir Charles Napier I received the following remarks:

"The battle began at *nine o'clock*, and we formed on the opposite bank of the Foolailee at *one*, firing still going on. What the dispatch says was taken from all our watches."

Now Major Waddington says the opposite bank was gained at half-past one, thus giving an additional half hour; and as the lowest calculation gives four hours' fighting, the greatest part must have been spent in the close conflict, thus confirming my account, which gave three hours and a half of rugged battle.

Major Waddington says—"By some misconception of an order, the 1st Grenadiers N. I. faced to the right-about, and retreated some distance before their officers could rally them." Sir Charles Napier says emphatically, "They went about by Clibborne's order; but there were a thousand causes assigned at the time for their conduct."

Major Waddington says—"Lieutenant-Colonel Pattle*

* *(Copy.)* "Poonah, 6th March, 1844.

"My Dear General,

"Your letter of the 28th ultimo I received last evening.

"As regards Colonel Pattle ordering the cavalry to charge of his own accord, I can affirm such was not the case. I received orders from you to

had not received the General's order to charge; but seeing the necessity of checking the enemy's movement, and being urged by Captain Tucker, of the 9th Bengal cavalry, after some hesitation, permitted the cavalry to act."

This statement, qualified by the acknowledgment that it was hearsay, would give all the merit of the conception of that brilliant movement to Lieutenant-Colonel Pattle and Captain Tucker, and all the merit of the execution to the 9th Cavalry. Major Waddington, however, only writes, as he says, from the information he received from others: he was, I believe, close to the General all the action, and carried no orders to any other part of the field. He has been misinformed on this interesting portion of the action. Sir Charles Napier informs me he sent three officers one after the other with the order, fearing death might intercept it. Those officers were Lieutenant-Colonel McPherson, Captain Pelly, and Captain Thompson; and their letters declaring this fact are in existence, but he had only that of Captain Thompson at hand to send to me: it is given below.

desire the cavalry to charge. I rode up to Colonel Pattle, and delivered *to him distinctly and loudly* (he being rather deaf) the *order* in nearly the following words: 'Colonel Pattle, you will advance as quickly as possible with your cavalry, and charge the enemy on their right;'—and at the same time I pointed out to him the direction with my hand. His reply was, 'Very good,' or 'Very well.'

"Thompson had been before me, but I don't know if he delivered the orders to Major (now Colonel) Storey, or Colonel Pattle; but to the latter officer I gave the order distinctly, and he immediately acted upon it.

"I have made inquiry of Lieutenant Brennan if he conveyed any order to the cavalry on the 17th February: he says he did not.

"Believe me, &c.

(Signed) "P. McPherson,

"Lieut.-Colonel, H. M. 17th Regt.

"Major-General Sir C. Napier,
Governor of Scinde."

As to the charge being led by the 9th Cavalry, it is true, and nevertheless the irregular Scinde horse did perform the part assigned them in my work, namely, attacking the enemy's camp, and spreading confusion and terror in their rear after passing the Foolailee; for the Bengal troopers, while in the dry bed of that river, turned a little to the left, and thus the Scinde horsemen passed them, and fell on the camp.

Captain Thompson's Letter.

"Simla, 22nd May 1844.

"Colonel Pattle was mistaken when he told you he received no order to charge at Meeānee; for you gave the order to me, and I met the Colonel about half-way between the cavalry and infantry: he was *riding towards the latter*, and asked me how they were getting on? I made no reply, but told him your order: he said, 'Tell Storey,' and I rode on. I told Major Storey, and *saw* the 9th cavalry advance, and remember Garrett beginning to trot, when Storey called out, 'Gently, Garrett! Gently!' On my return I met McPherson, who asked me if I had given the order; and I think he rode on to the cavalry: so there can be no mistake about the Colonel having received the order.

(Signed) "H. THOMPSON."

Major Waddington, speaking of the enemy's loss, says—"The enemy left upwards of four hundred dead in the bed of the Foolailee, and there were probably as many more in different parts of the field, and the Shikargah, killed by the artillery and cavalry."

The officers of the 22nd and Company's Service who read this at my request were unanimously and decidedly opposed to its correctness; but the following observations by Sir Charles Napier will probably be deemed the best authority; and it is to be remembered that the detailed returns made to the Ameers by the different tribes of the loss of

each in the battle, fell afterwards into the English General's hands, and gave an amount of eight thousand!

"As to the dead, Waddington is decidedly wrong. Two officers, I think Pelly and Fitzgerald, counted *four hundred bodies* within a semicircle of *fifty paces' radius*, where I chiefly stood, near the little nullah running into the bed of the river. Now to the *left* of that were all those killed by the 12th regiment, by the grenadiers, and by the cavalry; a pretty good lot! The ground was covered by the dead! Then again, in the Shikargah, no one can tell, it was a dense wood,—the artillery and Tew's men must have killed many, but no one could count the whole, or even see them! Waddington did not, but 400 may have been the number there; far more, people said at the time. I did not see them; I never entered the wood. The cavalry killed none in the wood; no horse could go three yards in it."

Having thus noticed the leading points of Major Waddington's account of the battle, it may be that you will not object to the following remarks of Sir Charles Napier as to his reasons for attacking on so contracted and well occupied a front, instead of turning the Ameer's line of defence by his right.

"I have examined all our surveys; there is no mistake, the front was rather more than 1200 yards: your plan in the 'Conquest of Scinde' is perfectly correct. The front between Kotree and the wall is 700 yards; but that was *our front*, not the Ameers'. They outflanked us far: look at Jacob's report of what he found on the ground, marked in your map as 'impassable for cavalry.' On the enemy's left also. Not only did he occupy the Shikargah; but I have since heard his people reached to a bend in the river, which there runs about a mile west, and then wheels north.——I had moved with the 9th Cavalry to my right before the battle, and no doubt our advance was well watched from the wood, and troops prepared to receive us: it is hardly possible to doubt this. On reaching the wood I deter-

mined to flank it. I dared not enter such *a defile;* thick woods on both sides of the river bed; wherefore I halted my advance, and filed off to the left. No one can believe that such skilful men, in taking up their position, would have left the wood unoccupied, and allow me to march quietly through the bed of the river and turn the left flank of their ground at Meeānee. It is evident, that, had I been mad enough to march that way, I should have found myself between two deadly fires of matchlocks from both banks, and have been defeated. Each bank is a parapet; my cavalry would have been useless; and the wood was so dense that our infantry must have been broken, and the affair quickly finished: each man singly would have had a host upon him with shield and sword."

W. NAPIER,
Major-General, Author of "The Conquest of Scinde."

TO THE EDITORS OF THE ROYAL ENGINEER PROFESSIONAL PAPERS.

Aden, 28th September 1849.

GENTLEMEN,

As you have admitted into the 10th Volume of the Royal Engineer Professional Papers some observations by Major General Sir W. Napier, Author of the "Conquest of Scinde," on my account of the battle of Meeanee, published in the 9th Volume of the same Papers, I trust that you will allow me the advantage of making my reply to the Major General's strictures in the next forthcoming Volume, as well as in the next number of your Corps Papers. The latter request I prefer under the impression that a considerable period may elapse before a sufficient number of contributions shall be collected to form another Volume of Professional Papers. Major General Sir W. Napier's deservedly great reputation as an author makes it of importance to me to show that my account of the Battle of Meeanee was carefully composed, and that every particular not coming under my own personal observation was attested to me by competent eye-witnesses. Some of the discrepancies between the Major General's statements and mine admit, I am happy to say, of explanation, and will be shown to be only so in appearance. Without further preface, I now proceed to notice the Major General's observations in the order in which they occur. After some prefatory sentences, his first specific stricture is as follows :—

"Major Waddington states the British forces to be about 3000 strong. They were so perhaps on paper, ten days before the action, and including sick; but I am assured by Sir C. Napier

that for the reasons mentioned in my work, not more than 1700, including officers, were engaged in the battle; and this enumeration is the result of a very careful examination by the Staff of the General, made after the action, to correct the despatch, which, written in the confusion of the moment, was certainly inaccurate. This result has also been recently confirmed by the assurance of two officers of the 22nd Regiment, and one of the Company's Service, who were present in the fight."

My statement was prepared from information given me at the time by Adjutants and other regimental officers, who had the means of knowing with accuracy the numbers of their men. As to those who were actually engaged in the battle, I cannot in any way bring down the number to 1700, as stated by Sir William Napier, unless the cavalry are to be struck out of the list. I have not preserved a copy of my memorandum of the strength of the several regiments, but I can from memory state nearly how the 1350 bayonets mentioned by me as composing the infantry line just before the advance was made were distributed. Her Majesty's 22nd Regiment, which had been joined by its Light Company from Hydrabad, mustered about 470 bayonets; the 25th Regiment N. I. had about 250; the 12th Regiment N. I. about 440; the Grenadiers about 190 bayonets. Here are 1350 men, exclusive of commissioned officers, and if we take the Artillerymen and Sappers at 150 more, how are we to bring the 700 or 800 cavalry, which were certainly in the action, within the number admitted by Sir W. Napier?

The statement in my account selected for objection is that which is given at its very beginning, and which makes the British force on the day preceding the battle 3000 strong. I have above enumerated 1500 infantry and artillery, and 700 or 800 cavalry; (the latter were 850 strong, according to my information at the time.) To these add

the Baggage-guard 450, and 200 men detached in the steamers, and we have 3100 men, from whom are to be deducted the Light Company of Her Majesty's 22nd Regiment, which only joined us after our arrival at Muttara.

There are two obvious methods by which the actual strength of the force on the day of battle might be accurately ascertained. One of these would be a reference to the Adjutant General's Returns, which I presume were Sir C. Napier's authority for writing in his despatch—"We formed in order of battle about 2800 of all arms"; the other is a reference to the Abstract of Prize-money, from which I observe that the number of individuals of all ranks who shared for the Battle of Meeanee was 4744. ("Bombay Government Gazette," G. G. O. No. 435, 23rd August 1849.) In this Prize Abstract the actual fighting men who were with Sir Charles cannot be discriminated, but after making due allowance for the crews of two vessels of the steam flotilla, for the Commissariat and Medical departments, the sick, and some non-combatants, such as drivers and bheesties, I arrive at the conclusion that the effective force at Sir Charles's disposal the day before the battle could not have been under 3000 men, but probably somewhat exceeded that number.*

2nd Observation.—"Major Waddington states that the top of the shikargah wall was at first thickly studded with matchlockmen, but on the advance of the line was abandoned. Sir C. Napier writes as follows :—

"'The Beloochees were not crowded on the wall, which was only a foot thick ; one man sat astride on it, firing at us, I believe at me, and that he was a marksman, put there as knowing me. He had only time for three shots or so, for, seeing how he fired at me and my staff, I told some of the 22nd to shoot him, and

* See Postscript.

he fell like a lump of lead on our side. We had seen matchlocks handed up to him. I swept the whole wall well with my telescope before we advanced, and while under the cannonade, and there was not a man but him on it. I saw through the opening A B obliquely, my light passing A to a good way behind B, and I ascertained there was no scaffolding to enable them to fire over, no loopholes to fire through. It was this made me think the wall was purposely broken to let them sally out on our rear. When I was satisfied there were neither loopholes nor banquette, I ordered the advance. I was so particular, that though my horse, Red Rover, stands steady, I could not satisfy myself while on the beast's back; and I dismounted, and again steadily swept the wall, and examined the breach.

" 'I did not think of sending on Tew till we were advancing, and I was thinking of how to deal with them, if they rushed out from the wall: many things came like flashes across my mind. I was unsatisfied at this moment; the fire from the matchlocks in front was heavy, and no time to lose. Suddenly the idea came into my head to *attack them through the wall, as the best check*, and I ordered one company, about 60 or 70 men; I could not spare more. I told Tew he must defend the entrance to *the last*; or rather I sent him that order, for the 22nd had got to firing: there was confusion, and matters had put on a very dangerous aspect. Tew beat them back, and he found plenty there, and fell about 60 yards within the gap; but his men *held on*. He could not have gone further: thousands filled the wood, upon whom soon afterwards we opened a nine-pounder through the wall; it told tremendously, and relieved Tew's men, who would otherwise have been sorely pressed; yet I could have aided them with guns had they been driven back.' "

In the extract here given from Sir Charles Napier's letter, there is a direct contradiction of the statement assigned to me by Sir William Napier. A reference to my account of the battle will show, however, that my real statement differs widely from Sir William's version of it, and

is perfectly reconcileable with Sir Charles Napier's letter. Sir W. Napier has inadvertently altered my expression, "the approach of our column" (of march), into "the advance of the line," and hence the apparently flat contradiction. Sir Charles describes the wall after his line was formed, but before it advanced, and says that there was but one man on it. What does my account say? That before our column reached the ground where it was wheeled into line, the wall was deserted. While we were yet at a distance from the shikargah, however, I shall take leave to repeat that the wall *was* covered with armed men, and I do so without fear of contradiction, for the fact must have been notorious. Sir Charles is combating an imaginary assertion on my part, that the wall was not abandoned till the advance of our line. I said nothing of the sort. The wall was abandoned long before that. The spot from which we saw the wall studded with Beloochees was that marked on my Plan as "Sir C. Napier's position while awaiting the arrival of his main column." The spot from which Sir Charles describes himself as sweeping the wall with his telescope, was in front of the "British Infantry Line, 1st Formation," as marked also in the Plan. There is a distance of half a mile between the two positions.

In my account of the battle, the episode of the single man who remained sitting on the wall was omitted, but I see that he is mentioned in my journal written at the time, of which the following is an extract *verbatim* :—

"Opposite to us, but closing to within 900 yards on our right front, and running E.S.E. from the Fulailee, for nearly a mile, was the wall of the shikargah, about 8 feet high, the eastern, or receding end of which was covered with armed men, and immediately beyond that were two standards, with a dense mass of infantry, and large bodies of horse in its rear: here also

were their guns. After a considerable delay at this spot, (waiting I believe for the camel guns,) an advance was again made of 1000 yards, still in column, and edging off to nearly S.E., so as gradually to approach the shikargah wall to within 300 yards, which, after some discharges of matchlocks, was deserted as we neared it, one man alone remaining squatted on the top of the wall. The General here fixed on a tree to his left, on which to direct his column of infantry, and as soon as it had taken up sufficient ground, he halted, and wheeled it to the right into line."

3*rd Observation.*—"Major Waddington would seem to imply, for I am not quite sure of his meaning, that the close fighting did not last more than one hour.

"Upon this point I have consulted the three officers alluded to before, having first requested them to read the major's account: they were unanimous that he was mistaken, and gave several strong facts within their own peculiar knowledge in support of their view; and from Sir Charles Napier I received the following remarks:

"'The battle began at *nine o'clock*, and we formed on the opposite bank of the Foolailee *at one*, firing still going on. What the despatch says was taken from all our watches.'

"Now Major Waddington says the opposite bank was gained at half-past one, thus giving an additional half hour; and as the lowest calculation gives four hours' fighting, the greater part must have been spent in the close conflict, thus confirming my account, which gave three hours and a half of rugged battle."

It certainly was my intention, in writing my account of the battle, to record my opinion that the duration of the close fighting had been over-estimated, and that in all probability it did not much exceed one hour. I was aware that this was at variance with the General's despatch, but that despatch had necessarily been written in haste, and I trusted that I should incur no imputation of disrespect in assigning, on what appeared to me sufficient grounds, a shorter duration to the actual decisive struggle. The point

was by no means easily determined, but I think the conflicting accounts may be reconciled in the following manner.

Sir Charles writes that the battle began at 9 o'clock, the meaning of which somewhat vague expression we learn from his despatch to be that he formed his men in order of battle at that hour. Now this was a long operation, for after the line had been formed it was dressed with unusual care. The Pioneers of Her Majesty's 22nd Regiment, I recollect, were ordered out to cut down some brushwood which was in the way of the Regiment; skirmishers were thrown out, and Sir Charles describes himself as carefully reconnoitring through a telescope, and again dismounting from his horse for the purpose. At length, when the general's plan of action was finally decided, the word was given to advance from the right in échellon of battalions. We advanced 200 yards, halted, and our guns then unlimbered and opened their first fire on the enemy. At this time I looked at my watch. It was not quite eleven o'clock. Surely we could not have spent two hours in forming and dressing the line, in reconnoitring and in marching 200 yards. Certainly not, but I think it possible, and even probable, that half that time had passed in this manner, which would bring the formation of the line to between 9 and 10 o'clock. I am the rather disposed to the opinion that the line was formed at some considerable time after 9 o'clock, because the despatch says, that "at 8 o'clock the advanced guard discovered their (the enemy's) camp; at 9 o'clock we formed in order of battle." Now, the time which elapsed from the discovery of the enemy's camp to the formation of our line, must, in my judgment, have been nearer to two hours than to one, and if this be admitted, the formation of the line would have taken place about half-past 9 o'clock, which in common parlance might be called 9 o'clock.

With respect to the time of opening our first fire, I

addressed Major Lloyd, the officer who commanded the artillery, on that point, thinking it likely that he might have noted the time. The following was his reply :—

"My dear Waddington,

"The first shot was fired from our batteries a little before 11 o'clock, as you say. There was a very large canal to cross that morning, which occasioned considerable delay, and we were also delayed that morning by the store cart of the Horse Battery, and also indeed by the Camel Battery, one or two of the pintle-eyes having broken, which is always a nasty troublesome business.

"Yours sincerely,

(Signed) "Jno. Lloyd.

"P. S.—A waggon of the Camel Battery was also upset, just as we were leaving our encampment that morning, which caused very great delay.

"To

"Major Waddington,

"Commanding Engineer."

Assuming then that our first shot was fired at a little before 11 o'clock, let us bear in mind that, after opening this first fire, we advanced and halted again twice, each time unlimbering and firing, before we made our final advance to the bank of the Foolailee; and when the distance passed over is also taken into account, it does not appear to me that less than an hour would have sufficed for the three halts, and three corresponding advances. This would bring us to the near bank of the Foolailee at a little before 12 o'clock, and as all the fighting there was over by about 1 o'clock, or even somewhat sooner, according to the time furnished to Sir Charles Napier, I have shown, at least, how my conclusion was formed, that the close fighting at the river did not last much above an hour. The following is the entry in my journal, written, as before

stated, when the impression of events was still fresh in my mind: "I believe that the actual combat hand to hand did not last less than an hour."

4th Observation.—"Major Waddington says, 'By some misconception of an order, the 1st Grenadier N. I. faced to the right about, and retreated some distance before their officers could rally them.' Sir Charles Napier says emphatically, 'They went about by Clibborne's order; but there were a thousand causes assigned at the time for their conduct.'"

I cannot deny that I had heard a report of Major Clibborne's having ordered his men to retire, but I had also heard that this was a mistake, and that his order had been misunderstood. I was of course inclined, and indeed thought myself bound, to give the most favorable version of the story.

5th Observation.—"Major Waddington says, 'Lieut. Col. Pattle had not received the General's order to charge, but seeing the necessity of checking the enemy's movement, and being urged by Captain Tucker, of the 9th Bengal Cavalry, after some hesitation, permitted the cavalry to act.'

"This statement, qualified by the acknowledgment that it was hearsay, would give all the merit of the conception of that brilliant movement to Lieut. Col. Pattle and Captain Tucker, and all the merit of the execution to the 9th Cavalry. Major Waddington, however, only writes, as he says, from the information he received from others: he was, I believe, close to the General all the action, and carried no orders to any other part of the field. He has been misinformed on this interesting portion of the action. Sir Charles Napier informs me he sent three officers one after the other with the order, fearing death might intercept it. Those officers were Lieut. Col. McPherson, Captain Pelly, and Captain Thompson, and their letters declaring this fact are in existence, but he had only that of Captain Thompson at hand to send to me—it is given below.

"As to the charge being led by the 9th Cavalry, it is true, and nevertheless the Irregular Scinde Horse did perform the part assigned them in my work, namely, attacking the enemy's camp, and spreading confusion and terror in their rear after passing the Foolailee, for the Bengal troopers, while in the dry bed of that river, turned a little to the left, and thus the Scinde horsemen passed them, and fell on the camp.

"*(Captain Thompson's letter.)*

"'Simla, 22nd May 1844.

"'Colonel Pattle was mistaken when he told you he received no order to charge at Meeănee; for you gave the order to me, and I met the Colonel about half way between the cavalry and infantry: he was *riding towards the latter*, and asked me how they were getting on? I made no reply, but told him your order; he said, 'Tell Storey,' and I rode on. I told Major Storey, and *saw* the 9th Cavalry advance, and remember Garrett beginning to trot, when Storey called out, 'Gently, Garrett! Gently!' On my return I met McPherson, who asked me if I had given the order, and I think he rode on to the Cavalry: so there can be no mistake about the Colonel having received the order.

(Signed) "'H. THOMPSON.'"

Besides Captain Thompson's letter there is one from Lieut. Col. McPherson given in a note by Sir W. Napier, but as it appears from Colonel McPherson's letter that "Thompson had been before him," and I shall show that when Captain Thompson delivered his order a portion of the 9th Bengal Cavalry had already moved, it is unnecessary to copy Colonel McPherson's letter here.

The following are extracts from letters received by me from two officers of the 9th Bengal Cavalry, eye-witnesses of what occurred:—

(Extract from a letter dated Simla, 18th June 1843, written by Captain Tucker.)

"At that period of the engagement of the 17th February,

when the 9th Bengal Light Cavalry had been ordered up as a 'support' to the left of the infantry line, we found ourselves some 20 or 30 paces in rear of the 1st Bombay Grenadiers; the left squadron overlapping their left by about its own extent. Whilst conversing with Lieut. Col. Pattle, and Captain Bazett, in front of the squadron, we observed the regiment in our immediate front fall into some confusion, and come to the right about; a bugle was at this time sounding, and for a moment we feared a general retreat was about to take place. The officers of the regiment however, by their exertions, succeeded almost instantly in getting their men to face round again, and we one and all perceived it was a movement confined to that one corps, and, I have since heard, was 'entirely owing to some misconception of an order.' Be this as it may, no sooner had it taken place, than I observed the enemy at and near the village on our left, and between our position and the bank of the Fullalie, showing themselves in every direction, evidently encouraged by what had occurred: it then became evident that unless some step was taken immediately to check this feeling in the enemy, and to give confidence to our troops, our flanks might be turned, and the most serious consequences ensue. The troops on the right, where Sir Charles Napier was commanding in person, were still, we saw, engaged hand to hand with the enemy, and I urged strongly that the left squadron be allowed to advance, and drive the enemy into the bed of the river; the Lieut. Colonel for some time hesitated, not from any disinclination to be amongst the enemy, for a more gallant soldier never lived, but in consequence of having no orders to that effect from the General; but on my again representing that unless something were done, and that quickly, with or without orders, it might be too late, and that Sir Charles, from his position in the hottest of the fight, was probably not yet aware of the state of affairs on the left, the desired permission was given to advance, but *without any specific order:* the squadron advanced at a trot, driving the enemy, who made no organized resistance, into the bed of the river,

followed them into it, and was the first portion of the whole force which descended the bank. A considerable number of the enemy were drawn up in rear of the village, and it was whilst dislodging them from a strong position I received five wounds, and shortly afterwards fell; and was succeeded in the command of the squadron by Captain Bazett, who completed the dispersion of the enemy in that direction."

(Extract of a letter, without date, written by Captain Bazett, at Hydrabad.)

"The advance was made without any order to that effect having *reached* Colonel Pattle from the General, on the urgent entreaty of Captain Tucker, who pressed on the Colonel the very critical situation in which our line was, so desperately engaged in most parts, hand to hand at times, and unable to gain much ground, even at times giving way; and the desirableness of a movement threatening their right flank, and probably turning it, which, whilst it would give confidence to our men, would dishearten the Beloochees, and his conviction that could Sir Charles Napier see the opportunity we had on the left of doing this he would instantly order it; but he was probably far too deeply engaged in the hottest of the fight on the right to observe it at that moment. After repeating this more than once, Colonel Pattle took on himself the responsibility of ordering the advance, and we set forward: I heard that an officer came with the order a few minutes later, but cannot say if this is correct, or who he was."

Nobody, after reading these extracts, will, I think, doubt that the 3rd Squadron of the 9th Bengal Cavalry had already descended into the bed of the Foolailee, when Captain Thompson arrived and communicated the General's order to Colonel Pattle. In my account it is said, "The 3rd Squadron was followed by the 2nd under Captain Garrett," and this is evidently the advance which Captain Thompson describes in his note, and which he was not

aware had already been forestalled by the advance of the 3rd Squadron under Captain Tucker. I confess, however, that I cannot understand how Sir Charles Napier is robbed by this fact of "all the merit of the conception of that brilliant movement," for he gave the order in complete ignorance of its having been already partly carried into execution. At the same time, Captain Tucker deserves, in my humble opinion, the highest praise, not only for his spirited representation and his distinguished bravery, but for his cool judgment, enabling him to take the same clear view of the emergency which had simultaneously prompted the General's order. "There was," says Sir Charles Napier in his despatch, "no time to be lost, and I sent orders to the cavalry to force the right of the enemy's line."

6th Observation.—"Major Waddington, speaking of the enemy's loss, says: 'The enemy left upwards of four hundred dead in the bed of the Foolailee, and there were probably as many more in different parts of the field, and the shikargah, killed by the artillery and cavalry.'

"The officers of the 22nd and Company's Service who read this at my request were unanimously and decidedly opposed to its correctness, but the following observations by Sir Charles Napier will probably be deemed the best authority, and it is to be remembered that the detailed returns made to the Ameers by the different tribes of the loss of each in the battle, fell afterwards into the English General's hands, and gave an amount of eight thousand!

"'As to the dead, Waddington is decidedly wrong. Two officers, I think Pelly and Fitzgerald, counted *four hundred bodies* within a semicircle of *fifty paces' radius*, where I chiefly stood, near the little nullah running into the bed of river. Now to the *left* of that were all those killed by the 12th Regiment, by the Grenadiers, and by the cavalry, a pretty good lot! The ground was covered by the dead! Then, again, in the shikargah,

no one can tell, it was a dense wood; the artillery and Tew's men must have killed many, but no one could count the whole, or even see them! Waddington did not, but 400 may have been the number there, far more, people said at the time. I did not see them; I never entered the wood. The cavalry killed none in the wood, no horse could go three yards in it.'"

On this point, namely, the number of the enemy's dead, I had no guide but my own observation and computation. On the day after the battle, I made a survey of the field, from which the Plan given with my account was taken. Whilst in the field, I noticed attentively the several heaps of slain in the Foolailee, as well as the bodies scattered in the ditches, the village enclosures, and the shikargah. I looked well about me, and in company with my lascars searched the skirts of the shikargah for bodies. There were not many there, nor in the village enclosures. In one of the latter we found one dead horse of the 9th Cavalry. It is possible that some bodies might have been removed in the night, but not I think very probable.

Sir Charles Napier remarks that "the cavalry killed none in the wood, no horse could go three yards in it," alluding no doubt to my statement that "there were probably as many more in different parts of the field and the shikargah, killed by the artillery and cavalry." When properly punctuated, as in the original account, and taken in connexion with the preceding sentence, the plain meaning of my words is, that the artillery and cavalry together had probably killed as many, in all other parts of the field of battle, shikargah included, as the infantry had killed in the bed of the Foolailee. But in Sir W. Napier's quotation from my account, a comma has been introduced accidentally after the word "field," which quite alters the meaning of the sentence, and no doubt provoked Sir Charles's

remark, by the unintended and absurd construction which the sentence will then bear; namely, that those slain in the shikargah had been killed by the cavalry, and those in the field by the artillery.

I am, Gentlemen,
Your obedient Servant,
(Signed) CHARLES WADDINGTON,
Lieut. Col. Bombay Engineers.

P. S.—A copy of the Prize Roll of the men present at Meeānee has been since received, and is subjoined.

Present at Meeanee.

CORPS.	European Commissioned Officers.	European Warrant, Non-commissioned Officers and Rank and File.	Native Commissioned, Non-commissioned Officers, and Rank and File.	Public Followers, Bheestees, Lascars, and Medical Subordinates.	Total.
General Staff	13	..	..	..	13
Her Majesty's 22nd Foot	25	592	..	32	649
9th Regiment Bengal Light Cavalry	16	3	473	..	492
2nd Battalion 2nd Company Foot Artillery	2	73	144	4	223
1st „ 3rd Company	1	1	..	..	2
Golundauze Battalion, 3rd Company	..	1	144	6	151
1st or Grenadier Regiment Bombay N. I.	11	2	644	11	668
12th Regiment Bombay N. I.	12	3	712	12	739
21st „ „	1	..	4	..	5
25th „ „	13	4	774	12	803
Madras Sappers and Miners	3	2	57	..	62
Scinde Irregular Horse	4	1	556	1	562
Poona Auxiliary Horse	1	..	251	1	253
Warrant Officers	..	4	..	..	4
Claims subsequently admitted	2	9	3	91	105
Total	104	695	3762	170	*4731
Paid Prize-money, but were not present in the Battle.					
Steamer "Satellite"	5	13	20		38
„ "Planet"	6	12	21		39
Flat No. 1	..	..	20		20
Steamer "Comet," subsequently admitted	6	13	9		28
	17	38	70		125
					*4731
				Grand Total.	4856

N. B.—Paid Prize-money to Men of H. M.'s 22nd Regiment who were not present in the Battle of Meeanee, under the command of Lieut. Carrow, 2 Officers, and 29 Rank and File.

SPEECH OF VISCOUNT JOCELYN, M.P.,

IN THE

HOUSE OF COMMONS,

ON THE CASE OF THE

AMEERS OF UPPER SCINDE,

JUNE 23, 1852.

AN AUTHENTIC REPORT, PUBLISHED BY REQUEST,

WITH AN APPENDIX.

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SPEECH OF VISCOUNT JOCELYN, M.P.,

ON THE CASE OF THE

AMEERS OF UPPER SCINDE.

In rising to move for the papers of which I have given notice, I shall venture to ask the permission of the House to trespass upon their attention whilst I bring to their consideration certain facts to which those papers refer, bearing on the present state and condition of the ex-rulers of Scinde.

I am aware that I may be met by the objection that this question is one that has been considered some years ago, and that the policy that was then brought under the consideration of Parliament has had the sanction of the House; but it should be recollected that at that time grave doubts were entertained by many persons as to the justice of that policy. Since that period matters and facts have been brought to light bearing strongly upon those acts which, I think, prove that the views that were taken at that time by those who were opposed to the policy of the annexation of Scinde were correct, and that I am now justified in again asking Parliament to reconsider the case of those unfortunate princes.

I could have wished that some individual of greater

weight than myself had undertaken their cause—some one whose abilities would have insured more ample justice being done to the case of these unfortunate princes; and when I recollect that my right honourable friend the member for the University of Oxford, only a short time since, has advocated so powerfully the cause of an oppressed people in a neighbouring country, I feel more than ever my own inadequacy to the task I have undertaken. I have a satisfaction, however, in believing that the ear of the House has never yet been deaf to the claim of justice; and the fact that the persons on whose behalf I plead were princes of India—once our faithful allies, now exiles from their native land—affords no reason why they should be thought undeserving of the sympathy and commiseration of a British House of Commons.

I believe I am justified in asking for those papers on the ground that, as matters of history, they should be given to this House. The documents connected with the affairs of Scinde, up to 1842, have been furnished to Parliament, and bring before us the proceedings by which the British Government came into the possession of that territory. Since the year 1842, various transactions of great political importance have taken place, together with great changes in the internal arrangements of that country, therefore it seems most desirable that the documents containing the additional information should also be laid before Parliament. When we consider more especially that an inquiry is going on up-stairs in reference to the future government of India, we

must feel that these are papers which bear peculiarly upon many points connected with that inquiry, and should be furnished to us without delay.

I concur in an opinion which I lately read in the work of an honourable and learned friend of mine, a member of this House, the hon. member for Sheffield—that "to form a just appreciation of the conduct of those who have taken part in the government of mankind, is one of the great purposes for which history is written," and that it is therefore right that the transactions in which they have been engaged should be fully and fairly laid before the public. With this view, I consider that it is necessary for the due appreciation of the characters of the public men who took part in the transactions in Scinde, that the House should be furnished with all the documents having reference to those transactions.

Perhaps the House is not aware that a few weeks since, a similar motion to that which I now make was brought forward by a noble earl in another place; but that noble earl, in moving for documents, moved only for a portion of the papers for which I now ask. That noble earl moved for a report of a commission appointed in India twelve months since, for the purpose of investigating certain charges of fraud and forgery that were laid against his highness Meer Ali Moorad, Ameer of Upper Scinde—a commission by which that prince was tried and convicted of the crimes for which he was arraigned; but the noble earl, though he moved for the papers, stated at the same time his own doubt as to the character for

fairness of that commission. Considering the high position of that noble earl, his knowledge of Indian matters, and his experience on this question, it seems to me that anything that has fallen from him is deserving of great weight; and that therefore we should have before us further documents to enable us to come to a more satisfactory conclusion with regard to the report of that commission.

The documents which I think I am justified in requesting are—first, the report of Sir George Clerk, late Governor of Bombay, one of the ablest servants of the Indian Government, on whose opinion it was that the commission was appointed; secondly, the minutes of the members of the Government of Bombay, to whom the report of that commission was submitted; thirdly, the minute of the Governor-General in council—the first authority in India—who is bound to see justice done between all persons, and to maintain the honour and dignity of the British name.

I think I am justified in asking for those documents, as they all bear on the question at issue. They are not in the secret department, but are furnished to the Court of Directors, and it is usual to give them to Parliament on questions of this nature. More than that, I firmly believe in my own mind that those documents, if produced, will do honour to the servants of the British Government in India by whom that investigation was conducted, and demonstrate the impartiality of the tribunal.

I ask for the documents at this moment, because

there are means at the disposal of the British Government by which reparation to some extent may be afforded. I may be asked,—why not leave the matter to the Governor-General of India? In reply, I would say, I feel confident no person could be found more willing to ameliorate the condition of those unfortunate princes than the noble marquis at the head of the Government of India; but at the same time it is my conviction that, in a case which has given rise to so much discussion, and concerning which there has been such diversity of opinion, an expression of sympathy on the part of the British House of Commons would aid the Governor-General of India in carrying out a just and righteous course of policy.

I would beseech the House to give me a patient hearing, whilst I attempt (but feebly I fear) to plead the cause of men who have now no other person in this House to speak in their behalf. I would recall to the recollection of the House the circumstances which took place on the first acquisition of Scinde; and I need not go farther back than the year 1838. That was the year, it will be recollected, which gave birth to that policy, for the carrying out of which, a British army was marched into Central Asia. It was considered necessary to secure the friendly feeling and cordial co-operation of the rulers of Scinde, to insure its success. A treaty was proposed by the British Government, and in that treaty the Ameers, after lengthened negotiations, concurred. In the

year 1838 the first intimate political connection was established between them and the British Government. There were treaties previously, but merely commercial. At this period, three brothers were rulers of Upper Scinde,—Meer Roostum Khan, Meer Mobarik Khan, and Meer Ali Moorad. Their father's name was Meer Sohrab Khan, a chief of the Talpoor dynasty. He died in 1830, dividing his territory into four portions, leaving to each son a portion as a patrimony, and attaching the fourth portion to the turban, or chiefship, which devolved upon Meer Roostum Khan, the eldest of the three brothers.

From 1838 to 1841 disputes at various times arose between Ali Moorad and the two eldest brothers, in reference to territory. Those disputes were decided by the British resident under an agreement made by the treaty of 1838. In 1842, Ali Moorad placed himself at the head of an army, attacked the forces of his brother, defeated him, and forced him to sign a treaty, called the treaty of Nounahar, by which Roostum Khan agreed to make over to him certain villages belonging to himself and Meer Nusseer, son of Meer Mobarik Khan. Those villages formed the subject matter of inquiry under the commission issued in 1850 by the British Government.

From an early period Ali Moorad, who had been described, by those who knew him intimately, as a crafty and designing prince—commenced a series of intrigues against his eldest brother, Meer Roostum Khan: these intrigues were unfortunately too

successful. He placed in the hands of the British resident in Scinde certain letters, which he said he had intercepted—letters purporting to be hostile to the British Government, and which he alleged to have passed between Meer Roostum and the Court of Lahore.

Meer Roostum denied the authenticity of the letters, and asked for an opportunity of proving their fabrication. He also begged to be confronted with his accusers. But both those reasonable requests were refused. The letters were sent to certain officers of the British Government, who were supposed to be most competent to pronounce an opinion on documents of that description. Their authenticity was doubted at the time by those officers, one of whom was Sir George Clerk, who declared that he doubted, not only the authenticity of the documents, but more especially the seals attached to them. About this period, in the autumn of the year 1842, Sir Charles Napier made his appearance in Scinde, and soon after became the chief civil and military authority. Contrary to the opinion of the officers to whom reference had been made, and who had seen the letters in question, Sir Charles Napier declared, upon the opinion of Capt. Brown—who, according to Colonel Outram, and other evidence, knew nothing of Persian, (the language in which the letters were written)—that they were authentic, and immediately took possession of a large portion of the territory of Roostum Khan.

Another question had been raised between Roostum Khan and Ali Moorad, viz. the succession to the turban. Meer Roostum Khan, nearly eighty years

of age, was desirous of leaving the turban to his eldest son. But it was also claimed by Ali Moorad. Sir Charles Napier took part with Ali Moorad, with whom he had entered into close communication soon after his arrival in Upper Scinde. Meer Roostum Khan, with a view to escape from the intrigues of his unnatural brother, asked permission to enter the camp of Sir Charles Napier, and to place himself entirely in the hands of the British general. Sir Charles Napier, instead of eagerly taking advantage of such an opportunity of unravelling the tangled skein of Upper Scinde politics, refused at that time to receive him, but directed him to the camp of Ali Moorad, the very person who had probably forged the letters which were so derogatory to his brother's character, and the very person who was at that moment engaged in plots to compass the poor old chieftain's destruction. The House, perhaps, would scarcely believe that a British representative could have taken such a mistaken step, under the peculiar circumstances in which the unfortunate Meer Roostum was placed. But Sir Charles Napier himself records the remarkable fact. He writes to the Governor-General on 20th of December, 1842, that Meer Roostum was anxious to take refuge in the British camp, adding, " I did not like this, as it would have embarrassed me how to act; but the idea struck me at once that he might go to Ali Moorad, who might induce him, as a family arrangement, to resign the turban. I therefore secretly wrote to Roostum and Ali Moorad; and about ten

o'clock I had an express from Ali Moorad, to say, 'that his brother was safe with him.'" *

It appears that subsequently Meer Roostum Khan was prevailed upon to cede to Ali Moorad the turban; but the latter at the same time entered into an agreement, by which he promised to secure to Meer Roostum that portion of his territory which was left to him by his father as a patrimony. The treaty of cession reached the British general, but the agreement between the two brothers, which accompanied it, never came into that gallant officer's hands. Ali Moorad still continued his intrigues with a view to the ruin of his unfortunate brother, and led the British general to believe that Roostum Khan was about to raise troops to attack the British army. Hence the destruction of Emaumghur, and the first commencement of hostilities. Sir Charles Napier marched a force to the point where he was told Roostum Khan was encamped; but on his arrival found there was no enemy to oppose him. He had, however, the satisfaction of blowing up the fortification without mischief to a single man. On the other hand, the unfortunate Meer Roostum, who had fled to the desert, alarmed by an intimation from his brother that the British general wished to make him a prisoner, was found by Colonel Outram surrounded by only a few followers, and his wives and children. Distracted and perplexed, in his agony he implored to be taken to the British general, for the purpose of throwing himself on his mercy; but the interview

* *Vide* "Supplementary Scinde Blue Book," and "Thornton's History of India," vol. vi., pp. 425 to 435.

was again prevented by the intrigues of Ali Moorad,* and subsequently Meer Roostum was directed to proceed to Hydrabad. In Lower Scinde, however, he found that sympathy which he had not met with at the hands of the British representative, or from his relatives in Upper Scinde. The Beloochees, who are always described as a wild and warlike race, stung to madness at the treachery experienced by the aged prince from his near kinsman, and the harsh treatment he had received from the British general, dashed into the field against the British troops at Meanee, under the walls of Hydrabad. There, however, they were defeated by the skill of the British general and the valour of our army; the result of this action was, that some of the Ameers were sent as captives to British India, while others were left under the control of Ali Moorad. Such was the first chapter in this painful history. I will now proceed to the second.

In 1846, Sir Charles Napier, who was about to leave Scinde, appeared to have changed his opinion in regard to the character of Ali Moorad. It seems the general left a memorandum in his office, stating that he had grave doubts of the honesty of Ali Moorad, and that he had reason to believe that he had possessed himself of certain lands which were not his of right, and which belonged to the British Government. Sir George Clerk, the Governor of Bombay, proceeded on a tour to Scinde in 1848, and instituted an investigation regarding this memorandum. He found on his arrival in Scinde, that there were two

* *Vide* "The Conquest of Scinde, a Commentary." Sect. 9.

individuals, named Sheik Ali Hassan, and Peer Gohur, one of whom had been Prime Minister to Ali Moorad, and the other his confidential adviser, who were prepared to give evidence against Ali Moorad to the effect that the leaf of the Koran on which the treaty of Nounahar was written had been torn from the volume, and that another leaf had been inserted, in which the word "districts" had been substituted for "villages," and that, therefore, property of considerable value, to which the British Government was entitled by right of conquest, had been wrongfully held by Ali Moorad. Although the characters of these witnesses were doubtful, there was such corroborating evidence of the circumstance, that Sir George Clerk was induced to consider it the duty of the Government to appoint a commission to inquire into the whole case. A commission was appointed, consisting of Mr. Pringle, a man of judgment and ability, and Major Jacob and Major Lang, both officers of great political experience and high reputation, before whom Ali Moorad was cited to appear. He appeared accordingly, and was allowed to examine and cross-examine witnesses, but was unable to rebut the charges brought against him. The very leaf on which the treaty of Nounahar had been written was produced; the chief was convicted of fraud and forgery; and has since been compelled to relinquish the territory of which he had wrongfully held possession, and the turban which he had so disgraced.

Now I wish to point out to the House the bearing which this inquiry had on the charges originally

brought against the Ameers of Scinde. It will be recollected that one of the first charges made against those princes had reference to the letters said to be intercepted, and which were furnished to the British resident by Ali Moorad, who alleged that those documents had passed between Roostum Khan and the Court of Lahore. Roostum Khan asked to be confronted with his accusers, and to be shown the documents, but both requests were refused him. It has now been proved that Ali Moorad was, from the commencement, plotting to effect his brother's destruction; in which he unfortunately succeeded; and this very Ali Moorad, who furnished the letters on which his brother was condemned, has since been convicted of fraud and forgery against the British Government, to which he had such abundant reason for showing the greatest gratitude.

But there is another fact—a most important one—namely, that when that commission was sitting, Ameer Mahomed Houssein, the eldest son of Roostum Khan, who, since the conquest of Scinde, had been living on the bounty of the Mahomedan chiefs on the banks of the Indus—for he would never deign to ask or accept a favour from the British Government, so long as a stigma rested on his name and family—, at the risk of his life and liberty, appeared before that commission, saying:—The British Government is about to institute an inquiry into the iniquities of my uncle Ali Moorad: I wish to vindicate the honour and good faith of my father, and to wipe away the stain which now rests on my family, and I have

brought evidence to prove that every one of the charges against my family is false. The commissioners said they regretted not to be able to enter into that inquiry, and that they were obliged to confine themselves to the matters to which they were restricted by the instructions they had received from the British Government. But I believe there was not a man, from the first commissioner down to the humblest individual present at that inquiry, who was not convinced that the family of Meer Roostum Khan were wholly guiltless of the charges originally brought against them.

Another charge brought against Meer Roostum was that of stopping and robbing the Dawk; on which, it will be recollected, Sir Charles Napier laid such stress. Roostum Khan declared at the time that he and his family were innocent of that charge; and proof has since been tendered that the man who caused the Dawk to be intercepted was Ali Moorad himself, for the purpose of laying the crime at the door of his unfortunate brother: to this point the Ameer Mahomed Houssein was ready to give evidence.

The next scene in this painful drama was the cession of the turban, and that was proved to have been forced from Roostum Khan when in confinement; and whilst the treaty ratifying the cession was duly conveyed to the British general, another messenger, who bore the other agreement, by which Meer Roostum's patrimony was secured to his family, was stopped on his way by a horseman of Ali Moorad, and the document taken from him.

Another most important fact was elicited by the commission; that the principal moonshees, or native clerks, in the office of the Government of Scinde, through whom the information was furnished on which the whole of the proceedings was based, were bribed by Ali Moorad. There is one more point to which I must allude — namely, the attack of the Beloochees on the British forces at Hydrabad. Considering that the feelings of the people had been greatly exasperated by the treatment which Roostum Khan had received at the hands of the British representative, I find no fault with brave soldiers seeking with their lives to vindicate the honour of their ancient rulers, and dashing into the field to their support.

I would now wish to point out to the House the claims which I think those princes have to the consideration of the British House of Commons and of the British Government. At the time of the invasion of Affghanistan, it was stated by the military authorities that Scinde being the base for the operations of our army, it was a matter of the greatest importance to obtain possession of the strong fort of Bukkur, on the Indus. At our request, Meer Roostum Khan, contrary to the wishes of his family and of the Beloochee soldiery, surrendered the fort of Bukkur to the British Government, although it was considered the heart of his country. So important was the cession of that fort thought to be, that Lord Auckland and Sir Henry Pottinger declared that the gratitude of the British Government was due to Meer Roostum Khan;

and Sir Alexander Burnes wrote about the same time in these words:—"I have never doubted their (the Ameers') sincere desire to serve us, but, in their weak state, I did not expect such firmness in the day of need." Again, the British envoy writes to the Governor-General—"*Meer Roostum has shown in the day of trial what he professed at all times, that he was the sincere and devoted friend of the British nation.*"

Such were the services that were performed by the family of Meer Roostum in 1838, and such were the opinions expressed with regard to those services. No Englishman can forget the year 1841, when clouds arose which seemed to threaten the annihilation of the British rule in India; but at that moment the Ameers of Scinde, deaf to entreaties and to the religious cry that was then raised by the Mahomedans from one end of India to the other—regardless of all personal considerations—remained true to British interests. So valuable were the services they rendered at that time, that it was said by the highest military authorities, that if it had not been for those services, and especially the supplies they furnished to the army of Brigadier England, that army could never have advanced or retired, and British honour could never have been retrieved under the walls of Cabool.*

In smaller matters also they showed their anxiety

* It is very important to bear in mind that these services were rendered *after the treaty of* 1839. Previous to that treaty, the conduct of the Ameers was undoubtedly hostile; but subsequently they saw the hopelessness of contending with British power, and, according to Captain Postans, "fully made up for their former hollow professions, and want of faith, *by a cordial co-operation.*"

to assist the British forces: Colonel Outram, acknowledging the services of the Ameers in remitting all customs on supplies furnished to the British troops, wrote in these terms on the 24th of June 1841:—"That he was instructed by the Governor-General to acknowledge the satisfaction with which he had received this additional mark of their friendly disposition, and of the liberal policy with which their administration is conducted."

Such was the letter addressed to Meer Roostum in June 1841. Let us now read the account given of the same prince a few months subsequent, when, branded and hunted by his unnatural relative, assisted by the forces of Sir C. Napier, he was found a fugitive in the desert: Colonel Outram writes, "I beheld the sovereign of Upper Scinde, whose important services a Governor-General had deemed fitting to acknowledge, become a houseless wanderer; one who, nursed in the lap of luxury, had not known what an ungratified wish might mean. I met him in the jungle, surrounded by his faithful retainers, unprovided with the decencies of life. A tent with a single awning, not ten feet square, afforded the sole protection from the weather enjoyed by the party during heavy and long-continued rains; and is it to be wondered at, that I felt intensely for the poor old man?"

I should not do justice to the true character of the Ameers if I did not allude to the charges which have been heaped on them by the first military historian of this country. I could have wished, for the honour of the British army, that those accusations

had never been penned; for there was no language to be found which was not used to asperse those princes, and no crimes of which they were not said to be guilty. It must be recollected that the historian had never been in Scinde, and had no personal knowledge of the circumstances he relates; whereas, in direct contradiction to his statements, there is the evidence of British officers,* who had lived in daily intercourse with these calumniated princes in the days of their prosperity, who, one and all, repudiate the charges against them, and bear the strongest testimony to their conduct and character. I have perused letters from many of these gentlemen, but I will select only one to read to the House, because the writer is well known in India, and because he was for a considerable time in constant intercourse with those princes—I mean Captain Postans. That gentleman, who was six years political agent in Scinde, pronounced them to be "merciful to a fault, and just, where they judged for themselves. As men (he added) I consider them exemplary characters; and the devotion and respect evinced towards them by their children and all around them, was a conclusive proof of the domestic harmony which reigned in this singularly-constituted family."

Now, I would ask the House to allow me to advert to the condition in which the Ameers have been ever since our occupation of their territory. After the battle of Hydrabad, some of these princes were despatched to British India, and others of them were

* *Vide* Appendix.

left to the tender mercies of Ali Moorad. Among the princes sent to India was the aged Meer Roostum Khan, who shortly afterwards sunk under the weight of years and anxiety, and, to use his own touching language, descended into the tomb "with his face blackened in the sight of his countrymen, and his grey hairs dishonoured." He left behind him a son and a nephew, who are still prisoners in India. Besides these princes, there were the members of the families of the Lower Scinde Ameers, against some of whom, there was no charge save that of defending their country, and against others not even that charge. One, Meer Shadad, after four years close confinement in the fort of Surat on certain charges, of which, I understand, he was acquitted after investigation, and released by order of the Governor-General of India, still remains a prisoner in Hindostan.

With reference to the other members of their family, there were some eighteen sons and nephews of Roostum Khan, who were left to the tender mercies of Ali Moorad, at whose hands they experienced treatment which is not to be described. On that subject I will read to the House an extract from a very graphic and painfully-interesting work, called "Dry Leaves from Young Egypt," the author of which held political office in Scinde, and writes of what he himself saw and knew. It is as follows:—

"The younger Ameers, the children of Meer Roostum and Meer Mobarik, were handed over by Sir C. Napier to Meer Ali Moorad, who has inflicted on them every cruelty and insult that malice and hatred

can suggest. Born princes, hunger, cold, and nakedness have been their portion. In their memorial to Sir C. Napier they stated that death would be preferable to their condition. In 1848, the resident at Khyrpore reported that not one of Ali Moorad's shikarees was not better off than they. They had been reduced by want to the sale of their wives' ornaments and their own wearing apparel, and it was a well-known fact, that the fourth son of the late Meer Roostum appeared as a suppliant for assistance before the door, and is now living on the bounty of her, who was in his father's lifetime a low courtezan in the Khyrpore bazaar." Such was the state of some of the Ameers of Upper Scinde, whose fathers had earned the commendation of the Governor-General, who had proved themselves our faithful allies, and stood by us in the day of adversity and trial.

Although at the risk of wearying the House, there is one more fact to which I must allude, and it is a painful one. After the battle of Hydrabad, the ladies of the captive Ameers remained in Scinde. Those who know anything of the Eastern character, know that the religious feelings and the habits of the people are such, that it is almost impossible for ladies of that high rank to take long journeys, more especially across the seas. It will be recollected, on a former discussion on this question, we were horrified with details of the brutal conduct on the part of the Ameers towards their wives, which were then told with every air of authenticity; but the extract I am

about to quote is the best reply to these monstrous assertions.

The extract I hold in my hand is from a letter written by the wife of a British officer in Scinde, in reference to the condition of those unhappy ladies, which I will read to the House. She said:—"They looked and acted like what they were, the ladies of the land, and very different from the native women we were in the habit of seeing; not that they were particularly beautiful—on the contrary, there were few of them who had any claims to youth or good looks, but, as I said before, there was a bearing which stamped them at once of a superior class. There they were—whose bare feet had previously never pressed the ground uncovered by the richest carpets, with every luxury around them—living in a place without even a mat to the floor; common bazaar charpoys to sleep upon, and the roof leaking every shower of rain that fell. I thought at the time that the prize agents might have spared the carpets and other little luxuries from the thousands we had taken from them. They were too proud to ask for them, nor did I even hear them complain of this, though they did of having their clothes sold. They said,—'Our jewels and gold we consider as forfeited; but we did not expect to be stripped: it is our fate.' It appeared a day of great rejoicing when a letter arrived from the Meers (their absent lords). They generally sent me a request that I would come and see them, and hear all about the Meers. It appeared as if they thought I could enter into all their little

joys, as well as feel for their misfortunes; which in truth I did, although I always avoided touching on a subject so painful to them."*

It appears to me that this is one of the most painful stories connected with the British rule in India, and one of the darkest pages in its history. A tale known not only in Scinde, but throughout Central Asia. A tale which has often been cited by the Mahomedans to the detriment of the honour and character of Christian and British rulers. Nor is it alone confined to Mahomedan Asia: Central Africa re-echoes this story of violence and wrong. I find the following passage in a work of Dr. Richardson, a traveller in Central Africa:—"The conversation was stopped by the entrance of a remarkable personage—the quasi Sultan of Ben Walid. Having heard that I was present, he said,—'Christian, do you know Scinde?' 'Yes,' I said. He then turned and said something to the people in the Ghadamsi language. I afterwards learned it was;—'You see these Christians are eating up all the Mussulman countries.' He then abruptly turned to me,—'Why do the English go there and eat up all the Mussulmen? afterwards you will come here.' . . . . . I replied,—'The Ameers were foolish, and engaged in conspiracy against the English in India, but the Mussulmen in Scinde enjoyed the same privileges as the English themselves.' 'That is what

* The *Times* in its report erroneously mentions Lady Macnaghten's name as the writer of the letter. No name was mentioned in the House. The *Morning Chronicle* states, "The reading of this touching account produced a deep impression on the whole House."

you say,' he rejoined; and then continued,—'Why do you go so far from home to take other people's countries from them?' I replied,—'The Turks do the same; they come to the desert.' 'Ay, you wish to be such oppressors as the Turks.' He then told me not to talk any more, and a painful silence continued for some time."

I would ask the House if this is not a question worthy the consideration of Parliament, one in which British honour, British justice, and British humanity are so deeply involved. It is painful to think, whilst we express sympathy for the oppressed people of Hungary, whilst we receive the Poles with open arms, whilst a right honourable friend of mine, only a few weeks' since, made a powerful appeal on behalf of the people of Naples, and whilst we blame our gallant neighbours for their want of faith towards Abdool Kader, that the British Government should sanction conduct equally unjust and oppressive. But here partial redress is in our own hands, and, after the facts that have been elicited, we shall be doubly culpable if we do not make all the reparation in our power to those we have so grievously injured. I have undertaken to bring the subject before the House from a sense of duty and a sense of justice, and I may truly say, I never recollect feeling a warmer interest in any case, or a more solemn conviction of the truth of the cause I advocate.

I have endeavoured—I fear very inadequately—to place before the House—first, the charges that were originally made against these princes; next, the

bearing which the late Commission of Inquiry had in reference to those charges; then to point out the intrigues and machinations of Ali Moorad; and, lastly, to compare the condition of that felon prince, still in the enjoyment of his patrimony, with that of those unfortunate princes, the victims of his treachery.

I know well there is great difficulty in retracing our steps, and that there is an idea that, where civilization and barbarism come into contact, it is a proof of weakness in the former to recede. I am aware that, in a country which has been for some years under our rule, new ties are formed, and new interests are created, which cannot be disturbed without the hazard of committing a second injustice on the people whom we have taken under our protection; but I do not ask on behalf of the Ameers of Scinde that they should be replaced as rulers of their country; they do not ask it for themselves: in their own touching language they make known the earnest desire of their hearts—"A tree in our own land is better than a palace in a foreign country"; they ask merely to be allowed to return to their native land. The Government has it now in their power to grant that boon; and I cannot conceive it possible that it will be refused. At the same time it would ill become a private individual to point out the exact mode in which reparation should be afforded; I am therefore prepared to leave it in the hands of the Government of India, confident in its integrity and in its humanity. But this I may be permitted to say, that little injury is to be feared when honour and character

are to be maintained, in a Government, like that of India, firm and united, acknowledging to the Hindoo and Mahomedan nations under its sway, that unwittingly a grave error has been committed, and showing their desire to remedy that error, as far as possible, in a magnanimous and generous spirit. On behalf, therefore, of the Ameers of Scinde, once honoured, powerful, and wealthy, now fallen, crushed, and poverty-stricken, long our faithful friends and allies, I implore the sympathy of this House, and ask for the papers which bear out the statements I have felt it my duty to make; satisfied that the facts have only to be thoroughly understood, to obtain for these unfortunate princes, not all that justice demands, but all that it is now left in the power of the British Government to bestow.

[The noble lord then moved for Copies of the Evidence and Report of a Commission appointed to inquire into a charge preferred against his Highness Meer Ali Moorad, Ameer of Upper Scinde, of having made fraudulent alterations in the treaty of Nounahar, concluded between his Highness and the late Meer Roostum Khan, and of all Minutes and Correspondence on the Indian records connected with the charge; and of the Report on Scinde of Sir George Clerk, K.C.B., late Governor of Bombay, dated 24th day of April, 1848.]

The documents moved for, with the exception of the report on Scinde, by Sir George Clerk, K.C.B., were granted.

APPENDIX.

The following statements, with respect to the characters of the Ameers, by British officers—many of whom held high and responsible political situations in Scinde, and all of whom were personally acquainted with those injured princes—were published some years ago, and have never been refuted.

Extract from a Letter from CAPTAIN FRENCH, Political Agent, Nimaur, late Assistant Political Agent, Upper Scinde.

It is very deplorable that General William Napier should have published to the world such charges against the ex-Ameers of Scinde. As far as my observations will enable me to speak, they are totally unfounded. I was in Scinde and Cutchee from the 6th September 1840 to the 7th December 1842, when I left for Ferozepoor, and during that period, or in fact until the appearance of the "Conquest of Scinde," on my word I never, as far as my memory will enable me to speak, heard of such doings by the Meers. Had such horrible atrocities ever been perpetrated, I think you will allow I must have heard of them; first, because, as you know, I amused myself by gathering some notes on Scinde; and, secondly, because the Ameers and their Rule was a daily subject of conversation for many months of the above period, while I was at Sukkur, in every house there. Many officers had Scinde Moonshees; I had one, and some

of the others, like myself, employed them probably more with a view of acquiring local knowledge than aught else. I have but to repeat, that until the appearance of the 'Conquest of Scinde,' I do not recollect ever having heard of these abominations; I don't believe a word of them, but they will be all believed at home.

(Signed) P. T. FRENCH.

From MAJOR WOODHOUSE, Commanding the 6th Regt. N. I.

Sattarah, 16th Sept. 1845.

In the latter end of 1820, Captain Sadlier, of H. M.'s Service, was sent by the Bombay Government as an Envoy to the Court of the Ameers of Hydrabad. The other members of the mission were W. Simson, Esq., and Dr. Hall, and I had the command of the escort. The mission disembarked at Kurrachee, and from thence went to Hydrabad, where it remained about two months, and then returned to Bombay by the way of Luckput Bunder. During that time I did not hear anything which indicated any want of humanity on the part of the Ameers, or called in question their characters as rulers for justness and moderation. Had anything existed to militate against a favourable impression of their characters in these respects, it would in all probability have become known to the mission; and I think I do not err in saying that every member of it left Scinde with a good opinion of the Ameers as men and rulers; and during the late field service in Scinde, no facts came to my knowledge to lead me to assign to them a lower standard of character than I was formerly ready to accede to them.

(Signed) F. R. WOODHOUSE.

From Dr. Hawthorn, Surgeon, 3rd Regt., Light Cavalry.

17th August, 1845.

Sir,—I have much satisfaction in bearing testimony to the gentlemanly demeanour, and strictly sober habits of the Ameers of Hydrabad when they were in power in 1835-1836.

I resided at Hydrabad for a period of seven months, during which I was in professional attendance on His Highness the late Meer Noor Mahommed Khan. I had almost daily an opportunity of seeing the other Ameers, either in durbar or in their private dwellings, and frequently accompanied them on their hunting excursions. I never had any reason to suppose they were in the slightest degree addicted to intemperance: on the contrary, they had the greatest horror of any intoxicating liquor or drug, and would never take medicine without an assurance from me that it did not contain opium.

(Signed) H. P. Hawthorn.

From Captain Leckie, late Assistant Political Agent in Lower Scinde.

Sattarah, 2nd October, 1845.

My first introduction to the durbars of Upper and Lower Scinde was in the year 1830, when I accompanied the late Sir Alexander Burnes on a mission to Lahore. Subsequently I went to Hydrabad in October 1838, and remained there until September 1842, as assistant to Sir Henry Pottinger and yourself. During this time, I was frequently with the

Ameers, both in open durbar and at private interviews, on business and in a friendly way. With one solitary exception, I never knew them deviate from their style and bearing, which was always frank and gentlemanly.

In their habits they were temperate, and I never saw them in any way excited. As parents they were kind, and took a pride in the education of their sons. They were beloved by their chiefs and dependents who were at Hydrabad, and in constant attendance on them.

(Signed) J. D. LECKIE.

From CAPTAIN HART, 2nd Grenadier Regiment.

CAPTAIN HART'S* OPINION OF THE AMEERS AND THEIR GOVERNMENT.

A residence of three years in Scinde (1839-40-41) led me to the conclusion that the government of its Ameers had been judged by too high a standard. Compared with the rule of despotic states in Europe during the past century, their sway was mild; and although unrestrained in the exercise of absolute power, their people were not subjected to harsher measures than are common to native governments in India. The aversion of the Ameers to shed blood was notorious. Property was generally secure, notwithstanding the absence of any regular police. Even the jealousy evinced for the preservation of their shikargahs never carried them the length of the extreme punishments once authorized by the forest laws of Britain.

The acknowledged fact, that crimes of any magnitude were rarely committed, spoke of itself for the condition of

* Author of the Article on Slavery in Scinde in the *United Service Magazine* for January 1844.

the lower classes; of food they had sufficient in quantity, and of clothing in quality, to satisfy their wants. Limited in Scinde, as in other eastern countries, to securing a bare subsistence, the cultivators endured no hardships to which their Indian brethren are not liable; while the simplicity of the form of assessment freed them from numerous petty extortions of subordinates to which the latter are often exposed. The almost exclusive monopoly by the Hindoo population of the management of the revenue, proved that they did not consider the bigotry of their rulers as an intolerable burden. That trade was not, in all instances, depressed or obstructed, was shown by the transit of opium through Scinde to the coast in preference to the route of the British provinces, as well as by the encouragement afforded to merchants by the remission of customs duties in proportion to the extent of their traffic.

Of the private characters of their rulers, the Scindians spoke favourably. They were said neither to indulge in spirituous liquors or to smoke; and violating the sanctity of a subject's dwelling in search of wealth, or tenants for their harems, were acts unheard of, &c. &c.

(Signed) S. HART.

From CAPTAIN GORDON, in charge of the Ex-Ameers of Hydrabad.

Dum-Dum, 27th July, 1845.

MY DEAR SIR,—I have to acknowledge your letter of the 14th instant, requesting my sentiments on certain charges preferred against the Ameers of Scinde, in the second volume of a work recently published, entitled the "Conquest of Scinde." I shall reply to your queries in the order in which they occur in your letter to my address, premising, that from

my almost constant daily intercourse with the Ameers since they arrived in India, in April 1843, I have had the best opportunities of judging of their character and habits.

I observe, therefore, in reply to your first query, that the Ameers are the most temperate of men, rigidly abstaining from wine, and every kind of liquor; while to smoking also they have a strong aversion, and cannot even endure the smell of tobacco, and it will not be supposed that their present habits of "total abstinence" in these respects are newly acquired, or different from those they have hitherto been accustomed to. In regard, therefore, to "*smoking*" and "*drinking*" the Ameers are examples to most of us who boast a higher civilization, and a more self-denying morality.

With regard to your second query, I am unable to conjecture on what grounds it has been asserted that the Ameers' memorials were written for them by persons at Bombay and not by the Ameers themselves. In my opinion, the memorials referred to are in no respect superior to the usual correspondence of the Ameers, who are quite as capable of representing their own case, and proposing and answering objections, as are educated men among ourselves; and this fact will not be disputed by any person who has had opportunities of observing their good sense and shrewd and pertinent remarks on men and things. I am aware that an opinion is abroad that the Ameers are a set of "illiterate barbarians;" but this is not the case, for with one or two exceptions they are well acquainted with, and appreciate, the best Persian authors (in prose and verse), and the knowledge thus acquired from books, improved by their own sagacity and experience, has made them no mean judges of the motives which ordinarily govern men in their actions. After these observations, I need not obtrude my opinion that the Ameers were fully equal to write the petitions alluded to,—that they did write them, is my most firm conviction, and on this point I can scarcely be mistaken.

The Ameers solemnly deny the allegations referred to in your third query, regarding the destruction of infants in their zenanas; and in justice to them I cannot withhold my testimony, that while was I employed in Scinde and the neighbouring countries, I never once heard that such a practice existed among the Ameers, and had it prevailed it is scarcely possible that it could have been concealed from you and others who resided constantly for several years at, I may say, the doors of the Ameers.

It was, I believe, the wish of the ex-Ameers that their ladies should not accompany them from Scinde; and since their arrival in India, they have always expressed the utmost repugnance to their removal, in the hope, no doubt, that they themselves would eventually be restored to their own country. This hope they still cherish, and while it lasts (although far less intensely than before) they will never sanction a proceeding which, as we are well aware, is so offensive to their ideas of female honour and decorum. The Ameers have always spoken to me of the removal of their ladies as a step to be resorted to only in the event of their "vakeels" returning unsuccessful from England, and they now perceive that their worst fears in this regard are likely to be realised.

(Signed) FORBES M. GORDON.

From CAPTAIN WHITBLOCK, late Assistant Political Agent, Lower Scinde.

Seroor, 10th Sept. 1845.

It would be absurd to draw any line of comparison between any of the princes of Asia and the enlightened and accomplished rulers of the more civilized parts of Europe.

Among Eastern ones, however, the Ameers deservedly ranked high in the estimation of all the Europeans who had been on terms of intimacy with them. The Ameers, in common with all mankind, had faults and weaknesses, but in many respects their conduct was most exemplary. They religiously abstained from drinking wine, or intoxicating liquors of every description; nor did they use tobacco, with the solitary exception of taking snuff; and, moreover, they were not addicted to that almost universal practice among Mahommedans, of smoking tobacco. Their manners were mild and gentlemanly, their dispositions humane; and, as far as I could judge, their deportment towards their children, relations, and dependents, was invariably kind and affectionate.

I have felt great surprise at the reports that have been circulated of the Ameers' ill-treatment of their wives and females, and I can conscientiously aver, that, during my residence in Scinde, I never heard such a thing hinted at, although it is well known that there was an influential clique among the Hindoos, who were ever too ready to prejudice the European officers against the rulers of Scinde. I feel, however, thoroughly convinced that the Ameers were incapable of acting in so cowardly and despicable a manner. It it true that, with regard to women, there were amongst them one or two sensualists, and they of all persons were not likely to have acted towards them with harshness; yet, one of these, the late Meer Nusseer Khan, has been more particularly accused of treating them with great cruelty.

(Signed) C. R. WHITELOCK,
Captain, late Assistant Political Agent, Lower Scinde.

From CAPTAIN POSTANS, 15th Regt. N. I., late Assistan Political Agent, Upper Scinde.

I had the strongest personal regard for all the late Ameers of Scinde. In my personal intercourse with them, they always left the most favourable impressions from their urbanity, amiability, and desire to please. As rulers, though I could point out many faults in their mode of government, these were the consequences of their confined views as to civil polity, but, on the whole, the bulk of their subjects were probably as happy and contented under their rule as could be desired. Their great failing was profusion, on the one hand, and avarice on the other, but they were merciful to a *fault*, and *just*, where they judged for themselves. As men, I consider them exemplary characters (taking into the case their education, and prejudices of birth and religion), and the devotion and respect evinced towards them, by their children and all about them, was a conclusive proof of the domestic harmony which reigned in their singularly-constituted families. I really doubt if it were possible to find in our own country so many families, each and every member of which had his own interests to support, living together so peaceably and affectionately.

They have, I hear, borne their reverses like *men*, patient under many misfortunes; and this is an additional proof that their minds were well regulated in prosperity.

(Signed) T. POSTANS,
Late Assistant Political Agent, Upper Scinde.

From Dr. Winchester, Civil Surgeon, Rutnagherry, late Residency Surgeon at Hydrabad.

Bombay, 27th Sept. 1845.

During the two years I passed at the Residency in Lower Scinde, I had, as you are aware, daily intercourse with the different Ameers of Hydrabad. Previous to my nomination to Scinde I had been much associated with officers who had a personal knowledge of their Highnesses, from their official situation, and I was never prepared, from their conversation, to expect any thing unfavourable to the Ameers. Nor do I think from the latter end of 1834, when I first went to the province of Cutch, that I ever heard attributed to them, with one rumoured exception, and that regarding only one prince, any of those vices which have since been made so notorious. I most assuredly never heard any act of cruelty mentioned; on the contrary, I always thought the Ameers were lenient as rulers, and dispensers of criminal justice; and however oppressive their system of taxation might have been, it never was enforced by cruelty. The condition of the villages and inhabitants did not mark that the population of Scinde was worse treated than the generality of Eastern countries. I have passed repeatedly, alone, unarmed, through great portions of Lower Scinde in 1839-40 and 41, and never met with insult; but, on the contrary, with civility and kindness. * * *

In their habits, the Ameers were exceedingly simple, and in manners unaffected. Their food was plain; their drink was water, and except in the use of snuff, I never heard, or saw, any of them using tobacco or ardent spirits. They were free from the prejudices Mussulmans generally have towards Christians, and I never heard them affect to despise any other religion than the Hindoo, of which they had every contempt, on account of its idolatry.

No one ever hinted to me that the Ameers ill-treated their women. I repeatedly asked natives the manner in which women are obtained for their zenanas. I never heard of force being used; but that the women were very reconciled to their lot, being enriched by valuable presents of jewels, and insured a competence for life. When I have been within the precincts of the harem, I never beheld anything that could lead to the supposition of tyranny. H. H. Meer Nusseer Khan often solicited medicine for his females, as did the other Ameers, evincing, in the detail of their complaints, anxiety for their welfare; and I on one occasion was much struck with the conduct of Nusseer Khan towards a lady of his harem who was dangerously ill.

(Signed) JAMES W. WINCHESTER.
Civil Surgeon, Rutnagherry.

From DR. LEITH, Assistant Presidency Civil Surgeon, late Surgeon to the Political Agency in Lower Scinde.

From December 1841, to November of the following year, I resided at Hydrabad in medical charge of the Lower Scinde Political Agency; and it being the chief part of my duty to give medical attendance to the Ameers, or to any member of their families that might require it, I had, during that time, almost daily opportunities of seeing them either in Durbar or in private. And being again appointed medical attendant to the Ameers, in April 1843, when they were brought in captivity to Bombay, and from thence sent to Sassoor, I saw them during nearly two months under very greatly altered circumstances.

During my acquaintance with the Ameers, I remarked their great freedom from the vices usually prominent among Indian Mussulmans, and I was pleased with their affable and gentle manners and domestic habits, and also with the mild exercise of their power as rulers. The people generally seemed to love them; and from what I saw during my stay at Hydrabad, I could have expected the devotion they displayed a few months afterwards, in supporting their chiefs when fighting for their honour, their independence, and their territory. I never saw anything to give me the least suspicion that any of the Ameers used any intoxicating thing; nor did I ever, while in Scinde, hear even a rumour that they did so; and I think I must have known it if they had. The use of intoxicating substances I have heard several of them openly condemn: most of them used snuff, but none of them ever smoked tobacco or anything else. During the many opportunities of observation that my visits to the sick afforded me, I never saw or heard of any conduct towards the members of their households but what was marked with kindness. During my residence at Hydrabad, I heard of but one severe punishment being inflicted; the criminal was a murderer, and the usual penalty of having his hands cut off by the executioner was inflicted; and in this case the Ameers showed great anxiety for the safety of the man's life after the amputation.

(Signed) A. H. LEITH.

Bombay, 20th Sept. 1845.

From DR. PEART, Civil Surgeon, Poonah, and in charge of the ex-Ameers of Khyrpoor.

Poonah, 17th July, 1845.

Ex-Ameer Roostum Khan of Khyrpoor, with his youngest son, Ali Buksh, and his nephew, ex-Ameer Nusseer Khan, have been under my care since March 1844, and I feel the greatest satisfaction in being able to bear testimony to their noble bearing under their misfortunes; and I can safely say, that since I have had the pleasure of knowing them, I have never observed anything whereby even the slightest shadow of a suspicion of intemperance or debauchery could be attributed to them; and I have had ample opportunities of judging, visiting them at all times. Ex-Ameer Meer Roostum Khan, now upwards of eighty years of age, is in full possession of his faculties—his memory is good, and he is most strict in his religious observances; his mode of living is abstemious, eating meat only once a day, and his sole beverage water or milk.

Respecting the memorials which have been forwarded to England since the ex-Ameers have been under my care, I can assure you most positively that they have never had the most trifling assistance in framing them, neither were they seen by, or their contents known to, any European, until after they had been placed in my hands for transmission to Government.

(Signed) J. H. PEART.

From CAPTAIN MYLNE, 6th Regiment, N.I., late Political Agent, Hydrabad.

Bombay, 18th January, 1840.

I hasten to reply as briefly as possible to your questions regarding the private character of the ex-Ameers of Lower Scinde, and most truly can I say that, as far as my own observation went, and as far as I could learn from others, very few indeed of the native Princes of India could so well stand the test of inquiry into their domestic life.

I had, as you know, many opportunities of seeing them: they had, in general, very short notice of my intention of waiting upon them, and my visits not being confined to mere formal interviews at the Durbar, I had the better means of remarking the total absence of all marks of debauchery and symptoms of excess. I cannot recall to my recollection having ever heard, during the seven months of my being in charge of the agency, any accusation against them as being addicted to the common Mussulman vice of intemperance; and, kept informed as I was, through several sources, of their every day life, it could hardly have failed of coming to my ears had there been anything approaching want of kindness or affection displayed by them to their families. But the manner in which they invariably alluded to their households, and the grief expressed when any member of their families was in distress, convinced me that much attachment existed between them.

Need I say, that if there are any other points on which my opinion of the unhappy Ameers can be of any service, it will afford me much pleasure to give it?

CHAS. D. MYLNE.

Extract from "The Conquest of Scinde, a Commentary,"* by Lieut-Col. Outram, C.B., Resident at Sattarah.

To these convincing testimonies, I would add that of an officer long resident in Scinde, and intimately acquainted with its people. "My own knowledge," he writes, "that is, from personal intercourse, is nothing, but the unanimous testimony of all the natives who were in a position to know, shows that, with the sole exception, I believe, of Ali Moorad, the Meers of Scinde were sober and temperate to an extraordinary degree,—not only not drinking or using intoxicating liquors or drugs, but not even smoking a hookah."

On Sir Henry Pottinger I call to confirm the testimony thus rendered in their favour by every British officer who has had an opportunity of intimately knowing the Ameers. *He* can inform his countrymen that the documents now submitted to the reader are sober and literal statements of undeniable facts. * * * * * Sir Alexander Burnes's eulogies of Meer Roostum, "the good old man," I have already placed before the reader.† And if, as I confidently

* "The Conquest of Scinde, a Commentary," by Lieut-Col. Outram, C.B., Resident at Sattarah. Wm. Blackwood & Sons, Edinburgh and London, 1846.

† I deeply regret that I have it not in my power to refer to Captain Del'Hoste's Journal, written in 1832, which, though buried in the records of Government, I believe contains sketches of the characters of the Ameers. The following passage, extracted from Dr. James Burnes's book will show how innocent were the preceding generation of Ameers of the foul charges brought against their sons:—

"The Ameers of Scinde are less sunk in sensuality and indulgence than Mahommedan princes in general. Meer Moorad Ali Khan asked me on one occasion whether I had any objection to his taking daroo, a word which I understood in its usual acceptation of ardent spirits; and I was proceeding to explain that it would be better to avoid all stimulants, and particularly wine, for the present, when he abruptly interrupted me, by begging that I would not use the name of the forbidden juice of the grape in the presence of a true believer. I found afterwards that his Highness only meant a pomegranate; and although this anecdote may give an impression of display before a large assembly, still I believe it is well ascertained that the Ameers never indulge in intoxicating drugs or liquors. They have been known to dismiss persons

expect, I have satisfied my reader of the utter groundlessness of this charge of debauchery and drunkenness against the Ameers generally, and against the venerable Meer Roostum in particular, I may safely leave it to his judgment to determine what degree of credit is due to the monstrous and incredible stories narrated on the same authority as that which I have just proved to be so worthless. The Ameers have been accused of committing deeds exceeding in iniquity those ever invented in the most fabulous romance of ancient or modern days; such as, *chopping their own "offspring to pieces with their own hands, immediately after birth; but more frequently placing them under cushions, smoking, drinking, and jesting with each other about their hellish work while the children were being suffocated beneath them;" chastising their wives with "whips of twisted brass wires," for "what they deemed the*

with disgrace from their presence, who have appeared before them redolent of wine; and Bahadoor Khan Cokur, a Beloochee chief of high birth, in the service of Meer Moorad Ali Khan, was suspended from his employments for a considerable time, from having been once seen in a state of intoxication. The Ameers universally objected to take medicine in the shape of tinctures, from the spirits they contained. There is not a hookah to be seen at their court, nor do any of the family ever eat opium. It were to be hoped that this temperance on the part of the rulers had had a proportionate effect on their subjects; but experience obliges me to declare that most of the soldiery, and many of the courtiers, are addicted to every species of indulgence that can either enervate the mind, or debilitate the body. The eating of opium is as common in Scinde as in Cutch; and I found no present more acceptable than a few bottles of brandy, and no annoyance more intolerable than incessant indirect applications to repair the ravages of unlawful disease, or to renew the powers wasted in luxury and debauch. The Ameers commence business about two hours before daybreak, when each holds a private levee to listen to complaints, and adjust the affairs relative to his peculiar province. It is on this occasion only that they wear turbans. About sunrise, they repair to their apartments to dress, and appear shortly afterwards in durbar, where the whole family regularly assemble, and where all State proceedings are transacted. The letters which have arrived during the night or preceding day, are then thrown before them in a heap, and the time is passed in reading or giving orders regarding them, and in conversation till ten or eleven o'clock, when they withdraw to their morning repast. At two o'clock they again show themselves abroad, and remain together till dark, when they separate for the night to their respective places of abode."

*poor women's offences, such, perhaps, as weeping over their slaughtered children;" "hellish deeds, which rendered them objects for horror rather than sympathy."** Such are the

* "Conquest of Scinde," page 348:—"Nusseer Khan of Hydrabad, depicted the most noble and generous of the Ameers, the most humane of the pernicious brood, had in his zenana a whip expressly to correct the women; the last is composed of two lengths of twisted brass wires! It is no fable! the usage is certain, &c." That the romancist who palmed off on his too credulous countrymen the arrant nonsense (out-Heroding the famed Munchausen) of Fitzgerald of the "tempestuous hand," should write such trash, excites but little wonder. But it is surprising, and derogates not a little from the respect due to the collective wisdom of the nation, that the absurd fable should have been listened to in Parliament.

It must have astonished all English gentlemen in India conversant with the mild ways of Mahommedan gentlemen towards the inmates of their harems—(subjected to no other hardships than that of voluntary seclusion, which they themselves consider as disgraceful to infringe as would an English female regard a reflection cast on her chastity)—to see so wantonly libellous and utterly absurd an accusation gravely uttered by a British Senator in the presence of the Parliament of England. The report of the debate given by Hansard states, that *sensation* was caused by this climax to all the misrepresentation and mystification palmed on the House on that occasion, but the nature of that sensation is not described: for the honour of my countrymen I trust that it was the sensation of *indignation* at the unblushing assurance of Mr. Roebuck in presuming to attempt to impose such trash on the representatives of our nation. Of all the Ameers, Nusseer —the courteous, refined, and even chivalrous Nusseer—was the last on whom the romancist should have attempted to cast this stigma. Nusseer! who would as soon have given pain to a woman as would Mr. Roebuck or General Napier dream of inflicting the same barbarous cruelty on their own daughters. Poor Nusseer is now no more. It has pleased God to summon him whither the malice of his persecutors can no longer pursue him; where the wicked cease from troubling, and the weary are at rest. He was mercifully removed ere the atrocious calumnies of General William Napier could add another drop of bitterness to the overflowing cup of his misfortunes. *Requiescat in pace.* His nephew, Meer Hoossein Ali, indignantly replied as follows to the charges, as preposterous as they are malignant, of the historian:—"*Whatever stories the General has written concerning our ladies, we could reply to them by as bad and worse words about him; but it is not our custom to write evil about any one, or call him bad names, agreeably to the saying, the man of wisdom will not call him a respectable man who uses the names of respectable men with disdain.* (Persian proverb.) *Sir Charles Napier has described the killing of children by the Ameers; but in reply we say, thousands of woes to him who wrote such a thing, for we are neither guilty of that, nor know any thing about it. This is only an unfounded charge and a false*

statements put forth as *History*, and as worthy of the belief of the most civilized portion of the globe! They can only

calumny. Let it be asked, how can a man be so inhuman as to cut to pieces a young child, and in consequence expose himself to the fire of hell and the curse of God? Regarding the brass whip which the General has written about, it is all a lie, like the rest of his accusations; because a whip is for horses and not for women. There is no matter if the General has got it (the whip with which it was alleged Meer Nusseer chastised his women) *in his possession to show to the people, for we also can produce not only a brass whip but hundreds of iron whips.*" And thus the young Ameer concludes his humble attempt to defend the memory of his father, and to uphold the character of his brethren, all that remained to them:—"Sir Charles Napier calumniates the Ameers, because he knows that he has injured them very sadly; and, by calling the Ameers monsters, he hopes to draw off the sympathy of people from their sorrowful misfortunes; but he will fail in his design even in this world; and on the day of judgment, when the Beloochees, who were innocently murdered by the General in the battles of Meeanee and Douba, shall rise against him,—on such a day, where will he find refuge from the accusations and complaints of those whose characters he has blackened by his calumnies?"

A brass whip—by no means a great rarity in the East—is found in the women's apartments, and the logical inference is, that *it was designed for their backs!* By a parity of reasoning, the valuable firearms, swords, jewels, and treasures, found in the zenanas, may be concluded to have been collected by the ladies, who, addicted like their lords to intrigue, were meditating a "revolt of the *Harem!*" Alas, poor England! If your senators are at the mercy of Mr. Roebuck, and your rising generation are dependent for Eastern *facts* on the imagination of General William Napier! England of all nations is most interested in obtaining correct information regarding India; Englishmen are of all Europeans the most ignorant, and the most easily imposed on, in all that concerns it!

To prove how cruelly the Ameers treated their ladies, the historian tells us, that "*when the Ameers fell, not one woman, old or young, mother, wife, or concubine, would follow them to Bombay, so much were they detested;*" and we are told that they "sought and obtained leave to return to the homes of their childhood." The reader of the foregoing pages will not be surprised when I tell him that THIS IS A PURE UNMITIGATED FICTION; though he will probably be amused at the hardihood of the fabrication. The ladies did not accompany their lords, because to have done so would have been an acknowledgment that all hope of the return of the Ameers was abandoned. The treatment of the captive Ameers, the indignities to which they were exposed, the undefined horror entertained by all Asiatics of transportation across the "black water" (sea), and the incertitude as to the final disposal of the captive princes when in the country of those who had evinced such a recklessness of justice, truth, and mercy,—were enough to deter even affectionate wives from voluntarily accompanying their husbands at first. But it was not their husbands' wish that their wives should accompany them.

be accounted for, by some heartless wag having practised on the credulity and too ready ear of Sir Charles Napier (to

UP TO MY LAST ACCOUNTS—JULY 1845—THE AMEERS' LADIES, SO FAR FROM HAVING "RETURNED TO THE HOMES OF THEIR CHILDHOOD," WERE STILL LIVING IN A TANDA (A WALLED VILLAGE) ABOUT THREE MILES FROM HYDRABAD! What say Dr. Peart, in charge of the Khyrpoor Ameers, and Captain Gordon, in charge of those of Lower Scinde, on this subject? The former writes:—

"In reply to the last part of your letter, from frequent conversations I have had with the ex-Ameers upon the subject, I am enabled to state that their disinclination to have their families sent to them from Scinde is quite insurmountable, and when I have proposed it to them, their reply has always been, '*As long as we are prisoners, this is no place for our wives and children, to make them prisoners also.*' I trust you will excuse my refraining from informing the ex-Ameers of the allegations that have been made against them, as I am sure, by so doing, I should be adding fresh causes of sorrow."

The latter, thus:—"The Ameers solemnly deny the allegation referred to in your second query, regarding the destruction of infants in their zenanas, and in justice I cannot withhold my testimony, that while I was employed in Scinde and the neighbouring countries, I never heard that such a practice existed among the Ameers, and *had it prevailed, it is scarcely possible that it could have been concealed* from you and others who resided constantly for several years at, I may say, the doors of the Ameers. IT WAS, I BELIEVE, THE WISH OF THE EX-AMEERS, THAT THEIR LADIES SHOULD NOT ACCOMPANY THEM FROM SCINDE, AND SINCE THEIR ARRIVAL IN INDIA, THEY HAVE ALWAYS EXPRESSED THE GREATEST REPUGNANCE TO THEIR REMOVAL, IN THE HOPE, NO DOUBT, THAT THEY THEMSELVES WOULD EVENTUALLY BE RESTORED TO THEIR OWN COUNTRY. THIS HOPE THEY STILL CHERISH, AND WHILE IT LASTS (ALTHOUGH FAR LESS INTENSELY THAN BEFORE) THEY WILL NEVER SANCTION A PROCEEDING WHICH, AS WE ARE WELL AWARE, IS SO OFFENSIVE TO THEIR IDEAS OF FEMALE HONOUR AND DECORUM. THE AMEERS HAVE ALWAYS SPOKEN TO ME OF THE REMOVAL OF THEIR LADIES, AS A STEP TO BE RESORTED TO ONLY IN THE EVENT OF THEIR VAKEELS RETURNING UNSUCCESSFUL FROM ENGLAND, AND THEY WILL NOW PERCEIVE THAT THEIR WORST FEARS IN THIS REGARD ARE LIKELY TO BE REALIZED." This, be it remembered, is the testimony of two high-minded English gentlemen, writing simultaneously from the eastern and western extremities of India, daily associating with the Ameers, and acquainted with all their thoughts. They cannot be supposed to be discontented "at being by Lord Ellenborough debarred from plundering the Scinde revenues, under the names of collectors," &c. They are gentlemen whose words have never been doubted, nor their honour called in question; with no interest in the matter save that of Englishmen jealous for the honour of their country. And what is opposed to them? The assertions of one whom I have proved to be as reckless of *truth* as he is ignorant of what he pretends to discuss—the champion of a brother whose policy is unjustifiable, and only to be extenuated by proving its victims monsters more horrible than it hath hitherto entered into the mind of man to conceive!

hear any thing to the disadvantage of his victims), who forthwith transmitted what may have been intended as a bad joke and fiction, to him who was to become the annalist of the Conquest of Scinde.

Translation of the PETITION of the Wives of the dethroned Ameers of Scinde, transmitted through their accredited Envoys, to Her Majesty QUEEN VICTORIA.

May the shadow of Queen Victoria increase, the pure, and the magnificent as Balkis (Queen of Sheba).

It is almost two years since Sir Charles Napier came to Hydrabad, in Scinde, with an army and artillery, and plundered our habitations of all our money, ornaments, jewels, and of every thing of value. And at the same time he took from us the Ameers and our children, and sent them to Hindostan as captives. We helpless women, devoid of power, were, when Sir Charles Napier arrived, seated in our houses. What manner of custom is this, that he should enter our dwellings, and plunder us of our valuables, leaving us not sufficient for our support? Two years have elapsed since he tore us from our houses, and native city, and compelled us to dwell outside the town of Hydrabad, in huts, like the destitute. God knows the hardships we suffer for our food and raiment; and through our separation from the Ameers, we endure such distress and despair, that life is distasteful to us. That one should die when God wills it, is no calamity; but we endure with each successive day the torment of a new death; wherefore we cherish the hope, that you yourself being a Queen, as we were once, will

sympathise with us, and will take compassion upon us, and cause restoration of those things of which Sir Charles Napier has robbed us; and since our hearts are lacerated with grief at being separated from the Ameers, and from our sons—by which, indeed, we are brought to the brink of despair—you will remove this cause of distress, otherwise we should reckon it the greatest favour to put an end to our existence. May your days be lengthened!

Signatures of the Begums of—

MEER KURM ALI KHAN.
MEER NOOR MAHOMED KHAN.
MEER MAHOMED NUSSEER KHAN.
MEER SOBDAR KHAN.
MEER MEER MAHOMED KHAN.

Written on the 27th of the month Shuwal, 1260,
at Hydrabad, in Scinde.

Translation of a Paper given to LORD ASHLEY by the VAKEELS of the Ameers of Scinde.

August, 1845.

We, AKHUND HABIBULLAH, DIWAN MITHARAM, and DIWAN DYARAM, the accredited Envoys of the Amírs of Sindh, solemnly declare that we have never, on any occasion, acquiesced in the truth of the charges against our masters the Amírs. We believe, and we affirm it in the most solemn manner, that the letter said to have been written to Bibarak Bugti by Mir Muhammad Nasir Khan,

was a forgery. We believe, before God, that the Amírs are wholly innocent of the charges brought against them.

Signatures of

AKHUND HABIBULLAH.
DIWAN MITHARAM.
DIWAN DYARAM.

19, Harley Street, 15th August 1845.

Extract of a Letter from LIEUT.-COL. OUTRAM, C.B., formerly Commissioner in Scinde, to LIEUT.-GEN. SIR CHARLES NAPIER, G.C.B., dated 26th January 1843, (a few weeks previous to the battle of Meance.)

"It grieves me to say that my heart, and that judgment which God has given me, unite in condemning the course we are carrying out for his Lordship, as most tyrannical, positive robbery. I consider that every life that may hereafter be lost in consequence, will be a *murder*."*

Extract of a letter from the Right Honourable SIR HENRY POTTINGER, Bart., G.C.B., formerly Resident in Scinde, read in the House of Commons by Lord Ashley, in Feb. 1844.

"Your letter brought our happy and merry days in Scinde vividly to my mind, and I lamented, on reading it, if possible more deeply than I had done, over the 'fallen estate' of my old friends the Ameers, of whose case I have all along said, and ever shall say, under all circumstances, and in all society

* *Vide* "The Conquest of Scinde, a Commentary," page 290, Part 1st.

and places where I may hear it alluded to, is the *most unprincipled and disgraceful that has ever stamped the annals of our empire in India.* No explanation or reasoning can, in my opinion, remove the foul stain it has left on our good faith and honour, and as I know more than any other man living of previous events and measures connected with that *devoted* country, I feel that I have a full right to exercise my judgment and express my sentiments on the subject. I was in hopes that some influential voice would have been raised in England against the tyranny and spoliation that had taken place, but the intelligence by the last mail—that of July—holds forth no such prospect, and all that I can now hope is, that the author of all this cruelty and misery may meet with his deserts hereafter. I shall only add, that I shall esteem it a favour if you will let my opinions be known wherever you hear the affair mentioned, and that you cannot use too strong language in expressing my disgust and sorrow on the occasion."

THE END.

London: Printed by Stewart and Murray, Old Bailey.

NOTES

ON

SIR C. NAPIER'S POSTHUMOUS WORK.

BY

MAJOR JOHN JACOB, C.B.

COMMANDANT OF THE SINDE IRREGULAR HORSE;
HONORARY A.D.C. TO THE MOST NOBLE THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL
OF INDIA, ETC.



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1854.

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NOTES

ON

SIR C. NAPIER'S POSTHUMOUS WORK

ON THE

"DEFECTS OF THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT."

By MAJOR JOHN JACOB.

Page 12.

"Lord Dalhousie thought that sufficient to ensure quiet execution."

It would have been so with a disciplined army.

Where the native army is in a proper state, *nothing* will induce the Sepoys to attempt to remedy a supposed grievance by force, nor even to represent it, except through their European officers, to whom they entirely trust for protection. The seniority system chiefly (with other causes) has ruined the discipline of the Bengal army, and destroyed mutual confidence between officers and men. The evil influence of the state of affairs in the larger body is, I fear, fast communicating itself to the Bombay army also.

Page 14.

"And then the mutineers murder him."

It is a remarkable and significant fact that this does *not* occur, the mutineers never do "murder him;" yet I deny the possibility of the Sepoys mutinying while their English officers are alive *and do their duty*. Men are *not* suddenly most vicious, and would never mutiny for trifles when they know that the FIRST STEP must be that which *they* know and feel, even among themselves, to be a detestable crime—the murder of their officers. Let the officers have calmly made up their minds to be obeyed or be killed, and there would be little disobedience! To show they were in earnest, let the first man guilty of open mutiny be shot on the spot by his commanding officer, and the thing would spread no further; let there be no talking or reasoning with the offenders on such occasions.

It is not that officers want the determination necessary to carry out this course successfully, but such proceedings are *not the fashion* at present, and the officers feel doubtful of support at head-quarters. Yet what is here advocated is undoubtedly wholesome, good, and merciful.

Page 19.

"The natives are most sensitive to curses and charms."

They are much more sensitive to the influence of a proper discipline and of proper leaders.

Page 29.

"Military rules sit light on the low-caste man."

It is a positive fact that, where a proper discipline

and a proper soldierly pride exist, the men of high caste give less trouble about their castes than the low-caste men.

The cry about caste among the Sepoys of Bengal has no real connexion with their religion—it is maintained as good policy to enable them to keep power in their own hands.

But doubtless the best materials for soldiers in India are the Hindostan Mussulmans, who are highly-civilized beings, with no castes at all, yet not of "low caste."

Page 49.

"In Sinde the police was organized," &c.

It is the greatest folly to speak of Sinde as having come into our possession by conquest. It was only its land revenues which did so. We had been in full occupation and possession of the country, for every military and commercial purpose, for several years before the arrival of Sir C. Napier.

Page 53.

"That Military Board is a curse on the Indian army."

This is most just if for "Indian army" we read "India," for it is not only the army which suffers: excessive folly and ruinous delay are the attributes of the Board, the system trammels honest men only, but is no check on rogues. As an example of the working of such a system of conducting public works I may mention a thing close at hand :—

Under the auspices of the Board it has been attempted in vain during fourteen years past to make a passable road from Sukkur to Shickarpoor. The most important

piece of road perhaps in all Sinde. Yet I would stake my life that an excellent road could be made there at moderate cost within six months from the date of the work being put into my hands.

Page 56.

"You should get no more: we would stop them; what would you do then?"

Let Commanding Officers have power to dismiss with punishment and infamy such knaves as this on the spot, and promote none but deserving men, and such "jests" would not pass. Government might enlist a million of excellent men in India in a day in spite of any impertinent opposition on the part of Bramins, &c.

If the Commanding Officers had more power, and were left to make their own arrangements with their corps, there would always be with each regiment a good body of "Oomeydwars" (candidates for enlistment) ready instantly to take the place of any discharged men.

There are generally fifty or more of these Oomeydwars with the Sinde Irregular Horse, so that we have always the pick of good seasoned and half-trained men eager to serve.

Page 59.

All these mutinies are caused by the absurd system which insists on having imbecile Native officers and insolent soldiers.

The Native soldier should look up to his European officer as his god, and he will do so, if properly treated.

Page 62.

"The Hindoos sworn," &c.

What amazing folly is this! The fellows perjure themselves with wonderful readiness!

The assertions in the text are good specimens of the ludicrous ignorance and credulity of the author as regards Eastern men and customs; they come most characteristically from the man who put down "*Suttee*" in Sinde, where it was as much but no more practised than in England (*vide* "Administration of Sinde").

Page 72.

"Yet I subdued them."

This is not true.

Sir C. Napier's measures against the predatory tribes of the Sinde border (there were none in the interior of Sinde) totally failed, and even made matters worse, for he encouraged our own people to commit murder and robbery (*vide* my Notes on the "Administration of Sinde," and Appendix thereto).

Page 73.

"When the generous course is first followed by the most powerful."

What perversion of terms is this! Had we been powerful in this matter, would any generous feelings have induced us to pay, or to propose to pay, the Affreedees *anything?*

Page 74.

"To have the frontier tribes as police was a successful experiment of mine."

This is not true.

The experiment was made by Colonel Outram, and by his orders, I early in 1842 enlisted the Doombkees and Jekranees in our service, and they remained perfectly faithful, attached to the Sinde Irregular Horse all through that year, the period of the Cabool disasters. In 1843, after the conquest of Sinde, the ignorance and mismanagement shown on the frontier caused these tribes to plunder and lay waste the whole country, far and wide, within the British territory. Sir C. Napier attempted to remedy this by encouraging the tribes within our border to rob and murder in return, and of course made matters ten times worse.

He made the people all robbers, not policemen, as is here asserted. Moreover, when I commenced to remedy these things in January, 1847, when I found the state of affairs as bad as could be, Sir C. Napier writes to me (1st February, 1847) that he had been "persuaded, like *an ass*," to allow these border tribes to be armed!

After I had quieted the country by having recourse to measures, and persevering in courses directly opposed to the principles and proceedings of Sir C. Napier, Sir W. Napier asserts that Durriah (or as he calls him, "Deyrah") Khan's (the Jekranee chief) "warfare was the consummation of a *profound scheme* of policy—"Administration of Sinde," page 268. Sir C. Napier writes at the time that he acted like an ass for permitting it!!

(See my Notes on the "Administration of Sinde.)

Page 76.

"Justice—Rupees—and Bayonets."

This is fearfully false! Sir C. Napier's principles in Sinde may be, if you please, truly said to have been falsehood—rupees—and bayonets!

The rupees having been poured into his own pocket to the tune of two millions!

Page 77.

"When Sir C. Napier, at variance with the governing powers in India."

The sword was bestowed by no Sirdars in Sinde except Captain Rathborne, Collector of Hyderabad, and his immediate dependents.

As to the Sinde war, the people were driven to resistance by the most base and outrageous injustice ever practised by man.

They fought at last in utter despair, without a hope of success; but maddened, and blindly furious at witnessing the enormous iniquity and cruelty with which their venerable Prince, poor old Meer Roostum, was treated, they determined to die.

The presented sword was a farce got up by Captain Rathborne; the whole thing was a gross deception, if intended to be considered as expressing the sentiments of any *natives of Sinde*, except the immediate creatures of the collector—Messrs. Khan Mahomed and Co.

Page 79.

"There are blood feuds."

Many more blood feuds were made or fostered by Sir C. Napier himself than he ever put down; while our

own troops slew a pretty general average of our own subjects by mistake.

Page 79.

"There is a public morality."

This is a beastly falsehood.

Page 79.

"There is the barbarous exhibition."

We hang and transport, instead of cutting off hands; that is all! Hands, ears, and noses were cut off by the bushel in England in the reign of James the Second. We have not much to boast of as to the humanity of our criminal code even now.

Page 80.

"There is an agricultural system."

This system, in the hands at least of the *collector* of *Hyderabad*, appeared to be somewhat defective; for nothing could have been worse than the state in which he managed to get his collectorate. The Kardars and other subordinate civil officers were left unpaid for eighteen months or more. How had they lived meanwhile, except by plundering the ryots?

Page 78.

"There are fictions to refute."

Copy of memorandum concerning the proceedings of the prize agents at Hyderabad in 1843, written many years ago by Major Jacob.

When the sales of prize property were going on at

Hyderabad in March, 1843, I went on a few occasions to the place where the plunder was collected and exposed for sale, for the purpose of examining some horses among the prize property, which my men wished to purchase for service in the ranks of the Sinde Irregular Horse.

On these occasons I saw among the prize property *great numbers* of pieces of silk embroidery and such like; many of the pieces half finished, with the needles still in the work. I also saw there ladies' work-baskets and boxes, large heaps of ladies' dresses and Oriental female attire of all sorts, infants' clothing, &c., with immense quantities of the furniture, crockery, &c., of ladies' bed-rooms and toilettes; also beds, bedding, carpets, children's cots, &c., in heaps; together with all manner of other household furniture of sorts in great quantities. These had evidently been in use by their late owners immediately before they were seized and exposed for sale by the prize-agents at public auction.

I never bought anything myself at any of these sales, and only went to the place on the occasions above mentioned, being heartily disgusted with the whole proceeding. But I know that the sale of such things still continued in July, 1843, when I repeatedly saw young officers and others return from the prize sales with handfuls of silk embroidery, such as choolies (boddices) and other articles of female dress, some half worked only, which they had purchased "for fun" at the auctions of prize property.

I loudly and frequently uttered my opinion regarding these things at the time, and vehemently argued that no conquest gave any right over the private personal property of individuals, much less over that of women

and children; and that, be the right what it might, it was a shame to strip poor ladies of their furniture, dresses, &c., as was done by the prize-agents. But at this time I did not blame Sir C. Napier for these infamous robberies, of which he professed ignorance; and when complaints on the subject reached him, he *always referred the complainant to the prize-agents*, "whose business it was to settle such questions," pretending not to understand that these prize-agents were the very people complained against.

To such an extent was carried the meanness and atrocity displayed in the collecting of prize property at Hyderabad, that when one of the ladies of the Meers (I forget which), expecting shortly to be confined in childbed, wished for a favourite bed of hers which had been seized with the rest as prize property, and sent one of her followers to ask the "agents" to let her have it, *her request was refused!*

The man, a most respectable member of the Meer's household, then went to Captain Brown (at that time on Sir C. Napier's staff as civil commissioner), whom he had known well formerly under very different circumstances, and begged of him to obtain for the unfortunate lady the trifling favour she craved, offering at the same time to *pay the prize-agent for the bed if he required it.* With some trouble Captain Brown obtained the bed for the poor woman, a princess in the land.

This transaction was notorious at the time. Captain Brown several times spoke to me about it, laying the whole blame on Captain Bazett, and speaking of the affair in the terms of indignation which it deserved.

While the ladies of the Meers were still living in the fort of Hyderabad, a common prostitute, then in the

keeping of Captain Leeson, Sir C. Napier's baggage-master, was by the prize-agents posted at the gate of the fort for the purpose of searching the persons of women leaving the place, and none were allowed to escape this search, which was conducted often without any regard to decency.

Sir C. Napier may believe, as he has often asserted, that the families of the Meers at Hyderabad were protected, and allowed to carry away *millions* of rupees' worth of property out of the fortress, but the facts are as stated above, and were notorious at the time. The proceedings described above frightened the ladies almost to death, and when any one went towards their apartments, a servant or follower rushed out to offer him jewels, trinkets, or such like; the poor things always feared that they were about to be seized and stripped.

The woman at the gate of the fort was not idle, as I have been assured by several officers who were on duty in command of the gate-guard during these proceedings.

The slaves, attendants, &c., who went out of the fort were all searched, and nothing could escape the hands of the searchers.

JOHN JACOB.

Memoranda:—Regarding the state of the families of the Ameers of Upper Sinde, in January, 1852.

Residing at Bhirra, twelve miles above Roree, the widow of Meer Roostum Khan, of Khyrpoor.

The wife of Meer Nusseer Khan, daughter of Meer Roostum.

The widow and two daughters of Meer Moreed Hyder, son of Meer Roostum.

These ladies, when I took command of the field force at Roree in January, 1852, I found living in the most

abject poverty, occupying the most wretched hovels, and, in fact, existing in misery and squalor with their attendants, who still faithfully adhered to them.

I could not have believed (had I not witnessed former proceedings at Hyderabad) that any British authority could possibly have allowed, under any circumstances, princesses, whose husbands and fathers were so lately our allies, whose territories we had seized, and who were so lately sovereigns in the land, to sink into such a miserable state as to be suffering *from actual want of food.* They were living on jowarree bread, which was all they had to eat, and they had not too much even of that coarse food.

The undermentioned are at present residing, as mentioned below, at Mehrabpoor in the Nowshara districts:

Meer Ali Murdar, Ali Ackbar, and Goolam Mahomed, sons of Meer Roostum.

At Bawulpoor, Meer Mahomed Hussun, eldest son of Meer Roostum.

At Meeanee Le Tanda, territory of Meer Ali Morad, Meer Mahomed Ali, Meer Ali Mahomed, sons of Meer Mubarick.

Meer Ali Muddud, Ali Ahmed Khan, sons of Nusseer Khan of Khyrpoor.

Ali Bux Khan, son of Meer Fazil Mahomed

The persons here mentioned are the chief individuals of the former rulers, and their families now remaining in the country. They are all very ill provided for; some in extreme want, and those in the territory of Meer Ali Morad are as badly treated as the others, personal insult being sometimes added to poverty and neglect.

JOHN JACOB, Major,
Commanding Field Force, and Political Superintendent on the Frontier.

Page 81.

"I do not know Sir Charles."

Captain * * * * the writer of the letter here quoted, was a curse to the country. He was perfectly unscrupulous, very clever, and a most coarsely sensual mind. One of the favourite amusements of this "dog of decent breed," as he here calls himself, was talking horrible obscenity with Meer Khan Mahomed and other Sindee "*gentlemen*," as great beasts as himself. Such is the man who presumes to malign the noble-minded and chivalrous Lord Jocelyn and the generous Captain Eastwicke; a yelping cur is a respectable animal indeed, when compared to such a collector of * * * * filth.

Sir C. Napier's courts of justice, of which he boasts so much, were positive absurdities. The trials were always rehearsed before the "Civil Judge-Advocate," and then the farce was duly played off, all being well drilled in their parts, before three officers, forming what was called a Military Commission. The members of these commissions were sworn to try the titles to lands, cases of bribery, &c., by civil officers, and all manner of such like things relating to revenue matters, &c., "according to the custom of war in like cases."

The trials were a mere pretence, a veil to delude the public, the only real authority being the pleasure of Sir C. Napier.

But even up to the present moment the want of proper courts of justice is one of the greatest wants in Sinde. Though it may be true that the system in India, with its eternal appeals and reversals, &c., is so bad that Sinde is better with none, still it is a serious want. There is now no court in which an action can be

brought against the collector or against Government. While, and this is the greatest evil of all in practice, the revenue officers having the whole judicial duties of the province to perform, have little time left to attend to their proper fiscal duties.

Page 84.

"In Sinde the political Outram."

This is shamefully false. It is certain that had Outram's advice been followed there *would have been no war.* Not a man would have been hurt on either side. But then there would have been *no prize-money.* Sir C. Napier knew this well.

We were in full possession of Sinde, for all useful purposes, before the conquest. The Ameers had agreed to all our demands, &c. But there was no prize-money! To obtain *this* it was necessary to drive the princes or people of Sinde to resistance, and it was done.

Page 88.

It is moral more than physical force which is required to control these predatory tribes; both are doubtless necessary, but the latter is so, chiefly, to enable us to apply the other.

Justice, honesty, high principles, and unswerving firmness, without any violence, succeed best with these men as with others. If we imitate their crimes on pretence of retaliation, &c., we only perpetuate the evil.

Page 98.

"Had the Afreedees, &c."

All this about the jerail is erroneous. I have myself seen men shot by jerail balls at a distance of 750 yards.

I have been close to a man when he was so struck, and saw whence the ball came, the top of a hill, 750 yards distant.

Page 102.

"If Government select an officer."

This is most true and excellent. *Act* on this principle in the Indian army, with regimental commanders, and our Native troops would speedily become perfect. The principle meets every difficulty, but while claiming its operation in his own case, Sir C. Napier would not, it seems, apply it to those under him!

Page 105.

"In Sinde I twice sent the Irregular Horse."

Not twice only, but many times—habitually.

I had no Europeans with me, and but 800 men of all arms, when, in June, 1843, Shere Mahomed, with some 10,000 men, attempted to surprise my camp, but was himself attacked on his line of march, and totally defeated, his army dispersed, and his artillery all taken.

There were no Europeans with Major Billamore's force in the hills in 1839-40. Nor on hundreds of other similar occasions which might be mentioned. In fact, Sir C. Napier is here proving an axiom.

Page 108.

"All were raw troops."

This is not true. The Sinde Irregular Horse had been for three years previously continually on active

service, and had seen much rough work and hard fighting.

The 25th regiment is just before stated in the text to have been composed of excellent soldiers, who shone in battle at "Kotra" several years before "Meeanee" was fought!

Page 129.

"Had the Native officers," &c.

The Native officers are in Bengal purposely made powerless for evil or for good. Why, then, blame these poor old gentlemen. Make them really efficient, by promoting, not the oldest but the most able and most deserving men; make their advancement depend only on their merits, *as estimated by their regimental commander*, and you will have no mutinies, cut the pay as you will.

Page 131.

"The Native officers," &c.

This proceeding of the Commander-in-Chief was perhaps the greatest act of mutiny of all, though the disbanding may have been ever so judicious.

Page 134.

"The religious combination was by that stroke."

This is purely imaginary. There never was anything of religion, in reality, in any of these mutinies. I know this well, and I have not formed and led a large body of Sepoys, for the best part of my life-time, without knowing the thoughts and feelings of the men with whom I have been so long and so intimately associated.

It is certain also that the people of India generally have little or no sympathy with these mutinous Sepoys, and that, when disarmed, they are absolutely powerless for evil; they have no moral power whatever, conscious of being criminals.

Page 165.

"Should avert immediate peril to the State by dealing promptly."

This is clearly *not* the whole question. Let him deal as promptly as he chooses, *within the bounds of* his own powers, which were ample. He had power to shoot the mutineers, but none to strike a regiment out of the army, &c.

Page 182.

"On which another soldier."

Had this man been properly treated he would have been discharged at once, receiving two dozen lashes on his back, inflicted in front of the regiment. But this after all would be only attacking a disease by its symptoms.—Remove the cause and the effect ceases.

Page 183.

"I am right in wishing for Goorka battalions."

Possibly so; but the Hindustanees, properly organized, are as good soldiers as any. They are quite misunderstood in Bengal, and the material always there remains raw.

Page 185.

"If any man in this army said so he should not have remained a day in it."

Most just and right; I would have the man flogged on the spot, and ejected with all possible infamy. But the thing *could* not happen with us.

Page 193.

"The Governor-General's censure proved."

Sir C. Napier when in Sinde, placed under arrest Lieutenant M——, of the Cavalry on one occasion, and severely repremanded Captain T—— on another, both officers in command of the post of Shahpoor, for acting precisely on the principles which he himself here advances.

Page 230.

"The general Indian custom of going to bed"

This is most unjust, as the practice is quite peculiar to Bengal. No man on guard, in the Bombay army, is allowed to disarm or undress.

Page 231.

"The Bombay army is superior to theBengal in discipline, but not in military spirit."

This is a contradiction in terms. There can be no proper military spirit without discipline.

Page 235.

"They can hardly have been deplorably ignorant."

The change of "or" into "and" in this quotation, completely alters its sense.

Any one who honestly advocates promotion of natives by seniority only, must undoubtedly be deplorably ignorant of the real merits of the matter whatever his reputation or position.

Page 237.

"But according to the Bombay Officer."

This assertion is false!

The "Bombay Officer" never asserted any such thing as is here stated, but he strongly advocated the having as commanding officers men *not* governed by caprice, ignorance, &c., and leaving the promotions in their hands

Page 238.

"He writes to excite ill-will."

This is contemptibly false! and *Sir C. Napier himself held formerly opinions very similar to those published by the "Bombay Officer,"* as I know well, having held numerous conversations with Sir C. Napier on these subjects.

There is no sort of breach of faith concerned in the matter of the promotion question, for the Sepoys on enlistment know and think nothing about their rights to promotion: they enlist to obey orders and to serve the State; their ideas of seniority, &c., are always acquired, after they enter the service, under the influence of a vicious system.

Page 239.

"Sir Hugh Wheeler."

If the old and influential officers of the Bengal army knew by experience the working of the contrary system,

the pernicious one now prevailing could not exist in Bengal as it is; its very existence of course proves that it meets with their approval. They prefer the only system with which they are well acquainted; but this proves nothing in its favour when compared to others with which they are not acquainted.

Page 240.

"The Bombay Officer says 'those who study Hindostanee books,'" &c.

This quotation is false. The Bombay Officer said nothing of the kind. With what he did say I most *cordially agree!* It was God's truth, every word of it, and was the result of honest labour, observation, and hard study, however startling and unpalatable it may have appeared.

Page 242.

"The Directors can supply their places with Goorkas."

This measure may be wise; but it is not wise to allow the discipline and obedience of your soldiers to depend on *their* good will and pleasure, and it is certain that the Goorkas would soon be as bad soldiers as the Hindoos of the Bengal army if treated in the same way. The Hindustanee Mussulmans are the best materials for our soldiers *in proper hands.*

Page 244.

"Stocks and clasps."

Most true, and all soldiers should wear beards, which are most useful as a protection against both heat and cold.

Page 246.

"A camel's average load is 300 lbs."

Sir C. Napier's baggage corps camels carried, or were supposed to carry, only 240 lbs., but a very ordinary camel, even not fed on grain, will carry 15 miles a-day a load of 400 or 450 lbs.

Page 248.

"But to save is not the object."

This is mere childishness! The work of most staff appointments requires superior qualifications, and involves superior responsibilities to those belonging to the command of a company of Sepoys.

If higher qualifications be required, you must pay for them, or you will not get them. You cannot buy good steel at the price of iron.

The error is in employing such numbers of costly Europeans in command of Native companies, whose duties would be just as well or better performed by Native officers properly chosen, and formed in a good school.

Page 249.

"To select for a large army is impossible."

It seems by no means impossible when the matter is rightly understood.

Page 250.

"It is said that if the Europeans were fewer."

There is much ignorance shown in all this.

European officers do not improve their Native officers by "*mixing*" with them, but by *being really* superior

to them in moral qualities and high principles. The two races cannot be kept too distinct. Any approach to the adoption of Native habits is a deplorable error. It is so even as regards a matter so comparatively trifling as dress.

Page 250.

"To that is opposed the example of Meeanee."

How so? Was the regiment present in that battle with only three officers worse than the others with many? Has it ever been found wanting there or anywhere else?

Page 253.

All flank companies are bad in principle. So also is all "sizing." The companies should all be alike and all able to act in any part of the line in which they may find themselves.

Page 254.

"This new rule," &c.

It does no such thing if the Commanding Officer hold orderly room (as he should do in every regiment, Native or European) every day of his life in some public place, hearing every man who has anything to say to him. Where is the objection to men being properly dressed on these occasions. Coming to the Commanding Officer at improper times, and in an improper manner, if permitted, gives rise to backbiting, or the reputation of it. Everything should be open and public between the officers and men.

Page 258.

"Proclaim that no man enlisted."

Why not, then, have *done* this instead of perpetuating the crushing evil of seniority promotion?

The idea of equality is *absurd*. If we are not a superior race, we cannot hold India at all.

If we are so, the more we improve the capacity of the Native officers the more this truth will appear to them. I know this well from practical experience and study.

Those likely to assert equality with their European officers must be silly persons—not likely to prove very formidable.

Page 265.

"No one wants to see guns accompany charges."

This is not sound.

The closer the horse artillery can accompany the cavalry the better. But, in truth, Sir C. Napier understood little of artillery matters, and nothing of *horse* artillery as a distinct arm. He resembled in this respect a General who should regard his cavalry as mounted infantry.

Page 265.

"From charges to leather breeches."

The cloth *pantaloons* are out of all proportion superior to the leathers. The soldiers always cover them, or the seat, &c., with leather, which gives them the advantage of the leather breeches, without their inconveniences. The long trousers are, however, bad. Cloth pantaloons and jack-boots should be worn by all mounted men.

Page 269.

"The Military Board is the greatest enemy to economy."

This is undoubtedly true.

Page 283.

"With geldings, heel-ropes are not needed."

Heel-ropes are a very great advantage and convenience with every kind of horse.

Page 283.

"The stud horses."

There is no doubt but that the stud-bred horse of India is the worst of all. But had the physiology of horse-breeding been understood and attended to, this horse would probably by this time have been the best of all on earth.

Having recourse to English horses at all for breeding purposes in India was a grave error.

The English horse was formed from the Eastern horse, and having become peculiarly well adapted to the climate, &c., of England, to bring him back to the East again was to undo all that the English breeders had been doing for centuries. Arab horses should alone have been used to breed from after the first start, which must necessarily have been made with a sufficient number of mares, the best procurable of any breed, as Arab mares are not obtainable.

The qualities of individuals should have been carefully and scientifically studied before bringing them together. On this depends the whole success of the scheme. To ensure a good produce it is by no means sufficient to put a good dam to a good sire. The excel-

lencies of each may be great, but may be neutralized in the produce by *similar* defects in each.

Both parents may be generally good, but may possess peculiarities, which, if exaggerated in the produce, would render it useless. Many breeders suppose that a sire and dam, being both winners of races, ought to produce winners, but their *excellencies*, though *great, may be unlike*, and their *defects*, though small, may be *alike*, in which case it is next to certain that in the produce the excellencies will have disappeared, and the defects be enormously increased. Were all stallions of other breeds now in the studs at once sold off, and none but the best Arabs used to breed from in future, no mare or horse of any other breed being hereafter admitted, Government might reasonably expect in twenty years' time to possess the finest breed of horses in the world—so quiet and docile that they might be used entire, without any of the evils here complained of by Sir C. Napier. But the physiology of the business and individual incongruity must in every case, and with every breed, be most carefully attended to, or the result will be a failure. A stallion, originally vicious, should never be employed. One becoming so should immediately be removed from the stud. Really good Arabs are never vicious.

As to the Cabool and Afghaun horse generally, he is a fine large horse to look at, but his real powers are contemptible. He is in reality the worst horse but one of all the breeds in the East. The first horses to fail in any fast work in the hot weather are *always* the Caboolees. In fact, as riding-horses, they are as bad as can be, though they answer well for draught.

The Arab horse is *unapproachable* in excellence, for

military and general purposes, by any other breed on earth.

A good Arab will *fly* with fifteen stone on his back. He will thrive on any fare, never loses his temper—is bold, gentle, docile, and enduring—while he has almost as much sense and reason as some men.

Next to the Arab in the East ranks the Persian.

The best *country* horses with us are those of Kattiawar, Cutch, and the valley of the Beemah. These three breeds are excellent. Then follow next in merit the horses of the Thurn and Guzzerat; then those of Cutchee and Kelat; then Punjaubees, Candaharees, and Caboolees; and, last of all, the Bengal-stud breed. The Toorkamaun horse is *excellent*, but a real Toorkamaun is never procurable in the market.

Page 290.

"The Northern horses (from Persia, Turkistan, Herat, Candahar, and Cabool").

The breeds of horses here classed together as Northern horses are nearly as different from each other as a dray-horse from a racer!

Page 298.

"Why, then, is the Englishman?"

Captain Nolan tells us why; and the few cavalry officers who think for themselves knew it well before.

Page 300.

"To arm cavalry Sepoys."

It is no mistake at all to arm them with good *cutting* swords of one uniform pattern. The English sword—

not the Government regulation iron, but a weapon made in England of good steel and of proper shape—is infinitely better than any Eastern blade. All the Native soldiers prefer it, and even my wild Beloochees are all begging to be allowed to buy these swords at any price. The things cut of themselves, however unskilfully handled.

The steel scabbard is best, *if* it have a complete wooden scabbard inside it, a construction, however, which I have never yet been able to persuade any English maker to adopt or to understand. They always leave the wood open, or imperfectly closed at the edge, where it is wanted most, and put a lot of screws and iron springs about the mouth of the scabbard, which totally defeat the object of the wooden lining. The scabbards of the Sinde Irregular Horse are of wood and leather, made as strong as may be, but still they wear out too fast, and break too often to please me. My own swords have metal scabbards, made large purposely, and lined with complete wooden scabbards, in this country the bell-mouth being formed of the wood. These scabbards are best of all.

Great mistakes exist regarding the respective powers of the edges and points of swords. On foot, or when moving slowly, it is unnecessary to argue in favour of the point of the fencer; its superiority is evident to all. But on horseback *the speed of the horse prevents the swordsman from drawing back his arm with sufficient rapidity after a home thrust.* So that if going at speed, as every cavalry man ought to be in attacking, his sword, after passing through his enemy, is very liable to be knocked out of his hand, the weapon running up to the hilt, and then, of course, violently stopping. This

has occurred to myself, when I should have been disarmed had not the sword been buckled to my wrist with a very strong leather strap. The same thing must have occurred to others. Such a tremendous twist, too, will certainly break any but a very first-rate blade, and is not a fair trial for a good sword. Wherefore, for cavalry soldiers, curved cutting blades are best. Straight swords will not cut, save in skilful hands; curved blades cut fearfully, with very little or no skill on the part of the soldier.

Page 303.

"But its weight reduced."

The musket is already too light for the ball, or the ball too heavy for the musket - call it which you will. The *recoil* is more than the Sepoy can bear properly.

Page 303.

"Exposed to minié rifles."

On the same principles as are here stated, we should abolish fire-arms altogether. The old English bow, on which the realm of England was said to stand for so many centuries, is open precisely to the same objections.

Page 304.

"But, then, where is the advantage?"

Clearly in rapid firing at close quarters. A good modern rifle is effective at 600 or at 60 yards; with correctness of aim, at all distances, long or short. All this in the text about fire-arms is unsound.

The possessing of superior weapons does *not* (as Sir

C. Napier supposed) tend to keep strong and brave men from closing with their foes. The bowmen who won the fields of Cressy, Poitiers, Agincourt, and Flodden, did they fear to close because they had the power to strike at a distance, and did actually destroy the enemy's men-at-arms afar off in spite of plate and mail, hauberk and helmet? Nothing was then esteemed sure fence against an English arrow; but when England was in exclusive possession of such a powerful missile weapon, were her sons less brave, *less* inclined to *grapple* with their foes than were their neighbours? Does the seaman—the English sailor—feel less inclined to board because his skill in gunnery is improved? Away with such nonsense! The whole line of argument here is erroneous, and Sir C. Napier evidently knew *very little* of *modern* fire-arms.

The minié rifle, or rather the minié ball, has most serious defects; the gun may at any moment become unserviceable, the ball, or rather a leaden tube which *was* the ball, remaining in the barrel. This happens about once in ten shots. Even when the ball is not left behind, it often, from being blown into a tube, drops short and feebly from the gun. These cups and balls are wholly untrustworthy.

I have expended a small fortune on these things, and have probably made more experiments with fire-arms than any man living. Ten years ago I offered Government a rifle which is still quite unequalled for military purposes. It was rejected because the Court of Directors did not require anything superior to the two-grooved rifles then in use with the English army. Yet the two-grooved rifle is the worst of all, being painfully-difficult to load, and because the ball being confined in one direc-

tion only is at liberty to roll or lean over in the other, so that the *conical ball cannot be used.* On the use and proper shape of *this* ball, however, depends the whole power of the rifle at long distances

My rifle loads more easily than a common smooth-bored musket, and never becomes so foul from firing as to cause any difficulty in loading. However loose the ball, it still follows the twist of the rifle grooves with perfect accuracy. It is effective at 1200 yards, and just as good as a common musket at 20 yards, or any other distance.

Page 306.

"The Directors should lessen the weight."

It is the recoil which is too much for the musketeer, not the weight of the piece: the bore is too large.

Page 310.

"Baggage corps."

For the truth of this surpassing folly, see paper at the end of these Notes.

Page 311.

"The subalterns all holding commissions."

It seems curious that so many of these subalterns (local lieutenants) were tried and convicted of peculation: they seemed, after all, notwithstanding what is asserted in the text, not to have been *much more honest* than the old commissariat people.

Page 312.

"The false notion that it is expensive."

It was enormously expensive, because quite useless; without it things were better managed.

Page 312.

"The camel corps."

The camel corps might have been of excellent service had it been used properly; its discipline interior economy, drill, &c., were excellent. But while in Sinde it was posted at Larkana, inside a fort, armed with heavy 12-pounder guns and a lot of field-pieces, and behind an impassable branch of the Indus, so that towns close to it were plundered in open day by large bodies of the Cutchee plunderers with perfect impunity—and, thus posted, an excellent corps was useless.

Page 348.

"On my departure."

All this is untrue. Nothing was done by Sir C. Napier to facilitate commerce on our northern frontier in Sinde. The import and export duties were vexatious and most injurious; *no* roads were made or commenced on; not a single bridge was built, or even proposed; and *no attempt* was made to improve matters affecting trade, either in our own territory or that of Kelat in the Bolaun and through Cutchee.

Much has been now done under the rule of Mr. Frere, and much more is in progress, which shows clearly what Sir C. Napier *might* have accomplished, but did not. In the district under my charge alone, some 500 miles of road have been made—not proposed only, but *actually made*—the roads being throughout 45-feet wide, and as straight as they could be. On these roads some 200 good brick bridges have been built, some of them of 40 feet span; while by the 1st of April next the great work of the Begaree canal will be completed—a channel

50 miles long and 50 feet wide—which will bring half the desert under cultivation. In the other parts of the province not less has probably been done, while the grand work of opening the Eastern Nara is in full progress, and a great road from Kurrachee over the Lukkee hill to our northern frontier fairly commenced.

Contrast all this with the puerile proceedings of the late governor of Sinde, with his foolish bunds, canal department, &c., so much boasted of by Sir W. Napier in the "Administration of Sinde."

Page 350.

"Make a road from Sukkur to Shickarpoor."

Sir C. Napier ruled in Sinde with despotic sway for five years, and during that time only proceeded as far as plans and estimates. We have occupied the country for fifteen years, and for the last ten years and more it has been our own, yet *still this most important little piece of road in the whole province* is even in a worse state now than it was in 1839. There have been far too many "plans and estimates," and too many discussions for any *work* to be done, and now that the thing has been given up to the tender mercies of "the Board," it may, I fear, be classed with a Chancery suit, and we may expect nothing but plans, estimates, and wise opinions to all eternity! Yet the business presents not the least difficulty, and the whole might have been accomplished in one season by contract at a very moderate cost.

It is as plain as the day, that to secure constant dry communication by land, and straight communication by water between Shickarpoor and Sukkur, all that is necessary to be done is to dig a canal from one place

to the other—throw the earth excavated to one side only, and on the top of this bank make your road; all the water-courses crossed by the bank being of course bridged. What can be simpler or better for the purpose? This was proposed by me in 1840, and in spite of all the plans and estimates, I doubt if anything better has been thought of since.

As things are now, the road by land—very bad at all times—is quite impassable for four months in the year, while, though the direct distance be only twenty-two miles, the distance by water is about seventy!

The bank on which the road would be carried would have to be fifty feet wide at top, but nowhere more than seven high, generally much less. But last season experiments were made with a bank ten feet thick, apparently in order to ascertain whether one of five times that breadth would stand or not. The strange devices played off on this little piece of road, or rather no road, during the last twelve years are almost incredible. The money wasted would have made the work properly several times over, I believe.

Page 335.

"Establish a horse fair."

This is pure delusion; the Affghauns now bring and always have brought as many horses as they had for sale.

These fairs appear to me silly things; their day is gone by. They were very useful once, in order that the traders might have that safety for goods and person in congregated numbers which they had not singly; but at present it seems to me that if we clear away all obstacles to

trade, and avoid *impeding commerce* in any way, leaving the traders alone to manage their affair themselves, we have done *all that can be done to advantage.*

Page 358.

" The increase of revenue from opium passes."

This opium story has been repeated over and over again so often, that even men of sense and ability almost believe it true. But the whole is a delusion, a very great mistake.

Be the profits on this opium business what they may, great or small, it is quite certain that they had and have no sort of connexion with the doings of Sir C. Napier in Sinde. We were in full possession of the country for military and commercial purposes long before. And before the " conquest," the Ameers had actually ceded to us their seaport of Kurrachee.

This business of the opium and the " opening of the Indus," *by reason of the conquest of Sinde*, are parts of an enormous delusion wherewith the public has been mystified.

The conquest of Sinde gave us nothing but the land revenue and *prize money*, the last being the true cause of the overthrow of the Ameers, who had agreed to all our demands.

Page 370.

" A dozen men make holes in the earth, melt the metal."

All this is erroneous and imaginary, cannon are not cast after this fashion, nor can artillery be formed and organized under a bush in the jungle. But it is certain

that we cannot hold the Punjaub, any more than the rest of India, by *brute force;* our rule must be the best and most righteous known to the people, or it cannot stand. Sir C. Napier never appears to have thought of reigning in men's minds, yet it is the only safe and secure reign after all.

Page 378.

"We do not use fortifications enough."

We want none! to be reduced to defend ourselves is tantamount to defeat in India.

We must assume the superiority, be worthy of it, and keep it.

Page 382.

"In a barbarous country, the law of arms."

This is a most grievous and pernicious error. In a barbarous country, the law of moral superiority—of a superior moral *nature*—should be supreme; and it is indeed all-powerful when fairly tried. How hold we India?

The experiment of Sir C. Napier's "law of arms" for a barbarous country was tried here on the frontier of Sinde for four years. Its result was robbery, murder, and all possible evil—fear, desolation, and horror.

The contrary method, commenced in 1847, has been attended with peace, quiet, abundance, and content, and a complete reform in the lives of all the robber tribes, both of Sinde and Cutchee.

(Vide my Notes to the "Administration of Sinde," and Appendix thereto.)

Page 385.

" No man travelled without a guard."

This is quite untrue. I travelled repeatedly, before 1842, all over the country, through the length and breadth of the province, without a guard, and can positively declare, from personal knowledge, that no country in the world could have been more free from robbers and thieves than was Sinde, under the Ameers, from 1838 to 1842.

No guard was ever required, and nothing was ever lost save occasionally when our own followers were the thieves. In spite of the excellent police, thefts and robberies are somewhat more common now, but they are still very few. The perfect safety of the traveller in Sinde under the Ameers, and his insecurity in our old province of Guzzerat, was often remarked on; during the years above mentioned, from 1838 to 1842, the contrast was striking.

Page 437.

" Had therefore augmented the Company's opium profit."

This is a complete delusion, vide Note to page 358.

THE SINDE BAGGAGE CORPS.

Established 1845 *and disbanded* 1851.

The Sinde Baggage Corps has at last been disbanded, and while the matter is still fresh in our recollection, it may be useful to record the facts and circumstances relative to this curious experiment.

The following observations on the subject are offered in the hope of laying the truth of the matter before the public while the subject is still remembered, and thereby saving the state from a repetition of the costly folly of bringing gentlemen from Europe to teach our old Indian Commissaries how to load a camel, and how to carry their kit.

The Sinde Baggage Corps was first proposed about the month of August, 1843, in consequence of an alarm at the number of camels said to be required to move the troops even in Sinde—where abundant supplies existed in every part of the province—where the inhabitants were always willing to sell those supplies—and where the enemy never attempted to prevent provisions reaching the army.

The first move in the matter was to assemble a special committee of three officers, supposed to be best acquainted with the subject in hand. Before this committee the ideas of the Governor of Sinde were laid, and it was directed to devise the best means for carrying them into practical effect.

The committee sat long, and evidently laboured much, for hundreds of returns of all kinds were called for from every department, regiment, and even company, in the army; there was nothing going on throughout the camp but weighing and measuring every article of kit carried by officers and men, or for their use, public or private; nothing escaped, from a tent to a toothbrush.

The labours of the committee were at last brought to a close, but the result never transpired, the proceedings were locked up,

and nothing was heard of them afterwards. Their nature or general tendency may, however, be shrewdly guessed at, *for the Baggage Corps was not mentioned again for nearly two years.*

During the *hill campaign* of 1845 the commissariat arrangements proved a failure, owing to a series of errors; operations were in consequence suspended ere they were well begun, and remained so for a month and more. (It appeared that it had even been forgotten that money was necessary to carry on war; and a day or two after the commencement of the "campaign" the discovery was suddenly made that both the military treasure-chest and the collector's treasury were empty.)

This failure was ascribed to the want of a Baggage Corps; and with a view to the prevention of such failures in future campaigns, the embodying of a Baggage Corps was ordered by the Government of India.

The existence of the Baggage Corps now commenced in good earnest: a committee was assembled to arrange the details; and the strength of the new corps was fixed at 1,800 camels and 1,800 private soldiers, with a due proportion of officers, European and Native, &c.

Some years afterwards the establishment of the corps was altered, its numbers reduced to 1,000 privates and 1,000 camels, and the whole arranged as appears in the Bombay code of regulations, from which the following number of men, &c., are taken.

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SINDE CAMEL BAGGAGE CORPS.

	Total of each.			Total.		
	Rs.	*a.*	*p.*	*Rs.*	*a.*	*p.*
1 Commandant - -	850	0	0	850	0	0
3 Division Commanders -	130	0	0	390	0	0
5 Sergeants - - -	50	0	0	250	0	0
6 Soobadars - - -	40	0	0	240	0	0
13 Jemadars - - -	30	0	0	390	0	0
19 Havildars - - -	20	0	0	380	0	0
60 Naiques - - -	15	0	0	900	0	0
1,000 Privates - - -	8	0	0	8,000	0	0
3 Nuggarchees -	10	0	0	30	0	0

STAFF.

	Total of each.			Total.		
	Rs.	*a.*	*p.*	*Rs.*	*a.*	*p.*
1 Native Adjutant - -	17	8	0 -	17	8	0
1 Havildar Major - -	10	0	0 -	10	0	0
9 Pay Orderlies - -	5	0	0 -	45	0	0
1 Quarter-Master Havildar -	14	0	0 -	14	0	0
1 Moonshee - - -	30	0	0 -	30	0	0
Office allowance - -	167	0	0 -	167	0	0
Stationery - - -	60	0	0 -	60	0	0
Office tentage - -	30	0	0 -	30	0	0

MEDICAL.

1 Assistant-Surgeon - -	450	0	0 -	450	0	0
1 First Hospital Assistant -	30	0	0 -	30	0	0
1 Second Hospital Assistant	25	0	0 -	25	0	0
3 Camel Doctors - -	20	0	0 -	60	0	0

ARTIFICERS.

3 Armourers - - -	15	0	0 -	45	0	0
3 Bellows Boys - -	5	0	0 -	15	0	0
3 Mochees - - -	15	0	0 -	45	0	0
10 Puckalees - - -	12	0	0 -	120	0	0
Allowance for Steel and Charcoal - -				21	0	0
Cost of 1,000 Camels at 80 rupees each, 80,000.						
Five per Cent. per annum on capital, per mensem - - - -				333	5	4
Loss by death, &c., of Camels, which last in work in the corps on the average about three years, per mensem -				2,222	3	6
Grain for 1,000 Camels, 6lbs. each a day, at 80 lbs. per rupee, per mensem -				2,250	0	0
Mussalas, Country Medicines, &c. at 4 annas per camel - - - -				250	0	0
Cost, wear and tear of Camels' Saddles, Ropes, &c. at 1 rupee each, per mensem				1,000	0	0
Cost of 1,079 Muskets or Fuzils, with 1,079 Bayonets, Belts, or Pouches, at per set 39 1 5 -	42,199	0	1			

	TOTAL.		
	Rs.	*a.*	*p.*
Five per Cent. per annum on capital -	175	13	3
Cost of Tent and Ammunition, Interest on Capital, and wear and tear, per mensem - - - - -	230	0	0
Total - - -	19,075	14	1
Cost of each Camel - - - -	19	1	2

Jameson's Code, p. 119, Art. 94.

About three hundred camels are required to move a regiment of native infantry, inclusive of tents, ammunition, and the private baggage of officers and men, but without any commissariat stores; and supposing but one-half of the European officers to be present, according to the scale laid down by the Bombay Regulations, p. 113, Art. 90, and according to the weights ordered by Sir Charles Napier to be carried by the camels of the Baggage Corps, 200 of these camels would be employed in the carriage of the private baggage of the officers and men. When the camels of the Baggage Corps are thus employed they are paid for by the men using them, at the rate of ten rupees each camel per mensem.

The camels only attached to regiments, and paid for during actual service, which for the period of the existence of the late Sinde Baggage Corps may have amounted on the average to one-fourth of the whole time.

The Baggage Corps existed from the middle of the year 1845 till the end of 1851, or six and a half years. Its total cost during that period amounted to 1,487,855 rupees per thousand camels.

The total amount received during that period as the hire of 1,000 camels, from officers and men amounts to 195,000 rupees.

The total loss to the State therefore on 1,000 camels of the Sinde Baggage Corps, employed in carrying the private baggage of the troops, amounts to 1,292,855 rupees, or nearly thirteen lacs of rupees in the excess of the cost of moving the troops under the old system on this one item alone.

Again, as respects the camels of the Baggage Corps employed

in carrying the tents, ammunition, and the public stores belonging to the troops.

The cost of 1,000 camels on the baggage corps system being as before 1,487,855 rupees.

The cost of hiring 1,000 camels by the commissariat department, when required for the movement of troops under the arrangement heretofore adopted in India, would amount during the same period to 12,000 rupees per mensem, according to the usual rate of 12 rupees per camel. This is the Bombay rate. That of Bengal, on service, is about 8 rupees. But these camels were accustomed to carry about double the loads allotted to those of the Baggage Corps. Their cost must, therefore, be reduced by one-half when compared to the others; they were also only engaged when required. Assuming this period to have been three months in the year, as before, and the total cost on the commissariat contract system of 1,000 camels during six and-a-half years employed in carrying the public stores of the regiments, amounts to 117,000 rupees. Total loss to the State on 1,000 camels so employed amounts to 1,370,855 rupees.

The men of the Baggage Corps were supposed to be soldiers as well as camel-men; so that on the line of march, in camp and while out grazing, no other baggage guard would ever be required. This was generally, though not always, the case on ordinary marches, through a friendly country, where a guard was only required as a matter of form; but when treasure or other valuables had to be transported, and whatever the nature of the loads in the field in an enemy's country, it was always found necessary to employ the soldiers of the line in guarding the camels, &c., as usual. Thus, no real advantage was in practice gained by the camel-men being considered as sepoys.

On the other hand, the attempt to make them soldiers seems to have spoiled them as camel men; for while the common camels of the country could, without ever being fed on grain, with ease carry a load of 400 lb. on the average, and the best of them very much more than this, the camels of the Baggage Corps could with difficulty carry the smallest weight allotted to them by the orders of the Governor of Sinde, namely, 240 lb. They also, from the ignorance and bad management of the sepoy camel-men, became so sickly, and died so fast, that anywhere but in a

country abounding in camels the corps could not have existed for six months. But in such a country, the facilities of hiring camels in any numbers when required is so great, that a Baggage Corps becomes there more than usually unnecessary.

The Baggage Corps, as has been shown, is exceedingly advantageous to the private convenience and comfort of the officers and men; the boon granted by its use is about equal to the grant of double batta to the troops while in the field; but the amount paid by the state for this boon is, as shown by the figures set forth before, something more than seven times the amount by which the troops benefit by the arrangement. Moreover, as respects the facility of moving troops, the Sinde Baggage Corps could only be of use in a friendly country abounding in supplies, inasmuch, as under any other circumstances, as large a commissariat establishment of cattle, &c., &c., must be entertained, as if the Baggage Corps did not exist, for the purpose of carrying food, &c., for man and beast; nay, a *larger* commissariat establishment must be maintained by reason of the Baggage Corps, because the sepoy camel-men, &c., of that corps must be fed and provided for like the real soldiers of the army. Extra carriage must also be provided for the conveyance of the tents, ammunition, and the officers' and men's baggage of the Baggage Corps itself, or, which amounts to the same thing, these must be carried on the camels of the Baggage Corps, and the amount of available carriage for the rest of the army be lessened by so much.

Again, the Baggage Corps is evidently useless, even in a friendly country, for the transport of battering trains or other heavy stores; for this, recourse must be had to the old commissariat arrangements, or to something equivalent to them.

It appears, then, that a corps on the model of the late Sinde Camel Baggage Corps could only be maintained in a country abounding in camels, in which these animals could be readily purchased or hired as wanted, or evidently under circumstances wherein such a corps must be very little required for the convenience of the troops, who could easily provide themselves with carriage without it.

Secondly:—That such a corps could only be maintained at a cost out of all reasonable proportion greater than the value of the benefits accruing from it.

Thirdly:—That under those circumstances wherein alone it becomes a matter of any real difficulty to move troops in India and the countries bordering on it, namely, when it becomes necessary to carry all the supplies for the use of the troops with the moving army itself, such a Baggage Corps becomes entirely useless, being unable to carry a month's supply of food even for itself. Under the old commissariat arrangements there was never more than one driver to five camels, each camel carrying about 5 cwt. The Camel Corps had more than a man to each camel, and that camel carried 240 lb.

Fourthly:—When the army is serving in an enemy's country, and it consequently becomes of the greatest advantage to reduce the "impedimenta" as much as possible, a Baggage Corps on the model of that lately disbanded, &c., tends only to increase, instead of to diminish, the necessary train. An officer even of ability, and though experienced in the armies of Europe, may well be excused for at first sight becoming alarmed at the train found necessary for moving troops in time of war in the East, and being dismayed at all the danger and disorder which apparently must accompany such a crowd of animals and followers; but it is soon perceived that the greatest evil in the matter exists in imagination and inexperience, and that the real difficulties have long ago been mastered, and the whole affair reduced to systematic rule by those to whom the subject is familiar.

The arrangements for supplying armies in the field in India, and conducting the enormous trains of beasts of burden which accompany them, have been brought to the greatest perfection by the commissariat department of Bengal. The details of the arrangements are well known to most old Indian officers who have served much in an enemy's country; the general results are familiar to all officers of local experience in India; and when these arrangements are properly understood by a general, they enable him to reduce to sufficient form, order, and regularity, that which at first appears an interminable, incongruous, and riotous mass of confusion. It is not, perhaps, necessary here to enter into the details of the gigantic arrangements of the Indian Commissariat Department. But it has been acknowledged as an axiom by the greatest generals who ever led armies in India, that the safety of an army or the success of a campaign depends at

least as much on the state of the "bazaar" of the army as on the goodness of the troops. The remarks of the Duke of Wellington on Colonel Monson's disastrous retreat are very instructive on this point. The Duke shows clearly that the whole of that serious misfortune was caused by the inefficiency of the colonel's bazaar and commissariat arrangements; and states, that he himself made it a point always to have in his camp a month's provisions for his whole force. The multitude of traders of all sorts, and the immense train of baggage animals which this implies, and which the Duke justly considered as essentially necessary to his safety and success, might have been considered by an inexperienced officer as ruinous to the army; but few would probably have had the boldness to propose as a remedy for the apparent evil an arrangement by which the number of men to be fed would be greatly multiplied and the means of transport greatly diminished. Yet such was the scheme not only proposed, but attempted to be carried into effect, under the title of the Sinde Camel Baggage Corps, to the amazement of all Indian officers of experience, and to the great delight of thoughtless young subalterns.

The proposing of such a scheme was merely ridiculous, but the practical experiment to test its merits was a more serious matter; for this experiment has cost the revenue of India more than 150,000*l.* sterling—a sum sufficient to have made excellent roads all over the province of Sinde; and, together with the large sums as foolishly wasted in making dams about Sukkur and Shikarpoor (which it was found necessary to destroy as soon as completed), would have sufficed probably for the construction of a railway from Kurrachee to the frontier desert.

The experiment of the Camel Baggage Corps, notwithstanding the enormous outlay lavished on it, and quite irrespective of the inadequacy of the return to the amount of capital expended, proved a complete failure. It was at once discovered that it was impossible to carry into full effect the original scheme, and, to move troops on real service, as many extra camels had to be provided as if the Camel Corps had not existed. The attempt to transport the stores and provisions of an army by any such arrangement as that of the Baggage Corps was at once, in effect, abandoned, and the Baggage Corps camels were employed solely

in conveyance of the tents, muskets, and ammunition in charge of regiments, and of the private baggage of the officers and men. For the carriage of the latter it had been hitherto the custom for the officers and men to make their own arrangements, and to supply themselves as they could, so that the Baggage Corps relieved them of considerable trouble and expense, and the scheme was in consequence considered by the parties who profited by it as excellent and praiseworthy.

This circumstance may go far to account for the astonishing fact of such a Baggage Corps having been continued in existence for six and a half years !

Having discussed the merits of this method of transporting the private baggage and tents of an army, let us now see if our Indian experience will enable us to propose a better plan.

First, let us observe, that for the transport of provisions and stores, park guns, ammunition (other than that in regimental charge), in short, for the carriage of at least nineteen-twentieths of the whole train accompanying an Indian army *in the field, nothing can be imagined more perfect than the system of the Bengal Commissariat* as it appeared with the first army of Affghanistan in 1839.

But still, however small a proportion it may be, as to the general train following an army in the field, the carriage of the regimental baggage, public and private, is, for many reasons, a matter of great importance.

Under the present system the march of regiments is sometimes considerably delayed for want of such carriage ; while our officers and sepoys, having everything done and provided for them by others, become helpless and unable to shift for themselves.

This is almost always the case with our regular army ; but let us take a hint from the despised irregulars, who march at once when ordered, without troubling collector or commissary.

The scheme then proposed, in place of the awfully expensive Baggage Corps, is as follows :—

Let the plan of paying batta in the field be wholly abolished. Let officers and soldiers of the native army receive one rate of pay under all circumstances. Let there be no allowances. Let this rate of pay be sufficient fairly to meet actual wants, which can

easily be calculated, and then insist on every officer and man being at all times, and in all places, provided with a proper description of carriage to enable all to move anywhere at once at a moment's warning.

Let the quarter-master of each regiment have a contract for the carriage of tents, ammunition, &c., and hold commanding officers strictly responsible that everything is always kept in an efficient state for immediate service.

This is no fanciful scheme; it is done to our hand; in all good Silidar Corps it has been long proved on a large scale, and with admirable success.

The indirect benefits of such a system would be nearly as great as those more directly accruing from it.

The sepoys, instead of being pipe-clayed automatons, would become comparatively clever and sensible men, able to provide themselves with whatever might be necessary, without giving the slightest annoyance to the people of the country, with whom they would necessarily take care to be on the best terms.

There would also be in this system the best possible check on men carrying too much baggage. A sepoy, who had to keep himself provided with proper carriage at his own expense, would very soon discover what articles were necessary to be carried; and would assuredly carry none which were useless or superfluous.

The men might be a little awkward at first, from not being accustomed to such work, but would very soon master every difficulty.

If more leisure time were required for the proper performance of their new duties, abolish pipe-clay, give the men black belts, and at least one hour more a day would be at their disposal. The abominations of this pipe-clay, of leather stocks, of chacos, and of knapsacks for soldiers in India, are unspeakable; such things are a disgrace to the intelligence of the age. The wisdom of using them in the army resembles that of a manufacturer who should tie up the limbs or disable the right arms of his artificers in the hope of improving their handiwork. It is difficult to write with patience on such absurdities; therefore, I leave this subject to others, and conclude with expressing the hope that it may be taken up by more able hands than mine.

NOTE.

It would appear, from the text of General Sir W. Napier's book, that the frontier was quite quiet after the hill campaign of 1845; and Major Jacob's proceedings and arrangements, conducted on totally different principles to those previously adopted by Sir C. Napier's orders, are not even alluded to!

Major Jacob's name is not even mentioned in connexion with the frontier affairs of 1847.

Yet it is certain that the utmost discord and misery prevailed throughout the border, during the years 1843, 1844, 1845, and 1846.

Our own people were as bad as the Boogtees; and Durrya Khan and his Jekranees, placed by Sir C. Napier, at Janadeyrah, plundered and murdered their neighbours just as they had done when living at Poolajee and Chuttur, before Sir C. Napier's hill campaigns.

Nothing was done to prevent this (Sir W. Napier even asserts that it was Sir C.'s "profound policy" to encourage it) until the arrival of the Sinde Irregular Horse, under my command, on the frontier, in January, 1847.

When the existing state of affairs was brought by me to the notice of Sir C. Napier, he expressed the greatest surprise, though Sir W. Napier now asserts that he encouraged these disorderly proceedings as a part of a profound policy! Be this as it may, it is certain that my proceedings on this frontier were conducted on totally different principles, and my measures carried out in a totally different manner from anything which has been known or heard of on this frontier since 1842; and that the consequence of this change of principles and proceedings has been the entire pacification of the country, with the establishment of peace, quiet, and safety for life and property throughout the land.

All this is studiously concealed by Sir W. Napier, but will be very apparent from the letters annexed to these Notes.

I have many other letters, &c., in proof of what I have asserted, namely, that Sir C. Napier entirely failed in his arrangements for quieting and guarding the Sinde frontier, and that all his efforts only made bad worse, until he placed me in command of this frontier in January, 1847, and I proceeded entirely to put a stop to the practice of private warfare, bearing of arms, &c., by our own people on the border (which practice, Sir C. Napier had *theretofore encouraged*), and to make the various other arrangements, as shown in these papers; which arrangements and principles were directly opposed to those which had been made and acted on by Sir C. Napier, as shown in his brother's book, but which have proved as entirely successful as those of Sir C. Napier were unsuccessful. Time has now shown the truth of my views, as set forth in my official letters in 1847. The country on both sides of the border is profoundly quiet—there is everywhere perfect safety for person and property; deserted villages have been reoccupied; old canals reopened, and new ones dug. A great part of the desert has been brought under rich cultivation, and the population on our side of the border more than doubled.

When we arrived at Khanghur, in 1847, there was one Buniah's shop there; and the village consisted of five miserable huts, containing about twenty men, women, and children. I was told by the officer, who preceded me in the command of the frontier, that I should find difficulty in procuring water and forage for more than one squadron at Khanghur; and on our arrival there, I found the cavalry detachment, then occupying the post, *locked up* in a strong fort.

There is now, where Khanghur was, the flourishing town of Jacobabad, containing some *ten thousand inhabitants.*

The fort "Khanghur," I have entirely destroyed.

There are water and supplies of all sorts, in and about the place, sufficient for an army; and there is a vast, busy, and flourishing bazaar, containing some 500 shops. All this has been brought about by stopping private warfare, and by protecting the people, but not allowing them to bear arms. In a word, by acting on principles exactly contrary to those on which Sir C. Napier acted, and which constituted what Sir W. Napier calls his "*profound policy*," but which Sir C. Napier himself writes to me at the time, he acted "like an ass" in permitting.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

SPEECH

OF

JOHN POLLARD WILLOUGHBY, ESQ.,

(M.P. FOR LEOMINSTER,)

ON THE MOTION OF VISCOUNT PALMERSTON FOR LEAVE TO BRING IN A BILL FOR THE BETTER

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS,

ON THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 18TH, 1858.

EXTRACTED FROM

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SPEECH.

Mr. WILLOUGHBY said, he felt very forcibly his incompetence to do justice to this important subject, and in rising to address the House he was still further embarrassed by finding himself in reluctant opposition to the right hon. Gentleman (Sir C. Wood) who had just sat down. The fact was that, in India, almost all the business of the Government is conducted in writing, and is made matter of record. To this great check he attributed much of the acknowledged purity of intention and beneficence in act, which characterizes the Administration of India. Those who had served in India were in consequence unaccustomed to take part in the debates of public assemblies, more especially of an assembly like that he had now the honour to address. They could seldom make speeches, though they were accustomed to write "Minutes;" and, for himself, he must say that he never rose in that House without feeling that he required their indulgence, and never more so than on the present occasion. Rising so late in the debate, he could not expect to be able to import into it much of originality or novelty, as most of the facts and arguments which he might have employed had been anticipated by preceding speakers. The

first remark he would make was, that he was not wedded to any particular system, or to a name. He could even be content to see the East India Company depart, with all its glorious associations, and all its successive generations of able servants, civil and military, provided a substitute was found from which we might reasonably expect better fruits. Most cordially did he concur in the concluding remark of his right hon. friend the First Lord of the Admiralty, that this was a question into which party politics and party spirit ought not to intrude; and it was on that very account, and because he thought in his heart that this Bill, if adopted, would ultimately destroy the freedom and exemption from the effects of political strife, secured by the existing system of administering the affairs of India, that he gave it his decided opposition. He hoped they would permit him for a moment to recal their attention to the real objects of this debate. They were about to legislate for the most magnificent dependency of the British Crown—an empire in itself, not a colony—"the creation of many minds and many ages;" the value of which could hardly be overrated, and which he had never heard doubted till the other evening in the speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. He was inclined to prefer to the view taken by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the words of the hon. and learned member for Sheffield, that "if we should lose India, we should lose the world." They were about to legislate for an empire (he took his statistics from a Parliamentary Return recently published) with a territory the area of which was computed at 1,456,322 square miles—

larger, in fact, than France, Austria, and Prussia put together; inhabited, according to the latest accounts, by 180,367,148 souls, not of one race, but of many races, all aliens in blood, aliens in language, religion, customs, and manners, not only from ourselves, but from one another; yielding in 1855 a gross and, before this unhappy mutiny broke out, he believed, an improving revenue of £30,817,528, the value of whose exports and imports amounted to £34,965,182, a moiety of which as nearly as possible, or £17,490,587, was exported to, or imported from, the United Kingdom, a trade which, exclusive of the Native craft engaged in the coasting trade, occupied 25,325 vessels of 3,252,256 tons, in which were included 4,728 British vessels of 1,822,157 tons; and burdened only with a debt of not more than two years' revenue. Now, by what means and by what agency was this magnificent empire raised? Notwithstanding the high authority of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, he presumed to assert that that empire was created by the East India Company, and, as was correctly stated in their petition, without the cost of one farthing to the British Exchequer. It was true the Company were assisted by the troops and fleets of England; but let it be remembered that every farthing of the expense was defrayed from the revenues of India; aye, and that, on various occasions in Indian history, the resources of the East India Company were applied for Imperial purposes alone—as, for example, in Egypt, Java, the Mauritius, China, and Persia, and in Affghanistan too, where an expensive war was carried on,

not so much for Indian, as for Imperial purposes. Then let them not touch this noble fabric with rude hands, or without careful and deliberate consideration, preceded by patient and anxious enquiry; for let them remember, that if they once destroyed the power of the East India Company, it never could be resuscitated. His first objection to the Bill had been anticipated by preceding speakers, and more especially by the hon. Member for Huntingdon (Mr. T. Baring), in his eloquent and able speech on Friday last—namely, that it was inopportune in point of time. He believed in his conscience that the most perfect Bill that could be framed at this time, involving changes, such as were introduced into the Bill before the House, would be productive of pernicious consequences. Surely it was not wise, in a time like the present, of great peril abroad and excitement at home, to introduce a measure which they could not hope would receive that calm and dispassionate consideration which should always be given to Indian questions. Surely it was not the part of wisdom, to hang the sword of Damocles over the authorities of India and in England, at a moment like the present, when the sceptre of authority in India seemed passing from our grasp, when all their thoughts, and all their energies should be applied to the preservation and retention of our power in that empire. Disguise it as you may, the Bill if passed will effect a radical change in the constitution of the Government of India, both at home and abroad. The East India Company had always been just, liberal, and generous to their servants; and could Her Majesty's Government think those ser-

vants would be indifferent to the extinction of that authority to which they had hitherto looked up as the guardian of their rights and privileges, and more especially the officers of the Company's army? There was not a more devotedly loyal body of Her Majesty's subjects than the servants of the East India Company; but that was not incompatible or inconsistent with a feeling of regret at the severance of the ties that had so long subsisted between them and the East India Company. His hon. and gallant friend the Member for Reigate (Sir H. Rawlinson) had taken upon himself to represent the wishes of the Company's servants. He (Mr. Willoughby) did not pretend to represent them himself, but his opportunities of learning their feelings were at least as great as those of his hon. and gallant friend, the best part of whose honourable career had been spent in Persia, Turkey, and Affghanistan; and he could truly say that every servant of the Company he had met, whether civil or military, had expressed a feeling of dismay at the proposed change. The Chancellor of the Exchequer had drawn no very flattering picture of the early history of the East India Company; but that had really nothing to do with the present question. When the right hon. gentleman observed that the weakness of a vessel at sea was best tested in a storm, he might have added that that was not a very appropriate time to throw the captain and the pilot overboard. Another objection to this measure, equally strong, was the effect that it would produce on the Natives of India. The Natives of India were not, as some people supposed, either children

or savages. They were an acute, intelligent, and sensitive people, and, above all, apprehensive of change. He was not aware that any desire for change had been expressed by the Natives of India. In fact, the only petition for a change that he had heard of, came from a section of the Anglo-Indian community at Calcutta, and was caused by Lord Canning and his Council having refused to adopt a policy of indiscriminate vengeance, which, if adopted, would have converted this military revolt into a national revolt. The natives of India knew, that so recently as 1853 both Houses of Parliament, after a full and careful enquiry, reported favourably of the then existing system of administering the affairs of India, and that with a few important modifications (which now turn out to be the thin end of the wedge) that system was continued under a Bill brought in by the right hon. Sir C. Wood, Lord John Russell, and the right hon. Sir James Graham. They knew also, that Her Majesty, on the 20th August, 1853, in a speech from the Throne, expressed her persuasion "that it would prove to have been wisely framed, and that it was calculated to promote the improvement and welfare of her Eastern dominions." They knew that the Act of 1853 had not had a fair trial, and, in fact, had scarcely been put into operation. They would, at the same time, say, that at no former period of the Company's Raj was so much vigour and activity exhibited in promoting the moral and physical improvement of the people of India, or in taking care of their interests, when these efforts were unhappily arrested by this calamitous military revolt. When

to this they added, that the Government of 1853, was partly composed of the same elements as in 1858, they would naturally ask why what was considered wisdom in 1853, should be considered folly in 1858? They would, notwithstanding all the fine speeches and assurances, that no fault or delinquency is charged against the East India Company, couple together the existence of the mutiny, and the extinction of the authority of the East India Company, and guided by the public press, by orations from the pulpit and the platform, and by other indications—they would imbibe the impression, however erroneous, that they were to be the subjects of a change of policy—of a change of that policy which had been pursued by eminent men like Malcolm, Elphinstone, and Munro—that an intention existed of introducing a system antagonistic to all their most cherished privileges and feelings; and he warned the House that if once such an impression obtained hold of the native mind, the effect would be more disastrous than the greased cartridges had been on the mind of the Sepoys; for it did not matter much whether a belief was true or false, provided it was seriously entertained. It was said the double Government was slow, cumbrous, anomalous, and irresponsible. The hon. Member for Reigate (Sir H. Rawlinson) had given an amusing account of the process which a despatch concocted in Leadenhall Street underwent before it was finally sent out to India; but his picture was greatly overdrawn, and by enumerating the stages which a despatch might go through, rather than those it did go through ordinarily,

he had stated the exception and not the general rule. On the other hand, the Vice President of the Board of Trade sought to show that all the business of India was transacted in Cannon Row; but any gentleman practically acquainted with the duties devolving on the Court of Directors on the one hand, and on the President of the Board of Control on the other, would know how exaggerated and erroneous such a statement was, the initiative, save in questions relating to peace and war, being vested in the Court. Again, the Vice-President of the Board of Trade would lead the House to suppose that it was the duty of the "Chairs" to go up weekly to Cannon Row and obtain the instructions of the Board of Control. Whatever might have been the custom when the right hon. Gentleman held office at the Board of Control, he (Mr. Willoughby) could only say that the weekly visit of the "Chairs" had for its object to discuss matters of importance and to smooth over difficulties; but, as for all the business of India, and the correspondence with India, with all the voluminous "Collections" appertaining thereto, being disposed of by the Board of Control, it was obviously impossible. With regard to the alleged anomaly, he (Mr. Willoughby) admitted the anomaly; but, was that a reason for abolishing a long-established system like the Government of India? Is the anomaly unattended with no compensating advantages? Are the checks it imposes against rash innovations, crude legislation, precipitant disregard of the rights and privileges of the Natives of India; and the security it affords for a careful consideration of the

numerous appeals received from all classes in India, and on other points affecting the welfare of India, to be regarded as nothing? True, it is an anomaly; but, is it the only existing anomaly? Was not our own glorious constitution itself, with its triple Government, under which we enjoyed all our liberty, an anomaly? Was not our representative system an anomaly? What was one of our most cherished institutions—trial by jury—but an anomaly, seeing that one juryman might, by superior physical endurance, hold the remaining eleven in check from coming to a decision? What else were the Horse Guards and the War Office? Above all, was not the very possession of India itself the greatest anomaly? The fact was, the duty of the Home Government was more deliberative than executive, and India, to be governed well, must be governed *in* India. For that end it was necessary to intrust vast and almost despotic powers to the hands of the Governor-General, and the local authorities in India acting under him. But, in consequence of that necessity, there was the greater necessity for their acts and proceedings being scrutinised and revised by some intermediate and independent body, not in a spirit of captious objection, but of liberal and generous consideration, and a due appreciation of all the difficulties with which they had to contend. He maintained that that duty had been hitherto most efficiently performed by the East India Company, under the control and authority, of course, in the last resort of the Board of Control, always excepting, that the Court of Directors had nothing

to do with the proceedings of the Secret Committee. On questions of peace and war conducted in the Secret Department, the interference of the Court is interdicted by *law*, and therefore as regards these they are free from responsibility. With regard to the alleged irresponsibility under the present system, he had been anticipated in replying to that charge by the hon. and learned Member for Enniskillen (Mr. Whiteside), who, with that view, quoted a very lucid passage from the speech of the First Lord of the Admiralty, when introducing the bill of 1853, which he (Mr. Willoughby) need not again trouble the House by reading.* But it was now said, that greater

* The following is the passage from Sir C. Wood's speech here referred to:—

"The home business of the Government of India may be divided into two parts. One comprises the political relations of the Government of India with other states, and questions of peace and war. These questions are decided not by the Court of Directors, but by the Government of this country, and their orders are sent through the Secret Committee of the India House; and for these decisions, not the Court of Directors, but the Government of this country, is entirely and altogether responsible. Upon that point there can be no question as to divided responsibility, or anything of the kind. The Secret Committee merely acts as an organ to convey to India the directions sent from the Board of Control, and the President of the Board of Control is in that respect only the organ of the general Government." Alluding to Lord Broughton's declaration, that he alone was responsible for the Affghan war, Sir C. Wood observes:—"There is no mistake, no concealment about the matter, and it is nonsense to talk of the irresponsible power of the President of the Board of Control, because the Government of this country is as responsible for war in India as it is responsible for war in Europe, Africa, or America."

"The other great branch of the Government is what is called the ordinary business of the administration of India, and in that the Directors take a very considerable and important part. Every despatch is addressed to them; all questions are considered by them in the first instance; and they have the initiative on every question. Grants of money cannot originate in any way with the Board of Control, and in the exercise of patronage, except in some of the higher appointments, the Directors are entirely uncontrolled. In the greater portion of their business, however, they are liable to the check and supervision of the Board of Control. A draft of every despatch

responsibility would be exacted under the new form of Government proposed—namely, a Minister of the Crown, assisted by a Council appointed by the Crown, and subjected to the control of Parliament. He was far from desiring to give any—the least—offence to the House, but he thought, with all due deference, that that House would not, could not, and ought not, to attempt to exercise the control over the proceedings connected with the government of India which was now exercised by the East India Company. They might depend upon it that, as soon as the present excitement subsided, that House, generally speaking, would relapse into the same indifference which it almost invariably showed with regard to questions relating to India. When the present crisis passed away, India would again become the "dinner-bell" of the House; for, as Lord Macaulay once truly said, a turnpike Bill, or a riot in Covent Garden, always

is sent up to the President of the Board of Control, is considered and revised by him, is sent back to them; is submitted to a Committee at the India House, and then to the Court, and is then carefully revised; and it is only just to the Directors that I should say, as far as my experience goes, I have reason to know that the most careful attention has been given by them to every important despatch. It is quite true that the President of the Board of Control has the power of overruling, in the last resort, the Court of Directors. I therefore fully admit I am responsible to this House for any acts in the administration of India, just as the Secretary of State for the Colonies is responsible for the acts of administration connected with his department. Honourable gentlemen seem to treat this question in a very singular manner; for at one time we are told it is impossible to say that the Court of Directors can be responsible, and at another time it is impossible to say they are not responsible; and, again, that they cannot find out who are responsible for the Government of India. The simple state of the case is, that the President of the Board of Control is the person responsible to Parliament for the Government of India. But this is nothing new; Lord Grenville stated the same fact in 1813."—*Hansard's Parliamentary Debates*, Vol. V., 1853, p. 1137.

commanded more attention in Parliament than the most important question connected with India. His hon. friend, the Member for Devonport (Sir E. Perry) had already anticipated that spirit of indifference, for, in the speech he addressed to the House on the question under discussion, he urged them to strike now, and so accomplish the object they had in view, "for it was only in times of emergency that the time of Parliament and the attention of the country could be directed to Indian questions." Then he (Mr. Willoughby) said the House could not exercise the control which the Government expected it would do. He did not mean, of course, that a great question connected with India, exciting general interest, might not command the attention of the House, and be fairly and deliberately debated. He alluded to the questions which ordinarily came under discussion before the Court of Directors. In the first place, the Members of the House, generally speaking, did not possess the necessary information; secondly, it could not spare time to do so from the consideration of domestic politics and concerns of this country; and for those reasons they ought not to make the attempt. The fact was, that, according to his small experience, responsibility to Parliament simply meant, that when a minister was strong, and backed by a strong party, he was unaccountable; when weak, he was assailed with party violence, and often compelled to do what was wrong, or blamed for doing what was right. But, in the words of the historian:—

"It was acknowledged that it was of vital importance to the prosperity and preservation of India that it should be subjected to an intermediate governing body, unconnected with party politics or Parliamentary divisions, and independent of the changes of Ministry in England; one that should look to the government of India as its sole interest and obligation, and should not be liable to be diverted from its one great duty by the manifold objects which, whether of European or purely British origin, whether of great or trivial magnitude, must ever render Indian interests of secondary weight with a British Administration."*

It was true that in some cases this barrier against party influences and Parliamentary conflicts—this breakwater—had been broken through, to the discredit of the nation; but these exceptions undeniably proved the value of the check thus wisely interposed by the wisdom of preceding Parliaments. He might mention as instances of that, the celebrated case of the Lucknow bankers, and that of the Nozid Zemeendar, of which, in allusion to the Parliamentary influence successfully exerted, Lord Brougham observed,—

"Unless some such agency was at work, nothing could be found to sanction the extraordinary interference of the Legislature to pass an Act in favour of a claim contaminated in its origin and illegal in its prosecution."

Another case which occurred in 1832, was that of Mr. Hutchinson, an officer of the Company, who, contrary to the regulations of the service, had engaged in pecuniary transactions with the Rajah of Travancore. He presented a Bill to that House; it passed through several stages, but was ultimately thrown out through the opposition of the Court of Directors, aided by the transcendent ability of Mr. Macaulay, then Secretary to the Board of Control. So with the case of the so-called Nawab of Surat. He did not intend to go into the merits of that case; but when it was discussed in that House, a tolerably large

* Wilson's British India, vol. 3, p. 506.

attendance was obtained through means of an active canvass, or of the process designated in America by the term "lobbying," although, a few days afterwards, the President of the Board of Control delivered his budget to nearly empty benches. So much importance attached to this point, that he must be permitted to read the evidence of a very competent authority, Sir Charles Trevelyan. Sir Charles was one of the ablest officers of Her Majesty's Government, but one whom India claimed as her own, because it was there that he had received his first lessons in statesmanship, and who therefore looked upon the question from an Indian as well as an English point of view. The following was the evidence he gave before the India Committee of 1853, with reference to the Court of Directors as the chief Governing body for India, in contrast to the Home Government:—

"It is most essential that the governing body in India and England shall not be subject to party influences. This object also has been satisfactorily attained:—there is an entire absence of party feeling in India; everything is decided on its own merits. Whatever faults the Court of Proprietors may have, it has furnished an independent basis for the Government of India. Deriving their power from a separate source, the Directors have not been influenced by political changes. They are taken from the best and most substantial portion of the middle class; they have the English element without any objectionable admixture of English party spirit. It is not the practice for them to take office under the Queen's Government; it is eminently a Government of the middle classes, and of the best portion of them. Their independence, also, in a secondary degree, rests upon their local position in the City of London, instead of their being at Westminster, and also upon their number being considerable. I consider that there would be very great danger in putting the Government of India immediately under the Government of England."

He then designated as the fatal detriment of the House of Commons—

"The evil principle which is known under many forms and names, party-patronage, favouritism, jobbing."

He thus adverted to the action of this evil principle :—

"The Executive Government depends for its political existence and success upon the House of Commons. Each individual Member of the House of Commons depends for political existence and success upon his constituents. Even in ordinary times the Executive Government and individual Members of Parliament find it difficult to refuse favours which it is in their power to grant, however strong the reasons may be against granting them; and when parties are evenly balanced, or great questions have to be carried, or a Government has to be maintained in power, or an Opposition has to be lifted into place, things are done in this country, in the face of our active public opinion, and free press, and freedom of exposure in Parliament, which show how much greater the evil would be if India were brought within the direct action of our party politics."

He had several other great authorities on the same subject, but he thought that would be quite sufficient. It was true that the noble Lord at the head of the Government had spoken lightly of these great dangers in introducing his measure, but he (Mr. Willoughby) confessed he was disposed to agree with the opinion expressed by one of the ablest of the servants of the Company, the late Sir Charles Metcalfe, who, though an "old Indian," one of that class which the hon. and learned member for Sheffield (Mr. Roebuck) considered perfectly incompetent to have any share in administering the affairs of India, had stated it to be his conviction that if ever our empire in the East received its death blow it would be in the House of Commons. Upon the next subject to which he would take the liberty of referring, that of patronage, he was very sensitive, perhaps Utopian. He had always been of opinion that no greater trust could be confided to man, or one involving more responsibilities, than that of selecting fit and proper persons to fill offices of high trust and responsibility. That trust, in his (Mr. Willoughby's) opinion, is not sufficiently fulfilled by

selecting one who is merely qualified; but the most competent man available should be selected. That opinion, no doubt, had been imbibed in India, where patronage was, for the most part, exercised for the good of the public service alone. It was his good fortune about twenty years ago to be associated in high official position in India with one of the best, ablest, and most conscientious men he ever met with—the late Sir Robert Grant. Upon one occasion he was consulted by Sir Robert regarding an appointment of great importance. He sent to the Governor a list of the names of those whom he (Mr. Willoughby) thought had any pretensions to the appointment, and in giving his opinion in favour of one, he enclosed an extract on patronage from a book called "The Original," written by a well-known police magistrate in this metropolis. He marked the passage then, and little thought at that time he should ever have occasion to use it in the House of Commons. In the chapter, entitled "Preferment in Places," Mr. Walker said:—

"I have often wondered, both in reading history and in observing my own times, that there are so few examples of the worthy employment of patronage. It might be supposed the glory and influence that would result from it to men in high place would have made that the rule which unfortunately for mankind is but the exception. It is marvellous that the feeling of responsibility, that the consciousness of the destiny of millions being in their hands, that the love of the approbation of the wise and good, do not outweigh in the minds of Kings and Ministers all lesser considerations. Nothing would so effectually excite honourable ambition as the conviction that the road to preferment lay open to merit alone, and that every place would be bestowed, without other consideration, upon the person most fitted to fill it. All patronage is a trust; and bestowing preferment unworthily is a violation of a trust, and the greater the unworthiness the greater the violation. It is not enough to prefer those who are fit; the choice should fall upon the most fit. It is not enough to choose from those who apply; the most meritorious should be sought out, and the preferment

offered to them, not as matter of favour and obligation, but as something required to be accepted from a sense of public duty.

"It is true these are not the doctrines generally received; if they were patronage would not so openly be made an instrument for creating undue influence or upholding party, nor would the public service be so often sacrificed for the sake of making provision for relations, friends, and dependents—a system which, strange to say, has many advocates amongst those who think rightly on other points. In my opinion, there is nothing more deserving of reprobation in public men than abuse of patronage, because I think there is nothing more detrimental to the public welfare. It not only discourages existing merit, but it encourages importunity, intrigue, servility, profligacy of principle, and many other base qualities which spread their pestiferous influences over society. It enables men in power to maintain themselves by other supports than that of public opinion, and surrounds them by a phalanx of hangers-on who effectually deter the meritorious from making their approach."

He had read that passage, in order to state that, according to his own experience, the patronage of India was distributed upon the principles laid down by Mr. Walker to a greater extent than in any quarter of the globe. He did not pretend to say that interest and influence had not sometimes their weight in India, as everywhere else, nor did he wish to be understood as referring to the ordinary routine appointments in the service, which must pass to a class of persons specially trained up to fill them; but his remarks were applicable, in all their force, to what were known as "selected appointments," large in number, and open both to civil and military officers. These appointments involved the greatest responsibility: and in the exploits of the noble men who had lately brought themselves under the public notice, we were reaping the fruits of the system by which the most important offices in India were given to those best qualified to fill them. He could venture to assert that, in these cases, merit and qualification for the most part secured the appoint-

ment; and in this manner some of the most distinguished servants of the East India Company obtained their first introduction into the public service. A very salutary check existed even with respect to the ordinary appointments. The Governor, of course, had the initiative, and may even overrule his Council; the latter, however, have the power, on good and sufficient grounds, to object, and finally to record their dissent—the proceedings in such cases being reported to the Home authorities, which constituted another great check against the abuse of patronage. He had frequently exercised this privilege, sometimes on merits, but oftener on the ground of infraction of some rule or regulation—such, for instance, as not having passed in the languages, withdrawing more than the prescribed number of officers from the same regiment. The Governor was checked by his Council; and it was one of the objections of the present Bill that it proposed to do away with that arrangement. An "old Indian" like himself could not be expected to look favourably upon a measure which substituted for the existing system the one which prevailed in this country. Here each Government distributed its patronage among its own friends and supporters. Under a Whig Administration the stream flowed in a Whig direction, and under a Conservative Government in a Conservative direction. Nor was the apprehended evil a light one. It was a great mistake to suppose that the patronage involved in the proposed change amounted to only a few cadetships. There was, besides, naval, legal, educational, and other patronage, and it was elicited

in the course of the evidence taken before the Committee of 1853, that those appointments were at present made in an unobjectionable manner. The initiative devolved upon the Chairman for the time being, but his nominations must be confirmed—they were often canvassed and sometimes put aside—by the Court of Directors.* He understood it to be the intention of the Government to keep the Native army distinct, but to amalgamate the Company's European troops with the Royal forces. He

* The following is extracted from the evidence obtained by the Lord's and Common's Committees in 1853, respecting the patronage then vested in the Court of Directors of the East India Company:—

The Court has the absolute right of making the first appointments in all cases to the various services, civil, military, medical, and naval. The number of appointments for the year being ascertained, is divided into twenty-eight parts; two of these go to the Chairman, two to the Deputy-Chairman, one to each of the other twenty-two Directors actually in office (six being out by rotation), and two to the President of the Indian Board. Chaplains also are appointed by the Court, the nominations being taken in rotation. The Court has also the power of appointing general officers on the staff for the Company's Army, the Superintendent of the Indian Navy, the Master Attendant in Bengal and at Madras, and volunteers for the pilot service; Assay Masters for the Mint; the Law Officers of the Government at each of the Presidencies, and the Members of Council, as well that of India, as those of Madras and Bombay, with the exception of the fourth or legislative Member of the Council of India, whose appointment is subject to the approbation of the Crown. Beyond these, the Court is precluded from interfering with appointments in India, except in cases in which the Board concurring, it may be deemed necessary. If injustice be done in India, an appeal to the Court is open to the aggrieved. To the appointments above-mentioned the Chairman of the day nominates, subject to the confirmation of the Court, and his recommendation is occasionally overruled. In case of the dismissal of any officer by the Indian Government, the Court may, with the concurrence of the Board, reinstate him, and this power is occasionally, but not frequently, exercised. Subject to the approval of the Crown, the Court has further the power of appointing the Governor-General, the Governor of the subordinate Presidencies, and the Commanders-in-Chief. Finally, the Court has the power of recalling or removing any of the officers or servants of the Company, unless in a few exceptional cases appointed by the Crown, on default of the Court, and this power is absolute and uncontrolled.

thought that would be found a more difficult arrangement than seemed to be anticipated. This, however, would at once transfer to the Horse Guards. 17,596 men, and 1,531 officers—a very serious matter as regarded the distribution of patronage. But his greatest apprehension related to the patronage in India, a matter which had been touched upon by the hon. and gallant Member for Aberdeen (Colonel Sykes). The Government, no doubt, believed the Bill to be a good measure, and it would be unfair to them to suppose that it was not introduced by them under that supposition. If it was in their power, he believed they would be glad to be relieved of the patronage question altogether; but that was impossible. It was the duty of a wise Parliament to foresee and to guard against possible danger. Suppose the case of a weak Minister, who had not the power or the strength to resist, or, what would be worse, an unscrupulous Minister, who was courageous enough to appropriate, and avail himself of the vast power conferred by Indian patronage? It is not exaggeration to say, that giving to the Imperial Minister the Indian patronage would enable him to convert the Treasury bench into a freehold.* Just let the House consider how the Bill proposed prepares and paves the way for such a Minister. The Minister is to appoint the Governor-General and

* "My own opinion is, that nothing would be more dangerous than to give the Crown the whole control of the thousands upon thousands of the population in that part of the British dominions."—Speech of Lord John Russell, India Debate, 1853.

the Governors of Presidencies; and the Governor-General and the Governors are to appoint their own Councils. And then what check would there be in such a case? The check at present was, that in case of any wrong appointment, or any deviation from the regulations, it very rarely escapes the scrutinizing eyes of the Court of Directors, and, although detection might be late, it was certain to be brought under their notice, when often the objectionable act was undone, or, if not, a censure was passed which prevented a repetition of it. The Bill interposed no check at all. He was bold enough to say that it would not be in the power of Parliament to apply any check. The hon. and gallant Member had also anticipated him on another point—he alluded to the amount of patronage to be disposed of. Let it not be supposed that there was not a wide field open for a vast amount of patronage. There were the whole covenanted and military services, all the staff appointments, most of which were by selection: but, above all, to keep within the mark, there were hundreds—his hon. Friend had said many thousands—in which latter calculation were included all the subordinate appointments held by Natives, and in saying many hundreds, he (Mr. Willoughby) only included those that were held, or likely to be held, by Europeans—hundreds of appointments that would come within the range of the patronage of the British Government. There were the deputy magistrates, the deputy

police magistrates, and magistrates at the different Presidencies, the survey officers, the legal officers, and an immense number of miscellaneous appointments too numerous to recapitulate. It might be said, in reply to this, that even under the present system the Government influence was felt in regard to appointments in India. In the course of a long official career in India he had known instances of Downing Street influence in India, but they were rare, and the check of the Court of Directors was useful in resisting them; and even supposing there was a desire in a Minister to ask the Governor-General to serve his friends, under existing checks it would be detected and disapproved of. Under the present system the Governor-General was, to all intents and purposes, a servant of the East India Company. He (Mr. Willoughby) had the misfortune to differ from the hon. and gallant Member for Reigate (Sir H. Rawlinson), upon many points, but there were some in which he entirely concurred. The hon. and gallant Gentleman had lately had to undergo the ordeal of an electioneering canvass, in the course of which he had been called upon to state to his constituents his opinions upon different matters. In one of those addresses the hon. and gallant Member referred to the danger of Parliamentary action upon the welfare of India, although it appeared now, that notwithstanding his opinions upon that point, he intended to support the Government measure. The hon. and gallant Member, in

another of his addresses to his present constituents, said—

"The object of the Directors was to improve India for the benefit of England, and if that object could be better obtained by the Crown, then, in God's name, let the Crown have it."

To which he (Mr. Willoughby) cried Amen! If he thought that the transfer of the Government to the Crown would benefit India, he would say, abolish the Court of Directors at once—

"But he doubted very much if the people of England had as yet begun to realize the importance of the step which was about to be proposed. He doubted if the taxpayers of England were aware that in taking that liability upon them they took upon themselves the liability of £100,000,000 sterling. There would be a difficulty, too, in transferring East Indian establishments to the Crown, because they were on a different system. But the great danger was from the increase it would give to the power of the Crown, a point upon which Englishmen were ever most jealous. When the Bill was proposed in the last century it was opposed entirely on the consideration that it was of the utmost danger to place an overwhelming influence in the hands of the Crown. He was quite ready to admit that means must be devised for preventing that evil, and for throwing open the patronage to the country at large; and, in that case, he would go hand in hand with the Government in carrying through the measure. It had been said that it would make no difference to the people at large whether the Crown or the Company had the patronage, because the military services would be recruited from the ranks of the middle classes as they were at present. That was the opinion stated in an article of the *Times*—an article intended to support the Government measure, but it omitted a most important question. The hard-working people would no doubt be of the middle class; but the sugar-plums would be reserved for the upper class. The great benefit of the present system was, that after a man entered the Indian service he arrived gradually at the top; but in the other system he might work for twenty or twenty-five years, and then have the sugar-plum taken from his mouth, and put into that of some titled favourite of the Horse Guards."

Upon another occasion something like the same sentiments had been expressed by the hon. and gallant member. In a speech he had made in the Court of Proprietors, he said:—

"If selection, indeed, should be substituted for seniority in the higher

grades and commands, and if the nomination were to rest with the authorities at home, I should apprehend that the rank and file of the army, the hard-working men who had done subaltern's and captain's regimental duty in the country, would be generally superseded by nominees from England, and that the *morale* of the army would thus seriously suffer. This is of course an evil to be guarded against, but it is not one of paramount importance or of constitutional danger!"

There were many other topics upon which he (Mr. Willoughby) wished to make some remarks, but the present was perhaps not the fittest occasion for them, and he had already trespassed at too great a length on the attention of the House. He should, therefore, confine himself to stating a few of the objections which he felt respecting the Bill itself. He was quite certain from his own experience of the quantity of work to be done, that a Council of eight would never be able to do it. It would be physically impossible. He did not pretend to say that, if the work were to be slurred over, or done in a superficial manner, eight, or even two or three would not be enough, but to do it in the careful manner it had hitherto been done would require a Council of more than eight. The old system of governing India might appear to be somewhat cumbrous. The correspondence from India might appear to be unnecessarily voluminous, and he did not pledge himself that in some details improvement and simplification might not be introduced; yet if they were to abolish the long existing system to which was attributable much of the efficiency of Indian government, which required that records of all transactions should be sent home, they would at the same time remove

all checks upon malversation.* With respect to the Court of Proprietors he regretted that it was intended to abolish it. He remembered, when in India, reading debates in that Court which were of great value and importance to India. It was true that lately the debates had fallen off in value, but it did not follow that therefore they should destroy a constituency which he considered to be a useful safety-valve—a means of ventilating Indian questions before an audience who would pay attention to them. He did not mean to say that the Court should not be reconstituted, and the anomaly of giving votes to ladies removed, yet he would maintain it in a remodelled and improved

* The following, extracted from the evidence obtained by the Committees of 1853, will give some idea of the increase of business which had then taken place; and, since 1853, I believe it will be found that there has been a still further increase.

In 1834 the number of despatches from India was 778; in 1851 it was 2,090; in 1834 the number of despatches to India was 667; in 1851 it was 1,012; in 1834 the number of miscellaneous letters addressed to persons in this country was 2,850; in 1851 it was 4,500.

A despatch may be received containing sixty, or a hundred, or two hundred cases; and the despatch, in itself voluminous, is rendered more so by *collections* attached to it, containing copies of all former correspondence on the subject or subjects of all letters written thereon by various local officers, and all papers relating thereto. There has not long since been in the Revenue Department a despatch with 16,263 pages of collections. In 1845 there was one in the same department with 46,000 pages, and it was stated that Mr. Canning some years since in the House of Commons mentioned a military despatch to which were attached 13,511 pages of collections. To illustrate the increase of business, a statement was put in, showing the number of despatches received from the different Governments of India in 1830 to have been 602, while in 1849 they were 2,445. Previous communications submitted to the Board in 1830 were 173; in 1849 they were 404—drafts of despatches laid before the Board in 1830 amounted to 617; in 1849 they had increased to 909; in 1830 the collections of papers appended to the previous communications or to the drafts were, in number, 1,440; in 1849 they were 5,720—the number of pages in those collections in 1830 were 103,710; in 1849 the pages were 212,075.

shape.* The Bill proposed that the Governor-General should appoint his own Council. This he thought wrong. At present the Council were appointed by the Court of Directors to assist and advise the Governor-General, and certainly from the mode in which Governors-General and Governors were sent out, it was necessary that they should have persons of local experience to advise them. He did not mean to make that statement offensively, for, taking all things into consideration, he believed that the Governors-General, and Governors of Presidencies sent out from this country, had been, for the most part, able and distinguished men. He was speaking of their Indian experience. The Council were not only advisers but they were checks. At present the Council acted as a check upon the commission of any job by the Governor-General or the Governors of Presidencies, but if the Governor-General is to select his own Council, that check would be gone. He would not say he had not seen some jobs attempted. In the course of the debates, many erroneous statements had been made with regard to the Directors, to some of which he would now refer. The honourable and learned Member for the Tower Hamlets (Mr. Ayrton) had done injustice to the Court of Directors in respect to the question

* A recent Parliamentary return shows that there are 5,782 proprietors of East India Stock, of whom 4,750 are males, and 1,032 females. The proportion who hold £1,000 and upwards, and who are, therefore, qualified to vote, are 1,255 males and 408 females.

of patronage, for although what he had said was technically right, it was substantially wrong. The hon. and learned Member said that the Court of Directors, in its corporate capacity, never gave appointments to the sons of officers who were killed in action, or had died in the service. There was no patronage at all in the disposal of the Court in their corporate capacity; but the papers which had been recently laid before the House showed how patronage had been distributed, and would certainly refute the charge. If the hon. and learned Member was not satisfied with that statement, let him call for a return extending over a certain number of years—say five years—showing the donor, the receiver, and in another column at whose recommendation the patronage was given, which would be the most important as testing what influence prevailed; and he was satisfied that such a return would be most favourable as respected the mode in which the patronage was dispensed. He did not think he need answer the hon. and learned Gentleman's remarks about the last farthing being exacted from the ryots, or the charge that the Natives were reduced to the necessity of eating dirt: and he fancied the hon. and learned Member, when making such observations, must have had in his mind the Oriental expression of "eating dirt." The hon. and learned Member for Devonport (Sir E. Perry) drew a glowing comparison between the Government of India and that

of Ceylon, favourable to the latter. The two did not very well admit of a comparison, but if it were made it would be found favourable to India. A similar comparison had been made by the hon. Member for Poole (Mr. Danby Seymour), the Secretary to the Board of Control, though the hon. Member did not seem well versed in the history of Ceylon, or had not refreshed his memory lately. If he had looked to the evidence taken by the Select Committee in Ceylon in 1850, he would have found that in that island there was an open rebellion in 1817, 1823, and 1848, and three conspiracies, independent of other circumstances of a threatening nature, were detected before they exploded in 1820, 1824, and 1843, and there had been plots in several other years. In a temperate and dignified letter to the Secretary of the Colonies, what did Viscount Torrington say of the state of Ceylon in 1817? The noble Lord stated—

"It is necessary to remind you of the state in which I found Ceylon on my assumption of the Government in 1847, its treasury nearly empty, its current expenditure largely in excess of its annual income; its commerce declining; the cultivation of its staple products, coffee and cinnamon, suddenly arrested and discouraged, and its general condition leading rapidly to bankruptcy."

He, however, was ready to acknowledge that, since 1847, the condition of Ceylon had improved wonderfully; but, he must add, that it was to the credit of the East India Company that it was so, for a large portion of the improvement was due to an Indian official, the late Sir G. Anderson. He was much inclined to notice some of the many fallacies

which were entertained with respect to India. He had read with great interest the numerous speeches made on the subject by Members of Parliament and others, and observing the great amount, he would not say of ignorance, for that was a strong term, but of want of information exhibited, he was not surprised that the East India Company were described as tyrants and oppressors. The hon. Member for Salford (Mr. Massey), in an address to his constituents, stated that Bhuddism and Christianity could not stand together. Now, Bhuddism was the religion of Ceylon, but it was not the religion of India. Then the hon. Member advocated the principle of toleration, but immediately afterwards explained that he meant toleration between different sects of Christians, but that toleration of Hindoos and Mahommedans was entirely out of the question. Now, if India was to be governed on that principle, it would not be worth six months' purchase.* The hon. Member for

* "The causes of that rebellion must be ascertained through a long and painful investigation. He was going to make a proposition which would perhaps startle: he believed that toleration of their faith—the superstition which they called religion—by the British Government had been in a main degree instrumental, had had the effect of retarding the ascendancy of the British name, and preventing the salutary growth of Christianity. But they must not misunderstand him. Toleration was the great corner-stone of the religious liberties of this country; but don't let them abuse that precious word—toleration. As he understood it, it meant the complete liberty to all, freedom of worship among Christians who worshipped upon the same foundation. It meant toleration of all sects and denominations of Christians who believed in one mediation; but, to apply the word toleration to a people who worshipped miserable and blood-stained idols, whose religion was founded on principles shocking to humanity and disgraceful to human nature—to say that toleration was to be extended to such superstitions was, in his opinion, a great abuse of the term. (Hear.)

Dover (Mr. B. Osborne) told his constituents that the Company had swept away the Hindoo custom of adoption, and he went on to add, that it was alleged the miscreant Nana Sahib had been impelled to all his atrocities in consequence of the great wrong inflicted on him in reference to this question of adoption.* Great ignorance prevailed in this country on this subject of adoption. Nana Sahib's adoption was never interfered with. By his own account, he inherited £280,000 from his adopted father; but, in reality, nearer £500,000. What he wanted was, that Government should continue to pay him the pension which had been granted to his adopted father for life; that, of course, was refused by the East India Company. Now, he (Mr. Willoughby) had read a letter dated the 13th June, 1818, from Sir J. Malcolm, reporting that the pension was given to the adopted father of Nana Sahib only for life. Was it possible, then, for the British Government to confer this pension of £80,000 a-year on Nana Sahib? However, Nana

His belief was, that Christianity and Bhuddism could not flourish in the same soil; where the one flourished, the other must perish," &c., &c.—Speech at the Town Hall, Salford, as reported in the *Times*, 14th November, 1857.

* "Another custom which the East India Company swept away was that of adoption, and it is said that the atrocities of that miscreant of miscreants, Nana Sahib, were prompted by personal resentment for the loss he suffered under the operation of this change. He was left the adopted heir of the Paishwa, but the Company stept in and deprived him of the pension he claimed, as inheriting from that prince. The Company left the rascal guns and an embattled fortress, and these very guns he used against our unfortunate countrymen at Cawnpore. If they did the thing at all, they ought to have done it thoroughly."—Speech as reported in the *Times*, 26th September, 1857.

Sahib sent over to this country Azimullah Khan, and some hon. Members might possibly have seen that worthy, for he had resided two years in this country, and was admitted, it appeared, to the highest circles in London and Brighton. That agent of Nana Sahib spent £30,000 or £40,000 in this country, and this circumstance showed the evil connected with the agitation of Indian questions in that House. Azimullah is not the only instance of emissaries deputed to England. After spending so much money in England, he went back to India, having found out that, in this country, people did not administer justice for money. Having thrown away so much money, he was inflamed against England; and again became the infamous councillor of the still more infamous Nana Sahib, and it was he who was sent to negotiate with the gallant but unfortunate Sir H. Wheeler the terms of capitulation, and who instigated Nana Sahib to the treacherous murder of the garrison of Cawnpore. He was a specimen of the men sent over to England to prosecute unfounded claims.* With regard to the law

* These facts are taken from a "A Brief Account, by Mr. Shepherd, of the Outbreak at Cawnpore, and the Disasters which resulted therefrom to the Christian Community of the Station," published by Parliament, No. IV., p. 173, of Papers relating to the Mutinies in the East Indies:—

"The following day (25th June) was fixed by the general for an interview with any person whom the Nana might appoint to arrange matters and accordingly at about noon, a man, by the name of Azimoollah, with a few of the ringleaders, sowars of the 2nd Light Cavalry, came to the camp, and were received by the General in one of the unfinished barracks outside the entrenchment. Azimoollah, who could read and write English, attempted to open the conversation in that language, but was prevented from doing

of adoption, he contended that the British Government never interfered with or violated it. Had they done so, they would have acted in opposition to repeated Acts of Parliament, which declared that the laws and customs of the inhabitants of India were to be attended to.* The right

so by the sowars. It was agreed, upon the part of our General, that all the Government money, the magazine in the entrenchment, with the guns (two only of which were in serviceable order, the rest having been injured and rendered useless by the enemy's cannon) be made over to the Nena; and in return the Nena should provide tonnage, and permit every individual in the entrenchment to proceed to Allahabad unmolested. This agreement was drawn up in writing, signed, sealed, and ratified by a solemn oath by the Nena. All hostile proceedings were stopped on both sides from the evening of the 24th."

Then follows a thrilling account of the perfidious violation of the agreement, by the massacre of the defenceless garrison of Cawnpore, and the subsequent proceedings of Nana Sahib. "Fresh corps were being raised, and recruits daily entertained. A new horse battery was formed. The Zemindars all around were directed to bring in the revenue due by them. New offices were created, and bestowed daily upon favourites. The Ganges Canal (built with so much trouble, and at so great a cost to Government) was bestowed upon the villain Azimoollah, who, together with about 150 of the Mussulman troopers of the 2nd Regiment Light Cavalry, and Tuka Sing Soobedar, of the same regiment (created a Brigadier-General of the Cawnpore division at the time), were at the bottom of all mischief. It was through their instigation that the Europeans were killed in cold blood, as described above; as also the gentlemen and ladies with their families that had arrived from Futtehgurh, whilst our entrenchment was besieged, who were also murdered in the most inhuman manner by the above wretches."

* For having acted in conformity with Acts of Parliament, and repeated Proclamations issued by the local Governments in India, guaranteeing to the natives of India the free exercise of their religion, caste, manners and usages, public opinion has recently been greatly excited against the East India Company, and numerous petitions betraying a most intolerant spirit have been presented to Parliament.

Clause 53 of the Indian Act of 1833 enacts that a Law Commission should be established, among other purposes "to suggest such alterations as may, in their opinion, be beneficially made in the courts of justice and police establishments, forms of judicial procedure and laws, *due regard being had to the distinction of castes, differences of religion, and the manners and opinions prevailing among different races and in different parts of the said territories.*"

Clause 85, with reference to the removal of former restrictions in the

of adoption is one of very great importance in India, as the Hindoos believed that the future happiness of the father depended on certain ceremonies being performed after his death by his son, or adopted son. It was true that the British Government sometimes refused to recognise an adoption carrying with it territorial and political rights; but this was not a prerogative introduced by the British Government, but had existed from time immemorial in India. In refusing to sanction adoptions of this kind, the Company had never interfered with the custom so far as private property was concerned; and, in proof of that statement, he might observe that the adopted son of the late Rajah of Sattara, though not recognized as the ruler of that

intercourse of Europeans in India, requires the Government of India to provide by laws and regulations with all convenient speed "for the protection of the natives of India *from insult and outrage in their persons, religions, or opinions.*"

And Clause 87, which may be regarded as the *Magna Charta* of the natives of India, enacts "that no native of India, nor any natural born subject of her Majesty resident therein, *shall, by reason only of religion, place of birth, descent, colour, or any of them, be disabled from holding any place, office, or employment under the said Company.*"

All these provisions are confirmed by the India Act of 1853. In like manner, the Letters Patent under which Her Majesty's Courts of Judicature in India are established, contain similar provisions. That of Bombay, established in 1823, prescribes that in the administration of justice, *respect shall be had to the religion and manners, laws and usages of the natives, both Mahomedans and Gentoos*—"for the exemption even of their appearance in Court, in certain cases, if contrary to native laws and usages, and the Court is directed to frame rules and process "*with an especial attention to the religion, manners, and usages of the native inhabitants living within its jurisdiction, and accommodating the same to their religion, manners, and usages, and to the circumstances of the country, so far as the same can consist with the due execution of Law, and the attainment of substantial justice.*"

territory, had been allowed to inherit all the personal property of his father, as well as land to the value of £2,000 per annum. There was another subject to which he also wished to refer, but which he approached in a spirit of great humility. He had never felt more humbled than when he found it stated by an influential portion of the press, and re-echoed from the pulpit and the platform, that the Government had ignored their faith in India. A more unjust, a more unfounded charge than that, he should contend, had never been made. It was said to the Court of Directors: "Did you not preserve Hindoo temples and uphold Mahomedan mosques? Did you not, in 1819, dismiss from a regiment of Sepoys one of their number who had become a convert to Christianity?" His reply to those questions should simply be: "You are talking of past times, and, if you will but bring to notice any remnants of the old system which ought to be dispensed with, a remedy is sure to be applied." But, he would go further, and tell the House that, if they now asked the Missionaries who afforded them the most efficient aid, they would reply, the civil and military servants of the East India Company. It was chiefly through their contributions and exertions that churches had been erected in many parts of India. Indeed, out of five churches which had been built on the Island of Bombay, three had been erected on the voluntary principle. To the Company's servants, also, was India mainly indebted for her

benevolent institutions—a fact to which several Missionaries, with whom he was acquainted, would be found prepared to bear testimony. He was aware that many hon. Members had lately devoted themselves to the study of the condition of India, but it was idle to expect that accurate information upon the subject could be obtained by any man who had not been resident in India. Book-learning might be useful, but the information which it furnished must necessarily be incomplete; and no man could fully understand India, or form a correct idea of the difficulties we have to encounter, without visiting India. He might, however, call the attention of the House to one book in corroboration of the justice of the views which he entertained—he referred to the interesting journal of the amiable and pious Bishop Heber. The right Rev. Prelate there stated that, upon the occasion of his entry into the town of Baroda, a deputation had been sent out ten or fifteen miles to meet him, and that no English Prelate had, since the days of Thomas A'Becket and Cardinal Wolsey, been so well received. The strongest evidence, however, he (Mr. Willoughby) could give the House of the unfounded nature of this terrible charge (for such he personally felt it to be), was contained in what he might almost call the dying words of the venerable Prelate who had filled the see of Calcutta for twenty-five years, and who, in the beautiful language of the Government order announcing his death—

"After a career of pious Christian usefulness as Metropolitan, extending through a quarter of a century, marked by a zeal which age could not chill; and, by an open-handed charity and liberality which have been rarely equalled, this venerated Prelate has closed his long life, leaving a name to be remembered and honoured throughout British India.

"The Governor-General in Council requests that the principal officers of Government, civil and military, and all who may desire to take this opportunity to mark their respect for the memory of the deceased Bishop, will attend the sad ceremony of his interment.

"The flag of Fort William will be hoisted half-mast high at sunrise on the morning of Monday, the 4th of January, which will be the day of the funeral.

"By command of the Right Hon. the Governor-General in Council,

"CECIL BEADON,

"Secretary to the Government of India."

In his sermon preached at Calcutta on the day of fast and humiliation, the 24th July, 1857, the late Bishop Wilson thus reviewed the efforts which have been made for the spread of Christianity in India, and the moral improvement of the people of India:

"Things were better with them than they were formerly. All had been moving on in the right direction for more than fifty years past. Never was there a more just or beneficent Government than that of the British power in India. Peace and security for person and property have prevailed, commerce and all the Western improvements in medicine and the arts have been encouraged; every man stands equal before the laws; the administration of justice is pure; the taxes are of moderate weight; the contrast, indeed, of the equity of the British Government for the last sixty years, with the fierce tyranny of the Mahomedan for 600 years, is immeasurably in our favour. Then as to Christianity, pious ministers of every name and class, missionaries from all the different societies, are protected and honoured. The reverend chaplains have been trebled in number since Bishop Heber's time. Sacred edifices have been reared in more than a ten-fold proportion, many of them with the munificent aid of Government. Native converts have been added in large numbers to the Lord, especially among the Karens in Pegu, at Tinnevelly, Krishnaghur,, and elsewhere. The number of enlightened and faithful European Christians has largely increased in the civil and military, and other services, and amongst the East Indians also charitable designs to meet new forms of destitution are liberally rewarded. Christian education in all our missions and national education not excluding Christianity, though not directly teaching it, is spreading throughout the country. Unity and love prevail amongst the different divisions of the Protestant family. We no longer maintain the old and fatal mistake that Christian men are not to co-operate for anything till they agree in every-

thing. We now hold the antagonistic and true maxim that Christian men should act together so far as they are agreed."

Such was the dying testimony of this good and pious Prelate, and no one, he thought, would hereafter venture to charge the Government of India with ignoring the Christian faith.* He should next advert to the

* At a meeting of the Church Missionary Society, held at Dublin on the 18th of January, 1858, Archbishop Whately thus advocated non-interference on the part of Government, in respect to the all-important matter of religion, the policy which, in fact, has been pursued by the East India Company for at least the last twenty years.

"There seemed," observed this learned Prelate, "to be apprehension spread far and wide that the Government were intending to force the Christian religion upon the people of India, and that it is that that alarms them, but the Missionaries they fear not. And the inference to be drawn from this is, Why has not the whole peninsula of India been overspread with Missionary stations? Government would certainly have allowed twenty times as many mission stations to be established, as have been established. We cannot say that Government, whatever its faults may have been, have prevented that. Had we performed our duty in such a manner as would have overspread the whole peninsula of India with missionary stations, the probable result would have been, that this revolt would not have broken out, or would have been speedily crushed. Now I take this occasion to state distinctly that I earnestly deprecate all allusions to Government. I may add, that I shall of course deprecate the opposition of Government to our efforts, so I shall, if possible, still more deprecate any assistance of Government as Government to it, as it will excite the greatest degree of suspicion and alarm, and raise the greatest prejudice against Christianity. I should say that the maxim of this Society as a Missionary Society, with reference to Government, ought to be the same as the answer given by the French merchant to the minister who asked how Government could aid and forward the commerce of France? His answer was, "Laissez-nous faire," let us alone. We should recollect that Government is an agent which possesses physical power; and if Government, therefore, were even suspected of coming forward to aid missionary efforts by its own power, it would be suspected of exerting physical force, than which nothing could be more fatal to the cause. I say it would be disastrous in any state of society, and it would be more peculiarly disastrous in such a country as India, for this reason: that it is impossible to take away the religion of the Hindoo by main force; which, I believe, is what cannot be said of any other religion under the sun. In all countries, but more particularly in that country, any interference of Government must excite peculiar suspicion; but, as to the Missionary efforts, they have no fear of them, because it is open to every one to listen or to refuse to listen to them as he pleases. I do think that the calamities in India are, in some

question of colonization, and the charge which was brought against the Company in connection with that subject. The Court of Directors were asked: "Why do you not colonize India as Australia and Canada have been colonized?" His answer was: "The cases are not parallel. In Australia and Canada, those who emigrate can, upon their arrival, without much difficulty, obtain possession of land, or purchase land, which will reward the exertions employed in its cultivation. In India the colonist would find not only that the best portions of the country were occupied, but also densely peopled." Another obstacle to settling in India was the nature of the climate; "for the hewers of wood and drawers of water," the climate was a complete bar in the plains of India. There might be a few spots in the Himalayas, where colonists from this country could establish themselves; but, as to establishing a self-supporting Colony in the plains, it appeared to him absurd. Europeans cannot contend against the scorching heats of May and June, or the equally destructive rains of the succeeding months.* He had now endeavoured

degree, to be considered as judgments, not supernatural but natural, upon our culpable neglect in not having overspread the whole peninsula of India, which it was free for us to do, with Missionary stations and schools, for those of the natives that chose to frequent them; and I do hope we shall learn wisdom by what has passed. Let us not come forward to seek aid from Government; let not Government appear in a prominent manner at all; but let us come forward with our own money, our own exertions, and ask Government for nothing more than that they shall let us alone, and not interfere with or hinder our operations."

* The following observations are so apposite, I cannot resist quoting them, the more especially as Parliament has appointed a Select Committee to enquire and report upon the best means of promoting European colonization

to answer a few of the many charges which had been brought against the East India Company. With reference to the Bill before the House, he could only say that the further the noble Lord at the head of the Government proceeded with it, the greater would he find the difficulties by which his path was beset. There was, in the first place, the military difficulty—the dealing with the Company's troops, and defining and preserving their rights and privileges. It was said that an order of three lines would settle; this but such was not the case. The Company's troops had their rights and privileges; and, above all, their own funds, which could not be interfered with. Then came a more formidable question still, that of Indian finance. All the loans had been contracted and obligations incurred, in the name of

and settlement in India:—"There is a manifest disposition abroad among us to apply colonial theories to a country which is not a colony at all, but a great dependency. The cry for more settlers, &c., proceeds on the strange assumption that India is a field for enterprise, like the Australian bush or the Canadian backwoods. But what shadow of resemblance is there between an unsettled waste, and an empire whose civilisation, whether it be good or bad, is as old as its hills? India is full of men to overflowing, and the greater part of it is cultivated close up to its capabilities of production. Immemorial prescription has given it a right to its own laws and customs, to its settled usages and accepted religions. Our obligation is to govern India for its own benefit, and not for ours. Our recent policy has been to permit English born subjects to settle and buy land indiscriminately in all parts of India. The European settler has the Hindoo to compete with, and the Hindoo beats him out of the field by greater frugality, greater knowledge of native character, and a perfect absence of scruple in money dealings."—*Saturday Review*, 21st November, 1857.

No doubt there is a wide field in India for the profitable employment of British capital, and the enquiry should have been directed towards ascertaining, and, as far as possible, removing any obstacles which may oppose the introduction of British capital into that country. But colonization, in the usual acceptation of the term, is an impossibility.

the Company, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer would not, he thought, find it an easy matter to deal with those public creditors who might say to him, "We lent our money to the Company on the faith of their good management, you have altered our security, give us back the sums which we invested." If those creditors were disposed to place a strong reliance upon the wisdom of the new arrangement they would not take that course, but under other circumstances such might be the result. He (Mr. Willoughby) did not say such a demand would be made to any extent. He hoped not, but if it was, he did not see how, consistently with good faith, it could be refused. Then there was a third difficulty, namely, that all treaties, contracts, and engagements had been entered into with the East India Company, and on some of those the East India Company could sue and be sued. How were they to be transferred bodily to Her Majesty's Government? He was not the panegyrist of the East India Company, for he knew that they had committed many faults, and had also borne the blame of many others which they had not committed. But he concurred in all that had been said in the eloquent peroration of the hon. Member for Huntingdon (Mr. T. Baring) as to the general goodness of their administration; and although it was now, in a time of national calamity, proposed to extinguish their authority, he had no apprehension as to what the judgment of posterity would be. In fact, he might say, that

the judgment of posterity had been already pronounced. He meant by that, that as Madame de Stael had remarked, "the judgment of foreigners was the same as the judgment of posterity, because it was free from all prejudice and bias;" and certainly all the histories and travels he had read, from the earliest writers down to Baron von Orlich and the American traveller, Bayard Taylor, were full of admiration of the Company's rule; and one of them, if his memory did not deceive him, the Swedish Count Bjornstjirna, describing it as a living miracle. One word more and he had done. He (Mr. Willoughby) should have rejoiced not to appear on the present occasion in opposition to H.M. Government. He entertained a deep sense of the high honour they had, without solicitation, done him in selecting him, a stranger, to be one of the first nominees of the Crown, and he owed a special obligation to the right hon. Gentleman who had preceded him in the debate (Sir Charles Wood). The honour, however, was unsolicited, and conferred without conditions. But he felt that he only had the alternative of either remaining silent or speaking out, and as his apology for the course he had taken he had only to say—*"Amicus Plato, amicus Socrates, sed magis amica veritas."*

A LETTER

TO THE EDITOR OF THE

"NAVAL AND MILITARY GAZETTE,"

IN REPLY TO ASPERSIONS ON

MAJOR JOHN JACOB, C.B.,

OF THE BOMBAY ARTILLERY;

COMMANDANT OF THE SINDE IRREGULAR HORSE,

&c., &c.

Which appeared in that Journal on the 7th July 1855.

By A SINDE HORSEMAN.

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1855.

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A LETTER,

&c., &c.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE "NAVAL AND MILITARY GAZETTE."

1*st September*, 1855.

SIR,

In your paper of the 7th July, you have thought proper to devote a long editorial to abuse of Major Jacob of the Sinde Irregular Horse, introducing a letter from Sir W. Napier, as usual, full of falsehood and mis-statements regarding that officer. With reference to this, allow me to point out that Major Jacob's sole error seems to have been his having supposed that you wished to maintain at least the form of appearing to prefer truth to falsehood. A series of articles, containing vile calumnies and contemptible falsehoods regarding Major Jacob personally, appeared in your paper; Major Jacob replied to these, and furnished you with proof—full proof—proof sufficient to hang a man—of the truth of every

word which he advanced, and abstained at the same time from the slightest approach to the language of coarse and scurrilous invective, with which you have for years past allowed your pages to be filled towards him.

You now say that you will not discuss these proofs: you reiterate foolish, old, and often refuted falsehoods, and say that you require no reply. Possibly no reply to such attacks may be called for, inasmuch as they carry their own refutation with them. However, I take the liberty to point out to you, that your first remarks, to the effect that Major Jacob having the full support of Government, &c., &c., no credit is due to him for making a good regiment, &c., must proceed from one of little or no experience either in raising, forming, leading, or commanding soldiers in camp or quarters, in war or peace, because the slightest practical knowledge of the subject would have convinced any one on trial, that to gain this support of authority, &c., &c., requires the hardest struggle, and is the most important success of all.

Why do not all other commanding officers command the same confidence and support?

Major Jacob never had the smallest "*interest*" with any one, in the vulgar sense of the word "*interest.*"

Your observations on this point seem tantamount to saying that no credit is due to a General for victory, because with equal forces at his disposal he was always ten times as strong as his enemy at the point of attack. Malice is often weak! However, in one

respect, you agree very much with Major Jacob himself in opinion; that officer having frequently publicly maintained that full powers to commanding officers is the one thing needful for the welfare of the Indian Army.

This you now show most forcibly to be true; for, if this alone enables such a silly contemptible officer as you represent Major Jacob to be, to form and maintain in perfect order and efficiency for fourteen years together, in war and peace, an excellent corps, what would not the same support effect in the hands of really able, or even of tolerably good officers?

You next affirm that the reputation of Major Jacob rests only on the reports of Sir C. Napier. In this you ignore all that occurred before Sir C. Napier's arrival in Sinde, for Major Jacob saw much hard service and had been engaged in many personal and other combats and encounters before the advent of Sir C. Napier. Moreover, Major Jacob both had before and has since repeatedly received thanks from Commanders-in-chief and from Government, for various services with which Sir C. Napier had no concern. But to take your own ground—Is not the often repeated public and private opinion of the General under whom he served in the field (that General being, according to Sir W. Napier, somewhat superior to Alexander the Great) about the best evidence which could be adduced of an officer's worth and ability?

Sir C. Napier, writing to his brother, the historian,

calls Major Jacob "the Seidlitz" of the Sinde army. Writing to Major Jacob himself, he says, "I consider you are one of the best officers I ever met in my life." After Sir C. Napier's departure from Sinde and from India, both he and his brother tried, somewhat ludicrously, to retract all such praise. But there had been no further Military service you say; and what can, then, have since occurred to enable you to discover, during peace, that the "able leader," as Major Jacob was described in war, is, in reality, a coward and a charlatan?

You state that Major Jacob was not under fire, and did nothing in Sir C. Napier's hill campaign. Yet Sir C. Napier, in his General Order, mentions that Major Jacob and one other officer had carried off all the military glory of that campaign; and Sir C. Napier also publishes in his General Order on the occasion of Major Jacob's successful night attack on Shahpoor (a stiffish piece of business, where the assailants were received by a very heavy fire, and Major Jacob carried the place at the head of a party of his men on foot) as high praise to Major Jacob and his corps as perhaps it is possible for the words of a General to convey to a soldier. And Sir C. Napier's letters also shew that Major Jacob's successful negotiations with the Murrees alone enabled the General to bring the campaign to a fortunate issue.

As to your stories of the battle of Meeanee they are very silly, as well as untrue. Major Jacob's horse

was shot and mortally wounded, two other balls also striking his saddle and the scabbard of his sword; but the horse did not fall, however, but, like a good Arab as he was, carried his master for a quarter of an hour afterwards. Directly his horse was shot, Major Jacob sent to the rear for another of his horses; meanwhile the wounded animal, though not able to keep the lead as usual, was still able to gallop after a fashion, was never out of the thickest of the melée, and long before the fight in the enemy's camp was over, a groom came galloping through the press with a fresh horse, which the Major instantly mounted. The wounded horse fell down as the saddle was being removed from his back, but the animal never fell or stopped before during the charge, neither was Major Jacob for one moment absent from the command of the Sinde Irregular Horse.

For the affair of Shadadpoor, where Major Jacob, with eight hundred men of all arms, was attacked by the whole army of Shere Mahomed, see Sir W. Napier's *Conquest of Sinde*, page 436. Major Jacob is there described as "a brave and able officer," "a gallant swordsman, and a skilful leader." Sir C. Napier at the time styled the affair "a glorious victory," and said that Major Jacob had saved his life. It is now asserted that the said "skilful leader" was a fool and a coward, who wanted the sense and courage to pursue a flying foe; and Sir W. Napier utters fallacy upon fallacy, raving about trials, as he calls them, and denials which never

occurred, and about the want of personal combativeness of a man who, while utterly despising such exploits and never seeking them, has yet been in the course of his duty successfully engaged in as many personal conflicts and single combats, probably, as any man in India. As to the story of the Sinde Irregular Horse not having been engaged at Hydrabad, and the 3rd Cavalry having done everything, the fact is that the Sinde Irregular Horse was on the right of, close to and in line with, the 3rd Light Cavalry. The two regiments advanced together, charged together, were mingled together in the melée, and together drove some 15,000 men (three-fourths of the enemy's army) from the field; and Major Jacob was in the thickest of the fight, and had freely to use his own sword in personal combat.

With respect to the intended chuppow on Nowkote, you have been ludicrously misinformed. The facts were thus:—In April, 1843, Major Jacob was, by Sir C. Napier, placed in command of Meerpoor and the outposts. The communication with Cutch had for long been cut off; Major Jacob thought that he could re-open it, and supposed that his general instructions authorized his making the attempt. He had ascertained that a large body (some 5,000) of Shere Mahomed's Belooches had assembled at the fort of Nowkote, and that the proceedings of this force formed the chief obstacle to the communications. Nowkote is some sixty-five miles south from Meerpoor, on the edge of

the Thurr. Major Jacob thought that he could surprise the place, and disperse or dispose of the garrison, and he determined to make the attempt at once, without waiting for orders from superior authority; accordingly, he reported to Sir C. Napier what he was about, and marched from Meerpoor with two squadrons of the Sinde Irregular Horse. When about half way to Nowkote, in the middle of the night, *while on the march towards the enemy's fort*, a hasty note arrived by express from Sir C. Napier, disapproving of the move, and directing Major Jacob to return to Meerpoor forthwith.

Major Jacob, of course, immediately countermarched, and wrote to Sir C. Napier to express his regret at having acted contrary to his wishes, and explaining that he thought that his instructions justified the proceeding. Copies of Sir C. Napier's instructions and letters on this occasion are annexed.

Since January, 1847, Major Jacob has commanded on the Frontier of Scinde, and has there, during eight or nine years, endured from the sun of the Desert a hotter fire than ever came from mortal arms; while the Desert itself has, under his rule, become a populous and cultivated country, and some forty thousand human beings have been reclaimed from a life of the wildest rapine and murder, to peaceful and industrious pursuits.

This was a task to which Sir C. Napier proved wholly unequal, and he attempted it in vain. But to have successfully accomplished which seems more

honorable, and calculated to afford a higher satisfaction, to any right-thinking man than a whole life spent in mere violence.

If you have the smallest sense of fair play, you will publish this letter and its accompaniments in full.

I am, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

A SINDE HORSEMAN.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR MAJOR JACOB, COMMANDING SINDE HORSE.

10*th April*, 1843.

1st. You are to repair and strengthen the Fort of Meerpoor, having a due regard to economy.

2nd. You are to take any measures that you deem necessary to keep the country tranquil and to put down any collection of armed Belooches, if you can reach them without endangering the safety of your post.

3rd. You are to send in by a cossid a weekly report of what goes on, and what you do for the defence of your post; also stating, as nearly as you can judge, what the feelings of the people are towards us.

4th. This weekly cossid is to be sent *every Saturday;* by this means, if he fails to come, it will give an alarm to Hydrabad that something is wrong at Meerpoor, and assistance will be rendered: perhaps, a cossid may be sent oftener, or more seldom; but at present, I think, a weekly one will be sufficient: you must judge of this.

5th. I think a good ditch round the Fort would be a great improvement.

6th. I am not aware of any other points requiring notice at present; but be so good as to write to me *direct* on all points that may strike you as being useful to the safety of your detachment and the maintenance of the peace.

(Signed) C. J. NAPIER,

Governor.

My dear Jacob,

This is all I have to say. Make FitzGerald marry a black girl immediately; tell Richardson that he had better leave his wife in the Fort till matters are more steady.—I remain,

Yours truly,

(Signed) C. J. NAPIER.

23rd April, 1843.

My dear Jacob,

My rule is for every man to do his own work, and the general arrangements for dawks, and for the peace of the country are mine—and all correspondence must come to me—and not across the country between Commanders of the posts. You are not to correspond with the Commander at Bhooj, only with those which I have placed under your orders, viz.: Oomerkote and Meerpoor, and Aliar Ka Tanda. Give yourself no trouble about the dawks, which is my affair, and will be arranged by me.

I approve of your making a march upon Nowkote, but *not till I had approved* of it. The consequence is that your so doing has disconcerted a plan I had formed for an attack upon these various heads that are forming: and just as I wrote to the word "forming," in came Thompson to say that a squadron of the 9th have been obliged to retire from Mahomed Khan Ka Tanda, to which place I sent them three days ago, and I am again crippled by your marching without my orders—which must never be done except when cut off, and when it is impossible to wait for orders. In future, send me information; and if the enemy are within reach, and likely to escape by delay, you can use your judgment. But in this case there was no

haste. I am now very anxious to hear from you, for Thompson says the country round that place is thick jungle, and filled with nullahs. However, I know you are a careful commander, and will go bridle in hand. I fear, that the retreat of the squadron from Mahomed Khan Ka Tanda will prevent the Fort of Nowkote from surrendering to you. These unconnected marches are bad.

I have desired Pelly to put FitzGerald in orders to proceed to Sukkur with two men per troop.

Yours truly,

(Signed) C. J. NAPIER.

25th April, 1843.

My dear Jacob,

I see I forgot to answer one thing. In your letter of the 8th you say there is some grain in the Fort, which a Sowcar in the town says that you told him he might have on paying me 400 rupees. I have, accordingly, let him have it. I never did any such thing! I was anxious to collect grain for your people, so this chap told a lie, for which you may bring him up, or not, as you please. If the grain was not worth more than 400 rupees, I suppose all this is right,

and the money will be of more use to you in repairing the Fort than the grain; and if the latter was worth more than the 400, you can make him pay the difference: but his story was not true.

I am exceedingly anxious to have the result of your expedition; not that I have any doubt of your keeping clear of mistakes, but I wish to hear whether the Belooche has really so strong a force in that part as he is said to have; and if so, what your opinion is about the country, for I much fear that the inundation will render it impassable for troops.

Yours truly,

(Signed) C. J. NAPIER.

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GENERAL SIR CHARLES NAPIER,

AND

THE DIRECTORS

OF THE

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GENERAL SIR CHARLES NAPIER

AND

THE INDIAN DIRECTORS.

INTRODUCTION.

This report of the debate on Mr. H. Bruce's motion in the House of Commons, is published to shew how true British feeling rises against foul intrigue. It is published also, with the accompanying documents and comments, to display the enmity of those men who drove Sir Charles Napier from India with scoffs and falsehoods, because he was earnestly working to give health and virtue to a decaying system of government. He was far-sighted as to coming calamities; able and energetic to forestall them with fitting remedies. His enemies and detractors were perverse. They had their way: twice they drove him from his beneficent labours; and so doing have brought upon India misery dire and dreadful—a surging sea of blood, the groans of strong men, the shricks

of women and children, tortured, murdered! With horror and gloom they have overspread the land, and the end is dark and uncertain! Yet, with this weight of hell upon their conscience, they have not scrupled again to assail the memory of the man who strived so earnestly to save England from the misery which now weighing her down, is a consequence of their perverseness.

The story of the intrigue will be told by the documents as they are arranged in this pamphlet. When an exposure was menaced by Mr. Bruce, the leading Directors of the East India Company endeavoured to evade it by cajolery, pretending that nothing inimical to Sir Charles Napier was designed. That failing, they sought to thwart it by declaring that the papers moved for could not be found—making the deceit a reality, by searching for Calcutta records in the Bombay archives; and for Bombay documents in the Calcutta repository. Industrious mis-seekers? Lastly, they attempted to menace, intimating that, if the motion was persisted in, counter-statements, adverse to Sir Charles Napier, would be brought forward.

When these contemptible arts failed; when Mr. Bruce with steady front rose in the House to expose and denounce the foul intrigue; the three Directors in Parliament—Mangles, Sykes, and Willoughby — Mangles the chairman, and Colonel Sykes, big talkers beforehand, slunk out of the house, leaving Willoughby alone to endure the crushing weight of Mr. Bruce's facts, the generous indignation of Sir William Codrington, the keenly home-pressed truths of Mr. Isaac Butt, and the fiery invective of Mr. Roebuck. How he

sped these pages will declare, so far as words go; but how he stuttered in his reply; how he cowered beneath Roebuck's lean pointed finger, giving mark and direction to a tongue of flame, those who were eye-witnesses may say—it was a pitiable sight!

The first document in this pamphlet is a letter from Sir Charles Napier, exposing the nature and commencement of the intrigue, as concocted by two members of the Bombay Government Council —Reid and Crawford. And to them may now be added Willoughby; because, as secretary of the Council at the time, he must have been cognizant of, and assisted to draw up their foul minute. Moreover, as will be seen, he adopted and defended the most offensive of its slanderous falsehoods.

Sir Charles Napier to * * * * *
March 24th, 1846.

"I won't write to you of my hatreds, my enemies, and my political aversions: it is foolish. But when a man is daily wasting the little existence he has left to do right, and to serve people, and is struck down at every step by villains, and amongst them by those he is labouring to serve, it is not easy to address one with whom he has no reserve and conceal the fire which consumes him. There is no falsehood that the Indian Press—with one exception or two—does not proclaim against me! One mass of spite, jealousy, malice, hatred, fury, is poured out upon me and all I do.

"The usual truism of the wise is not wanting,

upon every occasion,—'you should despise these rascals,' and such like *saws*, served up in fifty forms, like a mutton chop by a French cook. The answer to this is—why do you, good sir, cry out if your leg is crushed by a dung cart? 'Oh! that is different from newspaper abuse; nobody minds what a newspaper says.' Don't they? *The Bombay Times** asserted, with details, that I was driving the people mad with excessive taxation; that I had even dared to re-establish the tax called 'transit duty.' And these assertions were accompanied with all sorts of gross abuse, such as—'The sordid and shameless leader of Scinde;' 'The Autocrat of Scinde;' 'The Scinde Czar;' 'The unscrupulous murderer of the soldiers of the 78th and 28th Regiments;' 'The liar at the head of the Scinde Government;' and so forth.

"The whole of India was thus kept ringing for several months with my infamous attempts to make up a sham revenue to the destruction of the people and the country. But as I never put a single tax on the people of Scinde, good, bad, or indifferent, never laid a mite upon anything, and took off a great number of taxes, I, of course, laughed at what I knew must in due time be found a pure invention, like the people Herschell was said to have seen in the moon. But how could I laugh when, after India had resounded with these falsehoods, I found, by the mistake of a clerk at Calcutta†, that the

* The most scurrilous paper that ever disgraced even the Indian press, so notorious for scurrility; it was conducted by the Dr. Buist mentioned in the debate.

† This clerk, either by mistake or disgust at the foulness, sent a copy of the minute concocted at Bombay, and designed to be kept secret, to Sir Charles Napier.

Bombay Government had sent a *secret note of Council* to be registered there against me,—accusing me of making up a false revenue; not only by levying taxes, but more than that, for if I recollect aright they only hinted at that: they said I was doing this by a monopoly of grain, the price of which I raised by my command of the market, and sold dear to the troops, so as to make the loss fall on the Bombay Government! In short, of an act so very infamous, that had there been one iota of truth in it, hanging would be too good for me!

"Had the clerk not made this mistake, I should have had, in both the Bombay and Calcutta archives, a heinous crime registered against me by my bitter enemies, which hereafter might be brought to light and given to the world when I am no more, as an irrefragable proof of my bad conduct! And this done too, so ingeniously by the two members of Council, who are old practical merchants and accountants, that it took me a good week's hard work to prove the villainy; and that so far from trying to increase the expense of feeding the troops, if there is one thing to which I have more devoted myself than to another, for the three years I have ruled Scinde, it has been to *reduce* the price of grain to all by destroying monopoly, and to lighten the expense of the troops to the public revenue.

"This is not all. The secret minute was recorded, and the authors of it chuckled in their sleeves at having shot their assassin bold; but not content with this, they manufactured their minute into an article for Dr. Buist's paper, the words

hardly changed; and I, not knowing either its source or of the minute in Council, laughed or swore, probably the latter, at the usual attempt of Buist to make me out a scoundrel.

"Well, I answered the minute, and gave it to the Council pretty tightly, disproving by document after document, every lie they told. Was this all the result of the lies of the Bombay minute about taxes? No! Enough in all conscience, but not all. I got a letter from Lord Ripon, to say he heard this, but hoped it was not true, and then giving me all reasons to prove that I ought not to put on the 'transit duties' again—shewing that he was perfectly satisfied I had, as you say to a naughty child, I hope you have not been doing so when you know it has. Again a day was lost to answer him, and my work, real work, thrust in arrear. And what work! I had long trials to read, and to decide upon putting five men to death, all requiring calm thought and great resolution not to err! And at such a time, with my head in agony, my nerves torn, my whole mind and body on the rack to do right in the sight of God, I was to force myself down to think, and write, and dwell upon villainy and folly past all belief, and beyond my power to chastise! Fortunate that I escape from their power who are profiting by my ebbing life, and seeking my destruction: and all this in a climate proverbial for destroying the energy of mind and body! and at sixty-four!

"But to go on with my story. No sooner had I answered Lord Ripon, and thought I had been tormented enough by Dr. Buist's lie about the

taxes, when down comes from Calcutta, a letter from the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, Lord Ripon's colleagues, to know why I had restored the 'transit duty?' which they heard I had done, from '*various sources!!*' Why, as I asked them, do they not tell me *one* of their various sources, that I may expose their secret informer? They won't do this; but were we in the days of Venice, and the Council of Ten, these very men would soon put me out of the way. I have now told you *one* of the things that happen weekly, and yet I am told—'*Don't mind newspapers!*'"

It will be noticed, that in this letter Sir Charles Napier marked the intrigue as one designed to take effect, *when he should be no more.* Reader! mark the prescience with which he wrote. He died in 1853, and in 1857, twelve years after he had disproved the foul minute of the Bombay Council, we have Willoughby, the then secretary of that Council, adopting and reiterating the refuted slanders, in the House of Commons, during a debate thus brought about.

Mr. Ewart having moved a return of land tenures in India, one was laid before the House. Short and condensed, it was arranged under different heads, bearing, in capital letters, the names of the different provinces, such as Bengal, N.W. Provinces, Punjaub, Madras, Bombay; but no heading for Scinde, that would have drawn attention. Under the head of Bombay, however, without any connection whatever with *land tenures,*

was foisted in a reiteration of the foul charge against Sir Charles Napier, viz. that he had monopolised the grain to sell again at famine prices! Mr. H. Bruce, the member for Merthyr Tydvil, undertook to expose this shameless renewal of falsehood; and then occurred the following debate, so honourable to the feelings and justice of the House; so damnatory for Sir Charles Napier's slanderers.

Mr. H. A. Bruce.——Sir, I rise for the purpose of requesting the attention of the House to a matter of considerable importance, affecting as it does, not only the character of an eminent deceased public servant, but also the character of a great public body and the trustworthiness of documents furnished by them for the information of the House. It will be in the recollection of the House that on the 18th of June last, on the motion of the Honourable Member for Dumfries, a return was made on tenures of land in India by the Directors of the East India Company, in order to illustrate the subject of the growth of cotton in India, then under the consideration of the House. The return contained much interesting matter in a small space; but, unfortunately, instead of being confined to the subject of tenures of land, matter utterly irrelevant had been introduced into it, for the purpose, apparently, of reviving calumnies which I hoped had been forgotten, against a distinguished man whose name had been frequently mentioned in the discussion just ended—I mean the late General Sir Charles Napier.

The calumny to which I refer imputed to that gallant General, that having conquered Scinde and identified his reputation with the policy which led to that conquest, he had endeavoured to enhance its value by unfair means and deceptive representations; that grain being the main revenue of Scinde, he had taken advantage of his position to sell it to a starving people at high prices; and had also supplied it to the Commissariat at exorbitant rates, and by these means given a fictitious importance to the revenues of the conquered territory. (*hear, hear.*) That was the calumny. I will now read the extract from the return of which I complain:—

" In Scinde, not many years ago, the revenue " throughout was collected in grain by actual " division of the crop; the grain was then sold by " reserved auction at artificially high, and some- " times even at famine prices, by the Government, " as the great grain dealers of the country. The " natural condition of the market thus directly " interfered with by the Government, was yet " further forced by the circumstance of the Com- " missariat drawing the grain required for the " troops at *nominal* prices, from the Government " grain stores. Great progress has been made in " superseding this objectionable system by cash " assessments, which have already been introduced " into several districts of the Province. In the " Shikarpoor collectorate generally, but in Lark- " hana particularly, the advantages of a light and " fairly distributed cash assessment have been " most marked and beneficial. The tax-payers " are contented, and the Government demand is " readily responded to."

The House will observe that there is no connection whatever between the passage I have quoted, which relates exclusively to the manner of dealing with the revenue, and the subject of the return, which was the tenure of land. Then why was it introduced? for the purpose, as I shall prove, of reviving a foul calumny against an obnoxious man, and of furnishing his enemies with weapons to be used in blackening his memory. Now this charge first appeared in the Bombay newspapers, and was treated with silent contempt. But (to use Sir Charles's own language) "could I "laugh, when after India had resounded with "these falsehoods, I found, by the mistake of a "Clerk in Calcutta, that the Bombay Government "had sent a *secret note of Council* to be registered "there against me, accusing me of making up a "false revenue, not only by levying taxes, but "more than that, for, if I recollect aright, they "only hinted at that, they said I was doing this "by a monopoly of grain, the price of which I "raised by my command of the grain, and sold "dear to the troops, so as to make the loss fall on "the Bombay Government! In short, of an act "so infamous, that, had there been one iota of "truth in it, hanging would be too good for me." I beg the special attention of the House to what follows:—"Had (continues Sir Charles) the Clerk "not made this mistake, I should have had in "both the Bombay and Calcutta archives, a "heinous crime registered against me by my "bitter enemies, which might hereafter be brought "to light and given to the world when I am no "more, as an irrefragable proof of my bad con-"duct." (*hear, hear.*)

Sir Charles Napier is no more, and, as he anticipated, this miserable charge has been repeated against his memory on the authority of the Bombay archives, and has been used to justify his slander by the bitterest of his enemies. (*hear, hear.*) Well, Sir, I recently entered a notice of motion for the Despatch of Sir Charles Napier in answer to the official charge against him, but I was assured that it could not be found. (*hear, hear.*) The answer was most full, distinct, and particular in meeting every point of the accusation against him, but, although the charge was forthcoming, the answer to it cannot be found. (*hear, hear.*) The Honourable Member for Guildford (Mr. Mangles), has informed me that this injurious paragraph was copied from a return from the Bombay Government, and that search has been made, but without success, for Sir Charles Napier's answer. I do not doubt the good faith of the India Directors nor the diligence of the search, but there is something unpleasantly suspicious in the non-appearance of this document. It was forwarded to Bombay; either it has been improperly retained there, or, if sent to this country, it has been thrown aside and lost. I will venture to say that such is not the treatment which charges made *against* Sir Charles Napier have received—they will all be found carefully preserved and duly ticketed, and ready for immediate reference. (*hear, hear.*)

Of the answer itself, I will pledge my word to the House that it was as full, as complete, and as satisfactory as an answer could be. In the absence of this document, let me, by the kind indulgence of the House, be permitted to bring

forward some evidence on this subject, the very strongest which could be produced. Sir Charles Napier left Scinde on the 1st October, 1847, and was succeeded in the government by Mr. Pringle, a civilian. On the 31st December, 1847, Mr. Pringle made an elaborate report on the state of Scinde. With reference to Sir Charles Napier's financial policy, Mr. Pringle wrote:—"Moderation, "simplicity, and equity have taken the place "of rapacity, complexity, and oppression; and "although there may be much room for improve- "ment, I am inclined to think the progress hitherto "would bear a very favourable comparison with "that of most provinces which had been for the "same time under our rule, and reflects much "credit on the officers to whom it is due." Mr. Pringle thus sums up his observations on Scinde: —"I hope it will not be considered in excess of "my province if, in concluding this report on "the civil administration as I have found it to "exist, I take occasion to express the sense with "which my inquiries have impressed me of the "wisdom, energy, and ability with which it has "been organised and directed by his Excellency "the late Governor, under circumstances of "considerable novelty and difficulty."

Here was direct testimony as to the character of Sir Charles Napier's financial policy. But it may be objected that this was written after only two months' experience, and that a more careful inquiry might have brought a change in Mr. Pringle's opinion. Two years afterwards, when Sir Charles Napier was appointed to the command of the Indian army, Mr. Pringle, who had no

personal acquaintance with Sir Charles Napier, wrote to him as follows:—

"On your fitness for the military command "there is but one opinion. I speak as one who "has had more than ordinary means of forming "a judgment, when I say that your aid will be "found not less valuable in the civil government, "if your colleagues be wise enough to avail "themselves of it; and I can wish nothing better "for the interests of our newly-acquired provinces "in the Punjab, than that they may have the "benefit of the same strong and just government "which was so successfully applied to the intro-"duction of order here."

Now, let me ask, could it be credited that, if Sir Charles Napier had been guilty of the malpractices imputed to him, Mr. Pringle, who succeeded him in the government, would be found, two years after he had possessed the fullest means of acquainting him with the facts, going out of his way to express such strong opinions of the justice and energy of Sir Charles Napier's rule in Scinde? (*hear, hear.*)

But the indirect evidence does not end here.

Mr. Pringle was succeeded by Mr. Frere, the present chief Commissioner of Scinde, a man whose integrity and ability are well known to many members of this House. I had the pleasure of meeting Mr. Frere in this country last year, and he told me that, highly as he appreciated Sir Charles Napier as a soldier, he thought his genius for civil government still more remarkable. And I was much struck with a remark of Mr. Frere, that so deeply imbued was the mind of Sir Charles

Napier with the principles and practice of civil government, that he was satisfied that if he had been awakened in the middle of the night, and asked to dictate a minute on any measure of police or revenue, or any detail of civil administration, he would have done so without hesitation, in language which would not have required the slightest alteration. And Mr. Frere could hardly find words to express his sense of the tenderness, humanity, and kindliness which underlay an exterior somewhat rugged, and a disposition somewhat irritable*. (*hear, hear.*) Sir, the facts I have brought before the House would in themselves justify the time I have occupied in refuting this official slander; but the necessity for this refutation will be still more apparent, when I read to the House an extract from a pamphlet written recently by Dr. Buist, in which he justifies all his former and present attacks on Sir Charles Napier, by quoting the very paragraph in this return of which I complain. Here are Dr. Buist's own words:—

"A paper has been presented, by order of Par-
"liament, on the Land Revenues of India, from
"which the following is an extract:—The parlia-
"mentary paper seems nearly a transcript of the

* These words seem to have been Mr. Frere's; but whether his or Mr. Bruce's they are totally at fault as to Sir Charles Napier's temper and manners. His exterior was not rugged; he was gay and kind, and cheerful, with that real politeness which springs from good feeling though too frank for mannerism; he was remarkable also for a quaint mirthful social humour, that won upon both men and women, especially the latter, and ruggedness is certainly not what they like.

" official intimation sent formerly, and not, as " asserted by mistake of the clerk, to the Governor " of Scinde in 1846. It shews, that not only may " we have war and conquest in India, prosecuted " against all authority, but we may have cooked " accounts, grain raised by monopoly to famine " prices, transit duties under the most obnoxious " form of taxation, without anyone having the " power to punish or prevent." And then followed the extract from the return laid before the House.

The Hon. Member for Guildford informed me that a justification for this statement in the report would be found in Colonel Rathborne's evidence, as quoted by Sir George Clerk. As Colonel Rathborne had been a Collector in Scinde under Sir Charles Napier, I looked with some interest at the passage furnished me by the Hon. Gentleman. It was in these words:—" The Collector was in the " position of a wholesale corn-merchant, and acted " precisely as one in the trade would do." Of course he did, and it was Sir Charles Napier's duty as long as the revenue consisted of grain to get for it the highest market price. But that was a very different thing from forcing up prices by virtue of his position, and selling grain at fictitious prices to the Commissariat. The Commissariat accounts and the prices current of the day were still in existence, and would easily refute the latter charge. With respect to the former and more serious charge of raising unnaturally the price of grain to a starving people, it was wholly untrue. Sir Charles indeed continued the system which had long subsisted in Scinde of exacting a portion of the grain for the purposes of revenue—but he

reduced the proportion—and introduced many improvements in the manner of levying it, while he encouraged the substitution of money-payments by arrangements favourable to the tax-payers.

The years succeeding the conquest were years of scarcity and suffering, for not only had agriculture been neglected during the war, but an unusual dearth produced a scanty crop, nearly all of which was devoured by a flight of locusts, which desolated Scinde in common with several other regions of Western India. But Sir Charles did his utmost to mitigate these sufferings by allowing all grain to be introduced from foreign States, such as the Punjab, Moultan and Bhawulpore, at a mere nominal duty of 1*s.* 3*d.* per quarter, while no duty whatever was charged upon grain imported from the provinces of British India; and, as Scinde was accessible from the North by the Indus, and from the South by the sea, the neighbouring province of Goojerat being the most fertile corn-growing country in India, the absurdity of supposing that he dictated prices in Scinde, while he admitted unlimited importation, is too apparent to require argument. And it is remarkable that Scinde was the only province in India in which no tax was laid upon salt. Nor would arguments be required by any of those who personally knew that great man, or had read his life, to disprove charges affecting his humanity, for if one quality more than another shone forth in his character, it was the depth and earnestness of his sympathy with the poorer classes. Yet as official authority has been given to this unjust and cruel imputation, I conceive I have only performed an act of simple justice to the memory of an

illustrious public servant, when I vindicate it from charges so repugnant to his character and so destitute of truth. (*hear, hear.*)

Mr. WILLOUGHBY.——SIR, I regret very much the absence of my honourable and gallant friend, the present Chairman of the East India Board, from his place in this House during this discussion, and I also regret that I am not at this moment, but in his absence I beg to say that I think I am in a position to prove that there was nothing intentionally wrong in the report in question, the statement being taken from the Annual Report of the Bombay Government, dated December 25th, 1855. With regard to the civil government of Sir Charles Napier, I can only say he was not responsible for the system of collecting the revenue, though he might have been for the manner in which that revenue was realised. In 1854 a voluminous Blue Book on Scinde had been published; in that would be found the minute of Sir George Clerk, who had gone to Scinde to make himself acquainted with the state of that province; Sir Charles Napier was not responsible for the system which he found in force in connection with the revenue as afterwards realised. In connection with the subject, I will read an extract from the minute of Sir George Clerk, dated April 24th, 1848, in order to shew the evils that existed.

Then came the words quoted by the Honourable Member as used by Colonel Rathborne. So that it would appear that the collector managed the market for grain, overholding or letting out, as was best calculated for keeping up the prices,

acting, in fact, as a wholesale corn merchant, and thereby making appear an incorrect amount of revenue. With regard to the character and conduct of the late Sir Charles Napier, I will not say that he was responsible for the abuses in the collection of the revenue, and I contend that the extracts I have quoted shew that the corn was sold out at enormous rates, thus giving a fictitious amount of revenue.

General CODRINGTON.——SIR, I cannot refrain from saying that I feel, deeply and acutely, the charges that have been heaped upon the head of Sir Charles Napier, as represented by the Honourable Member who has called the attention of the House to the subject. (*hear, hear.*) I say it is most melancholy, as well as humiliating, to the feelings of the friends of the gallant General, who fought so long and so well on behalf of his country in almost every quarter of the globe, to have those charges against him raked up, now that he is no longer amongst us to defend himself, and when Death ought to have set a seal upon them for ever. (*hear, hear.*) I contend that when such miserable charges as those now before the House were made against Sir Charles Napier, a great man, whose name was dear to every Englishman (*hear*), it was but fair to the memory of that great man, the value of whose services were never appreciated until it was too late to do so (*hear, hear*), his answer to those charges should be forthcoming. (*hear, hear.*) The House had heard the charges against Sir Charles Napier, and he would be glad to see the answer to them. (*hear, hear*). The Honourable Member who had just spoken had repeated the

charges; and it was but fair to the memory of Sir Charles Napier that his answer should be produced. (*hear, hear.*) I feel satisfied that those charges could be refuted, and therefore it is melancholy to see the character and memory of so great and good a man frittered away by unsupportable charges. (*hear.*)

Mr. Roebuck.——Sir, I concur in every word that has fallen from the gallant General on this subject. I say with him, that it was melancholy that the character of Sir Charles Napier should be frittered away by such slanderous imputations. That character was British property, and it ought not to be so frittered away (*hear, hear*); but there were always *vermin* in society ready to prey upon the characters of great and good men. If there be a man who, more than another, exhibited forbearance, and gentleness, and greatness of disposition, that man was Sir Charles Napier. He fought the battles of England in a manner that shewed his great skill and bravery, and he won for this country a renown of which she might well be proud; and when he was leaving the country, and the very people whom he had conquered, they followed him down to the river when he was going away, and shewed by their actions, their manner, and their expressions, how much they honoured him, and how much they appreciated him, for the valuable services he had rendered them. (*cheers.*) They were not insensible to the evils he had on the other hand inflicted upon them in conquering them, yet, notwithstanding that, they as thoroughly were persuaded of his complete humanity; and they evinced,

by their manifestations, that they regarded him not merely as a good and just governor, but as a great and distinguished soldier. (*hear, hear.*) I ask any man to read the valuable Memoir of the life of Sir Charles Napier, written by his gallant and distinguished relative, and if he would look into the last volume of it, he would see in every word he uttered the most just sentiments, and the most correct prescience of the outbreak that had lately taken place; and if the Directors of the East India Company had taken warning by what that great man had indicated to them, they might have averted those calamities. (*hear, hear.*) However, it fortunately does so happen that I hold in my hand a letter written from Colonel Rathborne to the Honourable Member for Merthyr Tydvil, upon the subject, in which that gallant officer totally repudiates the statements of Sir George Clerk. No doubt, writes Colonel Rathborne, the Honourable Member (Mr. Mangles) had the authority of Sir George Clerk for that tissue of falsehoods called *Sir George Clerk's minute;* but that minute had been drawn up by the secretary of the Governor, Mr. Goldsmith, and he (Colonel Rathborne) was quite satisfied that though Sir George Clerk was made its official father, he was incapable of giving it birth, especially as regarded quoting him (Colonel Rathborne) as the authority for this charge. The note I allude to is in the following words:—"My dear Mr. BRUCE,—"I have just received your note, in which you "inform me that Mr. Mangles intends to justify "the statement as to the sale of grain to the "Commissariat at fictitious prices, by the authority

" of Sir George Clerk, who, he says, quotes me as " his authority." In reply I would merely observe that he no doubt has the authority of Sir George Clerk for the statement, because it forms one of the charges against the Scinde Government, contained in that tissue of falsehoods, called " Sir " George Clerk's Scinde Minute;" but which, in fact, was drawn up for his signature by his then revenue secretary, Mr. Goldsmith. " But though Sir " George has been thus unhappily made to father " official falsehoods, I am sure he is quite incapable " of giving birth to any, and therefore it is impos- " sible that he could have given me as his autho- " rity for so gross a mis-statement." (*hear, hear.*)

Sir, that document speaks for itself, and the House must dispose of it according to its merits; but I must again repeat, that I quite agree with the Honourable and Gallant General, that the memory of Sir Charles Napier was the property of the British nation, and that it was the duty of the Legislature not to suffer it to be frittered away by a set of official vermin, who always lived upon the defamation of the reputations of great men. (*hear, hear.*) Sir Charles Napier had fought the battles of England against greater odds than they were ever fought against, and in worse times even than the present; and by his masterly movements in the field, and his great military skill as a General, had won a renown almost unknown amongst men. (*hear.*) More than that, he had governed the country which he conquered for England with so great equity and such extraordinary success, that he was attended down to the river where he embarked on leaving it by the men from whom he had taken that country;

and homage of the highest order was thus paid to his great capacity, to his justice, to his judgment, and to his humanity. In fact, the same homage was spontaneously paid to him as was paid to a benefactor, proving that as a Civil Governor he was even a greater man than he was as a Soldier. England now knew how to appreciate his services and to bewail his loss, and therefore (*cheers*) now, when it is too late to appreciate it, we know the full value of Sir Charles Napier. I asked any man to read his life as drawn by his brother, and, looking at what had just occurred, to say whether it did not almost seem as if he possessed the gift of prophecy. (*hear.*) Every word he had told them with reference to India had been fulfilled; and had his warnings been attended to, it would not have fallen to the lot of the Chairman of the East India Company to say what had happened had come like a thunderbolt on the Government of India. (*hear, hear.*) If they had taken the warnings of this wise and farseeing man, they would have foreseen the mischief and guarded against it (*hear*). But there was that in the minds of the Home Government,—there was that in the minds of the Government of India,—that led them to hate this great man. (*hear, hear.*) They hated him because he was a great man (*hear, hear*), for he towered above them, and shewed by the comparison their inferiority to himself; and the Government of India shewed that they hated that great man, whose memory was so foully slandered. (*loud cheers.*)

Mr. DANBY SEYMOUR.——SIR, I have but a very few words to say upon this subject. I rise merely

for the purpose of correcting the statement made by his honourable friend as regarded Sir George Clerk. That gentleman, I have no hesitation in saying, is not the man to put his hand to a tissue of falsehoods; on the contrary, he had duly inquired into all the circumstances of the case. Neither was it the fact that the Governor of Bombay desired to depreciate Sir Charles Napier. I agree with all that has been said in praise of Sir Charles Napier, and I believe the paragraph which had got into the report by accident had no intention of disparaging the character of that eminent man, who stood so high in Indian history. (*hear.*)

Mr. ROEBUCK.——The words "tissue of falsehoods" were not mine, but *Colonel Rathborne's* words.

Mr. DANBY SEYMOUR.——Well, be that as it may, I have only to repeat that Sir George Clerk never put his name to a document, the truth of which he did not believe, and into which he had not himself inquired. Sir George Clerk fully inquired into this subject, and it was a mistake to suppose that either he or the Bombay Government wished to depreciate the merits of Sir Charles Napier. I concur in what the honourable and learned gentleman had said as to the super-eminent merits of Sir Charles Napier. The paragraph in the return to which objection was taken had been accidentally inserted there, and I do not believe it was done with any intention of disparaging the character of the eminent man to whom it alluded. (*hear, hear.*)

Mr. ISAAC BUTT.——SIR, a charge has been made against a great man in a return on the

revenues of India, and Sir Charles Napier replied to that charge; but while the charge still stood, the reply was not to be found. It was on record in the life of Sir Charles Napier that he answered that charge fully, document after document, and line after line. Where was that answer? The charge had been reiterated, but where was the answer? That was not the way in which the character of a man who had served his country ought to be treated and trifled with. I therefore say that I think the House ought not to part with the subject without coming to some expression of opinion in vindication of Sir Charles Napier. (*hear, hear.*) It would appear from the discussion which has taken place upon the subject this evening that Sir Charles Napier himself, on discovering by accident the nature of the charge made against him, replied to it in words that had been published, and therefore there existed a complete documentary answer to the accusation. (*hear, hear.*) It was said this answer was lost, but as the Honourable Gentleman opposite (Mr. Willoughby) had reiterated the charge, some effort ought to be made for the production of the answer to it. I would suggest that the Honourable Member for Merthyr Tydvil (Mr. Bruce), who said he had seen a copy of it, should send that copy to the President of the Board of Control in a private letter, desiring him to ask the Court of Directors whether it was a true copy, and that then the whole correspondence should be laid on the table of the House. I should have been content to let the matter rest on the statement of the Honourable Member near him, but the Honourable Member opposite, speaking on

behalf of the East India Company, had reiterated the charge. If the charge were reiterated, the House ought to express its opinion upon it; but if it was abandoned, then I have nothing more to say. But as the Honourable Member opposite had not withdrawn the charge, and had seemed to me to reiterate it, I appeal to the President of the Board of Control to take some steps to get the document produced. I really do think that the Right Honourable Gentleman was bound to do that after what had occurred. An extract has been read from a certain "Blue Book," and commented upon the absence of the "charge" which was said to be lost. They had it in the life of Sir Charles Napier that he sent an answer to the Government of Bombay, refuting the charge against him; but the document which could disprove the charge was withheld. I advised my honourable friend, by whom the subject now under consideration was brought before the House, to address a communication to the Right Honourable Gentleman the President of the Board of Control, requesting him to take some steps to cause the charge against Sir Charles Napier to be produced. It was due to the defence of the memory of that maligned but gallant General that the document should be found, and orders should be sent out to India to produce it.

This terminated the discussion.

This debate requires few remarks; but some it does.

1. Willoughby's re-assertion that the charges of monopolizing grain and selling it at famine prices, was, and is, absolutely false to the very core, and shews he was a party to the original slander. His assertion that Sir Charles Napier was not responsible for the mode of collection was also untrue. Sir Charles Napier had despotic power, and could maintain, or abrogate, or modify the amount of taxation, and the collection of the revenue—which was paid in grain—at his pleasure. The assertion to the contrary was of a piece with the declarations that no design to vilify Sir Charles Napier existed! to impute crime is not to vilify! But if there was no design of that nature, how came it that the "*Homeward Mail*," an organ of the Directors, should have published about the time the return was asked for, an article expressly directed against Sir Charles Napier's government, in which, with many additional falsehoods, the very words of the Parliamentary return are used? And this was again quoted at length by Buist!

2. Colonel Sykes, and the Chairman of the Board of Directors, Mr. Mangles, speaking of the present unhappy revolt, said—Sykes that it had come like the cholera! none knew how or where. Mangles, as noticed in the foregoing debate by Mr. Roebuck, said it had "*come like a thunderbolt.*" Again, let Sir Charles Napier's prescience be marked and compared with these men's stolid affrontery of declamation.

Extracts from a Letter of Sir Charles Napier, 1851, *when Commander-in-Chief.*

After laying down a system of military movements and defence, "*if forced to fight for life and* "*India*," he thus continued:—

This may seem a wild idea of danger, but it is not impossible, and we should be prepared: for if ever mischief comes to India it will "*come like a* "*thunderbolt.*"

3. Mr. Danby Seymour's mawkish defence of his official colleague, Sir George Clerk, was inaccurate in the premises and conclusion. Sir George Clerk, he said, would never sign his name to a document he had not ascertained the truth of by inquiries, and that Sir George Clerk had not done so here.

Now, Sir George Clerk was not long enough in Scinde, nor in a state of health to ascertain personally any thing about Sir Charles Napier's government accurately; nevertheless he set his name to a document drawn up by his secretary Goldsmith, a malignant partisan, and justly stigmatized by Colonel Rathborne as "*that tissue of* "*falsehoods, called Sir George Clerk's Minute.*" Sir George Clerk has not, and as a man of honour cannot defend its foul misrepresentations.

The Directors who gave the return into which this charge of the Bombay Council was foisted, cannot find the refutation: the false charge they could find, and with stealthy foulness palmed it on the House; but the refutation they cannot find! I can, and here give it in all integrity.

Sir Charles Napier to the Governor-in-Council, Bombay, October 21st, 1846.

" Right Honourable Sir.—I have the honour to state, that I have read a letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Stuart, dated as per margin—19th September, 1845, No. 370—to Captain Brown, the Secretary to the Governor of Scinde. In one of the enclosures are two '*Minutes*,' by Messrs. Crawford and Reid of the Bombay Council, reflecting on my character. I therefore take the liberty of answering the letter of Lieut.-Colonel Stuart direct to your Excellency.

" In the first place, the document marked A will shew that I have done all in my power to put the collectors and the commissariat into communication with each other, with a view to reduce the expense of the latter, when possible. In the next place, Captain Preedy's letter gives a clear explanation why the grain, called *gram*, is so dear in the Kurrachee collectorate. Had the Bombay Government waited for Captain Preedy's explanation, this correspondence, so unjustly accusing me of forcing up the price of grain, would not have taken place, and the offensive '*minutes*' made by Messrs. Crawford and Reid would not have been made. I will first answer the minutes: they appear to have been forced upon His Honour by his Council."

" *Para.* 1.—Answer. The grain in Scinde is sold at the '*market price*,' which is *not* determined by the collectors; but—as it is every where else I suppose—by the relative pressure of *demand and supply*. Why the Honourable the Governor of

Bombay in Council should suppose that any other rule governs the market in Scinde, I am at a loss to conceive. It is true that the Ameers determined the prices at which their *own* grain was sold; which prices were above the 'market price,' and as no one would voluntarily become purchasers at such exorbitant rates, the Ameers made their Kardars answerable for the money, leaving the said Kardars to sell the grain as they best could: no other grain was allowed to be sold till that of the Ameers was disposed of.

"These Kardars were allowed to commit, and did commit every sort of atrocity upon the people, till they sold the Ameers' grain, and reimbursed themselves: this they could not always do, though they exercised torture pretty freely to effect their purpose. This system is one of the causes why Scinde was daily becoming a barren land under the rule of these tyrants. The Government of Bombay would, it seems, imagine that I am pursuing the same system, so replete with folly and villainy.

"*Para.* 2.—Answer. This paragraph falls to the ground, having been founded on the false premises assumed in the first place, namely—that the collectors fix the price of grain in Scinde: they do not.

"*Para.* 3.—Answer. The interests of Government are no doubt involved in all questions relative to finance. For that reason it would have been well, had the Bombay Government given a more patient consideration to the present question: it would then have seen, first, its error in supposing that the Government of Scinde, with the erroneous view of increasing the revenue, kept up '*high*

prices' in grain. Second, its error in supposing that the collectors '*fix the rate.*' By such an Ameer-like proceeding, the Government would '*lose much more than it can gain in an increased revenue,*' as Sir George Arthur remarks; but I much doubt whether he is right in supposing that such a mad proceeding would increase the revenue at all! On the contrary, it would very soon decrease the revenue.

" The Bombay Government is in error as to the principles which rule the Government of Scinde. This is not surprising. I believe they differ very much from those entertained at Bombay. I can prove that my greatest exertions have been to *lower the price of grain ;* and that I have taken the only rational means in my power to effect this, namely:—

" 1. Extending cultivation by every liberal measure towards the cultivators of the land, to increase thereby the supply, and lower the price current in the market.

" 2. To take off taxes which I found existing on the importation of grain.

" To enter into details of the first would be here a work of supererogation: but I have succeeded as regards cultivation, which is rapidly increasing. With regard to the second, one of my first acts of administration was, as I have before said, to take off the taxes levied by the Ameers on imported grain. These taxes were, on the wholesale merchants, three rupees thirteen annas per cent. to which was added a demand called '*Chounsee:*' this last was not a fixed tax, but was never under two rupees four annas per cent.

making the whole, when lightest, above six per cent. The retail seller paid five per cent. and also chounsee, making seven rupees four annas when lowest.

" Having introduced the Bombay customs, because I thought they would suit both ports,—this introduction was approved of and sanctioned by the supreme Government—I also adopted the new Bombay tax on grain: this I did on the 25th of August last. All grain imported into Scinde from British ports enter Scinde, as far as we are concerned, *duty free*, being covered by a certificate, given at the port of export, that it has paid export duty. By this your Excellency will perceive, that the only enactments which tended to raise the price of grain in Scinde emanated from the Governor in Council at Bombay, unless this tax was ordered by higher authority, which I cannot easily believe*.

" A tax on the *export* of grain is unusual. I confess that I do not like a tax upon grain. As far as I am capable of judging, it would be better in general that the trade in grain should be left free, in order to reduce the price. In England, we know that the importation of corn is taxed to raise the price, that the farmer may be able to pay his heavy taxes; but in Scinde the case is different. I have made the taxes on land light, labour is cheap, and my great object is, by producing abundance, to make food cheap. If food is dear the price of labour must rise; if food be cheap the

* It was not: the tax was one of Bombay, concocted by the very men who were accusing Sir Charles Napier of laying on unjust taxes,—falsely accusing him of their own misdeeds.

price of labour will fall in Scinde, for the wages of labour are paid in grain. But the Bombay Government appears to think otherwise in regard to these matters! And here let me observe, that the tax, as it is levied at the port of export, Bombay—not at the port of import, Scinde—adds but little to the Scinde revenue, but apparently much to that of Bombay where it is levied.

" *Para.* 4.—Answer. The Honourable the Governor of Bombay is right in saying that Scinde 'once exported grain.' So she does now, to the amount of about a million of pounds weight annually; but this export is of *red rice*, which kind of grain is not required by the Commissariat, and does not enter into the present question—unless it pleases the Bombay Government to feed its Cavalry on *red rice!* The Ameers nearly destroyed agriculture, and I beg leave to remind the Governor in Council of Bombay that, although the soil of Scinde is '*naturally so fertile*,' it cannot yield produce without cultivation.

" Now let me explain the unfortunate state of Scinde, as regards cultivation since the conquest in February 1843—just two years and eight months.

" 1. Scinde never exported the grain called *gram*. The whole of lower Scinde, to use the expression of one of the collectors, 'does not grow gram enough to feed the Governor's troop orderlies'—yet on gram the question chiefly hinges.

" 2. The Honourable the Governor of Bombay in Council must surely know that war prevents cultivation, and we had war in Scinde up to

August 1843, almost too late for cultivating anything that year.

" 3. That plundering grain was rife all over the land while war lasted. People stole grain and concealed it, especially Government grain; for the conquerors were strangers in the land and fear pervaded all hearts, none knowing what the victorious foreigners would do:—quantities of grain were therefore buried, and cultivation neglected.

" 4. That we at first had no knowledge of the proper men to employ as Kardars and Umbardars, nor did we know the amount of the collections which ought to be made; consequently the Government was robbed to an immense extent: an evil which still exists, though it gradually decreases. These Kardars therefore took no pains with cultivation: they were occupied with pillage.

" 5. That the canals could not be properly cleaned till the country was fairly settled; and without this clearing there could be neither health nor crops in Scinde. When we conquered Scinde the canals were choked up, for the Ameers having resolved on war every thing relative to agriculture appears to have been abandoned for some time before the battle of Meeanee:—men were preparing for war.

" 6. That a plague of locusts fell upon Scinde. This was a heavy and extensive infliction: it not only consumed this country, but, I am told, ravaged whole provinces in Upper India; so that very small collections could be made there. Be that as it may, these locusts nearly destroyed the Scinde crop in 1844.

" 7. The locusts were preceded by a dreadful epidemic, which raged from the end of August 1843, to January 1844, destroying thousands, and leaving those who survived unable to work. The troops suffered less than the people of the country; yet, out of 17,000 fighting men, 13,000 were helpless in the hospitals; and of the remaining 4000, not above 2000 could have made a day's march. Cultivation was abandoned, for no man had strength to work.

" 8. To close this catalogue of ills which fell upon the cultivation and people of Scinde in 1843 and 1844, the Indus suddenly fell, while the few crops which that year had been raised, were yet on the ground, and a vast portion thus perished from want of water, for the river did not again rise.

" A proof of this fearful fall of the river may be adduced from the following fact. The steamer having on board the 78th Highlanders was suddenly left *high and dry* off Muttaree when going to Sukkur. The men were consequently obliged to land and march up to their destination. A canal was dug to the steamer, and after some weeks she was, as it were launched into the Indus, which had altogether left her."

It was when Sir Charles Napier, struggling amidst such difficulties and dangers, was educing order and prosperity from the chaos, that the Bombay Council concocted its minute, and made the attempt to record it *secretly*, as a charge to ruin his reputation after death; and it is now after death that, suppressing his refutation of the calumny, it is

again sought to foist the false charge upon the House of Commons, in a return to which it had no relevancy. And with these facts to encounter, Mr. Willoughby had the front to declare that nothing intentionally injurious to Sir Charles Napier was designed! It was not bad policy to withhold this defence, pretending it was lost; no amount of effrontery could have sustained the exposure. And it is not a little curious that Dr. Buist's paper was originally employed to disseminate the slander; and now the same person has been employed to disseminate the renewal of it in a pamphlet. The refutation proceeds thus:—

" After the above explanation, which was always at the service of the Bombay Government, I think it will not appear '*extraordinary*' that grain of all kinds should be dear in Scinde, although the country is "*so fertile*"*. Indeed, had it not been so, such a succession of misfortunes to agriculture must have caused a famine. But there are now other causes which produced a great demand for, and consequent rise in price of grain in Scinde. One is the large force which occupies it, and which, though not above 17,000 fighting men, may be fairly calculated at above 40,000 people to be fed. The other is, that a great addition has been made to the population by an influx of settlers from surrounding countries since Scinde has been under British rule. The unwearied exertions of the officers employed in the Govern-

* At this very time the same people were, through the tool Buist, proclaiming Scinde as a *Golgotha*, a waste of sand, to decry the value of the conquest.

ment has produced great confidence in our rule, and numbers flock to Scinde.

" The authorities have not laboured, '*like charlatans*,' to produce a dishonest revenue, and make a show in figures, as Messrs. Crawford and Reid assume to be the case: they have laboured honourably and successfully to serve the East India Company, by drawing forth the national resources of this fine country, and turning a miserable, long-oppressed and cruelly-treated people, into a happy and contented population, that will not rise in rebellion against their rulers, but will stand by those rulers in time of need—for the peasants have on every occasion shewn great readiness to assist the police, and to make their attachment to this Government in every way. This great increase of population produces an increased demand, which has been met by importation, chiefly I believe from Bhawalpoor and Guzerat, the transport of grain being easy by water. The contractors of course bringing the description of grain which the Commissariat requires, and at a cheaper price than that at which the collector can sell, viz. '*the* '*market price.*'

" *Para.* 5.—Answer. The subject has always been one to which I gave the greatest attention that my time and small ability enabled me to apply: but to meddle with the price of food is a question of great difficulty, and I much doubt the wisdom of the Bombay Government in placing a tax on the exportation of grain. Why should grain grown in Bombay pay a tax upon being taken to Scinde, a province under the same Government? However, there may be reasons for this

which are unknown to me. It increases the prices of grain in Scinde: in fact it is a corn law passed in Bombay, for the benefit of that Presidency perhaps but injurious to Scinde, by raising the price of grain in the latter province."

Sir Charles Napier was convinced that the tax was laid on purposely to injure Scinde and produce mischief to his government.

"*Para.* 6.—Answer. I now come to the '*minutes*' made by Messrs. Reid and Crawford, which two minutes I may treat as one. The motives which have actuated these two gentlemen I shall not enter upon. As Governor of Scinde I have only to deal with the result—that result is want of truth.

"It is not true that the military charges against Bombay are added to, '*in order that the revenue of Scinde may appear in a favourable point of view.*'

"It is not true that grain is issued at higher rates '*than those which ought to prevail according to the natural state of the market.*'

"I defy these two gentlemen to prove their bold and thoughtless assertions, which are utterly groundless, as I have shewn; and I take leave to say it is not a little unreasonable, that because Messrs. Crawford and Reid are ignorant of the subject on which they write, they are to pen minutes alike injurious to my character and the character of those who under my command have so zealously served the public. I may therefore be permitted to request that these two Members of Council at Bombay will not again deliberately attribute to me a dereliction of duty to the public

as Governor of Scinde. If they think me culpable, let them proffer their charges.

" Allow me to add, that although the contractors may have accidentally purchased grain from the collectors at the market price, the latter have sold to the general customers, who, the collectors tell me, have generally been the merchants of Scinde, altogether unconnected with the contractors."

Private Letter to the Governor-General, following the Official Memoir.

" If you will compare the '*minutes*,' sent to you by Sir George Arthur, Mr. Crawford and Mr. Reid, and the answers which I sent officially three days ago with the enclosed, extracted from the *Bombay Times*, you will see the style of underhand warfare made upon me. I do not accuse any of the above-named gentlemen of being '*the eminent and unquestionable authority*,' quoted by the *Bombay Times*; but when I see that the minutes and the newspaper correspond so well, and that the latter boldly asserts its high authority to be eminent and unquestionable; and when I read in a letter of Dr. Buist, the Editor, that he boasts '*how close to the sovereign authorities are his sources of information.*' When I read these things, I hope you will not think me like 'Sir Hippington Miff' in the play, if I take the above to be a 'very suspicious circumstance.' I perfectly acquit Sir George Arthur of publishing the paragraph in question, and only send it to shew how I am attacked, and how accident from time to time discovers to me the quarter, though not always the individual. I believe that Dr. Buist tells truth, which is unusual,

when he says his sources of information are close to the sovereign authorities!"

"Will you be kind enough to let me have the enclosed extract back, because I do not take the *Bombay Times*, and cannot easily get another. I enclose a return of the prices of grain in Scinde for the last eleven years, by which you may see how erroneous is the information furnished by the 'eminent and unquestionable authority,' on that point as on every other."

To the Governor-General, December 15th, 1845.

"RIGHT HONOURABLE SIR,—In answer to the extract from a letter of the Secret Committee, I have to say—

"1. That transit duties were abolished in Scinde by Lord Ellenborough's orders in 1843. I am here to obey the orders which I receive. I cannot imagine why the 'Secret Committee' should suppose I disobey those orders! The transit duties have not been reimposed upon the people of Scinde, nor any new tax.

"2. There is no '*pressure of financial difficulty*' in Scinde: its revenues increase, and a surplus of about £.250,000 sterling has already been placed to the credit of the Honourable Company, after defraying the cost of the Civil Government and 2400 armed and disciplined police.

"3. The Supreme Government, at my recommendation, sanctioned the adoption of the Bombay Customs code, and desired me to substitute this code for the destructively severe system of the Ameers in Scinde, and I have done so gradually.

Like all changes having for object to diminish the receipt of taxation, it will probably reduce the revenue in a slight degree next year, but add to it afterwards. It is well understood by, and agreeable to the merchants and people, whose present burthens will be relieved. After the 1st January, 1846, the heavy and, what is worse, the vexatious duties levied hitherto under the old system of the Ameers will cease, and be replaced by light import and export duties levied on the frontier, except on goods in transit through Scinde. In fine, the Bombay regulations are adopted.

" 4. I have the honour to enclose herewith a lithograph plan of the positions of the ' *Chokies*,' or custom-house ports which I am establishing at the entrances to Scinde; and I have been induced to hasten the establishment of these ports, for the purpose of preventing the entrance of opium not covered by passes.

" 5. Though I regret that my conduct should have failed to obtain for me what I think it deserves, the confidence of the Home Authorities in a sufficient degree to overturn the baseness of *secret* information, which I have reason to suppose was sent from Bombay, I have, nevertheless, the satisfaction of believing that I possess the confidence of your Excellency.

" C. J. NAPIER."

Lieut.-Colonel Rathborne to Sir William Napier.

" *Sept. 25th*, 1857.—Since I forwarded to you the statement rebutting the infamous slander on

the memory of your brother, in relation to the alleged raising the price of grain in Scinde to a famine scale, in order to swell the revenue, I have taken the trouble to analyze the returns appended in the "Blue Book" to Sir George Clerk's minute, and which gives the rates actually realized at the Government sales in the principal collectorate, that of Hydrabad.

"An examination of these will shew, that there was not even a shadow of foundation for the charge. For, immediately after the conquest,—when there was necessarily some scarcity, as there is in every country under such circumstances,—the prices at which grain was invariably sold by Sir Charles Napier's Government were infinitely lower than prevail in any part of the Presidency of Bombay.

"I find that in the first year, for instance, the average price obtained for wheat was only sixteen shillings the imperial quarter; in the second, eleven and eleven pence; and in the third and last year, fourteen and two pence. That in the first year the average price obtained for *Badjree* was twenty shillings the imperial quarter; in the second, fourteen and five pence; and in the third and last year, eleven shillings the imperial quarter.

"That in the first year the average price for *Jowarree* was twenty shillings and eight pence; in the second, nine and three pence; in the third and last year, nine shillings.

"That in the first year the average price for rice was ten shillings and eight pence; in the second, eight and three pence; and in the third and last year, seven shillings and a penny.

"I further find, that even during the period of comparative scarcity which prevailed the first year, before the people settled down to cultivation when the war had subsided, the highest rate at which rice was ever sold was fourteen shillings the imperial quarter, which rate ruled for a very short time, as the average for that year, only ten and eight pence, shews.

"Any one who takes the return, and converts the Indian measures into English, and Indian money into English at its intrinsic value of one and ten pence farthing the rupee, will find this statement correct in every particular. You will then see, that not only is it an infamous slander to say, that Sir Charles Napier's Government sold grain at famine prices to raise a fictitious revenue, but that, in fact, the grain was never sold by his Government at famine prices at all.

"If you think that the publication of this letter can tend in any way to make the matter clearer you are at liberty to use it; though the manner in which the subject was dealt with by the House of Commons must shew that the only effect of the calumny has been to recoil upon the authors of it."

It was to the false return thus analyzed and exposed that Sir George Clerk set his name, and Mr. Danby Seymour's assertions in his defence were idle wind.

Sir Charles Napier gave all these refutations at the time to the foul calumnies secretly preferred by the Bombay Council—they were earnestly, as shewn, called for by Mr. Bruce and Mr. Butt, but

the Directors could not find them in their archives! they could only find the refuted charge to lay before the House of Commons when their mean and spiteful attempt to foist the latter surreptitiously upon its records was detected and exposed! Such are Sir Charles Napier's enemies, such their practice. I deliver them over to public opinion, hoping they may receive what they most want—Shame!

W. NAPIER, *Lieut.-General.*

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CORRECTIONS

OF A FEW OF THE ERRORS

CONTAINED IN

SIR WM. NAPIER'S LIFE OF HIS BROTHER,

SIR CHARLES NAPIER,

IN SO FAR AS THEY AFFECT THE PRESS OF INDIA,

IN A LETTER ADDRESSED TO THE AUTHOR,

BY GEORGE BUIST, LL.D.,

Editor of the "Bombay Times;"

FELLOW OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY OF LONDON; MEMBER OF THE ROYAL ASIATIC SOCIETY OF LONDON; FELLOW OF THE GEOLOGICAL SOCIETY OF LONDON; CORRESPONDING MEMBER OF THE ROYAL GEOGRAPHICAL SOCIETY, LONDON; CORRESPONDING MEMBER OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY OF ARTS, LONDON; FELLOW OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY OF EDINBURGH; MEMBER OF THE SOCIETY OF ARTS, SCOTLAND; MEMBER OF THE SOCIETY OF SCOTTISH ANTIQUARIES; HONORARY MEMBER OF THE ST. ANDREW'S LITERARY AND PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY; HONORARY MEMBER AND FIRST CURATOR OF THE MUSEUM OF THE FIFESHIRE LITERARY AND SCIENTIFIC SOCIETY: MEMBER OF THE BOMBAY BRANCH OF THE ROYAL ASIATIC SOCIETY; MEMBER, SECRETARY, AND EDITOR OF THE TRANSACTIONS OF THE BOMBAY GEOGRAPHICAL SOCIETY, MEMBER AND LATE SECRETARY OF THE AGRI-HORTICULTURAL SOCIETY OF WESTERN INDIA, MEMBER OF COUNCIL OF THE NATURAL HISTORY SOCIETY, BOMBAY; FOUNDER AND RESIDENT SUPERINTENDENT OF THE REFORMATORY SCHOOL OF INDUSTRY, BOMBAY; LATE IN CHARGE OF THE GOVERNMENT ASTRONOMICAL, METEOROLOGICAL, AND MAGNETIC OBSERVATORY, AND OF THE GOVERNMENT CENTRAL MUSEUM, BOMBAY; LATE SHERIFF OF BOMBAY, ETC., ETC.

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THE following pages, prepared immediately on the perusal of Sir William Napier's work,* have been delayed at press till any little interest that may ever have attached to the subject has passed away. Aware that no amount of circulation could be secured for a pamphlet intended for the correction of the misstatements concerning myself, Sir William Napier has thought fit to disseminate, sufficient for the end in view, an impression, so small as scarcely to deserve the name of publication, has been printed to enable those of my brother journalists who may have unwittingly been the means of injuring me, to afford me redress.

Those alone who have suffered as I have done, from long expatriation, can appreciate the sensitiveness of the exile as to what is thought of him at home, and the pain that attacks, such as those which have been so unwarrantably made on me, before friends whose good opinions are most prized, and the kindred most dear to me, occasion.

With a life certainly above average spotlessness in all its relations, I have, during a seventeen years' residence in Bombay, devoted myself with the utmost earnestness to pursuits tending to extend the field of human knowledge and the happiness and welfare of the natives of the East. Admitted to have been one of the first to plan (1844), and in part carry out, the scheme of concerted meteorological and hydrographical observation which now engages the bulk of the civilized nations of the world, my attempts in this matter will be found warmly acknowledged by the celebrated Mr. Maury, of Washington, who, originating the project in the United States (1846), has carried his plan into execution with such triumphant success. I have been the founder of Reformatory Schools of Industry in the East: projected in 1843, commenced in 1850, and conducted in the face of neglect and opposition, till

* "The Life and Opinions of General Sir Charles Napier, by Lieut.-Gen. Sir W. Napier, K.C.B. etc." London: John Murray, Albemarle-street, 1857.

that in Bombay has attained a position of stability, and become one of our permanent social institutions. I have been the first to project and carry into effect the construction of canals of irrigation by private enterprise in India, without a guarantee, or any sort of assistance from government. With such claims as these as I imagined to acknowledgment, I find my name stigmatised with every epithet that is most opprobrious in the extracts from Sir William Napier's work, published in almost every newspaper I read, and probably believed in by the great majority of readers, solely because that through a twenty-five years' service as a journalist I have endeavoured to discharge the duties of that high office with honesty, fearlessness, and independence; censuring freely, as I praised abundantly, when praise or censure seemed due, without relation to the office or position of the individual, regard to personal interest, or bias from private feeling.

Those who study Sir William Napier's book with care will probably come to the conclusion that the principal charges against me contradict each other, and can by no possibility be true: that I could not have at one and the same time been, as alleged, an "outcast from society," and, as affirmed, on terms of intimacy with governors, commanders-in-chiefs, members of council, and secretaries; that my statements could not have been at once worthless, as asserted, and, as on other occasions affirmed, derived from the very highest authorities: but the bulk of mankind are apt to accept general assertions without consideration, and are seldom at the pains to study a book otherwise attractive, with the view of detecting its errors.

On these grounds I throw myself on the consideration of brother journalists, in the hope that those of them, at all events, who may have been the means of injuring me, will endeavour to secure for an old member of their order that justice which they would feel themselves entitled to claim, if unjustly attacked as I have been, for having honestly and fearlessly discharged what I considered to be my duty.

TO LIEUT.-GEN. SIR WILLIAM NAPIER, K.C.B.

SIR,

In perusing the life of your late brother, Sir Charles Napier, I find no fewer than seventy passages relating to myself or the paper which I have for sixteen years conducted, nearly every one of which contains at least one misstatement, most of them more than one. The passages referred to are subjoined, with such commentaries as they seemed individually to demand.

When the first part of your writings concerning Scinde appeared in 1845, I pointed out some three score emphatic misstatements in about thrice as many pages, there being in addition about twice that number made in the same space inferentially. These were mostly met by references to official documents as accessible to yourself as to me; the bulk of them were, I presume, in your own or your brother's hands. Your errors were not accidental, and they were aggravated by being subsequently repeated or persisted in, after they had been exposed.

At this date you confined yourself to what was untrue; you scarcely then ventured on the impossible. Practise in prevarication has emboldened you since then. You now not only assert the thing that is not true, but that which could not have been so. It was inconsiderate in you surely to charge me with stealing in Bombay, in July, 1845, your first book, when you knew that I left India the May previous, and did not return till the year after, and when you had yourself in your other publications shown your knowledge of the fact by quoting a letter published by me in England at the time you were alleging I was committing felony in the East. It was surely more than rash in your brother to assert that in 1844 I was in Paris, writing for the Parisian press, when he shows by other letters that he knew I was at that date in Bombay, and I had so been without interruption from the day of my arrival in 1840. I never was in Paris in my life but once, in February 1840, and never wrote a line, or instigated the writing of one, on any subject in any continental journal whatever.

The assertion made by your brother in 1843, that certain things were contained in Col. Outram's commentary on your first volume on the conquest, when Sir Charles allows that he knew that the book was not written in 1845, or published till 1846*—that the memoir of Col. Outram, in my History of the First Affghan War, was written by that officer himself—when it was known that this portion of the work was prepared and

* Vol. ii. p. 345 iii. 302. iv. 51.

published while the assumed author was in Europe,* is something more than indiscreet. Under date July, 1845, Sir Charles is made to affirm that Colonel Conway had "compelled Outram's testimonial committee to take off from the sword presented him in April, 1843, the inscription intimating that the defence of the residency at Hydrabad was due to him." Had Col. Conway, or the committee, done what is here ascribed to them, they would have acted in direct disregard of Sir Charles Napier's own despatch of that date to the Governor-general, never afterwards modified or recalled, in which he said that he considered the "defence of the residency by Major Outram so admirable that he proposed making it the subject of a separate despatch." At the date assigned to this communication to you, your brother must have read in the Bombay newspapers the following inscription, still on the sword, which he asserts to have been cancelled:—

"Presented to Major James Outram, 23rd Regiment Bombay Native Infantry, in token of the regard of his friends, and the high estimation in which he is held for the intrepid gallantry which has marked his career in India, but more especially his heroic defence of the British Residency at Hyderabad, in Sind, on the 15th of February, 1843, against an army of 8,000 Beloochees, with six guns.—Bombay, April, 1843."

These are matters which concern me not; it remains for you to explain them; unless the public are to be left to infer that the so-called letters of your brother are as imaginary as are the statements embodied in them, professing to be facts.

It is, I believe, a maxim that men or things that are despised are treated with silence: and as a converse of the proposition, that the space a man occupies in the estimation of an adversary might be measured by the amount of attention bestowed upon him. The humble individual who now addresses you may well feel overwhelmed with the position he seems for fourteen years to have occupied in the thoughts of a man, who, according to his biographer, surpassed Alexander and Napoleon, and only fell short of Wellington in greatness—whose conceptions exceeded those of the Macedonian madman who only wished to conquer the world—Sir Charles aspired to rule from his capital in Babylon from the Caspian to the wall of China. How sad that the *Bombay Times* should so long have disquieted his thoughts. His ten thousand a year of salary—his seventy thousand of prize money—the countenance of the Governor-general—the support of the *Bombay Gentlemen's Gazette* availed him nothing so long as the Mordecai of the *Bombay Times* sat, not as a mendicant, but as a monitor, at his gate. Did it never occur to you, as an old and practised author, that to devote to the abuse of Col. Outram, Mr. Willoughby, and myself, an absolutely larger space than is

* Col. Outram left Bombay, April 1, 1843; the book was published in September, being then sent to press sheet by sheet as written.

bestowed on the military operations and civil administration of Scinde, so far from satisfying the public that we were the despicable persons you desired it to be supposed, that we were considered by you, must have convinced them that we were in reality as formidable and important in your estimation as you wished us to be supposed the opposite?

You say that the editors of the newspapers in England are usually gentlemen arguing fairly on the facts before them. I concur with you in your opinion. Had it been otherwise the Press would never have acquired the position it enjoys. You make the editors of the *Examiner*, the *Spectator*, and the *Atlas* exceptions*—my own impressions were that the parties excepted had at all times held an eminently honourable place amongst the most distinguished of their brethren. The only stain on them is that they have failed to worship the name of Napier, and it is enough.

It was as an editor of a newspaper at home, a position I had for seven years occupied not without distinction, that I was in 1839 selected from the midst of many applicants to take charge of the *Bombay Times*, which during the first ten years of my administration returned ten fold into the pockets of the proprietors the money they had invested. I leave it for the world to decide whether there was any thing in the atmosphere of India or in the tastes of the members of the public service I have since 1840 mainly addressed likely to transform me into the worthless thing you would have me supposed to be—or whether it has not been my fate, in common with all others who have differed in opinion with you or your brother, to be slandered by that reckless pen which discerns good or evil only as the worshipper or critic of a Napier. Had I like Mr. McKenna tendered my services to support the conqueror of Meanee I should I have no doubt shared with him in the compliments he at present monopolizes, as confessedly the only journalist out of some hundreds referred to by you, who espoused your brother's cause. The honour is one of which I was not ambitious, it is a source of much gratification to me that I have done nothing to enjoy it along with one pronounced by the unanimous voice of his brethren the opprobrium of his order, who was dismissed from the office you are pleased falsely to assign to me, of correspondent to *The Times*, and left India at last confessed by his coadjutor as having "failed in the objects of life."‡

On this as in most other occasions you have taken on your-

* Vol. ii. iv. 40.
‡ Bombay Gazette, Feb. 1850. iv. 114.

self the task of refuting the imputations you have cast on me, in matters of personal character and social position. You state, in part at least correctly, that I was a visitor of the Governor, on terms of friendship with the Commander-in-chief, a constant inmate in the house of the Chief Secretary afterwards member of Council, appointed by the Crown since his retirement from the service East India Director, and returned to Parliament by the electors of Leominster, one of the ablest and most upright public men of his time—that I was the bosom friend of the man justly termed by your brother "*the Bayard of the Indian army*,"* and who within the past four years has enjoyed four of the most valuble and important appointments in the gift of the Indian government, and has been twice selected by the Sovereign for the highest and most responsible military duties;† and I leave it for the world to determine whether a man who without wealth, connection, or title, without public employment or other name than that which he had atchieved, in the enjoyment of privileges such as these could be termed an "outcast from society," or "one of the vilest of the most infamous wretches on the face of the earth."‡ I leave the point open for decision—it is needless for me to pronounce as to whether I enjoyed the position your brother assigns me or deserved the character he bestows on me. That the statement can be true on both points will I think be allowed even by yourself to be impossible.

I readily admit that there are many allowances to be made both for you and your late brother; that your failings are scarcely to be treated like those of other men: and in consideration of this I have throughout the discussions which have now endured over the greater part of fourteen years endeavoured to exercise a degree of moderation and forbearance which marvellous on retrospection as it now seems to me considering the violence to which it was opposed, I should be inexcusable in abandoning now that the victory is all my own, and the unanimous voice of mankind on my side.

From your recent volumes it appears that the conqueror of Scinde throughout his life was like his biographer incapable of discerning right from wrong in matters of moral principle: and that while at the outset he allowed the conquest to be "the rascality" it has since been universally pronounced—he considered it justifiable from the advantages expected to accrue to the

* Sukker Speech, Nov. 1842.

† Resident at Baroda, at Aden, at Luknow, and in Rajpoona—The organization of the Turkish contingent in 1853, the appointment not assumed; commander of the Persian expedition, 1857.

Vol. ii. 172. ‡ Vol ii. 61.

people,* and the wealth it would secure to the house of Napier! On visiting Sattara, Sir Charles pronounced in favour of the seizure of all native states without reference to the rights of their sovereigns or the obligations of the most solemn treaties.

It is equally apparent that while the virtue of the *meum and tuum* was ignored that neither of you ever could discern between truth and falsehood. Any thing however monstrous or unsupported was to be believed if only in accordance with your views—nothing however obvious or indisputable to be accepted which was opposed to them. Men were divinities or demons according as they were Napierean or anti-Napierean.

With a temperament so absolute and domineering as to brook no superior and endure no controul—a temper so violent and irascible as to lead him into an incessant round of quarrels, your brother, according to your account lived in perpetual strife—his hand against every man, and every man's hand against him. He could get on smoothly with no body, and the thought seems to have occured to you both that he was throughout life marked out for oppression and injustice—no reason being shewn or explanation given why mankind should have conspired against him. As "poor Peter Peebles" deemed all the world mad when the world had come to a like conclusion with regard to him—your brother from your account when he quarrelled with every man with whom he came in contact imagined that all mankind had determined to quarrel with him. The world is ruled by majorities, and when the concurrent views of the multitude are opposed to those of the one, the assumption may be accepted that the unit is in the wrong.

Poverty and sickness seem according to you to have combined to aggravate infirmates which stood so little in need of aggravation. Suffering from your account and from his own from the most abject want, Sir Charles Napier when the insurance office declined to accept a policy on his life, came to India "to provide for his family," with the full persuasion that he might lay his hands about him, and seize on the possessions of any party that it was worth his while to rob.

"These words are yours, Sir William, none of mine."

"The Ameers were supposed to be rich," as you have repeatedly informed us, a million sterling existed in the treasury, and though you assure us that the princesses of the Ameers took from one to two millions away with them there still remained enough to afford the conqueror of Meanee £70,000 for his share of booty. What better justification for

* Vol. ii. 218. Oct. 1842.

the attack on Hydrabad in violation of the possitive orders of the Governor-general that "the minds of the Ameers were not to be disturbed," could any Napier require even for a deed which he himself confessed to be rascally?

With an ignorance which appears to be incredible in a man of his reading and ability, Sir Charles Napier seems to have remained to the close of his career utterly unacquainted alike with the principles as with the details of the mechanism of the government he served. He never could realise the axiom that under the British constitution the military must always be subordinate to the civil powers, and that the Commander-in-chief dare not at his peril order a pistol to be fired were the Horse Guards attacked, unless by authority; and took it as a personal insult that the government of India should have exercised the functions with which the law had entrusted them, and which it would have been unwarrantable to have surrendered to any man.

So ill acquainted was he with the constitution and powers of the India-House that he considered the secret committee a section of the directors, until Sir John Cam Hobhouse assured him that the directors were powerless, that the whole political authority rested with the secret committee, and that the so called committee was in fact the chairman of the board.

The following extract from a letter published by you from Sir J. Hobhouse will illustrate my meaning—

"I have received your brother's comments on the letters of the secret committee, and regret exceedingly to find that he has entirely mistaken the purport of them, and has interpreted what was meant to soothe and pacify into a fresh insult. He appears to be quite ignorant that the secret committee is, in fact, the President of the Board, and that if he has been wronged in this last instance, I was the party responsible to him."—Vol. iii. 57.

In his song of triumph on his being in 1849 appointed Commander-in-chief, he considered that he had gained the victory over Leadenhall Street, in ignorance of the fact that though the court of directors might as easily have recalled him as his Deity Lord Ellenborough—pity they failed to exercise the power with which the law invested them—the Board of controul could insist on any nomination they desired to be made, the court's authority being a delusion—his appointment being due to the crown, and to the panic of the occasion to which the blundering of Lord Gough had given rise.

In the somewhat sordid discussion about the general's share of the Hydrabad booty it is obvious that your brother from first to last believed that the court of directors had a tangible and individual pecuniary interest in the matter, that so much at all

events of the money witheld from the pockets of the plunderers of Scinde would pass into that of a defunct East-India Company or the visionary representatives of phantom traders. He taunts the court with condemning the conquest yet accepting the kingdom of Scinde, and talks of the proposed restitution being dangerous to the *indiscreet old ladies*. Ignorant that the old ladies, whether directors or proprietors, had not the slightest personal interest in, or controul over political arrangements whatever they might be, the whole power having been passed into the hands of the ministry in 1783. He speaks throughout of the policy of Lord Auckland having been undertaken with a view to commerce, evidently considering the East-India Company still endowed with the attributes of merchants, and ignorant of the fact that their commercial character had ceased in 1834, and that the directors and the supreme council of India were all but unanimous in their opposition to the Affghan war which Sir J. C. Hobhouse afterwards justly claimed as exclusively his own.* It never seems to have occurred to either of you that had the whole of the two millions the princesses are said by you to have clandestinely withdrawn from Hydrabad out of the one million, the largest sum it was ever supposed to contain—I leave it to you to solve the problem of subtracting two from one so as to leave an ample remainder—in place of the paltry seventy thousand he secured been bestowed on Sir Charles; or that had the whole of the surplus revenues your brother asserts that he realised been lodged in the treasury, or the loss of the three millions Scinde has actually since its conquest cost India, been made good by you, neither proprietor nor director would have been one farthing the richer or the poorer. The Act of Parliament of 1833 guarantees an annual payment of £600,000 to the proprietors as interest on their twelve millions of stock. To this the dividends are restricted, and should the entire revenues of India become estranged, for this the imperial treasury is made responsible.

In keeping down or limiting expenditure deemed superfluous the directors are sparing the purses of the nation, not replenishing their own—assisting the Chancellor of the Exchequer in restricting liabilities which must within the present generation be met by the state. Individually they have no more interest in the matter than what may warm the bosoms of good and faithful servants in the discharge of duties exempt from the responsibilities England imposes on every branch of the administration, save that of India;—duties where faithful per-

* Evidence before the Salaries Committee, Sept. 1850, Blue Book.

formance draws forth no commendation, where neglect would incur no blame.

The monstrous romance about Mr. Reid and Mr. Willoughby summoning Col. Outram from Sattara to send him to the banks of the Sutlej to supersede the Commander-in-chief of India in the Sikh war of 1845-46, when the governor Sir Geo. Arthur forbad the madness of his councellors, implies that the romancer was ignorant of the fact that the minor precedencies are under such entire subordination to the supreme government of India, that the suggestion referred to if made would scarcely have been more impertinent or absurd than the offer of an ensign at Meance to relieve Sir Charles Napier of command. There were with the Bengal army in the field, in 1845-46, at least fifty officers, Col. Outram's seniors, including amongst them veterans of ripe experience and tried ability, all requiring to be superceded in the face of the enemy before a brevet Lieut.-Colonel from a subordinate presedency could have had so much as the charge of a division.

Your late brother must have been practising on your gullability when he thought it possible that you could believe, or send forth for belief, so incredible a canard as that regarding the alledged theft of a letter from Lord Ellenborough by Mr. Willoughby then Chief Secretary to government, on the occasion of the wreck of the steamer "Memnon" in 1843. The letter could not have been stolen; every article saved from the wreck despatches included being formally taken charge of at Aden. It would have been of no use to him, and occasioned no injury to the public service if it had, as there were registered copies in the archieves of the supreme government ready for use, the duplicates of the whole of the public letters sent by the "Memnon" forwarded by the mail of October, the first that followed after accounts of the wreck had been received, are now to be found both in Leadenhall Street and Cannon Row. I can only hope that the production of the various papers referred to—the medical opinion on the inexpediency of sending the 78th to Sukker at the date fixed on by Sir C. Napier—the records of the regiment shewing at what an early period of the march sickness broke out, and how baseless is the assertion of you and your brother that it did not appear till the end of the journey —the minutes of the Bombay government if any such exist in reference to the imagined proposal of despatching Col. Outram to the Sutlej in 1846, and the duplicates of the letters from the governor general forwarded by the "Memnon" lost in 1843 off Cape Gardafui, will be moved for in Parliament to confute you from your own mouth.

The papers will all be found in the archieves of the India-house

and Board of Controul, they may be had on the shortest notice. If not before then, they will probably be produced should Mr. Willoughby carry, as it is to be hoped he will, his purpose into effect of bringing you before a court of law for defamation. The nation is concerned that history shall not be polluted at its source by the pens of those it employes, and that the names of honourable men who have served their country with fidelity and distinction should not be tarnished by those whose powers of evil depend on their position in the army.

Were you to swear in a court of law to the statements published in your book you would be transported for perjury which only draws down punishment on falsehood, it scarcely aggrevates its guilt. If such a work as yours is to be accepted as history, an unjust judgment must be pronounced on those you have slandered. Conduct such as yours leads your countrymen into fearful wrong, and deserves a punishment proportioned to the malignity of your motives and the mischief your misrepresentations are calculated to occasion. The state can have no worse enemies than the habitual traducers of the noblest of her sons—the men who first tarnish their country's name, and then malign those who criticise their misconduct.

With every disposition to make the largest allowances for men prejudiced beyond all example, both ignorant of Indian affairs, and the one apparently gullable to an extent almost incredible, there are mistatements in your book and in your brother's letters which transcend the largest stretch of charity. It is not possible that men asserting (Jan. 1847) that no increase had occurred in the army in consequence of the conquest of Scinde with the notification of the governor-general of (Jan. 1844) before them, intimating that an augmentation of ten thousand had been made expressly from the exigencies in Scinde—with the returns shewing that between 1843, the year of the conquest, and 1847, when the declaration was made, the Bombay army alone had been increased from 51,694 to 65,209 men—the frontier garrisons said to have been advanced merely not augmented having been strengthened by nearly 1000 men;—it is not possible that your brother could have denied that any medical opinion had ever been given against the march of the Highlanders with the recollection that the Kurrachee report had been before him, and still existed in the public archives;—it is not possible that he could have asserted that no sickness was experienced by that corps on their upward movement, and that they first became ill at Sukker, with the regimental records open to him shewing that the contrary was the fact;—it is not possible that your brother or you could have affirmed that Scinde was not only meeting its own charges but yielding a surplus, when drafts on the treasury

to the extent of above a quarter of a million were being made annually to meet deficiencies, the gross revenue during the three years of his administration, from 1843 to 1847, being as shewn by the accounts of his own subordinates, £800,000, the expenditure above two millions, without he and you being both aware that you were saying "the thing that was not."

The bulk of your charges against me I can only meet by a flat denial of their justice. I never entertained the sentiments or employed the expressions you ascribe to me: the truth or falsehood of what you have unwarrantedly put in my mouth becomes therefore to me matter of indifference. The case is not one of those in which it can said that one man's word is as good as anothers—your assertion as my denial. If you have said no more than what is true, from the files of the Bombay Times, which if your brother never read he always paid for, and out of my own mouth you may condemn me. In this case you have an advantage over me of which I make you a gift; I have no newspapers and but few books in London to refer to, or my refutation of your errors might have been much more minute and precise than it is. You are welcome to the benefit of any mistakes into which failure of memory as to occurrences twelve years old may have led me. If left to choose I should have waited, but this was not permitted me. Your brother seems to have considered himself warranted in giving quotations from a paper he *says* he had never read, on the authority of what was stated to him by the officers around him, who, if they did persuade the general that the *Bombay Times* contained what he assigns to it, must have been one of the most impudent sets of wags who ever played on a prejudiced old man's credulity.

One phrase of mine, and one only, do they seem to have repeated correctly — the terms *liars*, *traitors*, *thieves*, *robbers*, *murderers*, &c., which you say you and your brother have been called, are none of mine. Their appropriateness was probably suggested by your own consciences; if applicable in fact the form could not seem illegitimate to writers in the habit of employing without any grounds or provocation, terms happily long excluded from civilized discussion.

I can appeal to an editorial career extending over nearly a quarter of a century for proof, that I have in no case exceeded the courteous language of a gentleman, or the dignified and measured terms due to the fitting exercise of an important and honourable profession.

The single expression I acknowledge is that in which it is stated that you and your brother had indulged in practices which would have caused a Knight in former times to have had "the spurs hacked from his heels." I confess to the phrase, and

adhere to the opinion it expresses. Sir Charles intimates, in Oct. 1842, that he was about to conquer Scinde at the time the conquest was interdicted, and when he professed to be pursuing means such as might preserve the peace:—When the Simla Manifesto had just been issued proclaiming that we were "content with the limits nature had assigned to us," and denouncing the folly of "again advancing westward so as to place the Indus between us and our resources instead of between us and an enemy advancing from the west;" when "the minds of the Ameers were forbidden to be disturbed," and Lord Ellenborough had promulgated at large the plans he proposed to pursue, and the relations afterwards to be maintained with the court of Hydrabad, "at which Outram was to be resident with the title of 'his excellency.'"* Without any relation to the treaties, the alledged refusal to sign which formed the pretended ground of quarrel—he intimated by proclamation, in 1842, that a proportion of the Khyrpoor territories was taken possession of "in terms of the treaty," when the Ameer informed him that no treaty existed. He kept back documents from the Governor-general the transmission of which would have removed the grounds of quarrel with the Ameers and saved the war. From the date of Meanee to the close of his career his letters contain one long and unbroken string of misstatements. The world mainly owes it to you that all these charges have been established beyond dispute, and I have sadly misinterpreted the history of chivalry if a knight in the days of yore could have remained on its rolls who had disgraced his name as you and your brother have in these most miserable matters done.

You have been singularly unfortunate in the time selected for the appearance of your book. Outram and Jacob, men at one time who could not be praised too highly by you and your brother for their invaluable services at Hydrabad, and are now pronounced fools, poltroons, and runaways, both tried in war and administration, are both now in the field selected by their sovereign for commands of unusual importance, in the exercise of which they are both covering themselves with glory.

One word more and I am done—I cordially concur with Sir Charles in the sentiment that strong language is discreditable in proportion to its strength if not borne out by facts."† You will find in the following extracts language of abundant strength, and strong in general in proportion to its baselessness. Sir Charles is the Daniel come to judgment on his own writings and on yours.

* Lord Ellenborough's Simla Proclamation, Oct. 1, 1842. Blue Books *Passim.*

† Vol. iii. p. 281. March 1845.

EXTRACTS.

Jan. 1843.—(1). Now also Outram had his secret views. The vilest of the Bombay journals had been filled with fulsome bombast about his abilities, and sneers at Sir C. Napier's imbecility:—such was the word.—Vol. ii. 296.

Feb. 1843.—(2). The Ameers of Kyrpoor are not gone, they said they were going but are not gone: they shall not deceive me. The "Bombay Times" has a ridiculous *fanfaronnade* about Outram. Luckily I am not of a jealous disposition or this would make me angry; it will make Outram so, it places him in such a ridiculous light to those who know he had nothing to do with the affair; he is too delicate and fine a fellow to sit quiet under such false praise.—He not only did sit quiet, but was reasonably suspected of having written it himself.—Vol. ii. 315.

Moorah, Feb. 7th. 1843.—(3). Abuse in the newspapers: one says I do nothing; another that I do all myself: a third that I take no advice or suggestions—not far wrong. A fourth that I am aware of my own imbecility and am entirely guided by Outram! Ain't I a funny fellow? However a letter from Lord Ellenborough attributes the prospect of peace in Scinde mainly to my "decision and enterprize;"—alluding to the desert march, which now appears to people an easy matter: it was before looked on as an *ugly job*, and it might easily have been so.—Vol. ii. 316.

Feb. 1843.—(4). There may be no time to write to-morrow to my best-loved friends, and with my battle luck my letter-writing may be altogether interrupted: if so, you and my brother William will find in my journal and letter-books ample materials to defend me from the Indian press, the editors of which are perhaps the most infamous and degraded set in the world.—Vol. ii. 322.

Feb. 1843.—(5). And because he has given me latitude of command, have also fallen on me in a way to be sure which draws ridicule on themselves: if I am killed there will be no end to their lies; but through the English papers, whose editors are men of some character and gentlemen, William and you can set me right. God bless you. To fall will be to leave many I love, but to go to many loved, to my home! and that in any case must be soon.—Vol. ii. 322.

I have already said that many of your brother's letters bear the impress of having been written at dates long subsequent to those they bear. "The ridiculous *fanfaronnade* about Outram," whom I had then only twice met, was, to the best of my recollection, a short recapitulation of general orders, and of what had fallen from Sir C. Napier himself or from the principal speakers at the dinners given the by officers at Sukker in November and at Bombay in December 1842. The latter was one of the most numerously attended that had ever occurred at the presidency, when a sword worth £500 was subscribed for by the army at large. The phrase imbecility was never used towards your brother by any newspaper in India, his errors lay in strength not in weakness. Outram, I will venture to say, was never suspected by any human being, not even by Sir C. Napier himself whatever he may have said to the contrary, of writing a

line in his own commendation. The modesty of his late dispatches from Persia contrast strikingly with the vain-glorious arrogance of the writings of his defamers. So far from there being any abuse of Sir Charles Napier in the newspapers, till long after the battles of Hydrabad (Feb. and March 1843) they were filled with the most glowing eulogies of his achievements—the *Bombay Times*, the most vehement denouncer of the policy all now concur in condemning, being the most cordial and warm. There was no room left for censure in the newspapers. Sir Charles Napier had very properly himself written for the *Bombay Times* an account of the object of the desert march (see vol. iii. p. 322) which, under a mistaken idea of his purposes, I had warmly commended. Lord Ellenborough very naturally expected peace in Scinde after having forbidden Sir Charles "to disturb the minds of the Ameers." The most despotic and head-strong of govenors generals little dreamt that the General had long before dertermined that there should be no peace till Scinde was ours. The following are the names of the Gentlemen who conducted the best known of our Indian Journals in 1843, so far as I can recollect them:—the *Englishman*, Calcutta, Captain McNaughton previously deputy-judge-advocate-general Bengal Army, Mr. (now Sir Ronald) McDonald Stevenson, projector, afterwards engineer of the great Bengal Railway; *Hurkaru*, Mr. John Kaye, Bengal Artillery, now of the India House, Author of the History of the Affghan war, the best historical memoir of the present day; *Calcutta Star* and *Morning Star*, Mr. James Hume, Barrister, now Police Magistrate of Calcutta; *The Friend of India*, a journal allowed to rank with the very first newspapers in Europe, Mr. John Marshman, one of the ablest advisers of government and most valuable of the witnesses examined on Indian affairs in 1853; all but successful for Ipswich for which I hope to see him returned first election. The Madras papers from their position shared but little in Scinde discussion; *The Bombay Courier* was conducted by Mr. W. Crawford, Barrister, now senior Magistrate of Police; *The Bombay Gentlemen's Gazette*, by Mr. P. J. McKenna, stated by Sir Charles to have made him a tender of service: the journal had just come into existence, and was throughout its career considered along with the *Kurrachee Advertiser*, believed to be the organ of your brother, and the *Guernsy Advertiser* which so largely shared your *sympathies* on Indian questions, to be without parallel in personality and blackguardism. There were then some thirty newspapers in various parts of India costing close on £100,000 a year for their maintenance, deriving their chief support and nearly all their intelligence from officers of the British army. It is for you to explain how it happened that these, banded together by

no common interest, addressing themselves to a body of highly educated gentlemen, amongst whom you assume that your brother was a special favourite, should have been unanimous in their condemnation of the Scinde policy, unless on the conviction that that policy was wrong. It is only now that we for the first time learn from his own letters, that Sir Charles went to Scinde with the avowed intention of conquest, and began at once to fasten a quarrel on the Ameers by interfering between them and their own subjects. Lord Ellenborough had in Nov. 1842, without any treaty to that effect, proclaimed the Indus open from the Mercunda (in the upper provinces) to the sea. It could never have entered into any human mind that it was meant by this to prescribe to the princes of Scinde under what regulations their own people should navigate the rivers within their dominions, to which we had only obtained access for transient purposes, and from which we had solemnly bound ourselves to withdraw when our operations in Affghanistan were at an end. Being then ignorant of the facts just supplied I censured the policy only. Your dodge seems to be to draw off attention from measures, on your own shewing wholely indefensible, to fasten it on parties you malign or slander on the ground that they abused the individual they were ever most anxious to praise.

*Feb.*20.1843.—(6). His field enemies were not however the most formidable: an anti-Ellenborough faction was in full activity at Bombay, and its newspapers were in full cry of abuse; especially the "Bombay Times," under the editorship of one Buist an unfrocked priest of St. Andrew's. This faction was incessantly calling on the Beloochee tribes to rise and destroy the army; they were told in detail all its weak points, plans of attack were promulgated, and the Sepoys were incited in distinct terms to mutiny and murder their general. Outram was the idol of this faction, and certainly its active tool against Sir C. Napier. Amongst other calumnies Buist published, that the Ameers' women had been abducted by the officers from the zenanas and were living in their tents, and that it behoved all the Mussulmen of India to avenge the insult: the answer was a document signed by the whole of the officers denouncing the statement as an infamous falsehood, without even an accidental or doubtful occurrence to excuse the fiction.—Vol. ii. 336.

The battle of Meanee occurred on the 17th of February, that of Dubba on the 5th of March. The information in reference to the ladies of the Zennana reached me in May. I was never "unfrocked," never having been a "priest of St. Andrew's" or any other place. My university career completed in Edinburgh, commenced at the venerable Seminary just named. I was, in in 1826, licensed by the presbytery of Forfar, of which my late father was for half a century member, and continue on their records as a licentiate to this hour. I became connected with the press in 1832, and continued to officiate in the pulpit till

1836, when the duties of editor and preacher at a period of extreme political excitement appeared to me incompatible, and I restricted myself to the latter. Your ally the *Gentleman's Gazette* on one occasion published portions of testimonials presented in 1839 to the proprietors of the *Bombay Times*, where I am designated as "Reverend" at the date of my departure for India. In 1845 it was asserted either by yourself or one of your coadjutors in abuse, that I had been remembered soliciting a medical appointment from the India House—the two slanders are of a pair. I first crossed the threshold of this building in 1845; I had never till then to my knowledge seen a Director, and I am a Doctor of laws not of medicine. There never was any anti-Ellenborough clique or political faction of any kind, and never any such cry as that here asserted on the part of any one. Had editors been the rogues you describe they knew their trade better than to recommend the slaughter of their subscribers as you maintain they did.

March 10th, 1843.—(7). To be praised by the Bombay newspapers is more disgusting than to be abused; in England there are gentlemen editors, but in India they are generally scoundrels turned out of private society.—ii. 347.

March 1843.—(8). This reappearance of the Lion was hailed with a treasonable exultation at Bombay. "He was a great commander; his force was overwhelming; the war was a religious one; the people adored their patriarchal princes; the whole Belooch race was rising in arms; they would be supported by the Affghans; and the British troops, deprived of Major Outram's protective genius and led by an incapable old ruffian, would be destroyed." This faction, taking Outram for their oracle, had always predicted such an ending, and through Dr. Bulst's newspaper, the known organ of some members of the Bombay government, took active steps to insure such a result. His articles, which were always translated, showed how and where to attack the troops with most advantage, and the chiefs were assured, most truly, that persons of authority and influence in England and Bombay would hail their success. Afterwards, when the general's ability and engery had baffled these traitorous schemes, the secret authors declared as earnestly, that there had never been danger or difficulty and Sir C. Napier had ferociously slaughtered some half-armed barbarians!—Vol. ii. 370.

What would Sir Charles have liked since he is equally disgusted with praise as censure? Silence? Then why be so cruel as publish extracts *said* to be taken from his letters? I confess at once to have been amongst the number of those who ever praised most warmly the military exploits and many personal excellencies of the conqueror, it was the policy only not then known to be his that I condemned. Of course, not one word of the advice here ascribed to me was ever given. It would not only have been superfluous for those who never read, but eminently dangerous if acted on. Return-of-post from Scinde was at this time about three weeks from Bombay, and the attack of a position deemed assailable at the time letters on

the subject *might* have been written for me might have become any thing but a wise measure a month afterwards. The absurdity of the charge renders it to me harmless—fatal to your brother's veracity.

May 1843.—(9). This disagreeable event has, or may, injure my plans much: but it is told to you in confidence; for there is such an extraordinary coincidence in the opinions put forth on Scindian affairs by the "Bombay Times," and those in Mr. Willoughby's private notes to me—identical words appearing in both, that I fear an attack on the person who unintentionally got me into this scrape. For myself I care not. A man must have a miserable opinion of himself who cares for the attacks of the "Bombay Times" and Dr. Buist: your order for his prosecution has given great satisfaction to the officers here. I fancy Buist and his writers would greatly rejoice if there should befall in Scinde a *pendant* to the Cabool massacre."

The prosecution noted above was never instituted: probably from the influence of Willoughby, the secretary of council and secret adviser of Outram.—Vol. ii. 383.

The writer of this letter seems very soon to have forgotten the words he here puts into Sir Geo. Arthur's mouth a little further on (vol. iii. p. 101) where instead of prosecuting he discourages prosecution. Why did the gallant general apply to the governor instead of taking the matter into his own hands? But a few years before Sir John Keane, Commander-in-chief, and Admiral Sir C. Malcam, superintendent of the Indian navy, each had sought the constitutional mode of redress in the Supreme Court. When people take the same views of the same subject their expressions are not unapt to be similar. During the Affghan war the sentiments of the *Bengal Hurkaru* and *Bombay Times* of corresponding dates were often so similar that the editors might have been supposed in communication had the thing been possible. Similar coincidences will be found betwixt the expressions of both papers and those of the Chairman, St. George Tucker, where communication was equally impossible. Sir Charles Napier's views of the Vandalism of the destruction of the public buildings at Cabool and the insanity of Notts advancing from Candahar without leaving supports in his rear, so exactly correspond with the sentiments and expressions to be found in the *Bombay Times* that he might with equal propriety as Mr. Willoughby have been assumed a contributor to its columns. I have my doubts of the whole story. Up to May 1843, Sir C. Napier had never, so far as I can remember, been spoken of in terms other than those of respect. Sir Geo. Arthur had strongly recommended to the Court of Directors my continuance in charge of the government observatory, an unsalaried appointment which I had received from his predecessor, Mr. (afterwards Sir George) Anderson, then senior member of council. He had always treated me with marks of consideration

and friendship—and that he was too sternly upright a man to be moved by these circumstances from a prosecution he considered merited—he was too high minded to continue his intercourse with any one considered deserving of it. Sir Charles Napier had at his own request been introduced to me by his Secretary, Col. McPherson, whom I had met at the mess table of Her Majesty's 17th, and knew I presume the social position I enjoyed. Sir Charles himself did the *Bombay Times* the honour of more than once making it the vehicle of his thoughts (see vol. iii. p. 332), the letter of *Lucius Junius* spoken of in terms of the highest commendation had appeared in its columns, and was understood to be from the pen of one of the ablest of those who afterwards distinguished themselves in civil employment in Scinde. A change came over the spirit of his dream the moment the *Bombay Times* began to expose the nefarious acts of which he was not then known to be the author. Failings of memory seem to have been common with you both. Sir Charles states that on the 22nd of Feb. the prize agents talked of having found two millions sterling in the treasury, and afterwards he asserts that the princesses had carried two millions clandestinely away; and in July "he held up his hands when the Governor-general told him his share would be £50,000," and in the following April he tells us that no prize money had all the while been expected, and that it was then (1844) doubtful if any would be obtained!

June 1843.—(10). Then came a report that you had refused to obey, spread by a man called *Devan*. I could not believe this and wrote to you in all haste: as I expected, you had obeyed, but the mere report broke off all treating with Shere Mohamed when, as I hoped, we were on the point of getting him to lay down his arms! By a prompt proclamation, and replacing the kardars, I have in some degree palliated the mischief Devan's lying had produced; but it has broken off all treating and will cause much loss of life. This Devan was afterwards, on strong grounds, supposed to be an emissary of Buist.—Vol. ii. 392.

I never heard of any man called *Devan*, and never had or desired to have an emissary of any sort any where in the whole course of my life. I never had the slightest occasion. I was never engaged in any enterprise I knew from the first to be "rascally." I never required any defence of that which "my conscience told me was right," or any undue or illegitimate stimulant to urge me to the discharge of my duty. I was on these grounds saved the temptations and humiliations to which Sir Charles describes himself as having been subjected by his pecuniary necessities, and the wants of his family.

July 1843.—(11). About 3½ lacs would make a pretty little fortune for

these rascals, though from it should be deducted their payments to the editor of the *Bombay Times*, who no doubt understands his trade as well as these moonshees. Having discovered this secret, and that the poor ladies would not profit, I have told the moonshees I will not pay them a farthing; and that, unless by to-morrow night, they obeyed my orders and furnished a list of rations in kind, I would put them in prison, which I mean to do accordingly.—Vol. ii. 400.

I understand my trade quite sufficiently to know that no more ruinous practice can be pursued than that which brings the independence or integrity of journalism into suspicion. I have no cause to feel offended with the imputation of corruption from you or your brother, who appear to have considered bribe-taking quite a common occurrence in India, and who saw nothing unbecoming in the conduct of an editorial offer of service on the part of the conductor of the *Gentlemen's Gazette*. Sir Charles enumerates half a dozen of occasions on which he was offered money, when he obviously supposes that the offerer considered him purchasable. He does not seem to have been aware that the offer of gifts to public men was an oriental usage—that it was an insult to refuse them—but that a government regulation half a century old in daily exercise sanctioned the acceptance of these, but made it imperative that they should be disposed of for the benefit of the treasury, the public purse being chargeable with the presents made in return. Sir Charles had no right to decline the gifts professed to have been offered him. They ought to have been accepted and carried to the credit of government. At the very time you are magnifying the wonderful familiarity with Eastern affairs your brother in an incredibly short space of time attained, you afford a demonstration under his own hand that he continued a griffin to the last. I had not the temptation to lay my hands about me which your brother confessed himself unable to resist—the fruits of honest industry in the exercise of an honourable profession sufficed my wants and satisfied my ambition.

July 1843.—(9). I must lift the curtain of the zenana, which Mr. Buist says I have already done for coarse purposes.—Vol. ii. 401.

July 1843.—(8).. The Beloochees thought they could murder and plunder us. Their constant theme in dhurbar was, "*We are braver and more numerous than the Affghans under Akbar Khan, the Feringhees are not so numerous as at Cabool.*" They are now content, and though the "Bombay Times," as usual, is trying to excite a guerilla warfare, it can do nothing against us: conciliation on one side and hard fighting on the other will succeed.—Vol. ii. 405.

July 1843.—(18). This fort had become very necessary, because Dr. Buist had in his paper especially pointed out to the Beloochees what parts were most vulnerable, accompanied with a detailed plan of attack—Schwan being marked as peculiarly favourable for such warfare.—Vol. ii. 417.

Every single one of the imputations against the *Bombay Times* is untrue. That Sir C. Napier could have endeavoured to per-

suade you that an editor would pursue the course most ruinous to his own interests, indicates the opinion he had formed of a mind so deranged by prejudice as to be capable of believing any thing however monstrous. What could the whole members of "the Bombay clique" have done for me to compensate for the loss of the support of the Scinde field force? The *Bombay Times* was never so prosperous or popular as when, according to your assertion, recommending the destruction of its best supporters—the persons to be slaughtered being the very correspondents who supplied all I knew on the subject under debate.

Sept 1843.—(14). It is good you should know, that Dr. Buist is constantly at the house of Mr. Secretary Willoughby of the Bombay government; that Mr. Willoughby is Outram's bosom friend—he was also his condjutor, adviser and director in his publications against Sir Charles Napier—and is, the world says, chief proprietor of the "Bombay Times." I know that Outram is in debt, especially to the powerful house of Rivington, which house is known to be in union with the "Bombay Times," and is said to cry up Outram with a view to their claim on him: I know, for he told me so, that they lent him 10,000 rupees to go to England.—Vol. ii. 433.

I arrived in Bombay and assumed office in May 1840—up to the date of this quotation I certainly had never been either in Mr. Willoughby's house or office half-a-dozen times in all. Outram was, as Sir C. Napier perfectly well knew, in England from April 1843 till May 1844, so could not have the advantage of counsel or coadjutorship. The bulk of the remainder of the assertions have been disposed of already by Col. Outram or his agents, and part in a letter I published in 1845 in the *Morning Herald*. Messrs. Remington and Company were not Col. Outram's agents: so far from being in any way connected with the *Bombay Times* they were the chief proprietors of its rival the *Bombay Courier*, as may be seen by the letters published in 1841, on their dismissing Sir Charles' friend, Mr. McKenna, from employment as editor. Mr. Willoughby never was proprietor or in any way connected with the *Bombay Times*. In 1842, when brought up by Chief Justice Roper, afterwards threatened with removal from the bench, the proprietors' names were published just as Sir C. Napier arrived in India. They are given again both as they then stood and as they stood in 1851, in a petition I laid before Parliament in 1852, praying to be examined before the Committee on Indian affairs then sitting. It will be seen that the name of Mr. Willoughby is not to be found amongst them. No human being least of all the man who makes the assertion to the contrary ever dreamt that it was.

Original Proprietors of the *Bombay Times*:—Messrs. Frith and Co.; Brownrigg and Co.; Ritchie Stewart and Co.; Skinner and Co.; William Nicol and Co.; Dirom and Co.; Higginson

Cardwell and Co.; Edmond and Co.; Martin Murray and Co.; Gillanders Ewart and Co.; Grey and Co.; Framjee Cowasjee Esq., Merchant; William Howard, Esquire, Barrister; William Montriou, Esquire, Barrister; Dr. William Mackay. The principle Proprietors of the *Bombay Times* in the end of 1851:—Gregor Grant, Esq.; C. S., Sudder Adawlut; Henry Young, Esq.; C. S., Collector of Customs; Colonel Holland, Quarter-Master-General of the Bombay Army; Dr. Boyd, Presidency Superintending Surgeon; Dr. Buist, Sheriff of Bombay; Thomas Forsyth Grey of the house of Dirom, Hunter and Co.; Native Manockjee Limjee, Esq., Parsee Merchant; Cowasjee Jehangeer, Esq., Parsee Merchant; Manockjee Nusserwanjee, Esq., Parsee Merchant; with a large number of Natives of respectability. You may recognise the name of one of the proprietors as Manockjee Limjee, as the gentleman from whom Sir Charles accepted an invitation to a party on his final retirement from India. The only Lawyer amongst them at the date your brother proposed to prosecute, was Mr. William Howard afterwards Advocate-General. Mr. Montriou had before this gone round to Calcutta. The public on perusing it may, perhaps, feel disposed to question the probability of the statement, that such a "wretch" as I am described to have been, should have been originally engaged, or had his engagement three times renewed by a body comprising many of the most eminent men in Bombay. I have, at this date, no recollection of what the last number of the *Bombay Times* contained in May, 1844—just as little of any writhing under any criticisms, from any quarter. If any such appeared it was not, according to Sir Charles, of very long endurance.

Oct. 1843.—(16). Outram was busy, proclaiming that the Talpoor princes at large must succeed; and the Bombay Times earnestly exhorted the mountaineers not to miss the opportunity of attacking the troops while prostrated by sickness! The total loss of Scinde and the destruction of the army seemed at hand, was prognosticated at Bombay, and would have happened but for the master spirit at Kurrachee.—Vol. iii. p. 2.

Had Sir Charles Napier been killed at Meeanee the battle would in all likelihood have been lost, and 50,000 infuriated Beloochees let loose on a force of 2,500. Scinde would then have been swept of British troops, a second Cabool with the Sikhs, whom we afterwards found enough by themselves, seen in the field, against us. Here, again, the fate of our army depended on the life of a sickness-stricken, worn out, old man. Was that a risk to which any sane man would have subjected the empire, for the sake of "providing for his family," on the back of a calamity so terrible as that of Cabool. On your own shewing, your brother, for his own selfish ends, placed our empire in such a

position that its fate depended on a single life, the silence or clamour of a newspaper.

Outram was at this time in London! He left Bombay in April, 1843, returned to it in January, 1844. At the date he is asserted to have been in India, proclaiming the Talpoor princes, if at large, must succeed, he was dating letters to you from the United Service Club, St. James's.

Dec. 1850.—(17). The Bombay Times is under Outram's command, and from expressions peculiar to him I believe he wrote the part about himself in Buist's book.—Vol. iii. 16.

Col. Outram left Bombay for England on the 1st April, 1843, returned in January following. The memoir referred to was written and published in July, and is referred to by you in your Guernsey letter of the 5th of August. Both passages have the appearance, like many others, of having been written long after the dates they bear, when Outram's whereabout's had become forgotten.

Dec. 1843.—(18). The threat of a general rising demands serious attention, for the Indian newspapers are calling on the mountaineers to come down on me, and those of the plains to rise while I have 10,000 *sick unable to stir!* The natives have all the papers translated, but, thank the stars, the Beloochees of the plains being as sick as ourselves cannot rise if they would. One is equally obliged to the editors; it will not be their fault if our throats are not cut. The Bombay Times is also trying to make my men mutiny: but all these kind designs fail.—Vol. iii. 20.

Feb. 1844.—(19). The rabid abuse of the Bombay Times makes me laugh; yet it is injurious, because good and honourable people swallow it all, and if Shakespeare is right that does harm.—Vol. iii. 36.

It would be rather hard for you to convince English journalists, that their brethren in India were in the habit of encouraging the slaughter of their subscribers and contributors; or that those who mainly depended on the goodwill of the officers of the army, were constantly acting so as to incur their displeasure. It would be interesting to your readers to be furnished with a few extracts illustrative of this anomaly. Men are said seldom to serve the devil for nothing. After acquainting us with the character of your brother, it is easy to understand his risking his life for the hope of £70,000; it is not so easy to see how editors should seek their own ruin just for the love of starvation.

Sir Charles was thrifty as well as chivalrous. He tells us that before he had received any prize money, he had set aside as much as would, at 3 per cent., allow £120 to his widow and each of his daughters (vol. iii. p. 125), or £12,000 betwixt Nov. 1841, when he arrived with £5 in his pocket, to June, 1844. When he had once got fairly above the world by lawful means, he might have borne with more temper observations on the Hy-

derabad booty. The fact of his having 10,000 of his men sick in Sept. and Oct. 1843, was not sufficient to deter a man so infallible from dispatching a European regiment through the sludge to march on Scinde in Sept. and Oct. 1844.

March 1844.—(20). "The officers here are very angry about Dr. Buist's new insult. I have not read it, but mean to do so because they want me to apply officially to the governor-general and the commander in chief of the Bombay army for justice, as Dr. Buist has cast a slur on all; and added I hear to his former insults. I hear also he has brought Sir Henry Pottinger on the carpet and referred me to him.—Oh here comes the paper, for I do not longer take Bombay Times. Well, it is a nice production. I long to hear your opinion. You wanted to institute a prosecution at first, and I think it will come to that at last. Sir Henry Pottinger will of course contradict the language ascribed to him!

"The same, March 2nd.—Dr. Buist's article in the paper of the 17th ultimo I divide into three portions. 1. The asserted language of Sir Henry Pottinger. 2. The assertion that an officer of the Hydrabad force told him, Buist, the lying story of the zenana. 3. The abuse which he bestowed on the *par nobile fratrum*."—Sir Charles and his brother William. As to the first, Buist has placed Sir Henry between himself and responsibility: how the plenipotentiary will like this remains to be seen. I congratulate him on having such a discreet friend at Bombay! As to the second, our officers hope the government will find out who Buist's informant was; this does not appear difficult, as the commander in chief must know what officers were in Bombay belonging to the Hydrabad force at the time. If this officer be found out we have no doubt his conduct will meet with its just reward. With regard to the third, it is a private affair of mine and I feel doubtful whether to prosecute the blackguard or not. It is with some difficulty I have prevented an officer from going to Bombay for the express purpose of thrashing Dr. Buist; and I should not be at all surprised if this little accident happens to him some fine morning.—Vol. iii. 63.

I have quite forgotten what the new insult on the officers was in March, 1844. It could hardly have been worse, whatever it was, than the advice I am alleged to have published, to have them all killed by the Belooches. I know perfectly that the *Bombay Times* never seemed more popular with the army, than when, according to Sir Charles Napier, it was insulting them and planing their destruction. The property was at this time paying some 30 per cent, in dividends. The case of Sir Henry Pottinger was this; he had on hearing the particulars of the conquest of Scinde, written to a staff-officer in Bombay, denouncing the monstrous cruelty and injustice of the proceeding, and concluding with a request that his sentiments might be made known. The letter was put into my hands, without any conditions as to the use to be made of it. I did not feel quite sure that its publication was intended, and refrained from this. I placed it in the hands of the correspondent of the *Morning Chronicle*, I forget under what circumstances. This gentleman believed it intended for publication, and in the *Morning Chronicle* accordingly it appeared. I

was annoyed at this, but did not feel that any faith had been broken. The *Chronicle* correspondent had taken a view of the matter I had not foreseen; I had no reason to suppose he had intended to do wrong or deserved to be blamed. You may remember that you at the time, without any authority, flatly denounced the letter as a fabrication. By April (p. 81) Sir Charles admits that "the letter is Pottinger's," and of course misquotes it, and then forgets the misquotation. He says this blood is not as that fellow Outram says, and as Pottinger says, my fault. At page 135 he says, Sir Henry Pottinger has sent a message to me through his friend Capt. Del. Harte, saying "Sir Henry never could nor did it ever enter his head to reflect on me—his remarks having reference only to the policy of the governor-general," Sir Henry doubtless spake to the general question only—Sir Charles forgets that he himself had followed a policy which was in direct opposition to the views of the governor general though afterwards conditioned by him.

Sir Charles, conscious of his own misconduct, takes from the first blame to himself which no one cast on him, up to the publication of the second Blue Book in April 1844, none of us supposed that the general had any thing to do with the policy he carried out. By no possibility could we have any personal feeling in the matter. There are few from whom less danger need be apprehended than those who are constantly telling you that they mean mischief. The "hold me or I'll fight" gentlemen are not in general very pugnacious. I was to have been broomsticked, prosecuted and I know not what all, only I never suffered any injury from my adversaries "because they were prevented." The Zenana story has already been disposed of.

March 1844.—(21). This Mainwaring was a man of humour also. Being at a dinner in Bombay, Dr. Buist was placed beside him and very nervously spoke thus. Captain Mainwaring I suppose I have your dislike, I am Dr. Buist of the Bombay Times. Why should I dislike you my friend? I never read your paper.—Vol. iii. 70.

April 1844.—(22). For my part I like to let truth come out, and not let falsehood fly her colours on the field without an opponent. I would punish the Bombay Times if I could, and as to its doing the paper good, I would not mind that; all I want is that the public should hear the truth.—Vol. iii. 74.

In April (page 81) Sir Charles tells us that Pottinger had advised Lord Auckland to do the very thing Lord Ellenborough had done. By October he quite forgets all this and here assures us (p. 152) that Pottinger and Outram wanted to have the Ameers kept on their thrones. He equally loses sight of the fact that Lord Ellenborough had in his published letters of March 1842 narrated all his arrangements for the preservation

of the Talpoor dynasty. That long after this he had forbidden their minds to be disturbed, and in the Simla proclamation of Oct. 1842 had denounced the advancement of our posts beyond the Indus as an insanity and a crime.

March 1844.—(23). That miserable wretch Buist made a comparison between Moore's retreat and the Cabool massacre, before I left Poonah. I answered him.—Vol. iii. 79.

"The wretch Buist" made no such comparison further than this—the Bengal Horse Artillery, who had behaved so nobly during the siege of Cabool, were said to have become disorderly on their retreat, and I think I said, I speak from memory of what I wrote seventeen years ago, that the best English troops had occasionally done the like under circumstances of extreme discouragement, instancing Corrunna as a case in point. Sir Charles Napier, who had very obviously taken up an entirely erroneous view of what I had actually stated, wrote me a very able letter on the subject to which his initials were subscribed. This as a matter of course I published pointing out the misconception as to my meaning under which it had been written. It was two years after this that he considered the *Bombay Times* the fittest vehicle for his account of the march on Emaurm Ghur. Had I been able to approve of the mode selected by him of "providing for his family" by the annexation of Scinde I have no doubt I should have found him a most valuable correspondent all through his Indian career. He complains of his want of an organ. He and his friends had always the fullest use of the *Bombay Times* whenever they had any thing to say in explanation or defence. It was my first duty to see that my readers should not be misled by misrepresentation or disgusted by abuse, and I disallowed only those which on pretence of justifying him abounded with such personalities and blackguardism as rendered them inadmissible. He always had the *Bombay Gentleman's Gazette*, the *Kurrachee Advertiser* and *Guernsey Advertiser* at his disposal —what more could he desire? Who prevented his punishing the *Bombay Times*? the supreme court was open to him, and he had no reason to apprehend any undue leniency on the part of the Bench to the press.

March 1844.—(24). "You may well say some of the editors of newspapers are nice fellows. I am under ban here for not being afraid of them: I lashed out at a public dinner, and their fury makes me laugh. They say I am more obliged to the press of India than any man ever was before; that it abused the Duke of Wellington '*ten times as much after the battle of Assaye as it has done me!*' a nice character of themselves: but I never complained of their abuse.—Vol. iii. 78.

The newspapers most certainly said nothing of the sort. The

editors perfectly well knew that at the time Wellington was in India, and for a dozen of years afterwards, the press was under a most rigid censorship. A government secretary read all the proofs before they went to press; and was at one time severely censured for not having excluded the reports of the debates in parliament. Silk Buckingham was, in 1826, deported for having censured the appointment of a stationary agent. Mr. Fair, in 1828, deported from Bombay for a misreport committed by accident. The journalist who in 1803 dared to say one syllable other than complimentary of the brother of the governor-general, would have found himself in custody within the hour. It was not till 1835 that the danger ceased; this Sir Charles knew right well. (See Mr. F. Warden, Blue Book, 1833). The passage, like many others, seems doctered for the English palate.

May 1843.—(25). Meanwhile I have much fear of the Lion getting into the Delta district amongst the rivers; a fear however which I do not mention; for if that man Buist got hold of it he would urge the Lion to do so, in hopes of destroying us in the marshes next autumn. Already the Bombay emissaries have been hard at work, trying to stir up resistance in the way most likely to succeed, namely, murdering our stragglers. Luckily the Beloochees do not join in the wish; but as Buist is sure to do mischief there is no time to be lost in attacking Shere Mohamed. —Vol. ii. 384.

Of course in all this there is not, so far as I am concerned, one syllable of truth. But Buist seems, in the imagination of the conqueror of Scinde to have been omnipotent and omnipresent. The people of Scinde, he tells us, were able and willing to have thrust forth the Ameers had they been let lose, it required the retention of 13,000 men to prevent me from bringing down the hill tribes on the plains. I have here the Lion at my command—the only hope of the general against me was to attack him.

Sept. 1843.—(26). Meanwhile the Bombay intriguers, finding they could not with all their cries and abuse drive Sir C. Napier from Scinde, and could not get the loaves and fishes which he reserved for the brave men who had conquered the country, they changed their policy and became obstreperous for the restoration of the Ameers—the "*injured patriarchs*" being now the watchwordl.—Vol. ii. 439.

The ignorance of Indian affairs manifested by you and your brother is something absolutely pitiable. Scinde was from the first in all things save supplies, placed directly under the supreme government of India; it was to the Calcutta treasury Sir Charles professed to have sent his imaginary surpluses, to Calcutta he must have produced his accounts. It mattered not one single straw to any of the governments in India or out of it, what became of the money that passed through Sir Charles' hands. It

was credited or debited to the treasury of the state. Not one government servant would have got one farthing the less or the more had the two millions said to have been secured by the princesses out of the million and a quarter the treasury contained before its seizure been made over to the army, or had the six millions Scinde has since 1843 cost us been obtained from it. Sir Charles was never able to rid himself of the idea that power in India was matter of traffic, and that public men provided for their families, as he did, from plunder.

Nov. 1843.—(27). But now the enmity of the Bombay and English Anti-Ellen-borough factions was become so virulent, and Outram so avowedly acting with them, that Sir Charles Napier could no longer be blind to his real character and broke off all acquaintance: it was full time.—Vol. ii. 453.

Nov. 1843.—(28). The attack on the Residency was an Act of virtuous and "*Christian war*"—this is Buist's expression and a curious one:—and we soldiers were all robbers and murderers.—Vol. ii. 453.

Nov. 1843.—(29). My brother gave him an opening to contradict all the falsehoods put forth by the "Bombay Times," to injure me and exalt him. He answers, that he will not. I could not contradict those lies at the time they appeared without condemning Outram, and so held my peace for his sake. Yet now the same lies are embodied in a book.—Vol. ii. 454.

Nearly all these statements are, as usual, utterly absurd and false. Two of them afford strong presumption of having been written long after the date they bear. In Nov. 1843, Colonel Outram was in London, so that he could not have acted in Bombay with any one. The book here asserted to have at this date contained certain falsehoods, was not thought of till your history of the conquest of Scinde appeared in Bombay, Feb. 1845, it was not published, as may be seen by the preface, till the following year, about two years after the matter contained in it is made subject of reference to General Simpson.

April. 1844 (30). "What think you of Outram asking him, Lord Ripon, for a letter to Lord Ellenborough, recommending his being employed militarily? Lord R. said he never interfered in military affairs and advised his asking the duke. Outram did so, and says he got a letter"—*not* true. "He arrived at Bombay and instantly started for Lord Ellenborough's quarters, giving out that he was charged with important dispatches from the duke so said all the papers. Lord Ellenborough however refused to see him, reprimanded him for having addressed the secretary otherwise than through the Bombay government, and finally offered him employment as assistant political agent at a place where, twenty years before, he had been chief political agent! And he took it!"—Vol. iii. 87-8.

Outram left Bombay on two years furlough on the 1st of April, 1843. On hearing of the Gwallior war he resolved to return to India before his leave expired, and reached Bombay in January, 1844. The story about the duke's letter is a Naperian fiction. He never got the length of the governor-general's

camp, nor could therefore have been refused an interview. I remember well of the *Bombay Times* condemning the indiscretion of his return with the view to employment under the government of India at the time he had so hurt the self-sufficiency of the governor-general as to render him implacable. He was refused military service, the war being by this time over, but was appionted political agent for Nimar, or first assistant as the officer is termed, to the resident at Indore. He had never in his life before been employed at Malwa; in 1824, when he is said to have been resident at Indore, he was a subaltern in the Bombay army, and Beel agent in Candesh. This passage surely could never have been written in India, where all these things were so perfectly well known. Is it a "Scinde House" interpolation? Pity the gazettes, the almanac, army list, in which all these things are set forth, were not referred to in cases so very simple as this.

April. 1844.—(31). "We concluded that the Ameers would defend their fortress and capitulate under a treaty, when there would have been no prize money: indeed I do not know that we are to have any prize money now! When McPherson told me there would be some and asked me to appoint him my agent I laughed at him, and told him he was welcome but that I did not think there was money enough to pay an agent for the trouble of collecting it; his answer was he thought there would be enough to give him a few rupees. Another circumstance also shews how little we thought of prize money in the camp. Outram wanted one of the swords taken in the battle, but the prize agents would not let him have it as everything was to be sold by auction. For this Major Outram could not wait, and offered his share of prize money for the sword! You may conceive he did not expect much, for the sword was purchased for him at £15—which was more than he expected to pay for it! Vol. iii. 99.

Sir Charles has by this time quite forgotten what his letter in October says, that it was not the ratification of the treaty, but the annexation of the country, on which he was bent. He equally forgets, that instead of his having expressed any idea of a battle, or a defence of Hydrabad, that he had all along professed his purpose to be peaceful, and expressly claims credit for the capture of Emaunghur as likely to avert the war. The best evidence we can have that he was sincere in his professions, monstrous as the thing appears, was his despatch of the Bengal troops for Ferorpore, and H. M. 41st for England, just when their services were most required. Most marvellous of all, he has by April, 1844, forgotten that he wrote in Feb. 1843, that the prize agent had reported from one to two millions in the treasury, and that Lord Ellenborough had assured him that his share would be £50,000. He states in vol. iii. that the inventories shewed that there was a million and a quarter of property in the treasury just before its capture.

May 1844.—(32). That such men as Buist, Fonblanque, Howick, Eastwick, and Sullivan will abuse his history of the campaign is as certain as that night follows day, but the duke's praise will bear out his commendations. —Vol. iii. 100.

Sir Charles was in this assumption quite correct. He paid me and the distinguished men whose names follow mine, the complement of believing that we should always condemn deeds of injustice, violence, and blood, that a work written in defence of crime, every page of which was defiled by glowing lies, was as sure to experience the disapproval of honest men, as night was to follow day. The conviction of this seems to have been the constant subject of distress to the conqueror of Scinde, when in the very zenith of his fortunes. The only solace he could find was in the chimera that the world at large, more particularly the members of the press had formed a conspiracy against him, on what ground he does not attempt to explain.

May 1844.—(33). Dr. Buist carries on his scurrilous abuse of William and me in every possible form. He might be prosecuted over and over again, but most of the leading lawyers at Bombay are said to be proprietors of his paper, which would make it dangerous. Other papers take our part. I consulted Sir G. Arthur about prosecuting, and his answer was, "I prosecuted a rascally editior in Van Dieman's Land, he was imprisoned, his wife and children were starving and I had to keep them out of charity. The prosecution did the paper much good, set it on its legs; and while I was feeding his family the editor became more abusive than ever." This decided me, and Buist's last number shows that he is writhing under my silence and the abuse of the other papers. I am pretty sure Outram writes in the Bombay Times, and the Calcutta Star.—Vol. iii. 101.

Sir Charles seems to have forgotten what he had stated (vol. ii. p. 383), that in May, 1843, Sir George Arthur had promised to prosecute me. Here he intimates that Sir George in place of promising to prosecute had dissuaded him from prosecution. Sir George Arthur knew right well, if his *assumed* correspondent did not, that an editor might labour in his vocation quite as profitably in jail as out of it. I believe the whole story to be a fiction. Outram never wrote a line for the *Bombay Times*, nor I believe for any other newspaper. You have forgotten that you have already described him as so illiterate as to be unable to compose his own books. I do not believe that up to May, 1844, there had been any censure whatever of yourself in the *Bombay Times:* on the contrary, when you attacked me in connection with the letter from Sir Henry Pottinger, published in Dec. 1843, in the *Morning Chronicle*, which you asserted to be a forgery, I met you in terms of courtesy and in part of compliment. It has been already shewn that Sir Charles Napier must have been perfectly aware of the names of the proprietors of the *Bombay Times*, there was only one lawyer amongst them, four-

teen who had no connexion whatever with law. The prosecution of a paper which confined itself strictly to the discussion of public topics, would doubtless have been very dangerous, but not at all on the grounds Sir Charles assumes. The chief justice, Sir Henry Roper, had very nearly been removed from the bench just two years before for his quarrels with the press, and I had no reason to hope for any great leniency at his hands. Why did not Sir Charles consult counsel in place of the governor on the subject? Was it to save a fee?

It so happens that it was at this very date (May 1844), as may be seen by the published papers, that I was experiencing the most distinguished marks of consideration from the governor, he having just before forwarded to the court of directors the strongest recommendations of my permanent continuance in charge of the observatory which I then held as an acting office only.

June 1844.—(34). Anything like the scurrility of the Bombay Times against me, and you too, for you stung Buist to the quick, I never read, except the Calutta Star which is as bad: in both we are *"liars, perjurers, blackguards, villains, whose spurs of knighthood should be hacked off our heels!"* The most infamous efforts are also made by them to drive my young friend Brown, my secretary, into a quarrel. Well, I laugh at them and take every public opportunity to call them the *Infamous Press of India*! And strange to say, two of them have wrtten to pay me court, and say they have defended me and will defend me! This shows there are some good, and I tell them it pleases me to find such sensible men!" Mr. MacKenna, Bombay Gentleman's Gazette, always justified by his conduct the title of his paper. Vol. iii. 124.

It was strange enough certainly, that even two out of thirty should have preferred the services of venal pens to the man who abused them one and all, till he discovered that those who tendered their advocacy were *sensible men*. I recollect having said, as already stated, that in the days of chivalry a knight would have had the spurs hacked off his heels, had he acted as you and your brother have done. To this statement, as now expressed, I adhere. The other phrases ascribed to Mr. Hume and myself, are the creations of your own imagination; did your conscience whisper, that perhaps they might have been applied without any great impropriety, unless in so far as they violated the decorums of discussion?

August 1844.—(35). I hear Dr. Buist and his wife are the constant guests of Sir Thomas and Lady M'Mahon! This accounts for many things! Vol. iii. 136.

Is it not rather a small matter compared with the great questions under consideration, to discuss where Dr. Buist and his wife dined. I first became a visitor in Sir T. M'Mahon's family in Jan. 1844, and ceased to be so on my departure for Europe in May 1845; I last met him when a resident in the house of an

honoured friend whose hospitality Sir Charles Napier accepted on bidding a final adieu to India. I never so far as I remember heard the name of Scinde or Napier mentioned in Sir Thomas M'Mahon's presence. Sir Charles considers "Bombay society as equal to that of a third-class town in England:" it is at all events sufficiently observant of propriety to exclude from discussion topics on which people think differently and feel keenly, and where in the heat of argument words might be used which would offend. How does my visiting at the house of the Commander in chief accord with the assertion that I was "an outcast from society." What are the many things for which these circumstances accounted? Could Sir Charles not have secured the services of some tell-tale or eves-dropping Capt. Mainwaring to repeat to him the conversation of the dinner table for the enlightenment of your readers?

August 1854.—(36). Slander was continual in various forms, and even the French press was employed for the dissemination of falsehood. At a time when Dr. Buist was passing through Paris, there appeared in the National, a forged report from a pretended committee of the House of Commons, containing a formal condemnation of Lord Ellenborough and Sir C. Napier with an approval of Outram's conduct! And in the Siècle, Sir Charles was denounced as a monster whose cruelty put the Algerian Dara caves in the shade!—Vol. iii. 138.

The only time I ever was in Paris was in Feb. 1840 on my way to India. From the time of my arrival, till May 1845, I never was away from it. I never wrote a line for any continental journal whatever, or remember to have observed any thing therein said of Sir Charles Napier similar to what is here ascribed to the National.

Oct. 1844.—(37). We had a great dinner for the 13th Regiment, and I told them what was true; that while they were fighting the Affghans at Jellalabad, Dr. Buist and the proprietors of the Bombay Times were advising those Affghans, not to fight but to starve them into a surrender. On all public occasions I thus *pitch into* the Bombay Times, but never so much as last night when I justly attacked the proprietors.—Vol. iii. 154.

I have already given the names of the proprietors of the *Bombay Times:* the reader may judge whether they were gentlemen likely to tolerate the publication of what is here imputed to it. The 13th, on coming to Bombay, were quartered close to my place of residence, and many of the officers became my visitors. Is it likely they would have become such had they believed one single syllable of what was here imputed to me? Col. Dennie had contributed largely to the columns of the *Bombay Times*, and Col. (now Lieut.-General) Havelock I have long had the honour of numbering among my friends. The story about my urging the Affghans to starve out the

garrison of Jellalabad, at that time in a great measure cut off from communication with other places, is not only opposed to the fact but is the reverse of it. The chivalrous Broadfoot, one of the garrison, was throughout the siege, as often as opportunity occurred, in the habit of communicating by short notes enclosed in a quill and secreted about the person of the messenger, with an intimate friend of his and of mine in Bombay. The information which was of the very greatest importance was always communicated to me with a view of assisting me to correct views on the subject. I never pulished a line of it till we had retrieved all our misfortunes, and its promulgation could do no harm. I could name a score of occasions, that for example of the want of ordinance and ammunition when we lay entrenched on the Sutlej, when I withheld information in my possession till the proper time arrived, declining the opportunity of making a boast of early intelligence when the use of it, however advantageous to the newspaper, might have been injurious to the country. These circumstances have procured me since then, numberless correspondents who have placed information at my disposal knowing that it would be dealt with only in such a manner as not to injure the commonwealth.

Nov. 1844.—(38). I have given help to Bombay within the last month, but confess to doing so with reluctance; not from any doubt, having none, of being able to hold Scinde with half my present force, but from fear of tempting revolt and having blood to spill: for the Bombay Times is quite capable of telling the people of Scinde that I am compelled to send troops to Bombay, and that now is the time to rise upon their conquerors; and this might draw the hill tribes down upon us.—Vol. iii. 163.

In November 1844, there were, according to Sir C. Napier's own returns, close on 13,000 troops in Scinde, while the country according to the conqueror might have been kept quiet "by Capt. Brown and his excellent policy," so there was nothing very marvellous in Sir Charles being able to spare some for Bombay. He had before this a dozen of times told us that the people rejoiced in the change of government and were delighted above measure with the new administration. Why in all the world should they have made an outbreak to please the *Bombay Times?* prepared it seems on this as on so many occasions to recommend the destruction of one of the largest sections of its supporters the Scinde field-force. Just a month after this Sir Charles tells you that "if all the troops were withdrawn and the Ameers turned lose he could defeat them with the people only." It required 12,000 men to keep me from producing a rebellion!

Dec. 1844.—(39). I came to India at the age of sixty to provide for my children, and I was immediately to expose myself to be broke by a court-martial

with disgrace, after fifty years' service, because a fool like Major Outram, and an abusive fellow like Dr. Buist, settled that barbarian robbers were to be allowed leisure to prepare a massacre of the British army.—Vol. iii. 194.

This is all very frank and candid, and very handsomely was the family provided for. Though Sir Charles in other places professes that it was to carry out the policy of the Governour general he went to Scinde. Truth will out. It certainly does not appear where either Outram or Buist made the recommendation referred to. Fiction should at least be probable.

Jan. 1845.—(40). Now befell a dreadful calamity. The 78th Regiment, designed for the hill campaign, nearly destroyed by a sickness sudden and terrible. The Bombay faction instantly proclaimed,—Outram being foremost in the shameless slander, "that Sir C. Napier's ignorance and reckless disregard of the medical men's advice had caused the mortality, and that he was their murderer."—Vol. iii. 204.

Jan. 1845.—(41). The 78th Regiment is absolutely destroyed: two hundred dead, and the living in a sad plight. Of course I am assailed by the scoundrel factious editors: that don't pain me, but the destruction of the poor soldiers deeply. I am not to blame. The usual course of fever is to attack in September and first half of October, after which few cases, but old ones are apt to relapse and very dangerously. I had orders from government to bring down the 13th Regiment to Kurrachee, and send the 78th up: this I did, so as to have the 13th away before the period of relapses, and the 78th there after the period of first attacks. Movement is reckoned good, the 13th escaped all sickness, and the 78th reached Sukkur in excellent health, and remained so till the 1st November, when the fever broke out with unheard-of violence till the end of the year!—Vol. iii. 204.

On the imputation against myself I have already met you in the columns of *The Times* and *Daily News*, and reduced you to silence. The following are the facts as they will be found in the books of the regiment at the disposal of your brother, and which ought to have been before him at the time he wrote—accessible at the Horse Guards, the Board of Controul and India House to any one. The head quarters of the Highlanders left Kurrachee on the 20th August 1844. Severe sickness made its appearance at Hydrabad and afterwards on the river. The first medical return after their arrival at Sukkur shewed that in September out of 423 men there were 145 in hospital. The left wing reported 10 sick out of a strength of 511 at Dooba on the River on the 23rd September, and sickness rapidly increased as they proceeded. You may select for your brother the horn of the dilemma on which you would have him impaled. He either knew nothing whatever of the health of the troops he commanded and said whatever came uppermost;—or uttered an untruth knowing it to be such. The facts now stated appeared in the *Bombay Times* in 1845, they were repeated in Feb. 1851, when your brother renewed his misstatements on addressing the Highlanders at Bombay. Col. Twopenny, their commander,

had been a guest in my house just before his departure for Scinde. I well remember the remonstrances of Col. Hamilton, and the other officers of that distinguished corps, when your brother, in a letter then just pulished in your book, ascribed the sickness from which the women and children as well as the men had suffered, to drink. Sir Charles Napier, against medical advice, dispatched the 78th from Kurrachee in August, knowing as he here admits that "THE USUAL COURSE OF FEVER WAS TO ATTACK IN SEPTEMBER OR THE FIRST HALF OF OCTOBER," a date at which he states there were 10,000 sick the previous year. This very month the men were to be exposed to malaria on the river. Fever made its appearance accordingly just as Sir Charles himself expected, and claimed at once 400 victims. It is now twelve years since these distressing incidents occurred. It may yet be seen what composure may be looked for in England for these disclosures now that you have provoked the publication for the third time of the facts just given on the highest official authority. I trust in this age of military reform the returns I have referred to may be called for. Mismanagement was not confined to the Crimea—nor the destruction of troops through the neglect of the most common-place and obvious precautions for their safety, peculiar to boards, or restricted to red tape. The mishap could only have occurred through the anomalous arrangements of Lord Ellenborough. Scinde had been conquered and annexed in violation of law, and it was created into an independent governorship and Sir Charles Napier placed over it in equal violation of the law. The Griffin Governor had no councellor to advise and no superior to controul him. In the former case a protest against a proceeding so insane and by which more loss of life was incurred than at Meeanee and Dubba put together would have been recorded—superior authority would have forbidden it. So fearful was the condition of the whole corps on returning to Bombay that the Adjutant and Quarter-master General and the Inspector General of hospitals for the Queen's army, Dr. Franklin, recommended its immediate shipment from India. Lest you should again commit yourself by a denial of these facts I beg to assure you that I have within these six weeks seen in London the official correspondent on the subject.

Jan. 1845.—(42). The necessity of secresy, especially against Buist and the traitor clique at Bombay, prevented my making sufficient preparation, and we have consequently had great difficulty.—Vol iii. 229.

It has been seen that two months before this I had compelled Sir Charles to keep 12,000 men in Scinde for fear of a rising, while the Ameers if let loose would have been turned out of the

country by the people themselves, even if the troops had been all sent away. When Sir Charles was about to start with 6000 men into the Murree Hills he was it seems prevented from making sufficient preparations for fear of me. The return of post from Sukker to Bombay and back was then about a month. He certainly intimated in general orders at starting that a fortnight's provision was all that would be required; while the troops were in reality occupied six weeks. On his return a line of outposts required to be established along the frontier just as if all the tribes supposed to be subdued, had still been in arms. Two months before he stated that but for me, half the Scinde army might have been sent to Bombay, when there would scarcely have remained so many as were required for the Murree Hills campaign. This may be very perfect or profound strategy in the eyes of heaven-born or divinely-inspired generals, it is rather perplexing to simple-minded civilians like myself.

March 1845.—(43). I was up at two o'clock in the morning, the march was twenty-two miles and we did not get to the end before twelve o'clock; I then slept under a tree till the baggage arrived, and it was half-past two before my breakfast was ready. People here say that you have set Buist mad with rage: I dont read him.—Vol iii. 281.

April 1845.—(44). Outram's friend Willoughby is secretary, and I am told keeps Sir G. Arthur in his pocket: this may or may not be true, but everybody says so. Buist also is his friend, and is all day long at his house it is said, and I have traced one or two lines in the Bombay Times against me, word for word with those in a letter of his to me; only in the letter it was as a question which prevented its being an attack. Then the heads of departments and that soft little silky man, Lieut.-Colonel Melville, brother to the Melville who rules the Indian house; if you bring all these upon me it will be difficult to hold Scinde. Buist is I am told, anxious beyond measure to make up with me: he is afraid of you.—Vol iii. 291.

The madness was manifested I presume by my reviewing your first work in which as already stated I convinced you of about three score specific misstatements in about thrice the number of pages, chiefly on the evidence of official documents not a few of them under Sir Charles' hand. The extreme moderation of the tone of the review drew forth the applause of the whole press of India. I have no means of knowing whether Sir Charles Napier read the *Bombay Times* or not, I know he ordered it and very punctually paid for it during the whole of his Bombay career. I am under the impression that it was ordered to be sent to him after his return to England. I had nothing to make up: I never had any personal quarrel with Sir Charles. I condemned the policy of Scinde without regard to its authors, without more of feeling than a judge may be supposed to experience in deciding on the evidence before him. Some of Sir Charles' chief favourites and most ardent admirers were amongst the most valued of my friends. On leaving

Scotland I had received a public dinner where half those present were my political opponents. It was in India I first found fair words and moderate discussion made the ground of personal quarrels.

Up to March 1845 I do not think I had been a dozen of times either to Mr. Willoughby's house or office. As Chief Secretary and by order of government, he in consonance with the system pursued by Lord Auckland, forwarded to the newspapers short notices of the movements of our troops in Affghanistan betwixt Nov. 1841, when our mishaps began, and March 1842, when Lord Ellenborough commenced war on the press. Beyond this he never wrote or instigated a line for the *Bombay Times*.

Feb. 1844—(45). The rabid abuse of the Bombay Times makes me laugh; yet it is injurious because good and honourable people swallow it all, and if Shakespeare is right that does harm.—Vol iii. 36.

Sir Charles and his friends never attempted an answer, had they offered any it would have been accepted at once: they knew they had none to offer. Was it not somewhat singular, that if Indian journalists agreed so ill amongst themselves as here described they should have been so unanimous in condemning the Scinde policy, that Sir Charles states there were only two out of thirty who offered to defend him?

March 1844—(46). This Mainwaring was a man of humour also. Being at a dinner in Bombay, Dr. Buist was placed beside him and very nervously spoke thus. Captain Mainwaring I suppose I have your dislike, I am Dr. Buist of the Bombay Times. Why should I dislike you my friend? I never read your paper.—Vol iii. 70.

I never remember to have met Capt. Mainwaring in my life, and am pretty certain that the incident here mentioned never occurred. How did it happen that "a wretch" "turned out of society" should have been admitted to the same table as the friend of a Napier? Were Sir Charles' friends in the habit of reporting to him dinner-table conversations for the purpose of publication?

April 1844.—(47). For my part I like to let truth come out, and not let falsehood fly her colours on the field without an opponent. I would punish the Bombay Times if I could, and as to its doing the paper good, I would not mind that; all I want is that the public should hear the truth.—Vol iii. 74.

Would you kindly tell us what the infamous accusations or charges were. Was Sir Charles Napier or were his friends ever refused the privilege of correcting errors or offering explanations? I solemnly declare that I published every thing ever sent me in his justification no matter how offensively worded, and only declined such blackguardism as that of "OMEGA," "YOUR TRUE

FRIEND," &c., on the score of the statements made by them being untrue and the tone resorted to unfit for the ears "of the society of a third rate English town," though very acceptable apparently to the governour of Scinde.

May 1845.—(48). The Bombay Times is trying two things. One is to make out that I attributed the deaths in the 78th to drunkenness, which is a lie; the second, that in my dinner speech, in which I called Buist the *'blatant Beast'* amidst great applause, and which speech he has not got; that I disclosed the whole plan and arrangement of a Punjaub war—which is another lie."

This lie proved a most pernicious one for the public and was doubtless so intended. The false version of Sir C. Napier's speech in the Bombay Times was read by the Sikhs, and more than one writer has affirmed that it roused that people to hostilities, as thinking the English were going to attack them!—Vol iii. 294.

"Buist" had nothing whatever to do with the matter. I had left for Europe in May and did not return till the following year. The fact mentioned in the *Bombay Times* on my departure and return must have been observed by the abuse of me on the occasion published in the *Gentleman's Gazette.* The speech in question was delivered at a public meeting at Kurrachee, on the 26th of April, and was published entire in the *Agra Acbar* or *Delhi Gazette*, I forget which, and in the *Bombay Gentleman's Gazette*; not in the *Bombay Times* at all excepting as an extract. The comments made on it caused subsequent reports to be modified and the whole ultimately denied. The accusation of the Highlanders of drunkenness was made in a letter which appeared in the second part of your Conquest of Scinde, published in May, when I was on my way home. I never saw it till after I was in England; but I remember perfectly receiving while in London letters from the officers of the 78th complaining bitterly of the attacks that had been made on them. The following extract from the speech I find in the Almanac—"Sir Charles Napier said it was highly probable he and the army he commanded would next cold season be called upon to act in another country: that good policy required that the frontier should be quelled before the troops were summoned elsewhere." This which appeared in the *Bombay Times*, as taken from another paper, was quite sufficient conjoined with Sir Charles Napier's declarations and exploits to provoke the attack the Sikhs made on on us in November. Whether it can be characterised as a disclosure of the whole plan and arrangements of the Punjaub war, I leave the reader to pronounce. The *Gentleman's Gazette* was through the whole course of its existence considered the opprobrium of the English press. It was commenced in 1842. In 1850 it was transformed into the *Bombay Gazette*, now a very able and

exemplary paper, when its originator, Mr. M'Kenna, mentioned elsewhere by Sir Charles as having tendered his services, quitted India. The *Agra Acbar* died out soon after this. The *Kurrachee* and *Guernsey Advertiser* are both extinct—all Sir Charles' beloved friends dead and gone.

May, 1845—(49). Outram lately quarrelled with the Bombay government, by resisting orders and saying they wanted to make a Meeanee slaughter in the Mahratta country: they recalled him, but Colonel Ovans being captured they left Outram; and when Ovans was liberated Outram *volunteered* to assist in this second *Meeanee Slaughter* at the head of a light corps, first making the amende to government. Ovans then resigned, and Outram was put in his place with a large salary and the direction for the war. So much for his principles: all right if he had not volunteered. This I know from Sir George Arthur to be the true story; but the papers try to cover him, saying he had no quarrel with government. The Bombay Times bullies about it, and Willoughby writes for the Bombay Times; and as he is Outram's bosom friend is likely to be the author of most of the attacks on me. I detected him in one, though he does not think so: he is remarkably smooth-tongued, and in concert with Outram is getting up a book against me.—Vol. iii. 301, 302.

Mr. Willoughby has himself already asserted that all the statements regarding him in connection with the *Bombay Times* are false, and I have already most fully corroborated that statement. I believe the whole of the rest of the passage to be about as true as the part which refers to Mr. Willoughby. I am convinced however that the words put into Sir George Arthur's mouth would never have been published had Sir George been alive to contradict them. The facts have been in your possession since 1845—you have published enough since then, but never mentioned them.

June, 1845—(50). What *people* do these papers represent? None! they are mere organs of vituperation. With a few exceptions the editors are men whose vileness has driven them from good society. One was driven from the church for some tricks with a child; another was broke for stealing a pearl, and for cowardice. It is plausibly asked, Why mind what such rascals say? But if society, by sustaining and countenancing such papers, evince a belief in what they publish, then we must care. Suppose a set of rascals burn, by force, *deserter* or *thief* on a man's shoulder or cheek, would he not be annoyed to be so falsely exhibited to the world? Would he not publish the truth? We cannot. The rascal editors assert the grossest lies, and you can't get them contradicted. I have been called "Traitor, murderer, thief, coward, liar, perjurer, tyrant, epicure,"—and half the good people of India believe every word. How can I enter into a controversy on my own character with such miserable wretches as Buist of the Bombay Times, or Cope of the Delhi Gazette?—since arrested for thieving. When we are dead, myself and my brother William may be discovered to have been honorouble men; but in the interim we are branded by these fellows, and their worthy coadjutors, Fonblanque, of the *Examiner*, in England.

The English journalists generally have the decency to state facts and reason on them according to the bent of their politics, but these Indian ruffians, for they are neither more nor less, invent the most atrocious falsehoods, and

then pour forth abuse as if the things had really been done which they have asserted. Take one of a hundred instances. The Delhi Gazette and Bombay Times distinctly state as a known fact, that a medical board represented to me the danger of sending the 78th Regiment to Sukkur; and that with murderous wilfulness I refused to listen to them. This is simply a fabrication of the editors, and without a shadow of foundation in truth. This is freedom of the press!—Vol. iii. 304, 305.

The papers represent I presume the sentiments of their readers; who they are will be seen further on. The great fault found with me is that I frequented the very best society in the presidency. I have already given (p. 15) a list of the editors of the principal papers in India in 1845. Cope was never arrested for thieving, but is just now prosecuting his accusers for libel, and will I trust give you the opportunity of explaining your meaning before a court of law. I have not waited till your demise to determine whether or not the judgment of your countrymen in your favour may be procured. I need seek for no better test of your veracity than the question concerning the 78th's sufferings.

It is to be supposed that Indian, like other newspapers, represent the parties they address, in our case English merchants at the Presidencies and members of the public service. The total male European population in all India, not belonging to the service, falls short, as shewn by the returns, of 10,000; of these probably 4000 are adults. The members of the public services, including officers of Queen's troops, amount to about 7000. In my petition to be heard before Parliament in 1853 on the press of India I gave the following in reference to the circulation of newspapers in India. It will answer the question of who they represent:—

"In 1848, the *Mofussilite* printed a list of all its subscribers, from which it appeared that four-fifths of these were members of the public service, and in a classified list of its subscribers lately laid before the proprietors of the *Bombay Times*, it appears that out of a thousand subscribers, assuming that to be the number on the list, one hundred and twenty-three were civil servants of the government, one hundred and seventy-nine messes and regimental libraries, three hundred and seventeen military men, fifty-two British merchants, thirty-six banks and public corporations, twenty-six were natives, two hundred and forty-three were private individuals, uncovenanted servants, tradesmen, &c., the rest clergymen, lawyers, native rajahs and the like, or in all, 719, or two thirds of the whole, were officers under the crown, or covenanted servants of government. It may safely be assumed, that the maxim which holds good all over the world will obtain in India, and that the amount and nature of commodities brought to market, will speedily adjust themselves to the demand. That newspaper proprietors will supply, and newspaper editors write, what is deemed most popular and acceptable amongst the newspaper reading classes, and what they are best disposed to pay for, that the returns on such things are ample, will be seen from a paper published in 1850."

I have already given a list of the proprietors of the *Bombay Times* as well as a list of the editors of the leading papers. That the press of India is not without its *Ages* and its *Towns* and *Satyrists* can unhappily not be denied. It is with these Sir Charles and his friends seem alone to have been familiar. The question of the Highlanders has already been disposed of SATISFACTORILY by the admission of Sir Charles Napier that he knew that September and October were the sickly months on the Indus, and that he not the less in spite, I re-assert, of medical opinion to the contrary, dispatched them in the end of August to plunge into the sea of malaria in which they perished.

May 1845.—(51). Did I tell you that in this country of monsoons there are no wind-mills! We are getting two up and expect them to pay us eight or ten thousand pounds a year.—Vol. iii. 301.

Did Sir Charles know that it was to the "wretch Buist" then secretary to the "Agricultural Society of Western India," that wind mills were applied for? I was in 1845, and for many years afterwards, labouring to introduce this form of machine into India. I had to toil single handed and at my own charge and failed only for want of time and mill-wrights. "Providing for my family," even by honest means, was not quite my sole object for going to India or my solitary care when there.

Nov. 1845.—(52). Buist is in a fury at the London newspapers because they won't adopt his filthy falsehoods; and has told us, that his informants on political and military matters are Sir George Arthur and the commander in chief: for the *sovereign authorities* in his expression, which can only mean the governor and council at Bombay. The commander in chief he plumply names!—Vol. iii. 350.

I never did any thing of the sort. The commander-in-chief referred to was Sir Jasper Nicholls, not the head of the Bombay but of the whole Indian army, who very properly selected, as Sir Charles Napier himself had done, the *Bombay Times* as the medium of defence against the attacks made on him for the dispatch of the artillery-men without guns for the Peshawar. The march of the men was ordered before the Ghibrie insurrection, and they were intended to take over the guns already at Cabool. A very reasonable arrangement marred by unforseenable circumstances. The allusion was made in a letter published by me in the *Edinburgh Witness* in reply to an attack on the press of India made in the North British Review. I complained that the press of England was not sufficiently alive to the warnings the Indian newspapers gave them of the inevitability of the disasters in Affghanistan—"the filthy falsehoods" here referred to. The allusion was only made at all when any one comparing the dispatches bearing Sir Jasper Nicholl's

name in the Blue Book and that without a name in the *Bombay Times* might have detected the truth. If Sir Charles believed Sir Geo. Arthur, Sir Harry M'Mahon, Mr. Willoughby, and Col. Outram my informants no better vouchers could be had for the authenticity of my information. If this again was as worthless as he describes, the Governor, Commander-in-chief and Chief Secretary could not have been, as he asserts they were my informants. You may stick him on which ever horn of the dilemma you prefer.

July 1845—(53). Boone has given a copy of your book to the Bombay Times, and no other has reached India. The editor boasts that he got it before publication. If Boone does not clear up this, I for one will never darken his doors again. I have enquired about a safe lawyer at Bombay to prosecute Buist for thus pirating your work, but am told your power of attorney is necessary."

No copy was given. One had been stolen, and Buist's piracy was a result; and it might be supposed such a literary offence would have debarred his being elected a member of the great scientific association. Not so. Capt. H. Napier made the facts known to the Royal Society, of which he was a member, and in the face of them that learned body adopted the pirate as an associate.—Vol. iii. 313.

I find from the publishers that the first part of your Conquest of Scinde was issued in London on the 15th of December, 1844, the second part on the 3d of May, 1845. The mail by Southampton with books and parcels then started on the 4th of the month, that by Marseilles on the 8th. I was then in the habit of receiving through my publishers, Smith, Elder and Co., publications of importance appearing betwixt the two dates just named through the Marseilles mail, and I find accordingly from their books that your book was so dispatched—there was no difficulty in this, and not the slightest occasion for theft. Your books sent off by common course on the 8th of January or 8th of May would reach Bombay on the 6th or 8th of the following month. The second part, which was received on the 8th of June by my *locum tenens*, Mr. Scott, reached after I had left India on the 20th of May. It was dispatched before I reached London in July, so it was physically impossible for me to have any concern in the matter either at one end or the other of the line.

When the Fellows of the Royal Society were told that I had stolen your book, they knew I was then in London exposing your misstatements through the newspapers; many of those who supported me having seen me while in town, they must have known that what was asserted was not only an untruth but an impossibility. The conduct of Capt. Henry Napier in London was in keeping with that of Sir Charles in Scinde. False charges were got up against the Ameers as against me, and they

were punished, as I was meant to have been, for what was never done. Did it never occur to you and your brother to withdraw from the Royal Society, the members of which had either admitted a thief amongst them or insulted you by disbelieving your statements? Are Messrs. Smith, Elder, and Co., by whom the book was forwarded, to be charged with theft? Or is Mr. Boone, your publisher, in a position to state that any theft was committed? On the receipt, in Feb. 1845, of the first part of your romance, I reviewed it chiefly by printing the most conspicuous passages at length, and appending to them in form of notes my remarks and the quotations from official documents, by which you were convicted of a misstatement in every second or third page. The amount of the quotation is I presume what is termed piracy. Just as the quotations in the *Athæneum* or *Quarterly Review* from your present work might be so called. The second part of your publication was of course placed in the hands of my *locum tenens*.

August 1845—(54). As to the publication of the Conquest of Scinde, Sir C. Napier was not even cognizant of it being undertaken until the first part was nealy ready for the press: it was commenced to meet the infamous attempts then making to ruin him in public estimation, and was not even spontaneous on the part of the writer, who was pushed to it by the urgent remonstrances of a common friend. In fine, it was as much an act of self-defence for the general as his conquest was one for India: both imperative. At this very time Outram published a letter, addressed to General W. Napier, libellous in the extreme as regarded Sir Charles: and he was being aided by Willoughby, secretary to the Bombay council, in the concoction of a book which accused Sir C. Napier of falsehood to his government; of malversation; of gross nepotism; of ignorance in his command that would disgrace a subaltern; of the murder of the 78th soldiers. And when thus infamously libelled by an officer under his command he will be found appealing to authority for protection, the answer being to appoint the offender to a lucrative post!—Vol. iii. 320, 321.

August 1845—(55). I told you Arthur had annoyed me about a commissariat officer; but I am now pretty certain that Sir George was himself deceived about the matter. However Sir H. Hardinge had twice or thrice overturned, most justly, the descripions of the governor in council at Bombay about this very officer. Sir George is said to be ruled by Willoughby; of this I know not, and if it be true God only knows how far he may go; but he is generally fair, and has given me such sound support on great occasions that I must acknowledge obligations to him. As to Outram calling me a correspondent of the Bombay Times, here is the fact. When the papers were calling my march to Emaum Ghur a *wild goose chase*, I was justly fearful, that as my character was unknown in India they would shake the confidence of the troops under me.

Nott, after Hykulzie, had in his first anger exclaimed, 'God defend me from Bombay troops and Horse Guards generals.' Now Nott was a man of great mind, and General England's defeat bore his exclamation out strongly. The desert march was incomprehensible to unmilitary minds, and there was therefore fear of the spirit of the troops suffering: in my army also were regiments which had been defeated, exclusive of the Cabool and Ghusnee

disgrace. Hence, being acquainted with Dr. Kennedy, Willoughby's brother-in-law, a gentleman of talent who had command of the Bombay Times, I wrote to him the reason for my march. Outram ought to be broke, but probably will be protected. I am sick of self; but remember in your answer to Outram, if you write any, that I have sent in charges against him.

Aug. 1845.—(56). I lately wrote to the governor-general about the flotilla, the officers of which were quarrelling with General Hunter. I, and my friend Powel, who commands it, agreed that as we should not quarrel the matter had better drop: accordingly my letter was never sent. It was however copied in the secretary's office, and yesterday appeared in the Bombay Times at full length! This is, I think, proof of the press being in league with subordinate officials; the editor bribes the clerks. The original letter is in my desk, it was never sent, never of course received, and therefore is a forgery.—Vol. iii. 322.

This is all quite correct so far as the Emaun Ghur communication is concerned; and it will be allowed that Sir Charles Napier acted quite becomingly in the matter. How he should have sought the assistance of the *Bombay Times* seeing the character he had before this given it does not appear. Dr. Kennedy was a man of great talent and accomplishments and my intimate personal friend. Neither he nor any other man, not even the proprietors themselves, have ever had the slightest influence over what has been published in or excluded from the *Bombay Times*. The authority of the local government is absolute within the limits of their own jurisdiction. Sir Henry Hardinge could never have upset any of the decrees of the Bombay Government in reference to their own commissariat officers just because he could never have been appealed to. And this was all it seems Sir Charles Napier knew of the powers of the various governments after having been nearly four years in India! The youngest ensign under him might have blushed at such blundering. I do not now remember the particulars in reference to the India flotilla; from May 1845 till Jan. 1846 I was absent from India. The *Bombay Times* was then under charge of the late Mr. T. A. Scott, who published four or five years since a full and perfectly satisfactory explanation of the whole affair when the charge against the *Bombay Times* appeared in one of your previous works. On this as on so many other occasions a gross and slanderous misstatement has been repeated by you after having been exposed. It is somewhat difficult to understand why a letter should be at once a copy and a forgery. Where public documents pass through the hands of so many clerks of low pay and still lower morals there need never be any difficulty in obtaining copies of any official paper. To the honour of the Bombay press the imputation of bribery or obtaining information unworthily was never cast on it by any one but a Napier. You and your brother

are unable to perceive that the charge of employing illegitimate means to obtain information is the highest compliment that can be paid to the value of the purchase. Men need never pay if content as you assert to resort to fabrication—the manufactured comes in the place of the purchased commodity. By the time Sir Charles wrote to you in 1851 he must have forgotten that he had in 1845 termed Kennedy his friend, and made him in 1843 the medium of communication with the *Bombay Times*—specially selected, as it had every right to be from its position, by Sir Charles and many other distinquished men as the vehicle of their thoughts.

Surely this is "coming it rather strong," it was shewn, when the matter was discussed before, that Sir Charles had read the proofs of the first part of the Conquest of Scinde, of which he is asserted not to have been so much as cognizant, during his expedition in the Murree hills. Col. Outram's book, as appears from the preface, was published on purpose to meet the mis-statements of your History of the Conquest. So far from your work and his being contemporaneous the latter was produced solely to meet the slanders of the former. The lovers of truth are obliged to you for so frequently selecting the 78th as an illustration of your veracity and of the untreatableness of your views. We could desire no better example, in the light in which I have already stated it.

Nov. 1845.—(57). There is a very able officer who has attacked the Bombay Times. He began with a letter signed *Omega*, and has gone on with a series of facts, to every one of which every officer in Scinde would swear: he is putting the Indian public right.—Vol. iii. 357.

Nov. 1845.—(58). And Outram's puffing himself into notice through the Bombay Times is shewn up.—Vol. iii. 358.

I remember of two writers, one subscribing himself OMEGA, and the other YOUR TRUE FRIEND—so false in statement and so infamous in tone, that even the friends of the Napiers blushed for them. Of course they cleared up nothing. To the best of my recollection the letters appeared in a miserable libellous little lithograph called the *Kurrachee Advertiser*, published if I remember rightly at the Government Custom-house press, and which was considered the Scinde official organ of the time—like the *Gentleman's Gazette* and other Napier admirers it has long ceased to be. In a reply to an attack on Col. Outram's private affairs published in 1845, and with the highest admiration for the gallant commander of the Persian-gulf expedition, I quite admit that in thrift he was infinitely surpassed by the victor of Meeanee, and was disinterested enough to protest against an act by which a large amount of prize money was placed within his reach, and it was stated that his agents were Messrs.

Leckie and Co., who never had the very slightest connection with government in any way whatever. Col. Outram was in 1845 only a regimental captain but was then a brevet major. He had for nearly twelve years before this been constantly in the most responsible political employment. He had enjoyed the highest place in the opinion of six successive governors—The Hon. Mount-Stuart Elphistone, Sir Jonn Malcom, Lord Clare, Sir Robert Grant, Sir James Carnac, and Sir George Arthur. The appointment he had held from 1841 as political agent in Scinde and Belloochistan, conferred on him by Lord Auckland, was more valuable than the residency at Sattara, occupied by him in 1845. He had in 1842 been proposed by Lord Ellenborough as resident at the Court of Hydrabad with the title of excellency. Since the time referred to by Sir C. Napier he has been twice resident at Baroda, once at Aden and once at Luknow, and is now appointed to Rajpootana, with a title, and seat in the supreme council in reversion. He was named, under Lord Aberdeen's administration, for the charge of the Turkish contingent in 1853, and has been appointed, under that of Lord Palmerston, to the command of the Persian-Gulf Expedition. . It would take a considerable amount of persuasion to convince the world that appointments for which a man had been selected under the ten governments and two administrations I have just named, and who found equal favour in the eyes of Lord Auckland, Lord Ellenborough, Lord Hardinge, Lord Dalhouse and Lord Cuming was the creature of fortune, or jobbed into a succession of appointments of which he was undeserving.

March 1846.—(59). The Bombay Times asserted, and with details, that I was driving the people of Scinde to madness with excessive taxation, and that I had even dared to re-establish the tax called *Transit duty.* These assertions were accompanied with all sorts of abuse such as—*The sordid shameless leader in Scinde.—The Autocrat of Scinde.—The Scinde Czar.—The unscrupulous murderer of the Soldiers of the 78th and 28th Regiments.—The liar at the head of the Scinde government.* Well, all India was thus kept ringing with my infamous attempts to make up a sham revenue, to the destruction of the people and the country! Now, as I never put one single tax upon the people of Scinde, good bad or indifferent; never laid a mite upon anything and took off a great many taxes, I laughed at what I knew must be in due time found pure inventions, somewhat like the people Herschel was said to have seen in the moon.

"But could I laugh when, after India had resounded with this cry, I found by a mistake of a clerk at Calcutta in sending a wrong letter—that the Bombay government had transmitted a *secret note of council to be registered at Calcutta against me!* accusing me of making up a false revenue, not alone by levying taxes, for as I recollect the minute of council only hinted at that, but by a monopoly of grain! the price of which was first raised it said by my command, and then sold at the enhanced price to the troops, so as to make the loss fall on the Bombay government: in short that I had

perpetrated so infamous an action, that if there had been an iota of truth in it hanging would be too good for me.

"Had the clerk not made this mistake"—probably a wilful one from disgust at the infamous intrigue—"there would have been in both the Bombay and Calcutta archives, a direct heinous crime registered against me by my bitter enemies, to be hereafter brought out and given to the world, when I am no more, as an irrefragable proof of my bad conduct! And this was done also so ingeniously by the two members of council, who are old practised merchants and accountants, that it took me a good week's hard work to disprove their villanous accusations, and shew that so far from trying to increase the expence of feeding the troops, if there be one thing to which I have more especially devoted myself for the three years of my ruling in Scinde it has been to reduce the price of grain by destroying all monopoly! But this was not all. The secret minute was recorded, and the authors of it chuckled in their sleeves at having so well shot their assasin bolt. Not content, they manufactured their *minute* into an article for Dr. Buist's paper, the words just slightly changed to suit a newspaper article: and I, not knowing either its source or anything of the minute of council, laughed, or swore, probably the latter, at Buist's usual attempts to make me out a scoundrel.—Vol. iii. 405, 406.

"Was this all the result of the Bombay Times falsehoods about the taxes? No! Enough in all conscience but not all. I got a letter from Lord Ripon, to say he had heard of my taxation but hoped it was not true; and then he gave all sorts of reasons to prove I ought not to put on the transit duty, showing that he was convinced I had done so—as a nurse says to a naughty child, I hope you have not been doing so and so, when she knows it has. To do Lord Ripon justice he gave me very little trouble to answer him; he displayed such perfect ignorance of the subject that I saw he don't very well know what a transit duty is. But thus again a day was lost in answering him, and my work, real work, thrown in arrear! And what work! Long trials to read, and to decide upon putting five men to death at the time; matter requiring calm thought and great resolution not to err.—Vol. iii. 406, 407.

"At such times, with my head in agony, my nerves torn, my whole mind and body on the rack, my soul intent to do good in the sight of God, I am to force myself down to think, and write, and dwell upon villany and folly past all belief, and beyond my power to chastise! fortunate that I escape from the power of those who, while profiting from my ebbing life, are seeking my destruction: and all this at sixty-four years of age in a climate proverbial for destroying the energy of mind and body! But to go on with my story. No sooner had I answered Lord Ripon, and thought I had been tormented enough by Dr. Buist's lies as to taxes, when down comes from Calcutta a letter from the secret committee of the Court of Directors.—Vol. iii. 407.

There is not one single syllable of truth in all this so far as I am concerned—save that concerning the transit duty which will come presently to be disposed of. The story about the mistake of the clerk sending the wrong extract is nonsence such as that about "Reid and Willoughby wanting to send Outram to supersede the commander-in-chief," or of "Willoughby robbing the post-office." The thing could not have occurred, as any one in the slightest degree acquainted with the manner of recording, examining, re-examining and transmitting all official

documents in India right well knows. As for the transit duties, the following quotation from the pen of a Scinde political will best meet the assertion that Sir Charles laid no taxes whatever on the people. How very extraordinary that so worthless a paper as the *Bombay Times* should have equally misled supreme authority in England as in India:—

"When Major Jacob was magistrate at Meerpoor in 1843, proclamations were sent to him to publish, to the effect that all transit duties were henceforth abolished. He did publish these accordingly; but a short time afterwards the country people complained to him that a man was collecting transit duties under written orders from the Collector of Hyderabad. The man was brought before Major Jacob, when he produced orders, signed and sealed by the Collector, directing everybody to pay him those transit duties. Major Jacob, thinking that in the face of the proclamation above-mentioned these orders must be forgeries, detained the man in custody and informed the Collector of his proceedings. In reply, the Collector informed Major Jacob that the orders were genuine documents; *and that though the proclamations were still published far and wide, it was not intended to act on them!*"—*Homeward Mail.*

Aug. 1846.—(60). It is said they have got up a newspaper to attack me, and subscribed 30,000 rupees: Outram's name at the head of the list.—Vol. iii. 445.

What newspaper might this be? The *Telegraph* was the only one which came into existence in 1846. It was the property of Mr. John Jameson who had no partner in the concern: it was edited by Mr. T. A. Scott who had acted for me in my absence in England the previous year. It was afterwards purchased by Mr. Scott, and in 1847 united with the *Courier* and made a daily newspaper. Mr. Scott's views of Scinde politics were closely allied to my own; as were those of the bulk of the Indian papers. The subscription of 30,000 rupees and all the rest of it is pure romance. Has it been already forgotten that Outram was affirmed to have been not quite so careful of his own family as his accuser, and to be in debt?

Nov. 1846.—(61). Sir G. Arthur writes to Lord Seaton, that I was "shamefully treated by the Bombay press." Why did he not order his attorney-general to prosecute for libel? that would have put a stop to it at once, as he well knows. Willoughby was his dry nurse, and the author of two-thirds of the attacks on me.

As already stated, Mr. Willoughby never wrote a line in the paper on Scinde politics. Is the statement about Sir George Arthur's letter any better founded than that about Mr. Willoughby's attacks? Why turn over the prosecution to the

Governor? We have no Attorney General in India. Lord Keane and Admiral Sir C. Malcom had each resorted to it about two years before. The court was as open in Bombay as London to Sir C. Napier, and he might have asked for a *rule nisi* at the one place as well as at the other, and would I have no doubt have got the same answer from the Chief Justice as he did from the Lord Chief Justice—*Refused.*

Nov. 1846.—(62). "What makes the *Times* down on me?"
Who could answer that question? Self-interest is the moving power of the *Times*, and like the piston of a bad pump brings up all sorts of impurities.—Vol. iii. 476.

This refers not to me but to the first journal in Europe. Why should it have been the interest of the *Times* or any other paper to be down on him unless in so far as it is the interest of every journal to advocate the right and speak the truth.

Jan. 1847.—(63). The Bombay Times makes one laugh with its sweeping lies. It says we have a famine here! We are actually deluged with grain, and exporting, not only to Bombay, but also up the river to Bhawhalpoor and Ferozepoor: a quantity also has, as usual, been imported, but cannot be sold and is being re-shipped. Vol. iv. 32.

I really do not remember more about the famine matter than this, that the *Bombay Times* account of it, like my account of the revenue, was correct—that the accounts of Sir Charles Napier were like those of the Royal British Bank and London and Eastern Bank, cooked. The papers on the subject prepared from the official documents supplied by Sir Charles' subordinates may be had any day if desired—the statements contained in them accord with those in the *Bombay Times.*

Feb. 1847.—(64). I knew well whence all these petitions came, but laughed, because it was clearly the object to see if I would do, or say, anything that might expose me to the attacks of the then Bombay government, i.e. the Bombay Times. I wrote to the Bombay government, and at my request it sent the body to Kurrachee, whence I forwarded it by a steamer to Hydrabad.—Vol. iv. 4.

It makes one almost melancholy to think that the shadow of the *Bombay Times* should on all occasions have hung like a cloud over the path of the Governor of a province. How little he comprehended the imperiousness of the duties of a journalist—how painful it was to censure, how pleasant to praise.

Feb. 1847.—(65). By this, taking round numbers, we can already prove that there was in the treasury 127,93,184 Rs., or more than double the whole of the prize money taken by the army. It is well known to you I believe, that on the capture of Hydrabad, I not only enforced the most rigid respect to the zenanas of the Ameers, but also gave those princes four days for removing their ladies, and all their private property without molestation. Of this, as indeed I expected, good use was made, and we have in

these inventories proof of a sum taken away equal to double what was left. As these papers are translated and adjusted, it will appear that the ladies must have carried away, at the lowest calculation, little short of one million sterling, if not two millions"—*it was afterward found to be more than two millions*! "However, these papers prove the vast treasure in Hydrabad when captured."

The high characters of Major M'Pherson, Major Blenkins, and Captain Bazete have never been impeached, the capture of Hydrabad was executed with perfect order, and my own conviction is that everything found was scrupulously accounted for: and so entirely has this been the opinion of the army, that not even Dr. Buist, or Lieut.-Colonel Outram, have yet dared to impeach the honour of the prize agents.

The value of a Company's rupee is two shillings, that of a Scinde rupee considerably less. 127,93,184 Rs. is therefore little more than a million and a quarter pounds sterling, and yet the ladies took away two millions and left nearly a million to be divided as prize money! This singular statement appears in a grave argumentative letter to the president of the board of controul. It was intended to mislead authority, not to practice on English credulity only, as so many others seem to have been.

M'Murdo went to Bombay, as I thought to see Charlie off, but I now find it was to thrash Buist; happily he first consulted Holland the lawyer as to the consequence, and on his advice relinquished his intention: Montagu is so fierce when his blood is up, that he would probably have gone further than mere beating, and even taken life.—Vol. iv. 42, 43.

There was just as little danger of the thrashing as of the homicide even if HOLLAND had not been consulted. Men disposed for strong measures are not much more likely to consult a lawyer, than to apply to a justice of the peace. I was at Bombay perfectly well known to be at all times quite ready to see my friends, and meet all my responsibilities, and accordingly I was never called upon by any of your kin or champions. When valour threatened to wax intemperate a lawyer was applied to, and valour was told "it had better not" and obeyed.

March 1847.—(66). I have asked Mr. Clerk to order the law officers to prosecute the Bombay Times for a villanous article; if he won't or can't, the libellous article shall go to Hobhouse, or Hardinge. As to Jacob, he has certainly abused me, yet that may have been temper of the moment; he thinks Outram the first of military men, and says he may indeed be inferior to the duke, but far beyond Napoleon!—Vol. iv. 45.

March 1847.—(67). The arrival of Nusseer Khan's body, backed by all the efforts of the Bombay Times, did not create the least sensation among the people of Scinde, which was the object of the whole manœuvre.—Vol. iv. 45.

I have no idea what the article referred to was. But why always apply to the Governor to prosecute? Mr. Clerk could do nothing excepting in form of law: Sir Charles could have gone into the Supreme Court without his assistance. The Governor

could only consult the advocate-general, who doubtless would have told him that there was no ground for an action. I was in England from July till December, 1845, quite within the reach of the law, and open to meet a prosecution. This fact, with my place of residence, was known to you from the replies to your attacks on me published in the newspapers, which were first taken up by you when you knew I had left for India. The English publishers of the *Bombay Times*, Messrs. Smith, Elder, and Co., at all times liable for anything actionable appearing in that journal, were always at hand. These constant confessions of a desire to "thrash" or to prosecute a journalist whose only fault was that he discussed public questions honestly, fearlessly, and on information so exact as to be believed by you and Sir Charles, to proceed from authority, are surely sad acknowledgments of imbecility.

January, 1849.—(68). I am told that Buist is the correspondent of the *Times*, and gets £500 a-year.—Vol. iv. 144.

I do not believe Sir Charles was ever told anything of the sort. From 1840, the *Times*, the *Morning Chronicle*, the *Morning Herald*, and the *Morning Post*, had all correspondents in Bombay, and they were all perfectly well known. As they did not give their names to the world, I have no right to reveal them. I never was "correspondent of the *Times*;" that journal, since I went to Bombay, has had five or six correspondents in succession, all men of accomplishment and ability, save one, whose services were dispensed with, and he was assisted by one of the ablest writers in India, but not a resident at the presidency.

January, 1851.—(69). "Men of the 78th," he said, "I have not had the pleasure of seeing you since you suffered so fearfully at Sukkur, and consequently have not had an opportunity of telling you publicly and to your faces, that an infamous falsehood was propagated, respecting your march to Sukkur by the lying papers of India. They stated that I ordered you to march to Sukkur at the most unhealthy season of the year! That was an infamous lie, men of the 78th!" The observations of the gallant veteran had by this time excited the deepest interest and attention on the part of all the officers present, and they crowded thickly around him. Observing this, he said, "Stand back, gentlemen, stand back, and let the band hear what I have to say." Then continuing, "I marched you at a healthy season of the year, and when attacked by the fever you were in barracks. The proof of this is, that the European artillery, who did not quit their barracks, who never marched at all, who had been two years stationed at Bombay, these European artillery men I say, were more unhealthy than you were.

"Men of the 78th Highlanders! I tell you men, I tell you on your parade," —here the general threw his hands together with a most expressive gesture— "I tell you that this vile story of the march is an infamous, a damnable, a worse than damnable lie! And I wish and request you all to tell your com-

rades what I say. I saw you embark at Sukkur, and the state you were then in was enough to break any soldier's heart; but the low lying papers of India never broke my heart—they never will, and they may go to ——!"—Vol. iv. 313.

I have fully replied to all this already (see page 34), and I give the preceding quotation to show with what emphasis the victor of Meeanee could state what he knew to be untrue. Sir Charles says here that he marched them at the healthy season of the year, and when attacked by fever they were in barracks. He has stated that the sickly season (vol. iii. 204) is in September and the first half of October, but that the 78th remained in excellent health until the 1st November. I have shown from official documents that must have been in his hands that the troops were marched from Kurrachee on the 20th of August, 1844; that they were exposed on the river at the season he knew to be most deadly; that they reached barracks in September, when a third of them were immediately attacked, a large number having been taken ill on the way. I leave the world to determine who it was that indulged in the "damnable falsehoods" here ascribed to the *Bombay Times*. You were not perhaps aware that the Manockjee Limjee, who gave the native entertainment, was a proprietor of the *Bombay Times*, and at the time I was most severe on Sir Charles, one of the committee of management.

July, 1851.—(70). "All Bombay knew Willoughby was a proprietor of the *Bombay Times*: there can be neither doubt nor proof of it. Many times I was told that Buist attended Willoughby's house daily for orders, and for Willoughby's own articles: all Bombay said so, and his brother-in-law, Dr. Kennedy, was certainly a proprietor, and a frequent contributor. I do not think they dare deny this."—Vol. iv. 332.

Sir Charles has by this time forgotten that he had before described Kennedy as his friend (page 44), and made him the medium of communicating with me on the Emaum Ghaur affair. As may be seen from the list already given (page 21), Dr. Kennedy never was a proprietor of the *Bombay Times*. By the passenger list it will be seen that he left India in April, 1843, nearly a twelvemonth before the Napier discussion began; Sir Charles not having been known as the author of the conquest, or as being more than the instrument of the Governor-general in the matter, until the appearance of the second Blue Book in April, 1844. As already stated, Mr. Willoughby never wrote a line for the *Bombay Times*. I never waited at his house or office on any single occasion to receive his wishes, and recognised the control of no one whatever over what appeared

in the journal which I have now for seventeen years conducted. Any one acquainted with the topography of Bombay, would see the perfect absurdity of the imputation against me. From 1842 to April, 1845, I was in charge of the government observatory, nearly three miles from the places referred to, which were not even on my way to office. I was from May, 1845, in Europe, until February, 1846, when I took up my abode six miles from the secretariat, for the sake of being able to bring into existence a reformatory school of industry, a task of infinite labour, but so entirely successful that two native gentlemen have just subscribed between them £5,000 for its support. I venture to say that no human being in Bombay, or out of it, ever dreamt of making an assertion so perfectly absurd as that quoted by Sir Charles Napier.

I have confined myself to the misstatements with which I am personally concerned; they form a very small proportion, indeed, of those your work contains. I know of no book in modern times that so abounds with the most pitiable prevarications as that which is the joint production of two lieutenant-generals in the Queen's service, and of which one colonel of the 22nd is the author, and a previous one the subject.

In the preceding analysis I have pointed out some hundred misstatements, many of them made in the clear and distinct knowledge of how the circumstances you have misrepresented actually stood; in reference to all of them the means of enlightenment were within easy reach of you. The only apology that can be offered where your guilt assumes its mildest form was, that you asserted at haphazard slanderous statements you had no reason whatever to believe true, much to suppose the opposite, which have been shown to be without the shadow of foundation, and which you took no pains to investigate.

Was it quite worthy of the dignity of history in the memoir of one "who never tarnished his name by shameful deed; of one who subdued distant nations by his valour, and governed them so wisely that English rule was reverenced and loved, where it had been before feared and execrated," (see preface, vol. i.) to make it subject of discussion where an individual so humble as myself, represented by you as something worse than humble, dined? who were his friends and associates, what his sayings at table, what his occupations in life, what his antecedents?—even if better informed on matters so little momentous and so fearfully wide of any subject under discussion, than you appear to have been.

My only fault, even on your own showing, was that in faithfully and fearlessly discharging the duties of a profession which has in England earned for those connected with it the designation of the "fourth estate," and which, at times, shows itself too powerful for the other three, I censured from the first, and long before I dreamt who was its author, a line of policy all men now concur in condemning, and which, from the elaborateness with which from the outset he endeavours to excuse it, Sir Charles obviously felt from the outset to be wrong. Though it was so, that every line written in condemnation of the measures in

1843, of which I long believed your brother the executor only, emanated from a single pen, you had no means of knowing that that was mine, and no right to attack me by name, as you have done, apart from the journal I conducted. It was with the *Bombay Times*, and the *Bombay Times* alone you had to deal, and when its assertions or its arguments were under consideration, common usage, as well as decency, forbade all allusion to the writer, real or supposed. From your having followed the course you have done, I am left to assume that my facts and reasonings having proved unassailable, you have endeavoured to avenge yourselves upon me by personality; threats of broomsticks and lawsuits, slander and abuse, were the weapons you resorted to, when no others were available. At the time Sir Charles complains of the want of a power of attorney to enable him to prosecute me (page 42, July 1845), you and he both knew that I was in London, and within your reach without the necessity of any intervening authority.

I have said you have been unfortunate in the date of the appearance of your late work; the misfortune is confined to the writer and his hero; at no time could it have been placed before the public at large with more hope of advantage to the nation.

We have just been discussing the privileges of the press, distinguished in the present age by the amount and variety of talent it employs, the loftiness of its views and purity of its tone, and the service it renders to the state, and considering the propriety of permitting junior officers to reflect in print on the conduct of their seniors. It has just been shown, that in a country such as ours, the most perfect freedom of intercourse between public servants and the press, in so far as this is not directly injurious to the service, is of the greatest possible importance to the welfare of the commonwealth, and this is now demanded by the sovereign people, whom the civil service as well as the army must obey. Your brother furnishes an example of a man who was all his life engaged in abusing his superiors, whose work on the Ionian Islands is one of the most scurrilous in print, but who the moment the mildest censures of his public conduct appear, turns round upon his censurers with the foulest abuse, resorts to a court of law, and threatens personal violence. The world, in want of other information, might infer from your book, that Colonel Outram,—in mildly defending himself in 1846, against a series of attacks made by yourself and your late brother, commencing in July, 1843, with an arrogant and unwarrantable demand on your

part upon him to come forward and contradict statements I had, without his knowledge, but on the best authority, made regarding his services,—had stepped out of his way to attack his superiors. It was you who were the assailants,—you who endeavoured to prevent both sides of the question from being placed before the public,—you who wished to deny an injured man the privilege of self-defence against the most gratuitous, most unwarrantable and insolent of assaults; and you, who, when you failed in compelling silence, cried out that the course of discipline and interests of subordination were being injured! It may consist with a Napier's ideas of heroism, that a man who has been unjustifiably assailed, shall have his hands tied the moment he attempts to lift them in his defence; it is not in accordance certainly with an Englishman's notions of fair play.

England understands better than she did in 1843 the value of services, of counsel, and of enlightenment, such as was then afforded by Colonel Outram. The Secretary-at-War states that the officer should be stripped of his commission who maligns the general just entering on a great enterprise. You now fall, as your brother formerly fell, under the category of those just pronounced by Lord Panmure worthy of removal from the army. I cannot, I confess, concur in the opinion expressed by that nobleman, that it can be at any time "inconvenient to inquire into misstatements" made by officers in reference to each other; nothing, as it seems to me, can be so inconvenient to the public service, or injurious to the character of the army, as to suffer men convicted of habitual prevarication to remain in the employment of the state. "Conduct unbecoming the character of an officer and a gentleman," was wont to be deemed worthy of dismissal. If falsehood is hereafter to be deemed venial, would it not be better to repeal a rule that has become obsolete, than to permit it to remain on the military code, treated as a dead letter, provided only the man who most violates it occupies the position in which it should have been most strictly observed?

At the time when the idea of a double government for India is fast becoming insupportable to the people, and a direct and intelligible responsibility to parliament is being demanded with an emphasis that will not much longer be withstood, you have shown us that it is not with a double, but with a quadruple government we have to deal. We require but to read the Blue Books of 1842, 1843, 1844, and compare them with the journal and letters of your brother, corresponding in dates with the

despatches of the Governor-general, to find that the two are diametrically opposed to each other—that while Lord Ellenborough had determined on peace, Sir Charles Napier was resolved on conquest; that at a time supreme authority specially desired to avoid extension of territory, pronounced it an insanity to dream of pushing our frontier beyond the Indus, the fragment desired to be estranged from the Ameers, being intended for the chief of Bhawulpure—a subordinate had determined that within the year, Scinde from side to side, end to end, should be British ground, and that subordinate, by withholding the information it was his first duty to have forwarded to his chief, accomplished the ends he desired—ends which the Governor-general had forbidden, and which England ever since has blushed for and deplored. Up to this date (1843) the object of the Governor-general was, according to his own showing, the pacification of Scinde; and, so anxious was he that nothing should be done to irritate, that he had intimated his desire to abandon all idea of tribute, and accept the cession of a moderate amount of territory instead. He was anxious not so much as to push the supplies of firewood for our own steamers to an extent that might annoy, When your brother threatened to press so severely on the Ameers as to drive them into violence, Lord Ellenborough authorised the terms of the treaty to be altered. Your brother, so early as October, 1842, in defiance of all the positions laid down by supreme authority, intimates his purpose of conquering the country within the year; and, with an infatuation, and an ignorance of the people wholly without example, ordered the Bengal troops to ascend the Sutlej to Ferozopore, and H.M. 41st to embark for Europe, when he himself was on his march to Hydrabad, with less than 3,000 men under his command, with the object now confessed of deposing the Ameers, and securing their dominions —the extinction of a dynasty, and annexation of a kingdom, which, according to your account, had 50,000 armed men in the field eager for the fray, being expected to be accomplished without a battle!

According to the best information, as yet within our reach, the present deplorable mutinies have mainly been occasioned by our late numerous annexations. The first and most scandalous of all was that of Scinde, of which the conquest of the Punjaub was the natural and necessary consequence. The whole of your book, from first to last, abounds with the strongest recommendations to the British government to seize, with or without an excuse, every native state within the limits of Hindostan.

Your brother loses no opportunity of denouncing the imbecility which suffers a native prince to reign, and the book containing these recommendations of wholesale plunder, with half a million of square miles yet to annex, and 400,000 native troops to defend them, makes its appearance at a time when we find we have pushed annexation so far, that the policy you desire to see extended already imperils the empire.

In your attempts to excuse the blundering of the despatch of H.M. 78th from Kurrachee in the end of August, 1844, so that they must unnecessarily have been exposed to the most malarious portion of the atmosphere of Scinde, which your brother correctly states to be within ten miles of the river, at a season which he with equal truth mentions as the most deadly, you have afforded us another gleam of light which the world at the present juncture will be glad to take advantage. Lord Ellenborough, in permitting the commencement of the war, much more in promulgating the sentence of annexation, without the cognizance or sanction of the home authorities, had violated a whole series of Acts of Parliament. The creation of a new governorship without authority, was as illegal as the invasion or the conquest, and ought to have been visited by the instant recal of both the culprits. Your brother was installed in a new office, which had, against all law, been purposely created for him, of which the powers and privileges could not be defined. He was thus, in a fit of caprice, in the face of his own avowed information on the subject, in defiance of all warning, enabled to plunge a European regiment into a sea of malaria so fatal, that the fragments that remained when they reached the shore, were only fit for the hospital. The despotic authority with which he had been so illegally and unwisely entrusted, might be exercised without the advice of any one, or any fear of responsibility, in any way he pleased. The details, as well as the results, are now before us. And all this occurs, it seems, under a system of rules, restrictions, references and records,—a machinery and combinations so complex and cumbrous, that progress in the right direction becomes almost impossible—unlimited as is the velocity with which we may rush on in wrong-doing. Well may Manchester ask,—"Who governs India?" and pause till Lancashire is as desolate as the sandy plains of Scinde before receiving a reply.

Matters seem in no way to have improved since 1843. We are just concluding a war with Persia, which those best acquainted with the subject and the country—Sir Henry Rawlinson amongst others—shows us ought never to have been begun, and have

given up by treaty the point which involved us in the war,—the sanctuary of the British residency. We have ordered our armies to remain behind at a season and position where they can be of no use, and may be decimated by disease. It is only by the braving of responsibilities that Sir James Outram has sent back the European troops to India just in time to relieve the difficulties your brother's policy as conqueror of Scinde, and neglect as commander-in-chief, to abolish high-caste enlistments and seniority promotions, tended to create. India has to pay a couple of millions for the solution of a question in which she never was consulted, in which she has no interest whatever, or if any, an interest on the side of peace,—and this at a time when a deficiency of two millions is increased by a loss of at least two millions more occasioned by the mutiny;—a seventh being thus added in a single season to her debts. In 1856, we send an Admiral to command the naval portion of the Persian expedition, in the teeth of an express and positive order of the Court of Directors, not seven years old, that he, as Superintendent of the Indian navy, should on no account, and under no pretext whatever, quit the presidency, and whose first exploit is to ground his fleet, and to fire so high as to keep our own troops from advancing on the fort they meant to take, winding up by firing on a friendly tribe. And all this is done in the recollection, fully recalled as a warning, that it was a Commodore in the royal navy who brought on the Burmese war, by seizing, without occasion, and in defiance of the Governor-general, a Burmese royal ship that was not in his way, and just as another royal navy Admiral gives us the war in China. Confusion worse confounded than this seems impossible; of course, as in the case of H.M. 78th, no one was responsible, and the same round of folly will follow, with no one to blame.

It is now for the first time that all these facts are fully brought before us by the publication of your brother's letters. Hitherto the belief has been that the conflict which Sir Charles Napier professed himself anxious to avoid, was the result of the indiscreet violence with which the ratification of the treaties of 1842 was urged by him. It now appears from your book that the treaties were in your brother's eyes delusions, their ratification or their refusal matters of non-account. He wanted Scinde, the whole of Scinde, and nothing but Scinde, and its prize money; and supposed that to a measure so moderate no resistance would be offered by its rulers or its people!

Peace or war, robbery or abstinence from plunder in India, are, as it will thus be seen, occasionally not only beyond the

control of the India house, India board, and Governor-general, but may sometimes be in the hands of one who, both as strategist and politician, sets at defiance every rule of common sense and common honesty. These are, indeed, momentous revelations, and they come before the world at a most momentous crisis. The £6,000,000 sterling the swamps and sands of the Indus have since 1844 absorbed, doubled by the amount of interest since then accruing on it, is exactly the sum required for the redemption of the dividends, and the rescue of India from that position of extreme insecurity she at present occupies. The sum would have given us just two thousand miles of railway, anticipated the wants of Lancashire, diminished the drain on Europe for specie, and rendered a mutiny impossible.

Lord Ellenborough, carried away by the glare of triumph and shouts of victory, having sanctioned that which he had most positively forbidden, proceeded next, in violation of successive acts of parliament, to add to our dominions (proclamation, 5th March 1843) without the reference to England he was bound by the oaths of office and acts of parliament to make—a province which he described to be "fertile as Egypt," and which speedily proved as sickly as Sierra Leone. You thus once more show us, that besides having to deal with, or endeavour to comprehend the mysterious doings of the India House, or Board of Control, we may occasionally have a Governor-general acting in defiance of both, rewarded by the sovereign for doing that which his ministerial superior condemns, with an adventurous and needy general officer, defying supreme authority, reversing the policy we profess to have prescribed for ourselves, rewarded by a magnificent fortune and the thanks of parliament for that which should have occasioned his dismissal.

The world which, by common consent, had on the grounds of his gallantry as a soldier, and force as a writer, agreed to rank Sir Charles Napier amongst its heroes, must lament the dispulsion of the delusion you have accomplished, and sorrow over the shipwreck a brother has made of a brother's name. While no one dreams of interfering with the laurels won at Meeance and Dubba, you have shown us that, while claiming credit for an extraordinary insight into the character of the people, Sir Charles Napier expected to conquor Scinde without a battle—that he actually sent his auxiliaries away when most requiring them, and rushed into conflict with a force ten times the strength of his own, without necessity, without a reserve, without the means of retiring or feeding his troops, in case of

a reverse, and when the fate of an army and safety of an empire were made to hang upon the life of an individual.

The right to depart from all the old traditions, usages, and plans on which the several administrations of the East had for two centuries been conducted, was supported by claims of a superhuman power that could discover by intuition what others learned by long experience, and an infallibility which needed neither example nor instruction. It turned out in reality that the revenues of Scinde fell off from the moment it came into our possession.*—that in the haphazard paroxysm of violence and haste, which your brother deemed energy and vigour, there was neither method nor system, plan nor purpose. The present distinguished commissioner, Mr. Frere, required at starting to commence with surveys and assessments—an intelligible plan of raising the revenue and keeping the accounts. By your brother's method of accounting you were able to show a balance of some £200,000 in favour of the imperial treasury, whereas in reality there was about double

* "Thrown into confusion by war, and suddenly abandoned by the revenue officials of the old government, the country was immediately subsequent to the conquest parcelled out into three collectorates, and entrusted to three military officers wholly untrained in revenue management. Even when constituted civil administrators of areas, varying from 15,000 to 27,000 square miles each, these officers were not absolved from military responsibilities or from military control. As magistrates, their judicial cases were subjected to a military commission. The police, in lieu of being placed in subordinate co operation with the magistrates, were a recognised check on him, and were frequently in direct and open antagonism with his proceedings. Nor was it until a revision of salaries and establishments was carried out in the years 1852-53 that regular and permanent revenue establishments were entertained. At that period many of the native *employés* were still only temporarily engaged, and were remunerated in grain. No adequate fiscal offices had been erected. No proper or uniform system of accounts had been introduced. The record of demands and realizations was very imperfect. No regular district accounts were kept. No registry of, or investigation into, the proprietary rights in the soil had been commenced. All hereditary village offices, emoluments, and accounts were ignored, and not even the roughest descripton of revenue survey and settlement had been attempted. Added to this that a pernicious system of *forced or statute labour* everywhere sapped the sources of wealth, and disgusted the minds of the people; that the revenue was collected in grain by actual division of crop; that this grain was then sold by reserved auction at *artificially high and sometimes* even at *famine prices by the government as the great grain dealers of the country:* that the natural condition of the market, thus directly interfered with by government, was yet farther forced by the circumstance of the commissariat drawing the grain required for the troops at nominal prices from the government grain stores, and it will not be difficult to understand the fiscal and financial condition of Sindh prior to the revision of its administration in 1852."—*Homeward Mail.*

this sum against it; the system pursued being that which has of late found favour with the Tipperary and Royal British Banks. If others have relieved you of the task of demonstrating the advent of results so unhappy as these I have adverted to, you have shown that under the circumstances of the case they were inevitable. You have proved to us that Sir Charles, in place of being able to master at a glance the mysteries of Oriental financialship and diplomacy, could never throughout the whole of his career contrive to comprehend the simple and familiar forms on which the business of the government he served was conducted. From not knowing the rules of the road your brother was perpetually getting run into by those who did, and misconstruing accidental collision, for which he was to blame, into intentional insult, to the fearful impediment of public business and the destruction of all harmonious proceeding.

The world is so greatly obliged to you for the expositions on these points you have given us, just when they were most required, that your other errors will perhaps be forgiven you. Your misstatements have at length become so monstrous as to deprive them of the powers of evil they might have possessed if less incredible. The demonstrations you have supplied that the control England believes to be exercised over India is a delusion and a snare, and that your brother's claims on fame were based on the boldness with which a daring, needy, and unscrupulous soldier defied the government he served, when bent upon the replenishment of an empty purse, are at the present juncture invaluable to us.

Your obedient servant,

GEORGE BUIST.

7, Sussex Place,
New Kensington, August, 1857.

☞ Since the preceding pages were printed, a paper has been presented, by order of Parliament, on the Land Revenues of India, from which the following is an extract. It fully explains the allusion in page 46 in the pamphlet, and shows that it was Sir Charles Napier, here as elsewhere, and not the *Bombay Times*, that made the misstatement. The parliamentary paper seems nearly a transcript of the official intimation sent formerly, and not, as asserted by mistake of the clerk, to the Governor of Scinde, in 1846. This revelation places us again under an obligation to you. It shows that not only may we have war and conquest in India, prosecuted against all authority, but we may have cooked accounts, grain raised by monopoly to famine prices, transit duties under the most obnoxious form of taxation, without any one having the power to punish or prevent it.

In Sind, not many years ago, the revenue throughout was collected in grain by actual division of the crop; the grain was then sold by reserved auction, at artificially high, and sometimes even at famine, prices by the Government, as the great grain dealers of the country. The natural condition of the market, thus directly interfered with by the Government, was yet further forced by the circumstance of the Commissariat drawing the grain required for the troops at *nominal* prices from the Government grain stores. Great progress has been made in superseding this objectionable system by cash assessments, which have been already introduced into several districts of the Province. In the Shikarpoor Collectorate generally, but in Larkhana particularly, the advantages of a light and fairly distributed cash assessment have been most marked and beneficial. The tax payers are contented, and the Government demand is readily responded to.

ERRATA.

For the sake of expedition and the conveniency of correcting the proofs, I at first employed a printer who resided near me at Kensington, who, after very great loss of time, was found unable to complete the task assigned to him, when it was committed to the charge of another, at a time too near that of my return to India to permit the whole to be reprinted. The first fifty pages are so covered with errata that I shall not meddle with mere typographical errors, but shall confine myself to corrections where the blunders tend to mislead, leaving the others in the readers' hands.

Page 5, line 11 from bottom, for "I should I have no doubt shared," *read* "I should I have no doubt have shared."
„ 17, „ 3 from top, for "I restricted myself to the latter," *read* "I restricted myself to the former."
„ 18, „ 19 from top, for "forgotten the words he here puts," *read* "forgotten the words he puts."
„ 19, „ 1 "And that he was too sternly upright," *read* "And though he was too sternly upright."
„ 21, „ 23 from bottom, for "returned in May, 1844, "*read* "returned in January, 1844."
„ 24, „ 4 from top, for "march on Scinde," *read* "march on Sukkir."
„ 25, „ 17 from top, for "afterwards conditioned by him," *read* "afterwards condoned by him,"
„ 29, „ 11 from bottom, for "Emaunghur," *read* "Emaum Ghaur."
„ 29, „ 8 from bottom, for "Ferorpore," *read* "Ferozopore."
„ 36, „ 16 from bottom, for "convinced," *read* "convicted."
„ 42, „ 3 from top, for "Sir Harry M'Mahon," *read* "Sir Thomas M'Mahon."
„ 44, „ 15 from bottom, for "India flotilla," *read* "Indus flotilla."
„ 45, „ at bottom of page, for "within his reach and it was stated," *read* "within his reach it was stated."
„ 46, „ 7 from top, for "Sir Jonn Malcom," *read* "Sir John Malcolm."
„ 46, „ 24 from bottom, for "Lord Dalhouse," *read* "Lord Dalhousie." For "Lord Cuming," *read* "Lord Canning."

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